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Note	  on	  Spelling	  and	  Names	  	  	  Names	  and	   foreign	  words	   in	   this	  dissertation	  are	   transliterated	   from	  (primarily)	  two	  languages:	  Russian	  and	  Tajik,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  written	  in	  Cyrillic	  characters.	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   Russian	   words	   and	   names,	   the	   standard	   US	   Library	   of	   Congress	  transliteration	   scheme	   is	   used,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   proper	   names	   with	  established	  English	  spellings	  (for	  example	  “Yeltsin,”	  not	  “El’tsin”).	  	  For	  Tajik,	  which	  lacks	  an	  agreed	  upon	  standard	   for	   transliteration	   into	  Latin	  characters,	  a	  slightly	  modified	   version	   of	   the	   Library	   of	   Congress	   scheme	  has	   been	   chosen	   to	   balance	  between	  the	  phonetics	  of	   the	   language	  and	  ease	  of	  reading	   in	  English.	   	  For	   those	  characters	   in	  Tajik	  not	  covered	  by	   the	  Library	  of	  Congress	  Russian	  standard,	   the	  following	  table	  has	  been	  employed:	  	  
Cyrillic	   Latin	  
ғ	   gh	  
ӣ	   y	  
қ	   q	  
ӯ	   u	  
ҳ	   h	  
ҷ	   j	  
ъ	   ''	  	  The	   spellings	   of	   toponyms	   and	   proper	   names	   have	   also	   changed	   extensively	   in	  Tajikistan	  since	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  southern	  Tajik	  city	  of	  Kulyab	   has	   since	   1991	   become	   “Kulob,”	   and	   many	   politicians	   and	   others	   have	  dropped	   the	   Soviet	   –ov	   ending	   from	   their	   last	   names	   (“Usmonov,”	   for	   example,	  becoming	   “Usmon”).	   	  For	   the	  sake	  of	   consistency,	   this	  dissertation	  has	  chosen	   to	  use	  the	  place	  and	  proper	  names	  employed	  by	  individuals	  and	  government	  bodies	  during	   the	  period	  of	   study.	   	   For	   this	   reason	   the	   city	   in	   the	   south	  of	  Tajikistan	   is	  consistently	  spelled	  “Kulyab”	  in	  the	  dissertation,	  and	  names	  are	  listed	  as	  per	  their	  contemporary,	   rather	   than	   later,	   spelling.	   	  Where	  multiple	   versions	   of	   one	  name	  are	  contemporaneously	  used,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  opposition	  politician	  Tohir	  Abdujabbor,	   who	   during	   perestroika	   interchangeably	   signed	   his	   last	   name	  “Abdujabbor,”	   “Abdujabborov,”	   and	   “Abdudzhabborov,”	   the	  most	   common	   usage	  has	  been	  chosen	  as	  the	  standard	  for	  this	  dissertation.	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Chapter	  One	  
Introduction	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  complicated	  story.	   	  At	   least,	   it	   is	  not	  as	  complicated	  a	  story	  as	  it	  has	  often	  been	  rendered.	   	   In	  1985,	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  assumed	   the	   leadership	  of	   the	  Communist	   Party	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   (CPSU)	   and	   the	   Union	   of	   Soviet	   Socialist	  Republics	   (USSR).	   	   Still	   the	   second	   of	   the	   world’s	   two	   superpowers,	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  of	  which	  Gorbachev	  took	  leadership	  was	  facing	  slow	  but	  steady	  declines	  in	  economic	   growth	   rates	   and	   an	   increasingly	   ambivalent	   populace.	   	   Faith	   in	   the	  Soviet	   project	   was	   ebbing,	   and	   Gorbachev	   set	   about	   to	   reform	   the	   system	  economically	  and	  politically.	  	  Initially	  these	  reforms	  were	  focused	  on	  the	  economy:	  Gorbachev	   believed	   that	   by	   increasing	   incentives	   for	   Soviet	   enterprises	   and	  individuals	   to	   pursue	   market-­‐like	   competitive	   behavior	   both	   the	   production	   of	  consumer	  goods	  and	  the	  overall	  economy	  would	  increase	  significantly.	  	  	  When	  his	  reforms	  failed	  bring	  about	  the	  desired	  outcomes,	  and	  instead	  led	  to	  dissatisfaction	  within	   the	   CPSU,	   Gorbachev	   turned	   his	   attention	   to	   the	   Party,	   initiating	   reforms	  that	  ultimately	  broke	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  70-­‐year	  grip	  on	  power.	  Together,	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  reforms	  led	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  to	  decline	  precipitously	  and	  Soviet	  society	  to	   fracture.	   	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1991	  the	  entire	  USSR	  had	  disintegrated,	  collapsing	   into	   15	   independent	   republics.	   	   Violence	   began	   to	   spark	   and	   fester	  around	   its	   edges,	   such	   as	   in	   Tajikistan,	  where	   a	   five-­‐year	   civil	  war	   (1992-­‐1997)	  would	  subsequently	  explode.	  	  While	   this	   is	   something	  of	  an	  oversimplification,	   it	   remains	  a	  clear	  outline	  of	   the	  history	  of	   “perestroika,”	  as	  Gorbachev’s	   reforms	  and	   the	  period	  of	  his	   leadership	  have	  come	  to	  be	  known.	  	  In	  the	  years	  since	  1991,	  however,	  this	  clarity	  has	  in	  many	  ways	   been	   lost.	   	   The	   link	   between	   Gorbachev’s	   economic	   reforms	   and	   the	  immediate	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  has	  been	  questioned,	  and	  the	  decline	  of	  the	   Soviet	   economy	   has	   been	   characterized	   as	   “inevitable.”	   Rather	   than	   see	   the	  political	   reforms	   of	   perestroika	   leading	   to	   social	   upheaval	   and	   societal	   collapse,	  many	   authors	   have	   sought	   the	   sources	   of	   Soviet	   collapse	   in	   earlier	   periods	   of	  history,	  whether	  the	  national	  delimitation	  of	  Soviet	  republics	  in	  the	  1920s,	  the	  long	  “stagnation”	  of	  the	  Brezhnev	  era,	  or	  the	  overstretch	  of	  the	  USSR	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  	  This	  has	  had	  the	  consequence	  of	  obscuring	  the	  period	  immediately	  prior	  to	  the	   Soviet	   collapse	   –	   that	   is,	   perestroika	   itself.	   	   	   As	   a	   result,	   Gorbachev’s	   failed	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attempt	   to	   reform	   the	   economy	   and	  polity	   of	   the	  USSR	   is	   judged	  not	   on	   its	   own	  terms	  and	  for	  the	  results,	  good	  and	  ill,	  that	  it	  brought	  about.	   	  Instead	  perestroika	  becomes	  a	  failed	  attempt	  to	  overcome	  the	  long-­‐term	  baggage	  of	  Soviet	  history.	  	  In	  this	   reading	   of	   history,	   when	   the	   inexorable	   collapse	   came,	   it	   was	   at	   least	   a	  triumph	  for	  the	  West	  (and	  thus	  democracy	  and	  freedom),	  and	  a	  peaceful	  end	  to	  the	  era	  of	  superpower	  rivalry.	  	  This	   narrative,	   however,	   obscures	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  what	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	  USSR	  meant	  for	  millions	  of	  its	  citizens.	  	  For	  a	  great	  many,	  this	  was	  the	  end	  of	  all	  things:	  the	  loss	  of	  employment,	  a	  regular	  income,	  and	  the	  basic	  ability	  to	  feed	  one’s	  family.	  	  It	  also	  quickly	  became	  a	  period	  of	  extremes	  and	  violence,	  as	  economic	  downturn	  bled	  into	  social	  upheaval	  and	  disorder.	  	  This,	  moreover,	  is	  a	  story	  that	  the	  simpler	  narrative	  can	  tell.	  	  As	  more	  and	  more	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  stopped	  functioning	  as	  the	   result	   of	  Gorbachev’s	   reforms,	   Soviet	   citizens	  became	   increasingly	   frustrated	  with	  their	  standard	  of	  living.	   	  Political	  reforms	  subsequently	  opened	  up	  space	  for	  demonstrations	  and	  public	  protest,	  and	  across	  the	  USSR,	  groups	  came	  together	  to	  demand	   change.	   	   This	   was	   often	   interpreted	   by	   Gorbachev	   and	   those	   who	  supported	  him	  as	  demands	  for	  more	  reform,	  and	  in	  fact	  sometimes	  they	  were.	  	  But	  the	   impetus	   for	   these	   demands	   remained	   the	   disintegrating	   state	   of	   the	   Soviet	  economy	  and	  its	  underlying	  social	  fabric.	  	  As	  much	  as	  protests	  were	  against	  the	  old	  Soviet	  order,	  they	  were	  against	  the	  new	  reformed	  order	  as	  well.	  	  	  	  This	   dissertation	   represents	   an	   attempt	   to	   return	   to	   a	   clearer	   narrative	   of	  perestroika	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  It	  does	  so,	  somewhat	  counterintuitively,	  by	  refocusing	  attention	  away	   from	  Moscow	  and	  towards	   the	   far	  periphery	  of	   the	  USSR	  in	  Dushanbe,	  Tajikistan.	   	  Rather	  than	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  reforms	   were	   developed	   and	   passed	   within	   a	   small	   circle	   of	   economists	   and	  politicians	   in	  Moscow,	   it	  also	  considers	  how	  these	  reforms	  were	  implemented	  on	  the	  ground	  far	  away.	   	  By	  investigating	  the	  practical	  implementation	  of	  reforms	  in	  Tajikistan,	   moreover,	   it	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   application	   of	   reform	   differed	   in	  many	  ways	   from	  both	  Moscow’s	   initial	   intention	  and	   its	   later	  assumptions	  about	  how	  the	  reforms	  were	  being	  implemented.	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Working	  with	  the	  case	  study	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republic	  (Tajik	  SSR),	  this	  dissertation	  argues	  that	  the	  social	  disorder	  and	  violence	  that	  erupted	  around	  the	  margins	   of	   the	  USSR	  were	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   period	   of	   reform	   that	   preceded	  them.	   	   	   Economic	   data	   from	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   clearly	   shows	   that	   economic	   reforms	  were	  being	  applied	  as	  early	  as	  1987,	  and	  that	  these	  reforms	  quickly	  led	  to	  a	  sharp	  downturn	   in	   production.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   they	   allowed	   Soviet	   enterprises	   to	  slowly	   siphon	   off	   funds	   into	   the	   growing	   cooperative	   business	   sector,	   export	  painfully	   needed	   consumer	   goods,	   and	   make	   a	   very	   small	   number	   of	   nascent	  entrepreneurs	  very	  rich.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  population,	  however,	  found	  over	  the	  same	  period	  that	  their	  earnings	  and	  chances	  of	  holding	  a	  job	  decreased	  while	  the	  cost	   of	   living	   and	   inflation	   increased.	   	   	   On	   this	   backdrop,	   Moscow	   continued	   to	  aggressively	   push	   for	   political	   reforms,	   which	   initially	   found	   little	   traction	   in	  Tajikistan.	   	  Once	   the	  economy	  had	   largely	  collapsed	   in	  1990	  and	  1991,	  however,	  the	  CPSU’s	  contradictory	  attack	  on	  its	  own	  legitimacy	  finally	  found	  a	  foothold,	  with	  new	  political	  parties,	  movements,	  and	  popular	  anger	  all	  gushing	  forth	  in	  a	  wave	  of	  unexpected	  and	  unchecked	  disorder	  and	  violence.	  	  This	  included	  riots	  in	  February	  1990	  and	  a	  final	  descent	  into	  civil	  war	  in	  April-­‐May	  1992.	  	   	  Much	  as	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  former	  USSR,	  perestroika	  found	  its	  final	  apogee	  not	  in	  peaceful	  slogans	  but	  in	  the	  crack	  of	  rifle	  shots.	   	  x	   	   x	  x	  	  This	   dissertation	   offers	   a	   challenge	   to	   much	   of	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   both	  perestroika	  and	   the	   causes	  of	   the	  Tajik	  Civil	  War.	   	   Since	   the	   final	   collapse	  of	   the	  Soviet	   Union	   in	   December	   1991,	   many	   academic	   and	   popular	   works	   have	  evaluated	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  its	  ultimate	  failure	  as	  a	  state.	  This	  has	  included	  a	  slate	  of	  new	  histories	  of	   the	  USSR	  from	  its	   inception	  to	   inglorious	  end	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  post-­‐collapse	  surveys	  of	  Soviet	  history	  have	   tended	   to	   treat	   perestroika	   and	   the	   end	   of	   the	   USSR	   as	   a	   natural	   –	   and	  perhaps	  inevitable	  –	  conclusion	  to	  a	  back-­‐and-­‐forth	  pull	  between	  authoritarianism	  and	   reform	   that	   ultimately	   exposed	   unsolvable	   flaws	   in	   the	   underlying	   Soviet	  bulwark.1	  	   This	   “structuralist”	   perspective	   has	   also	   found	   some	   reflection	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Geoffrey	   Hosking,	   A	   History	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   1917-­‐1991	   (Glasgow:	   Fontana,	   1992);	   Mary	  McAuley,	  Soviet	  Politics:	  1917-­‐1991	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1992);	  Martin	  McCauley,	  The	  
Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (London:	  Pearson	  Education,	  2008);	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny,	  The	  Soviet	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literature	   on	   the	   Soviet	   collapse	   itself.	   	   	   Especially	   in	   the	   years	   immediately	  following	  1991,	  many	  works	  were	  written	  highlighting	  one	  or	  another	  “inherent”	  flaw	   in	   the	   Soviet	   system,	   whether	   the	   impossibility	   of	   sustaining	   a	   command	  economy,2	  the	   incoherence	   of	   reforming	   an	   autocratic	   political	   system,3	  or	   the	  incongruity	  of	   the	  USSR’s	  place	   in	  a	  democratizing	  (and	   increasingly	  marketized)	  world. 4 	  	   While	   these	   works	   dealt	   with	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   reforms	  implemented	   by	  Mikhail	   Gorbachev	   and	   the	   Soviet	   leadership	   in	   the	   late	   1980s,	  they	   tended	   to	   view	   any	   particular	   changes	   as	   secondary	   to	   the	   underlying	  structural	  causes	  of	  the	  state’s	  collapse.	  	  In	  subsequent	  years,	  however,	  this	  structuralist	  explanation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  collapse	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  two	  major	  lines	  of	  criticism.	  	  As	  Valerie	  Bunce	  has	  shown,	  for	  example,	   the	  structuralist	  argument	   is	  essentially	  underdetermined:	   the	   long	  and	  successful	  development	  of	  the	  USSR	  over	  the	  20th	  century	  gives	  the	  lie	  to	  any	  claim	  about	  its	  “inherent”	  flaws.5	  	  Mark	  Beissinger,	  moreover,	  has	  effectively	  argued	  that	  claims	  about	  the	  “inevitability”	  of	  the	  Soviet	  collapse	  are	  not	  only	  teleological	  but	  also	  “meaningless,	  since	  any	  judgment	  concerning	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  Soviet	  state	  to	  survive	  cannot	  be	  extracted	  from	  the	  very	  events	  which	  caused	  the	  Soviet	  state	  to	  disintegrate	   in	   the	   first	  place.”6	  	   	  While	  structural	   flaws	   in	   the	  Soviet	  state	  can	  clearly	  be	  tracked	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  assuming	  their	  central	  place	  in	  the	  collapse	  of	  that	  state,	  as	  these	  and	  other	  critics	  have	  pointed	  out,	  makes	  an	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   kniga	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  2	  G.I.	   Khanin,	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   University	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  (Moscow:	   Novosti,	   1995),	   vol.	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   282;	   Jack	   F.	   Matlock,	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   an	   Empire:	   The	   American	  
Ambassador’s	  Account	  of	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1995).	  4	  Samuel	  P.	  Huntington,	  The	  Third	  Wave:	  Democratization	  in	  the	  Late	  Twentieth	  Century	   (Norman:	  University	  of	  Oklahoma	  Press,	  1991);	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  The	  End	  of	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  and	  the	  Last	  Man	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1992);	  S.	  Shakhrai,	  “Tri	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  novoi	  Rossii,”	  Nezavisimaia	  Gazeta,	  March	  05,	  1994;	  A.S.	  Akhiezer,	  “Samobytnost’	  Rossii	  kak	  nauchnaia	  problema,”	  Otechestvennaia	  istoriia,	  1994.	  5	  Valerie	   Bunce,	   Subversive	   Institutions:	   The	  Design	   and	   the	  Destruction	   of	   Socialism	  and	   the	   State	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  6 	  Mark	   Beissinger,	   Nationalist	   Mobilization	   and	   the	   Collapse	   of	   the	   Soviet	   State	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  5.	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essentially	   circular	  argument	   in	  which	   the	   failure	  of	   the	   state	  proves	   itself	   –	  and	  the	  immediate	  determining	  causes	  of	  any	  collapse	  are	  left	  aside.	  	  More	  contemporary	  research	  has	  considered	  the	  Soviet	  collapse	  within	  the	  context	  of	  perestroika	  and	   the	  consequences	  of	   its	   failed	  reforms.	  This	  has	  engendered	  a	  new	   standard	   narrative,	   whereby	   perestroika’s	   political	   reforms	   –	   primarily	  “glasnost”	   (openness)	   and	   political	   freedoms	   –	   are	   taken	   to	   be	   the	   determinant	  cause	   of	   the	   Soviet	   collapse,	   insofar	   as	   they	   exposed	   or	   otherwise	   revealed	   the	  latent	   structural	   flaws	   in	   the	   Soviet	   system.	   	   	   The	   purest	   form	   of	   this	   argument	  (and	   also	   its	   most	   popular)	   has	   been	   presented,	   perhaps	   unsurprisingly,	   by	  journalists	  stationed	  in	  Moscow	  during	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  who	  saw	  the	  slow	  disintegration	  of	  the	  former	  Union	  as	  the	  result	  of	  freedom	  of	  information	  simply	  overwhelming	  loyalty	  to	  the	  state.7	  	  More	  academic	  variations	  of	  this	  narrative	  can	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  particular	  focus	  –	  whether	  on	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  loss	  of	  internal	  authority	  and	  control;8	  the	  willingness	  of	  Soviet	  officials	  and	  bureaucrats	  to	   turn	   on	   the	   system	   that	   nurtured	   them;9	  the	   growth	   of	   “long	   simmering”	  nationalism	   and	   inter-­‐ethnic	   conflict;10	  the	   national-­‐republican	   structure	   of	   the	  USSR	   and	   its	   structural	   fostering	   of	   pro-­‐independence	   movements;11	  or	   certain	  republics’	  drive	  for	  sovereignty12	  –	  but	  the	  crux	  remains	  the	  same.	  	  Perestroika	  and	  glasnost	  opened	  up	  an	  opportunity	  for	   free	  expression	  and	  political	  mobilization,	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  David	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  Lenin’s	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  The	  Last	  Days	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Empire	  (New	  York:	  Vintage,	  1994).	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  Martin	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  Daedalus,	   121,	   no.	   2	   (1992);	   Z.A.	   Stankevich,	   “Sootnoshenie	  natsional’nogo	   i	   politicheskogo	   faktorov,”	   in	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   velikoi	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   natsional’noi	   vopros	   i	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   Sovetskogo	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   ed.	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   Sevost’ianov	   (Moscow:	   Izdatel’stvo	   “Sotsial’no-­‐politicheskaya	  mysl’”,	  2005);	  Stephen	  Kotkin,	  Armageddon	  Averted:	  The	  Soviet	  Collapse,	  1970-­‐2000	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Sydney	  Ploss,	  The	  Roots	  of	  Perestroika:	  The	  Soviet	  Breakdown	  in	  Historical	  
Context	  (Jefferson,	  N.C.:	  McFarland	  &	  Co,	  2010).	  	  9	  Stephen	   Handelman,	   Comrade	   Criminal:	   the	   Theft	   of	   the	   Second	   Russian	   Revolution	   (London:	  Michael	  Joseph,	  1994),	  esp.	  81-­‐92;	  David	  M.	  Kotz	  and	  Fred	  Weir,	  Revolution	  from	  above:	  The	  demise	  
of	   the	   Soviet	   System	   (London:	   Routledge,	   1997);	   Stephen	   Solnick,	   Stealing	   the	   State:	   Control	   and	  
Collapse	   in	   Soviet	   Institutions	   (Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   1998);	   Bunce,	   Subversive	  
Institutions.	  10	  Beissinger,	  Nationalist	  Mobilization;	   Ronald	   Grigor	   Suny,	   The	  Revenge	   of	   the	   Past:	   Nationalism,	  
Revolution,	  and	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  USSR	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  11	  Victor	  Zaslavsky,	  “Nationalism	  and	  Democratic	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  in	  Postcommunist	  Societies,”	  Daedalus,	  121,	  no.	  2	  (1992);	  Edward	  W.	  Walker,	  Dissolution:	  Sovereignty	  and	  the	  Breakup	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Lanham:	  Rouman	  &	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  Gerner	   and	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   Routledge,	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which	   led	   to	   a	   collapse	   of	   centralized	   control	   and	   ultimately	   guaranteed	   the	  system’s	  failure.	  	  
	  This	   body	   of	   literature	   has	   greatly	   expanded	   the	   study	   of	   perestroika,	   and	   it	   is	  inarguable	  that	  the	  USSR	  “spluttered	  in	  the	  face	  of	  freedom’s	  light	  wind”	  as	  Soviet	  citizens	  began	  to	  mobilize	  as	  part	  of	  political,	  nationalist	  and	  other	  movements.13	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  this	  remains	  a	  partial	  explanation.	  	  	  	  As	  Mark	  Harrison	  has	  argued,	  “The	  actions	  of	  [Soviet]	  self-­‐interested	  agents	  were	  critically	  important	  in	  tearing	  the	  state	  apart	  once	  the	  collapse	  had	  begun,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  explain	  why	  the	   collapse	   began.”14	  	   To	   understand	   why	   the	   collapse	   began,	   then,	   it	   becomes	  necessary	  to	  identify	  more	  clearly	  what	  changed	  in	  the	  USSR	  immediately	  prior.	  To	  posit	  glasnost	  as	   the	  only	  causal	  mechanism	   leads	  back	   to	  structuralist	   territory:	  Soviet	  citizens’	  motivations	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  static	  and	  inherently	  opposed	  to	  the	  Soviet	   state.	   	   When	   the	   USSR	   collapsed,	   it	   was	   not	   that	   anything	   had	   changed:	  instead	  it	  was	  only	  that	  people	  simply	  became	  capable	  of	  speaking	  their	  mind.	  	  While	  it	  may	  be	  appealing	  to	  assume	  that	  all	  Soviet	  citizens	  were	  opposed	  to	  their	  authoritarian	   government,	   available	   evidence	   is	   in	   fact	   far	  more	  mixed.	   	   As	   this	  dissertation	   will	   show,	   many	   Soviet	   citizens,	   especially	   outside	   of	   Moscow,	  continued	   to	   strongly	   believe	   in	   the	   Soviet	   project	   well	   into	   the	   late	   1980s.	  Glasnost-­‐driven	  arguments,	  moreover,	  tend	  to	  overlook	  the	  fact	  that	  structurally	  a	  great	   deal	   did	   in	   fact	   change	   during	   perestroika,	   most	   especially	   in	   the	   Soviet	  economy.	   	   Building	   upon	   leading	   research	   into	   the	   economic	   history	   of	   the	  Gorbachev	   era,	   this	   dissertation	   helps	   to	   show	   how	   the	   economic	   reforms	   of	  perestroika	  ultimately	  broke	  the	  existing	  planned	  economy	  of	  the	  USSR.15	  	  By	  1990	  and	  1991,	  changes	  in	  tax	  law	  and	  economic	  regulations,	  along	  with	  the	  legalization	  of	   private	   business,	   had	   effectively	   turned	   the	   Soviet	   economy	  upside	   down	   and	  left	  many	  millions	  of	  Soviet	  citizens	  without	  access	  to	  resources	  in	  the	  new	  system.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  V.V.	   Sogrin,	   “Perestroika:	   itogy	   i	   uroki,”	  Obschestvennie	  nauki	   i	   sovremennost’,	   16,	   no.	   1	   (1992),	  136.	  14	  Mark	   Harrison,	   "Are	   Command	   Economies	   Unstable?	  Why	   Did	   the	   Soviet	   Economy	   Collapse?"	  Paper	   to	   the	   second	   Oxford-­‐Houston	   conference	   on	   "Initial	   Conditions	   and	   Russia's	   Transitional	  Economy,"	  University	  of	  Houston,	  2001,	  6.	  15	  See	  Yakov	  Feygin.	  “The	  Making	  of	  an	  Economics	  Internationale:	  The	  Internationalization	  of	  Soviet	  Economics,	   Interdependence	   and	   the	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Détente.”	   	   Paper	   presented	   to	   the	  conference	   “Talking	   about	   economics	   in	   the	   socialist	   world,”	   University	   of	   Geneva,	   2015;	   R.G.	  Pikhoia.	  “Pochemu	  raspal’sia	  Sovetskii	  soiuz?”	   in	  Tragediia	  velikoi	  derzhavoi:	  natsional’noi	  vopros	  i	  
raspad	   Sovetskogo	   soiuza,	  ed.	   G.N.	   Sevost’ianov	   	   	   (Moscow:	   Izdatel’stvo	   “Sotsial’no-­‐politicheskaia	  mysl’”,	  2005).	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When	  the	  light	  wind	  of	  freedom	  did	  blow	  through,	  it	  picked	  up	  the	  frustrations	  of	  those	  whose	   fortunes	  had	   just	   rapidly	  declined,	   and	  knocked	  down	  an	  economic	  edifice	  far	  weaker	  than	  it	  had	  been	  in	  1985.	  	  	  Properly	  evaluating	  the	  development	  of	  popular	  anger	  and	  societal	  collapse	  during	  perestroika,	  this	  dissertation	  posits,	  demands	  moving	  outside	  of	  Moscow	  and	  the	  elite	  circles	  that	  developed	  reforms.16	  	  It	  just	  as	  equally	  requires	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  reforms	  were	  both	  implemented	   and	   perceived	   on	   the	   ground	   by	   average	   Soviet	   citizens.	   	   	   One	  particularly	   illuminating	  environment	   for	   this	   investigation,	   this	  dissertation	  also	  argues,	  is	  the	  far	  Soviet	  periphery	  of	  Dushanbe,	  Tajikistan.	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  Today,	   Tajikistan	   is	   a	   small	   landlocked	   nation	   located	   just	   to	   the	   north	   of	  Afghanistan.	   	  While	  bordering	  many	  countries,	   including	  Uzbekistan,	  Kyrgyzstan,	  and	   China,	   it	   remains	   largely	   cut	   off	   and	   inaccessible	   due	   to	   the	   high	  mountain	  ranges	  that	  occupy	  more	  than	  90%	  of	   its	   territory.	   	  During	  the	  Soviet	  period,	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	   was	   at	   once	   one	   of	   the	   Union’s	   most	   southern	   and	   least	   developed	  republics,	   often	   falling	   at	   the	   very	   bottom	   of	   Soviet	   socio-­‐economic	   surveys	  together	  with	  Turkmenistan.	   	  Given	  its	  outlying	  status,	   it	   featured	  infrequently	  in	  both	   Sovietology	   and	   central	   Soviet	   policy	   analyses,	   a	   position	   it	   has	   retained	   in	  post-­‐Soviet	   research.	   	   Like	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   Soviet	   republics	   in	   Central	   Asia,	  Tajikistan	   figures	   with	   rarity	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   Soviet	   collapse,	   most	  frequently	  arising	  as	  the	  site	  of	  nationalist	  uprising	  or	  unrest.17	  	  Comment	  has	  been	  made	  at	  times	  about	  the	  inconsistency	  of	  nationalist	  movements	  in	  the	  region,	  or	  the	   states’	   “accidental”	   independence,	   acquired	   after	   large	   majorities	   of	   their	  populations	   voted	   to	   stay	   in	   the	   USSR	   in	   1991	   and	   the	   republican	   governments	  themselves	   made	   little	   move	   towards	   sovereignty	   until	   essentially	   forced	   to	   do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Moscow-­‐based	   elites,	   including	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors,	   are	   central	   to	   many	   accounts	   of	  perestroika	   and	   the	   Soviet	   collapse;	   see	   The	  Gorbachev	   Factor	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	  1996);	  Robert	  English,	  Russia	  and	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  West:	  Gorbachev,	  Intellectuals,	  and	  the	  End	  of	  the	  
Cold	  War	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  17	  For	  perfunctory	  references	  to	  the	  region,	  see:	  V.A.	  Tishkov,	  “Soiuz	  do	  i	  posle	  piati	  let	  perestroika,”	  in	   Natsional’nie	   protsessy	   v	   SSSR,	   ed.	   M.N.	   Guboglo	   (Moscow:	   Nauka,	   1991);	   Jack	   Snyder,	  “Introduction:	   Reconstructing	   politics	   amidst	   the	   wreckage	   of	   empire,”	   in	   Post-­‐Soviet	   Political	  
Order:	  Conflict	  and	  State	  Building,	  eds.	  Barnett	  R.	  Rubin	  and	  Jack	  Snyder	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1998);	  Leslie	  Holmes,	  “Perestroika:	  A	  Reassessment,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies,	  65,	  no.	  2	  (2013).	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so.18	  	  	  Historical	  surveys	  of	  Central	  Asian	  nations,	  for	  their	  part,	  tend	  to	  skim	  over	  the	   period	   of	   perestroika,	   focusing	   instead	   on	   the	   development	   of	   the	   region’s	  Soviet	  institutions	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s	  and	  the	  later	  contradictions	  created	  by	  these	  structures.19	  	  When	   the	   end	   of	   the	   USSR	   is	   dealt	   with	   directly	   in	   the	   region,	   moreover,	   the	  standard	  narrative	  of	  glasnost’s	  “light	  wind	  of	  freedom”	  shaking	  down	  the	  curtains	  and	  exposing	  long	  dormant	  structural	  problems	  tends	  to	  be	  applied.	  	  This	  has	  led	  to	   historical	   and	   political	   science	   investigations	   into	   the	   structuralist	   causes	   of	  late-­‐Soviet	   ethnic	   violence	   in	   the	   region,	   the	   influence	   of	   poorly	   designed	   and	  demarcated	  borders	  on	  post-­‐Soviet	   interregional	   conflict,20	  and	   the	   causes	  of	   the	  Tajik	  civil	  war.	   	  Throughout	  the	  region,	   it	   is	  argued,	  Moscow’s	  agenda	  of	  political	  reform	   led	   to	   increased	   dissatisfaction	  with	   the	   Soviet	   government,	   as	   forgotten	  feuds	  and	  old	  iniquities	  were	  remembered	  with	  renewed	  fervor.21	  	  	  	  Yet	  by	  simply	  extending	   the	   Moscow-­‐centric	   narrative	   to	   Central	   Asia	   the	   actual	   content	   of	  perestroika	  in	  the	  region	  is	  left	  aside:	  little	  to	  no	  reference	  is	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  the	  actual	  implementation	  of	  late-­‐Soviet	  reforms	  or	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  Central	  Asian	   republics.	   	   	   Glasnost	   and	   its	   historical	   determinism	   are	   assumed	   without	  solid	  foundation.	  	  By	   providing	   a	   grounded	   micro-­‐history	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   perestroika-­‐era	  political	   and	   economic	   reforms	   were	   implemented	   and	   understood	   in	   the	   Tajik	  SSR,	   this	   dissertation	   challenges	   the	   assumed	   dominance	   of	   glasnost,	   pointing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Nazif	  Shahrani,	  “Central	  Asia	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Legacy,”	  Central	  Asian	  Survey,	  12,	  no.	  2	  (1993);	  Gregory	  Gleason,	  The	  Central	  Asian	  States:	  Discovering	  Independence	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1997),	  72-­‐77.	  19	  For	  some	  examples,	  see:	  Shoshanna	  Keller,	  To	  Moscow,	  Not	  Mecca:	  The	  Soviet	  Campaign	  Against	  
Islam	   in	   Central	   Asia,	   1917-­‐1941	   (Westport:	   Praeger,	   2001);	   Pauline	   Jones	   Luong,	   Institutional	  
Change	  and	  Political	  Continuity	  in	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Central	  Asia	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002);	  Francine	  Hirsch,	  “Toward	  an	  Empire	  of	  Nations:	  Border-­‐making	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  Soviet	  national	  identities,”	  The	  Russian	  Review	  59,	  no.	  1	  (2005);	  Adrienne	  Edgar,	  Tribal	  Nation:	  The	  Making	  
of	  Soviet	  Turkmenistan	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  20	  Rahim	  Masov,	   Istoriia	   c	  grifom	   ‘sovershenno	   sekretno’	   (Dushanbe:	   Paivand:1995);	   Rajan	  Menon	  and	   Hendrick	   Spruyt,	   “Possibilities	   for	   Conflict	   in	   and	   Conflict	   Resolution	   in	   Post-­‐Soviet	   Central	  Asia,”	   in	   Post-­‐Soviet	   Political	   Order:	   Conflict	   and	   State	   Building,	   eds.	   Barnett	   R.	   Rubin	   and	   Jack	  Snyder	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1998).	  21	  	   Yaacov	   Ro’i,	   “Central	   Asian	   Riots	   and	   Disturbances,	   1989-­‐1990:	   Causes	   and	   Context,”	   Central	  
Asian	  Survey	  10,	  no.	  3	  (1991);	  Shirin	  Akiner,	  “Melting	  Pot,	  Salad	  Bowl	  –	  Cauldron?	  Manipulation	  of	  Ethnic	   and	   Religious	   Identities	   in	   Central	   Asia,”	   Ethnic	   and	   Racial	   Studies	   20,	   no.	   2	   (1997);	   Ian	  Bremmer,	   “Post-­‐Soviet	  nationalities	   theory:	  past,	  present,	  and	   future,”	   in	  New	  States,	  New	  Politics:	  
Building	   the	   Post-­‐Soviet	   Nations,	   eds.	   Ian	   Bremmer	   and	   Ray	   Taras	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	   Press,	   1997),	   9-­‐12;	   John	   Glenn,	  The	   Soviet	   Legacy	   in	   Central	   Asia	   (London:	  Macmillan	  Press	  Ltd,	  1999).	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instead	   to	   the	   central	   role	   of	   economic	   change	   behind	   much	   of	   the	   later	   social	  strife.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   also	   intends	   to	   complicate	   and	   problematize	   existing	  narratives	  about	  the	  causes	  and	  start	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Civil	  War	  (1992-­‐1997).	   	  One	  of	  longest	  and	  bloodiest	  conflicts	  to	  arise	  from	  the	  ashes	  of	  the	  USSR,	  the	  Tajik	  civil	  war	   is	   an	   obvious	   counterexample	   to	   the	   common	   account	   of	   the	   “bloodless”	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR.22	  It	  also	  presents	  a	  counterfactual	  difficulty	  for	  the	  monolithic	  account	   of	   perestroika	   and	   glasnost’s	   development	   and	   application	   across	   the	  whole	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  if	  the	  same	  structures	  and	  reforms	  were	  applied	  across	  the	  USSR	  –	  or	  at	  least	  all	  of	  Central	  Asia	  –	  why	  did	  civil	  war	  arise	  in	  only	  Tajikistan?	  	  Since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   civil	   war	   in	   1997	   an	   increasing	   number	   of	   works	   have	  attempted	  to	  explain	  the	  Tajik	  counterfactual	  and	  its	  place	  along	  the	  spectrum	  of	  post-­‐Soviet	  eventualities.	  	  While	   subtle	   in	   its	   variation,	   the	   majority	   of	   this	   literature	   can	   be	   divided	   into	  three	  broad	  schools	  of	  thought.	  First	  are	  the	  French	  scholars	  Stephane	  Dudoignion	  and	  Olivier	  Roy	  and	  their	  supporters,	  who	  posit	  that	  the	  civil	  war	  started	  through	  a	  combination	  of	   regional	   animosity,	   frustration	  with	  Soviet	  development	  projects,	  and	   long-­‐suppressed	  religious	   fervour.	  Following	  an	  earlier	  generation	  of	  French	  Sovietologists,	   including	   Helene	   Carrerre	   d’Encausse	   and	   Alexandre	   Benningson,	  this	  version	  of	  events	  argues	  that	  Tajiks,	  much	  like	  other	  Soviet	  muslims,	  were	  for	  generations	   waiting	   and	   hoping	   for	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   to	   collapse,	   retaining	   and	  strengthening	   their	   pre-­‐Soviet	   identities	   behind	   a	   facade	   of	   Sovietness.23	  Once	   it	  was	   possible	   to	   shake	   off	   the	   Soviet	   yoke,	   Tajiks	   did	   so	   happily	   and	   violently,	  returning	  to	  their	  unforgotten	  conflicts	  and	  regional	  (or	  “clan-­‐based”)	  loyalties	  of	  70	  years	  prior.	  Not	  only	  had	  the	  Soviet	  experiment	  failed,	  it	  had	  only	  made	  things	  worse	  by	  trying	  to	  encourage	  Sovietization,	  inlcuding	  through	  the	  forced	  migration	  of	   entire	   villages	   from	   mountainous	   to	   lowland	   regions.	   	   As	   Roy	   has	   written,	  “Collective	   transfers	   of	   populations	   of	   different	   origins	  within	   one	   same	   zone	   of	  development	  do	  not	  in	  fact	  lead	  to	  intermixing	  of	  peoples.	  	  They	  lead	  to	  identities	  becoming	   fixed	   in	   a	   communitarian	   mode.”24	  In	   Roy	   and	   others’	   view,	   these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Cf.	  Kotkin,	  Armageddon	  Averted;	  Bunce,	  Subversive	  Institutions.	  23	  Helene	   Carrere	   d’Encausse,	  Decline	   of	   an	   Empire:	   The	   Soviet	   Socialist	   Republics	   in	   Revolt	   (New	  York:	  Newsweek	  Books,	  1979);	  Alexandre	  Benningsen	  and	  Marie	  Broxup,	  The	  Islamic	  Threat	  to	  the	  
Soviet	  State	  (London:	  Croom	  Helm,	  1983).	  24	  Olivier	  Roy,	  The	  New	  Central	  Asia:	  The	  Creation	  of	  Nations	  (New	  York:	  IB	  Taurus,	  2000),	  95.	   	  For	  accounts	   supporting	   and	   drawing	   upon	   Roy,	   see	   Stephane	   A.	   Dudoignon	   with	   Sayyid	   Ahmad	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relocations	   had	   entrenched	   intergroup	   violence	   in	   Tajik	   history;	   only	   the	  equivalent	  threat	  of	  state	  violence	  had	  kept	  Tajiks	  from	  each	  others’	  throats.	  	  In	  contrast	   to	   this	  argument,	  which	   traces	   the	   roots	  of	   the	  Tajik	  Civil	  War	   to	   the	  structure	   of	   the	  USSR	   and	   unresolved	   issues	   dating	   back	   to	   the	   1920s,	   a	   second	  group	  of	  authors	  have	   focused	   their	  attention	  on	   the	   immediate	  outbreak	  of	  war	  and	   the	  political	  conflict	   that	  preceded	   it.	  Arguing	   that	   the	  civil	  war	   in	  Tajikistan	  was	   essentially	   a	   bargaining	   failure	   between	   competing	   factions,	   these	   works	  emphasize	   the	   incentives	   for	   “non-­‐cooperation”	   in	   a	   collapsing	   system,25 	  the	  difficulty	   in	  sharing	  rents	   from	  stationery	  and	   investment	  heavy	  goods,26	  such	  as	  cotton,	   and	   the	  destructive	  power	  of	  nascent	  nationalism.	  27	  While	  many	  of	   these	  works	   also	   link	   their	   arguments	   back	   to	   the	   underlying	   structure	   of	   Tajikistan's	  economy	  and	  society,	  they	  often	  gloss	  over	  the	  period	  of	  perestroika	  as	  a	  final	  few	  years	  of	  collapse	  that	  did	  little	  to	  change	  the	  longer-­‐term	  trends	  in	  the	  republic.	  In	  this	  way	  these	  arguments	  also	  bear	  some	  resemblance	  to	  the	  first	  school:	  as	  long	  as	  the	  USSR	  kept	  Tajikistan	  running,	  its	  local	  “strongmen”	  had	  enough	  in	  the	  way	  of	   rents	   and	   other	   goods	   to	   keep	   their	   supporters	   happy.	   Once	   the	   economic	  functions	  of	  the	  USSR	  broke	  down	  and	  glasnost	  opened	  up	  space	  for	  debate,	  it	  was	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  until	   incentives	  for	  violence	  overcame	  any	  remaining	  social	  pressure	  keeping	  them	  in	  line.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Qalandar,	   “They	   Were	   All	   from	   the	   Country,”	   in	   Allah’s	   Kolkhozes:	   Migration,	   De-­‐Stalinization,	  
Privatisation	  and	  the	  New	  Muslim	  Congregations	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Realm	  (1950s-­‐2000s),	  eds.	  Stephane	  A.	  Dudoignon	   and	   Christian	   Noack	   (Berlin:	   Klaus	   Schwarz	   Verlag,	   2014);	   Aziz	   Niyazi,	   “Islam	   and	  Tajikistan’s	   Human	   and	   Ecological	   Crisis,”	   in	  Civil	   Society	   in	  Central	  Asia,	   eds.	  M.	   Holt	   Ruffin	   and	  Daniel	   Waugh	   (Seattle:	   University	   of	   Washington	   Press,	   1999);	   Alexander	   Sodiqov,	   “From	  resettlement	   to	   conflict:	   development-­‐induced	   involuntary	   displacement	   and	   violence	   in	  Tajikistan,”	   in	  The	  Transformation	  of	  Tajikistan:	  The	  Sources	  of	  Statehood,	   eds.	   John	  Heathershaw	  and	  Edmund	  Herzig	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2013);	  Gavhar	  Juraeva,	  “Ethnic	  Conflict	   in	  Tajikistan,”	   in	  
Ethnic	  Conflict	   in	  the	  Post-­‐Soviet	  World:	  Case	  Studies	  and	  Analysis,	   eds.	   Leokadia	  Drobizheva,	  Rose	  Gottemoeller,	  Catherine	  McArdle	  Kelleher	  and	  Lee	  Walker	  (London:	  ME	  Sharpe,	  1996);	  Barnett	  R.	  Rubin,	  “Russian	  Hegemony	  and	  State	  Breakdown	  in	  the	  Periphery:	  Causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  civil	   war	   in	   Tajikistan,”	   in	   Post-­‐Soviet	   Political	   Order:	   Conflict	   and	   State	   Building,	   eds.	   Barnett	   R.	  Rubin	   and	   Jack	   Snyder	   (London:	   Routledge,	   1998);	   Kathleen	   Collins,	   Clan	   Politics	   and	   Regime	  
Transition	  in	  Central	  Asia.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  25 	  Jesse	   Driscoll,	   Warlords	   and	   Coalition	   Politics	   in	   Post-­‐Soviet	   States	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2015);	  Idil	  Tuncer-­‐Kilavuz,	  “Understanding	  Civil	  War:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  Tajikistan	  and	  Uzbekistan,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	  63,	  no.	  2	  (2011).	  26	  Lawrence	   Markowitz,	   State	   Erosion:	   Unlootable	   Resources	   and	   Unruly	   Elites	   in	   Central	   Asia	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  27	  Shahram	   Akbarzadeh,	   “Why	   did	   nationalism	   fail	   in	   Tajikistan?”	   Europe-­‐Asia	   Studies	   48,	   no.	   7	  (1996);	  P.	  Foroughi,	   “Tajikistan:	  Nationalism,	  Ethnicity,	  Conflict,	   and	  Socio-­‐Economic	  Disparities,”	  
Journal	  of	  Muslim	  Minority	  Affairs,	  22,	  no.	  1	  (2002);	  Lawrence	  P.	  Markowitz,	   “How	  Master	  Frames	  Mislead:	  The	  Division	  and	  Eclipse	  of	  Nationalist	  Movements	   in	  Uzbekistan	  and	  Tajikistan,”	  Ethnic	  
and	  Racial	  Studies	  32,	  no.	  4	  (2009).	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  As	   Sergei	   Abashin	   has	   convincingly	   argued,	   however,	   both	   of	   these	   broad	  arguments	   about	   the	  Tajik	   Civil	  War	  make	   the	   anachronistic	   fallacy	   of	   analyzing	  the	   war’s	   causes	   through	   its	   ultimate	   resolution.28	  	   Regionalism,	   violent	   non-­‐cooperation,	   lost	   opportunities	   for	   national	   consolidation,	   and	   problems	   sharing	  “rents”	  were	  all	  representative	  elements	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Civil	  War	  once	  it	  began,	  rather	  than	   its	   root	   causes.	   	   The	   impact	   of	   forced	  migrations	   in	   the	   republic	   in	   earlier	  decades	  was	  equally	  mixed,	  with	  some	  researchers	  emphasizing	  its	  integrative	  as	  well	   as	   disruptive	   effects.29	  Reacting	   to	   the	   first	   two	   schools’	   lack	   of	   attention	   to	  the	  period	  of	  perestroika	  immediately	  prior	  to	  the	  Tajik	  Civil	  War,	  a	  smaller	  body	  of	   literature	   has	   attempted	   to	   more	   effectively	   tie	   the	   late	   Soviet	   period	   to	   the	  explosion	  of	  violence	  in	  independent	  Tajikistan.	   	  In	  his	  recent	  history	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Civil	  War,	   for	   example,	   Tim	   Epkenhans	   has	   emphasized	   that	   regionalism	  was	   at	  most	  “an	  ordering	  device…and	  not	  causative	  for	  the	  conflict.”	   	  Instead	  Epkenhans	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  local	  actors	  and	  ideologies,	  as	  well	  as	  localized	  reactions	  to	  glasnost	  during	  perestroika.30	  	  While	  seeing	  some	  role	   for	  regionalism	  in	  starting	  the	   conflict,	   Kirill	   Nourzhanov	   and	   Christian	   Bleuer	   have	   also	   demonstrated	   the	  multitude	  of	  causal	  factors	  underlining	  the	  Tajik	  Civil	  War,	  pointing	  to	  formal	  and	  informal	   political	   networks	   and	   the	  mobilization	   of	   non-­‐state	  movements	   in	   the	  final	  years	  of	  Gorbachev’s	  rule.31	  	  While	   drawing	   upon	   these	   bodies	   of	   literature,	   this	   dissertation	   problematizes	  their	  overwhelming	  emphasis	  on	   the	  political	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   the	  economic.	   	   It	  also	   relies	   upon	   a	   smaller	   group	   of	   authors,	   including	   Abashin	   and	  Martha	   Brill	  Olcott,	  who	   have	   linked	   the	   economic	   downturn	   observed	   during	   perestroika	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  S.N.	   Abashin,	   Natsionalizmy	   v	   Srednei	   Azii	   –	   v	   poiskakh	   identichnosti	   (St.	   Petersburg:	   Alateiya,	  2007),	   235-­‐238;	   for	   similar	   critcisms,	   see	   John	   Schoeberlein,	   “Conflict	   in	   Tajikistan	   and	   Central	  Asia:	  The	  Myth	  of	  Ethnic	  Animosity,”	  Harvard	  Middle	  Eastern	  and	  Islamic	  Review	  1,	  no.	  2	  (1994):	  4;	  Collette	   Harris,	   “Coping	   with	   daily	   life	   in	   post-­‐Soviet	   Tajikistan:	   the	   Gharmi	   villages	   of	   Khatlon	  Province,”	  Central	  Asian	  Survey	  17,	  no.	  4	  (1998):	  656-­‐657;	  Barnett	  R.	  Rubin,	  “The	  Fragmentation	  of	  Tajikistan,”	  Survival	  35,	  no.	  4	  (1993):	  71.	  29	  Olivier	  Ferrando,	  “Soviet	  Population	  Transfers	  and	  Interethnic	  Relations	  in	  Tajikistan:	  Assessing	  the	  Concept	  of	  Ethnicity,”	  Central	  Asian	  Survey	  30,	  no.	  1	  (2011).	  	  Soviet-­‐era	  research	  also	  echoed	  a	  largely	  mixed	  impact;	  see	  Sh.	  I.	  Kurbanova,	  Pereselenie:	  Kak	  eto	  bylo	  (Dushanbe:	  Irfon,	  1993).	  30	  Tim	   Epkenhans,	   The	   Origins	   of	   the	   Civil	   War	   in	   Tajikistan:	   Nationalism,	   Islamism,	   and	   Violent	  
Conflict	  in	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Space	   (Lexington	  Books:	  Lanham,	  2016),	  8-­‐11;	  quote	  on	  8.	   	  Also	  see	  Muriel	  Atkin,	   “Tajikistan:	   reform,	   reaction,	   and	   civil	   war,”	   in	  New	  States,	  New	  Politics:	  Building	   the	  Post-­‐
Soviet	  Nation,	  eds.	  Ian	  Bremmer	  and	  Ray	  Taras	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997).	  31	  Kirill	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Christian	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan:	  A	  Political	  and	  Social	  History	  (Canberra:	  ANU	  E-­‐Press,	  2013).	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the	  later	  violence	  of	  the	  civil	  war.32	  	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  USSR	  as	  a	  whole,	  glasnost	  and	  democratization	  are	  in	  Tajikistan	  just	  as	  equally	  partial	  explanations:	  they	  fail	  to	  consider	  the	  immediate	  causes	  of	  people’s	  anger	  –	  anger	  sufficient	  to	  lead	  them	  into	   the	   street	   and	  worse.	   	   Instead	   of	   glasnost	   and	   democratization	   opening	   up	  space	   for	   long-­‐suppressed	   anger	   over	   Soviet	   economic	   development	   or	   social	  policy,	   this	   dissertation	   argues,	   when	   Tajik	   Soviet	   citizens’	   frustration	   finally	  spilled	   into	   the	   streets	   it	   was	   the	   product	   of	   rapid	   change	   leading	   to	   economic	  disintegration.	   	   The	   citizens	   of	  Tajikistan	  were	   angry	   –	   and	  ultimately	   desperate	  enough	  to	  go	  to	  war	  –	  not	  because	  of	  the	  Soviet	  state’s	  long-­‐term	  policies	  in	  their	  republic.	   	   As	   the	   anthropologist	   Gillian	   Tett,	  who	   spent	   1991	   in	   Dushanbe,	   later	  observed,	   “By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Soviet	   era	   many	   of	   the	   Tajiks	   appeared	   not	   only	  reluctant	   to	   dismantle	   this	   Soviet	   state	   -­‐	   but	   rather	   more	   reluctant	   than	   the	  populations	  in	  many	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union.”33	  Instead,	  they	  were	  angry	  because	   as	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  had	  been	   slowly	   collapsing	  over	   the	  previous	  few	  years,	  so	  too	  had	  their	  salaries,	  access	  to	  consumer	  goods,	  and	  basic	  standard	  of	   living.	   	  War	   came	   to	  Tajikistan	  on	   the	  back	  of	   reforms	   that	  had	  unequivocally	  broken	  its	  piece	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy.34	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  This	   dissertation	   provides	   a	   detailed	   history	   of	   the	   implementation	   and	   local	  understanding	   of	   perestroika’s	   economic	   and	   political	   reforms	   in	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	  between	  1985	  and	  1991,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   later	   impact	   of	   these	   reforms	   into	  1992.	  	  Drawing	  upon	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  primary	  sources,	  including	  central	  and	  local	  party	  records,	  Soviet	  government	  archives	  in	  Moscow	  and	  Dushanbe,	  Tajik	  and	  Russian	  language	   memoirs,	   newspapers,	   and	   personal	   interviews,	   it	   offers	   a	   meticulous	  micro-­‐history	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   centrally	   designed	   Soviet	   reforms	   came	   to	  change	  and	  undermine	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  order	  in	  Tajikistan.	  	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	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  Martha	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   Press,	   1995);	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   (Moscow:	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   and	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  Institut	  etnologii	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  Ran,	  1998),	  10.	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  Gillian	  Romaine	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  “Ambiguous	  Alliances:	  Marriage	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  (PhD	  diss.,	  Cambridge	  University,	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  190.	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  critique,	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  “(Over)determining	  social	  disorder:	  Tajikistan	  and	  the	  economic	  collapse	  of	  perestroika,”	  Central	  Asian	  Survey	  35,	  no.	  3	  (2016).	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returns	  the	  period	  of	  perestroika	  that	  immediately	  preceded	  the	  Tajik	  Civil	  War	  to	  its	   proper	   centrality	   in	   this	   history.	   	   Instead	   of	   pre-­‐Soviet	   loyalties,	   Soviet-­‐era	  border	   delimitations,	   or	   suppressed	   nationalism,	   it	   argues	   that	   the	   changes	  wrought	   to	   social	   order	   by	   the	   collective	   reforms	   of	   perestroika	   were	   the	  most	  immediate	   and	  visceral	   cause	  of	   the	  violence	   that	  began	   to	   spark	  during	   riots	   in	  Dushanbe	  in	  February	  1990	  and	  eventually	  ignited	  into	  the	  civil	  war	  thereafter.	  	  In	  addition,	  by	  returning	  perestroika	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  this	  history,	  this	  dissertation	  also	   brings	   forward	   extensive	   evidence	   highlighting	   the	   role	   of	   economics	   and	  economic	   downturn	   in	   causing	   this	   strife.	   	   The	   mobilization	   of	   new	   political	  movements,	  activists,	  and	  personal	  anger	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  the	  evidence	  shows,	  was	  first	   and	   foremost	   connected	   to	   the	   radical	   change	   in	   economic	   fortunes	   felt	   in	  Tajikistan	   during	   perestroika.	   	   Economics	   was	   on	   the	   minds	   of	   individual	  protestors	  and	  politicians	  alike	  during	  the	  period;	  it	  drove	  people	  into	  the	  streets	  and	   activists	   to	   populist	   slogans	   and	   promises.	   	   	   Only	   by	   considering	   the	  importance	   of	   economic	   collapse	   can	   the	   history	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   late	   Soviet	   and	  post-­‐Soviet	  collapse	  be	  told	  accurately.	  	  More	   broadly,	   this	   dissertation	   also	   contends	   that	   the	   history	   of	   perestroika	   in	  Tajikistan	  has	  much	  to	  say	  about	  the	  history	  of	  perestroika	   in	  toto.	  Rather	  than	  a	  simple	  outlier,	  Tajikistan	  represents	  one	  extreme	  along	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  violent	  outcomes	  that	  occurred	  as	   the	  USSR	  collapsed.	   	  Some	  nascent	  states	  experienced	  violence	   that	   approximated	   civil	   wars	   (such	   as	   in	   Georgia	   or	   Moldova);	   others	  underwent	  wars	  with	  their	  neighbors	  (Armenia,	  Azerbaijan,	  or	  Chechnya);	  others	  experienced	   low-­‐level	   outburst	   of	   protest,	   violence,	   and	   uprising.	   	   Tajikistan	   is	  closer	  to	  the	  norm	  than	  is	  often	  claimed,	  although	  still	  remaining	  on	  one	  end	  of	  this	  spectrum.	  	  As	  a	  particularly	  peripheral	  piece	  of	  the	  larger	  puzzle	  of	  Soviet	  collapse,	  moreover,	  Tajikistan’s	  path	  through	  Gorbachev’s	  reform	  project	  can	  in	  fact	  help	  to	  clarify	   many	   issues	   related	   to	   the	   period.	   	   Far	   from	  Moscow	   and	   its	   attentions,	  Tajikistan	  underwent	  reform	  and	  collapse	  with	  limited	  political	  pressure	  from	  the	  outside,	   making	   Moscow’s	   interventions,	   when	   they	   came,	   clearer	   and	   more	  obvious.	   	   In	   this	   context,	   center-­‐periphery	   relations	   between	   Moscow	   and	   its	  outlying	   republican	   capitals	   gain	   sharpness	   and	   definition,	   speaking	   to	   their	  importance	   in	   defining	   the	   course	   of	   perestroika	   across	   the	   USSR.	   In	   the	   years	  since	  the	  Soviet	  collapse,	  moreover,	  Tajikistan	  has	  remained	  peripheral	  to	  many	  of	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the	  geopolitical	  debates	  over	  Soviet	  heritage,	  leaving	  evidence	  about	  the	  1980s	  far	  less	   politicized	   or	   part	   of	   larger	   discussions	   about	   the	   “colonial”	   or	   otherwise	  negative	  impact	  of	  the	  USSR	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  local	  ambiguity	  about	  the	  Soviet	  past	  in	  Tajikistan,	  surprisingly	  enough,	  has	  meant	  that	   it	  becomes	  easier	  to	  peel	  away	  the	   layers	   of	   post-­‐Soviet	   discourse	   and	   arrive	   at	   a	   clearer	   understanding	   of	   life	  such	  as	   it	  was	   lived	  by	  Soviet	  citizens	  through	  the	  collapse	  of	   the	   late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s.	  	  By	  reconsidering	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  collapse	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  its	  peripheral	   Tajik	   Republic,	   an	   alternative	   narrative	   emerges	   about	   this	   collapse.	  	  Rather	  than	  a	  story	  of	  increased	  democratic	  participation	  and	  glasnost,	  it	  is	  instead	  a	   history	   dominated	   by	   increasing	   unemployment,	   economic	   downturn,	   lost	  productive	  capacity,	  inflation,	  and	  sharply	  lowered	  standards	  of	  living.	  	  It	  is	  also	  a	  story	  of	  confusion:	  economic	  reforms	  were	  passed	  in	  Moscow	  and	  were	  discussed	  little,	  if	  at	  all,	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Tajikistan.	  	  When	  Soviet	  enterprises	  began	  to	  hold	  back	   production	   and	   the	   cooperative	   business	   sector	   began	   to	   siphon	   off	   funds	  from	   the	   economy,	   local	   actors	   in	   Tajikistan	   were	   left	   to	   refer	   to	   official	  government	   statements	   about	   the	   need	   for	   marketization	   that	   bore	   little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  reality	  they	  faced.	  	  The	  economy	  was	  collapsing,	  and	  yet	  “from	  real	   facts	   Gorbachev	   made	   for	   himself	   mollifying	   conclusions,”	   as	   his	   advisor	  Anatolii	   Cherniaev	   later	   admitted. 35 	  Armed	   with	   only	   these	   “mollifying	  conclusions,”	  the	  Tajik	  leadership	  was	  largely	  unable	  to	  convince	  the	  population	  of	  Tajikistan	  that	  it	  had	  a	  clear	  grasp	  of	  their	  condition	  or	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  republic.	  	  This	  gap	  grew	  as	  the	  economy	  continued	  to	  spiral	  downwards.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1991	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  in	  Dushanbe	  and	  across	  Tajikistan	  had	  lost	  faith	  in	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  local	  political	  class	  to	  improve	  their	  lives.	  	  Desperate	  for	  change,	  they	   emerged	   on	   the	   streets	   of	   Dushanbe,	   embracing	   a	   new	   class	   of	   populist	  politicians	  who	  promised	  a	  new	  path	  forward.	  	  While	  this	  narrative	  is	  particular	  to	  Tajikistan,	  it	  is	  built	  upon	  conditions	  that	  were,	  to	  one	  extent	  or	  another,	  constant	  across	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  Everywhere	  Moscow	  looked	  in	  the	  final	  years	  of	  the	  USSR,	   the	   economy	   was	   collapsing,	   enterprises	   were	   lowering	   production,	   and	  private	  businesses	  were	  getting	  rich	  while	  the	  population	  was	  getting	  poorer.	  	  This	  experience	  was	  not	  unique	  to	  Tajikistan,	  and	  its	  path	  through	  perestroika	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  A.S.	   Cherniaev,	   Shest’	   let	   s	   Gorbachevym:	   po	   dnevnikovym	   zapisiam	   (Moscow:	   Progress,	   1993),	  387.	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end	  of	  the	  USSR,	  this	  dissertation	  argues,	  should	  cause	  a	  significant	  reevalution	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  history	  of	  perestroika	  has	  been	  told	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  As	   a	   work	   of	   history,	   this	   dissertation	   attempts	   to	   sift	   through	   a	   multitude	   of	  sources	  and	  provide	  as	  clear	  a	  narrative	  of	  events	  as	  may	  be	  possible.	   	   In	   recent	  years,	  as	  many	  scholars	  have	  noted,	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  has	  undergone	  a	  radical	   shift	   from	  a	   field	  with	  a	  meager	   source	  base	   to	  one	   in	  which	   sources	  are	  simply	  preponderous.36	  	  With	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  opening	  of	  archives,	  historians	  are	   faced	  with	  more	  paper	   than	   it	   can	  be	  conceivable	   to	  analyze.	   	  The	  publication	   of	   innumerable	   memoirs,	   along	   with	   the	   proliferation	   of	   local	  newspaper	   sources,	   oral	   histories,	   and	   other	   primary	   materials,	   has	   collectively	  made	   Soviet	   history	   a	   field	   requiring	   particularly	   critical	   and	   close	   analysis	   of	  sources.	  	  This	  dissertation	  has	  attempted	  to	  utilize	  as	  wide	  a	  selection	  of	  sources	  as	  possible,	   assuming	   that	   all	   of	   them,	   whether	   government	   records	   and	   statistics,	  personal	  memoirs,	  second-­‐hand	  accounts,	  or	  interviews,	  are	  all	  in	  their	  own	  ways	  flawed.	   	   This	   dissertation	   does	   rely	   in	   part	   on	   Soviet-­‐produced	   government	  statistics,	  and	  follows	  Caroline	  Humphrey	  in	  treating	  these	  documents	  as	  no	  worse,	  if	  no	  better,	  than	  any	  statistics	  produced	  by	  other	  governments.	  	  As	  all	  bureaucrats,	  Soviet	   civil	   servants	  were	   in	   the	  business	  of	   representing	   reality	   in	  paper;	   theirs	  was	   not	   an	   empty	   performative	   function,	   but	   instead	   one	   that	   linked	   the	   reality	  they	   saw	   to	   the	   reality	   they	  wanted	   to	   explain.37	  	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   Soviet-­‐produced	   statistics	   are	   “true”	   or	   perfect:	   they,	   like	   all	   statistics,	   are	   essentially	  approximations.	   	  But	  they	  can	  be	  employed	  and	  extrapolated	  from,	  as	  with	  many	  other	   sources.	   	   Whenever	   possible,	   material	   from	   one	   source	   has	   been	   verified	  against	  other	  independent	  sources.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Tajikistan,	  moreover,	  there	  may	  be	  surprisingly	  even	  more	  reason	  to	  treat	  Soviet	  statistics	  as	  relatively	  reliable.	   	  In	  contrast	  to	  Uzbekistan,	  where	  local	  bureaucrats	   did	   engage	   in	   large-­‐scale	   misrepresentation	   (pripiski)	   of	   cotton	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36 	  For	   example,	   Sheila	   Fitzpatrick,	   “Impact	   of	   the	   Opening	   of	   Soviet	   Archives	   on	   Western	  Scholarship	  on	  Soviet	  Social	  History,”	  The	  Russian	  Review	  74	  (July	  2015).	  37	  Caroline	  Humphrey,	  “The	  ‘Creative	  Bureaucrat’:	  Conflicts	  in	  the	  Production	  of	  Soviet	  Communist	  Party	   Discourse,”	   Inner	   Asia	   10,	   no.	   1	   (2008);	   Andrea	   Graziosi,	   “The	   New	   Soviet	   Archives:	  Hypothesis	  for	  a	  Critical	  Assessment,”	  Cahiers	  du	  monde	  russe	  40,	  nos.	  1-­‐2),	  1993:	  13-­‐64.	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figures,	   Tajikistan	   was	   never	   shown	   to	   have	   lied	   on	   any	   large	   scale	   about	   its	  production	  figures.38	  	  In	  fact,	  although	  investigators	  were	  dispatched	  to	  Tajikistan	  in	   the	   mid	   1980s	   as	   part	   of	   Uzbekistan’s	   “cotton	   affair,”	   they	   only	   managed	   to	  arrest	   one	   oblast	   chairman	   on	   charges	   that	   ultimately	   failed	   to	   stick.39	  	   Even	  Gorbachev’s	  advisor	  Aleksandr	  Yakovlev,	  no	  great	  friend	  to	  Tajikistan,	  went	  out	  of	  his	   way	   in	   1987	   to	   highlight	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   was	   “the	   only	   [Soviet]	  republic	  in	  Asia	  that	  was	  clean,	  and	  where	  there	  was	  order	  in	  the	  economy.”	  40	  	  This	  plurality	  of	  sources	  has	  also	  required	  some	  inevitable	  restriction	  of	  content.	  The	   astute	   reader	  will	   note	   that	   this	   dissertation	   avoids	   extensive	   discussion	   of	  many	  events	  that	  are	  often	  otherwise	  at	  the	  center	  of	  perestroika	  narratives.	  Most	  immediately,	   this	   thesis	   deals	   very	   little,	   if	   at	   all,	   with	   the	   Soviet	   invasion	   and	  occupation	  of	  Afghanistan	   (1979-­‐1989),	   although	   this	   violent	   conflict	  was	   raging	  throughout	  most	  of	  perestroika	   just	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  Tajikistan's	  border.	  This	  lack	  of	  discussion,	  however,	   is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  oversight,	  but	   instead	  a	  calculated	  choice.	   The	   Soviet-­‐Afghan	   war	   has	   been	   extensively	   covered	   in	   excellent	  scholarship,	   as	   has	   its	   impact	   on	   Soviet	   politics	   in	   general.41	  More	   immediately,	  moreover,	   the	   Afghan	   conflict	   played	   a	   surprisingly	   limited	   role	   in	   Tajikistan	  during	   the	   1980s.	   There	   was	   no	   increase	   in	   instability	   in	   border	   areas,	   and	  although	  the	  “muhajedin”	  and	  their	  Pakistani	  backers,	  the	  ISI,	  tried	  to	  move	  people	  and	  subversive	  literature	  across	  the	  border,	  the	  KGB	  was	  very	  effective	  at	  holding	  this	  off	  until	  at	   least	  1991.	  The	  contingent	  of	  Soviet	  soldiers	   from	  Tajikistan	  who	  served	   in	   Afghanistan	   was	   limited	   in	   number,	   and	   although	   some	   research	   has	  linked	  Tajik	  experiences	   in	  Afghanistan	   to	  political	   radicalisation,	   the	  evidence	   is	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  Kirill	   Nourzhanov	   has	   claimed	   otherwise	   (Nourzhanov	   and	   Bleuer,	   Tajikistan,	   137),	   but	   his	  reading	  of	  the	  sources	  is	  mistaken.	  	  The	  analysis	  he	  cites	  comes	  from	  a	  passage	  in	  a	  1989	  article	  by	  Vasilii	  Seliunin,	   in	  which	  Seliunin	   is	   clearly	  discussing	  Uzbekistan,	  not	  Tajikistan	   (Vasilii	  Seliunin,	  “Bremia	  deistvii,”	  Novyi	  Mir	   5	   (1989):	  225-­‐226).	   	  Evidence	  about	   similar	   schemes	   in	  Tajikistan	   is	  simply	  absent.	  39	  Salohiddin	   Hasanov,	   the	   first	   secretary	   of	   the	   Kulyab	   Oblast	   Party	   Committee	  was	   arrested	   in	  March	  1988	  and	  ultimately	  released	  in	  July	  1991.	  	  See	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  157,	  d.	  1912,	  l.	  133-­‐136;	  “O	  rezul’tatakh	   proverki	   faktov,	   ukazannykh	   v	   stat’iakh	   “Kolokola	   nadezhdy”,	   “Dushanbe:	   god	  spustia…”,	   i	   “Genotsid	   –	   sputnik	   perestroiki?”	   	   Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana,	   July	   3,	   1991;	   Ne''mat	  Bobodzhon,	  “Krakh	  'tadzhikskogo	  dela',”	  Biznes	  i	  politika,	  December	  25-­‐31,	  1993.	  40	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  157,	  d.	  1912,	  l.	  148.	  	  	  	  41	  Rodric	   Braithwaite,	   Afgantsy:	   The	   Russians	   in	   Afghanistan	   1979-­‐89	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	  Press,	   2011);	   Artemy	   Kalinovksy,	   A	   Long	   Goodbye:	   The	   Soviet	   Withdrawal	   from	   Afghanistan	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011).	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mixed.42	  In	  addition,	   any	  organized	  mobilization	  of	   former	  Soviet	  veterans	  of	   the	  Afghan	   conflict	   took	   place	   only	   in	   mid-­‐1992,	   and	   was	   in	   fact	   in	   support	   of	   the	  conservative,	   nominally	   still	   pro-­‐Soviet	   government.43	  	   The	   financial	   costs	   of	   the	  Afghan	  conflict	  were	  for	  the	  Soviet	  budget	  limited:	  they	  represented	  no	  more	  than	  a	   0.5-­‐1%	   annual	   increase	   in	   budget	   expenditure. 44 	  Thus	   both	   socially	   and	  economically	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  pinpoint	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Afghan	  war	  on	  perestroika-­‐era	  Tajikistan.	  The	  war	  raged	  on;	  life	  in	  Tajikistan	  continued	  apace.	  	  Similarly,	  this	  dissertation	  devotes	  little	  space	  to	  an	  extended	  discussion	  of	  Islam’s	  role	   in	   the	   political	   sphere	   in	   Soviet-­‐era	   Tajikistan.	   	   	   While	   contrary	   to	   many	  accounts	   of	   the	   period,	   political	   Islam	   remains	   in	   this	   dissertation’s	   narrative	  essentially	  inert:	  religion	  is	  not	  a	  mobilizing	  factor	  in	  Tajikistan	  until	  at	  least	  early	  1992.	   	   Following	   leading	   scholarship	   on	   the	   question,	   this	   dissertation	   contends	  that	   for	   the	  majority	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   citizens,	   Islam	  was,	   until	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	  USSR,	   a	   non-­‐issue.45	  	   They	   comfortably	   identified	   as	   both	   “Muslim”	   and	   “Soviet,”	  and	   were,	   in	   fact,	   sincere	   in	   both	   beliefs.46	  	   	   For	   a	   small	   minority	   of	   believers,	  including	   those	  who	   founded	   the	   Islamic	   Revival	   Party	   of	   Tajikistan	   (IRPT),	   this	  was	   not	   true	   –	   but	   until	   the	   very	   end	   of	   the	   USSR	   these	   individuals’	   influence	  outside	  of	  restricted	  circles	  remained	  extremely	   limited.	   	  As	  this	  dissertation	  will	  discuss,	   it	   was	   only	   after	   economic	   collapse	   delegitimized	   the	   previous	   Soviet	  order	   that	   alternative	   structures	   of	   political	   power,	   including	   the	  more	   religious	  one	  promoted	  by	  the	  IRPT,	  began	  to	  garner	  support.	  	  For	  the	  same	  reasons	  of	  limited	  local	  influence	  and	  marginal	  impact	  on	  the	  ground,	  numerous	  other	  “key”	  events	  from	  perestroika	  are	  given	  limited	  treatment	  in	  this	  dissertation.	   This	   includes	   the	   “Nina	   Andreeva”	   affair,	   Gorbachev's	   agricultural	  reforms,	   the	   backroom	  politicking	   in	   Gorbachev's	   Politburo,	   the	   Russian	  miners’	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  Markus	   Görransson,	   “A	   Fragile	   Movement:	   Afghan	   War	   Veterans	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Collapse	   in	  Tajikistan,	  1979-­‐1992,”	  Journal	  of	  Soviet	  and	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Politics	  and	  Society	  1,	  no.	  2	  (2015).	  43	  Khaidar	   Shodiev,	   “300	   ‘Afgantsev’	   i	   narodnyi	   front,”	   Asia-­‐Plus,	   June	   1,	   2017;	   Khaidar	   Shodiev,	  “‘Afgantsy’	  Tadzhikistana:	  Ne	  zabyvaite	  nas!”	  Asia-­‐Plus,	  February	  16,	  2017.	  44	  A.A.	  Liakhovskii,	  Tragediia	  i	  doblest’	  Afgana	  (Moscow:	  Eksmo,	  2009),	  758.	  45	  Muriel	  Atkin,	  The	  Subtlest	  Battle:	  Islam	  in	  Soviet	  Tajikistan	  (Philadelphia:	  Foreign	  Policy	  Research	  Institute,	   1989);	   Paolo	   Sartori,	   “The	   Secular	   that	  Never	  Was:	  Untangling	   the	  Meaning	   of	   Islam	   in	  Soviet	   Central	   Asia,”	   Keynote	   speech	   given	   at	   the	   Central	   Eurasian	   Studies	   Society’s	   Regional	  Conference,	  Bishkek,	  2016;	  Edward	  James	  Lemon,	  “Governing	  Islam	  and	  Security	  in	  Tajikistan	  and	  Beyond:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Transnational	  Authoritarian	  Security	  Governance”	  (PhD	  diss.,	  University	  of	  Exeter,	  2016),	  111-­‐137.	  46	  Tett,	  “Ambigious	  Alliances.”	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strikes,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  with	  the	  West,	  and	  other	  moments	  too	  numerous	  to	  list	  here.	  Many	  of	  these	  events	  have	  been	  dealt	  with	  at	  length	  in	  other	  research.	  More	   importantly	   to	   this	   dissertation,	   they	   simply	   cannot	   be	   shown	   to	   have	  influenced	   either	   local	   politics	   or	   the	   state	   of	   the	   economy	   and	   society	   in	  perestroika-­‐era	  Tajikistan.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  Dushanbe,	  these	  were	  not	  the	  most	   important	   factors	   influencing	   final	   outcomes.	   Instead	   of	   unnecessarily	  proving	   this	   negative,	   this	   thesis	   has	   instead	   attempted	   to	   demonstrate	   which	  other	  events	  and	  trends	  ultimately	  led	  to	  outcomes	  of	  economic	  collapse,	  political	  paralysis,	  and	  civil	  war	  in	  Tajikistan.	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  This	   dissertation	   can	   be	   roughly	   divided	   into	   three	   unequal	   sections.	   	   First,	   two	  chapters	   analyze	   the	   state	   of	   the	   pre-­‐perestroika	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   differing	  perspectives	  on	  the	  need	  for	  reform.	  	  Chapter	  Two	  introduces	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  before	  perestroika,	   outlining	   its	   economic	   growth,	   participation	   in	   the	   broader	   Soviet	  modernization	  project,	  and	  development	  of	  a	   local	  political	   sphere.	   	  This	  chapter	  points	  to	  a	  fragile	  balance	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  whereby	  the	  continued	  implementation	  of	  centralized	  policies	  of	  “equalization”	  helped	  to	  guarantee	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  Tajik	  economy	  and	   local	  standards	  of	   living.	   	  The	  chapter	  also	  points	   to	  generally	  high	  levels	  of	  satisfaction	  amongst	  Soviet	  Tajik	  citizens	  with	  the	  Soviet	  state	  and	  their	  place	  therein.	  	  Finally,	  this	  chapter	  will	  point	  to	  the	  fractures	  that	  began	  to	  show	  in	  this	  balance	  after	  1985,	  especially	  after	   the	  removal	  of	  Rahmon	  Nabiev	   following	  Gorbachev’s	  ascension	  to	  power	  in	  Moscow.	  	  Chapter	  Three	   shifts	   focus	   to	  Moscow,	  where	   the	  mood	   in	  1985	   is	  altogether	   far	  more	   pessimistic.	   	   Considering	   the	   position	   taken	   by	  Mikhail	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	  advisors,	  it	  will	  analyze	  the	  three	  arguments	  they	  used	  to	  justify	  reform:	  statistics	  about	   economic	   growth	  were	   false,	   dissatisfaction	  was	   growing	   in	   the	   European	  metropoles	   of	   the	   USSR,	   such	   as	   Moscow	   and	   Leningrad,	   and	   mathematical	  econometric	  models	  showed	  ruin	  without	  radical	  change.	  	  Demonstrating	  how	  the	  reform	   proposals	   developed	   over	   the	   course	   of	   decades	   by	   a	   small	   cohort	   of	  mathematically-­‐minded	   economists	   came	   to	   align	   with	   Gorbachev’s	   personal	  views	  on	  reform	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  European	  Soviet	  consumers,	  this	  chapter	  will	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provide	  and	  outline	  of	  Moscow’s	  explanation	  for	  reform.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  Dushanbe,	  as	  of	  1985	  Moscow’s	  faith	  in	  the	  Soviet	  project	  was	  fading	  rapidly.	  	  The	  second	  section	  of	  this	  dissertation	  (Chapters	  Four,	  Five,	  Six,	  and	  Seven)	  details	  the	   content	   of	   Gorbachev’s	   economic	   and	   political	   reform	   program	   and	   its	  consequences.	   	   Chapter	   Four	   focuses	   on	   the	   economic	   reforms	   developed	   and	  implemented	  by	  Gorbachev	  and	  his	  advisors	  in	  Moscow	  between	  1985	  and	  1988,	  including	  the	  early	  “uskorenie”	  campaign	  and	  the	  later,	  more	  significant,	  Laws	  on	  Enterprises	  and	  Cooperatives	   (1987).	   	  The	  chapter	  will	   consider	   the	  content	  and	  intent	   of	   these	   reforms,	   as	  well	   as	   their	   basis	   in,	   and	   contrast	   to,	   earlier	   reform	  programs.	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  initial	  and	  immediate	  consequences	  of	  the	  economic	  reforms,	  which	  were	  evident	  in	  Tajikistan	  as	  early	  as	  1988.	  As	  this	  chapter	  shows,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  reforms	  was	  overwhelmingly	  negative,	  leading	  to	  economic	   downturn	   and	   increased	   unemployment	  within	   a	   very	   short	   period	   of	  time.	   	  Yet	  Moscow	  seemed	  unable	  to	  see	  this	  connection,	  creating,	  as	  this	  chapter	  highlights,	  a	  widening	  gap	  between	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  perestroika	  and	  Moscow’s	  attempts	  to	  control	  it.	  	  Chapter	   Five	   shifts	   gears	   to	   look	   at	   the	   political	   reforms	   initiated	   under	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev,	  most	  immediately	  the	  contradictory	  program	  of	  “glasnost.”	  Frustrated	  by	  the	  economic	  downturn	  and	  apparent	  lack	  of	  progress	  on	  his	  economic	  reforms,	  Gorbachev	  had	  turned	  his	  attention	  to	  mobilizing	  the	  Soviet	  people	   in	  support	  of	  reform.	   	   This	   came	   to	   involve	   a	   program	   of	   “democratization,”	   changes	   to	   the	  structure	   and	   functions	   of	   the	   Central	   Committee	   Apparatus	   in	   Moscow,	   the	  creation	  of	  an	  alternative	  state	  legislature,	  and	  “glasnost.”	  Rather	  than	  the	  freedom	  of	  speech	  that	  it	  has	  often	  been	  understood	  as	  in	  the	  West,	  however,	  here	  glasnost	  is	   best	   understood	   as	   a	   program	   of	   Party-­‐directed	   criticism	   against	   the	   Party,	  meant	  to	  open	  up	  space	  for	  non-­‐Party	  politics.	  	  In	  Tajikistan,	  as	  this	  chapter	  shows,	  this	   program	   initially	   met	   with	   local	   opposition	   and	   confusion,	   but	   following	  Moscow’s	  direct	  intervention,	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  republic’s	  first	  independent	  political	  movement	  –	  “Rastokhez.”	  	  Chapter	  Six	  continues	  the	  narrative	  begun	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  showing	  how	  Rastokhez	  and	   other	   early	   political	   movements	   in	   Dushanbe	   became	   caught	   up	   in	   the	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February	  1990	  riots	  that	  raged	  in	  the	  Tajik	  capital	  over	  February	  11-­‐18.	   	  Initially	  begun	  over	  rumours	  related	   to	   the	  arrival	  of	  a	  group	  of	  Armenian	  refugees	   from	  Baku,	  the	  riots	  eventually	  grew	  into	  a	  political	  confrontation	  over	  the	  course	  taken	  by	  Tajikistan’s	   leadership.	   	  This	  chapter	  will	  analyze	  this	  confrontation,	   including	  its	  leading	  actors,	  including	  Kahhor	  Mahkamov,	  Buri	  Karimov,	  and	  Boris	  Pugo.	  	  The	  chapter	  will	   also	   consider	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   riots	   for	  Tajikistan,	   including	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  elections	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  that	  occurred	  only	   a	   week	   afterwards.	   	   In	   many	   ways,	   the	   riots	   would	   serve	   as	   a	   beacon	   for	  future	   violence,	   showing	   how	   economic	   downturn	   was	   beginning	   to	   bring	   the	  masses	  into	  the	  streets.	  	  Chapter	  Seven	  completes	   the	  second	  section	  of	   the	  dissertation	  and	  ties	   together	  the	   consequences	   of	   Gorbachev’s	   political	   and	   economic	   reform	   programs.	  	  Covering	   the	   period	   between	   the	   February	   1990	   riots	   and	   August	   1991,	   this	  chapter	   demonstrates	   how	   ongoing	   political	   changes	   in	   Moscow,	   including	  negotiations	  over	  a	  new	  “Union	  Treaty”	  came	  to	  affect	  politics	  in	  Dushanbe.	  	  It	  will	  also	   emphasize	   ongoing	   interventions	   on	  Moscow’s	   part	   into	   Dushanbe	   politics,	  showing	   how	   this	   influence	   helped	   to	   pave	   the	   way	   for	   a	   slate	   of	   new	   political	  parties	   and	   activism.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   economic	   reforms	  were	   now	   in	   full	  force	   and	   supplemented	   by	   an	   additional	   set	   of	   changes	   that	   only	   further	  undermined	   the	   economy.	   	   In	  Tajikistan,	   1990	   and	  1991	  were	   years	   of	   collapse:	  production	  plummeted,	  while	   inflation	  and	  unemployment	   rose.	   	  The	  population	  was	   growing	   increasingly	   frustrated,	   but	   Dushanbe	   remained	   under	   a	   state	   of	  emergency	  until	  July	  1991,	  keeping	  the	  growing	  levels	  of	  social	  anger	  boiling	  under	  an	  artificial	  lid.	  	  The	   final	   section	   of	   this	   dissertation	   is	   covered	   in	   Chapters	   Eight	   and	   Nine.	  	  Chapter	  Eight	  describes	  the	  failed	  putsch	  of	  August	  1991	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Tajikistan,	   highlighting	   how	   local	   ambiguities	   about	   reform	   led	   many	   to	   tacitly	  support	   those	   conspiring	   against	  Gorbachev.	   	  When	   the	   attempted	  putsch	   failed,	  this	  made	  the	  president	  of	  Tajikistan,	  Kahhor	  Mahkamov,	  a	  political	   liability,	  and	  he	   was	   summarily	   pushed	   out	   of	   all	   positions	   of	   power.	   	   Arriving	   at	   a	   political	  vacuum,	  the	  Tajik	  leadership	  was	  essentially	  unprepared	  and	  unsure	  of	  how	  to	  act,	  continuing	  for	  months	  to	  hang	  on	  to	  any	  and	  all	  aspects	  of	  Soviet	  rule.	  	  As	  the	  USSR	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Chapter	  Two	  
Tajikistan’s	  Peripheral	  View	  of	  Soviet	  Prosperity	  
	  Arriving	  in	  Dushanbe	  in	  1985,	  a	  visitor	  would	  have	  found	  a	  teeming	  city	  of	  more	  than	   half	   a	  million	   people,	   full	   of	   “people	   bustling	   and	   arriving	   at	   bus	   stations,”	  hurrying	  about	   their	  business,	  and	  urbanely	  hardly	  even	  stopping	   to	  say	  hello	   to	  one	   another.	   	   To	   the	   residents	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Soviet	   Socialist	   Republic	   (Tajik	   SSR),	  their	   capital	  was	   a	   “great	   city,”	   impressive	   for	   its	  wide	   avenues	   and	   the	   tall	   and	  leafy	  oriental	  plane	  trees	  (chinar)	  that	  lined	  the	  roads	  and	  provided	  shade	  from	  the	  harsh	  summer	  sun.1	  	  Home	  to	  both	  the	  republican	  government	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  and	  its	  central	   industries,	   including	  a	  major	  refrigerator	  factory,	  steel	  mill,	  and	  textile	  plant,	  Dushanbe	  was	  a	  heterogeneous	  Soviet	  city	  of	  many	  peoples	  and	  languages.	  	  Tajiks	   represented	   at	   best	   half	   of	   the	   population,	   with	   thousands	   of	   Russians,	  Ukrainians,	  Germans,	  Uzbeks,	  Caucasians,	  Tatars,	   and	  many	  others	   filling	  out	   the	  population	  and	  the	  city	  streets.	  	  It	  was	  also	  as	  calm	  a	  provincial	  backwater	  as	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  Tajikistan	  rightly	  had	  the	  reputation	  in	  the	  USSR	  as	  a	  place	  where	   even	   political	   changes	   in	  Moscow	   could	   hardly	   shake	   the	   quiet	   and	  undisturbed	  course	  of	  local	  events.	  	  	  	  	  The	  capital	  –	  much	  as	  the	  entire	  Tajik	  SSR	  –	  had	  also	  grown	  enormously	  since	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  USSR	  in	  the	  1920s.	  Little	  more	  than	  a	  village	  with	  a	  large	  Monday	  bazaar	  in	  1924	  (hence	  the	  name:	  “Dushanbe”	  means	  Monday	  in	  Tajik),	  the	  city	  had	  become	   a	   fitting	   capital	   for	   Tajikistan,	   one	   of	   the	  USSR’s	   fifteen	   union	   republics.	  Initially	  folded	  into	  the	  USSR	  as	  part	  of	  the	  former	  “Turkestan	  region”	  during	  the	  Russian	   Civil	   War,	   Tajikistan	   was	   later	   made	   an	   “Autonomous	   Soviet	   Socialist	  Republic”	   in	   1924,	   and	   ultimately	   a	   full	   Soviet	   Socialist	   Republic	   in	   1929.2	  	  Incorporating	  parts	  of	  both	  the	  relatively	  more	  developed	  Ferghana	  and	  Zeravshon	  valleys	   in	   the	   north	   as	   well	   as	   the	   completely	   undeveloped	   South	   (“Eastern	  Bukhara,”	   as	   it	  was	   then	   called),	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	  was	  quickly	   singled	  out	  by	  Soviet	  planners	  as	  a	  region	  deeply	   in	  need	  of	   investment	  and	  modernization.	   	  From	  the	  1930s	   on,	   massive	   projects,	   such	   as	   the	   Vakhshstroi,	   a	   giant	   irrigation	   and	  agricultural	  project	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  southern	  Khatlon	  region,	  were	  put	  in	  place	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Abror	  Zohir,	  Dushanbe	  (Dushanbe:	  Adib,	  2007),	  9-­‐10.	  2	  Paul	  Bergne,	  The	  Birth	  of	  Tajikistan:	  National	  Identity	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Republic	  (London:	  I.B.	  Taurus,	  2007);	  Botakoz	  Kassymbekova,	  Despite	  Cultures:	  Early	  Soviet	  Rule	  in	  Tajikistan	  (Pittsburgh:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Press,	  2016);	  Masov,	  Tadzhiki.	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build	   up	   the	   Tajik	   economy	   and	   bind	   it	   tightly	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   Soviet	  superstructure.3	  	  By	  the	  1980s	  this	  project	  had	  proven	  very	  successful:	  Tajikistan	  was	   closely	   linked	   to	   Moscow	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economy	   through	   a	  thousand	  strands	  of	  finance	  and	  production.	  	  Most	  notably,	  the	  republic	  produced	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  tons	  of	  cotton	  each	  year;	  in	  exchange,	  the	  Soviet	  center	  was	  generous	  in	  its	  development	  funds,	  and	  both	  Dushanbe	  and	  the	  republic	  grew	  accordingly.	  	  	  	  	  While	  histories	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  have	  since	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR	  touched	  upon	  the	   republic’s	   long-­‐term	   economic	   and	   social	   development,	   the	   emphasis	   has	  generally	   remained	  on	   the	  excesses	  and	  difficulties	  on	   this	  path:	   the	  extremes	  of	  collectivization	  and	  the	  terror	  of	  the	  1930s,	  the	  forced	  transfers	  of	  populations,	  or	  the	   structural	   imbalances	   seen	   in	   the	   semi-­‐colonial	   cotton	   monoculture	   in	   the	  republic.	  	  These	  structural	  imbalances	  and	  experiences	  of	  violence	  are	  then	  linked	  to	   the	   breakdown	   of	   order	   in	   the	   final	   years	   of	   the	   USSR	   and	   the	   subsequent	  explosion	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Civil	  War.4	  	   All	   of	   these	   factors	   are	   indubitably	   important,	  and	  clearly	   reflect	   real	  and	  deeply	   felt	   events	   in	  Tajik	  Soviet	  history.	   	  And	  yet	   to	  link	  the	  earlier	  decades	  of	  Soviet	  history	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  political	  and	  social	  order	  in	  Tajikistan	  with	  little	  reference	  to	  the	  actual	  years	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  –	  often	  brusquely	  waved	   off	   as	   a	   period	   of	   “stagnation”	   and	   growing	   subsidies	   –	   seems	  both	  arbitrary	  and	  misleading.	  	  The	  response	  to	  perestroika	  and	  its	  reforms	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  would	  have	  been	  predicated	  not	  only	  on	  a	  reading	  of	  early	  Soviet	  history,	  but	   also	   just	   as	   much	   upon	   life	   as	   it	   was	   lived	   in	   the	   republic	   on	   the	   eve	   of	  perestroika.	  	  Elaborating	  on	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  conditions	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐1980s,	  this	  chapter	  attempts	  to	  return	  the	  experiences	  of	  daily	  life,	  work,	  and	  pay	   to	   the	  historical	   record,	   thus	   setting	   the	   stage	   for	   perestroika	   and	   economic	  reform	  later	   in	  the	  decade.	   	  Working	  with	  both	  published	  sources	  and	  previously	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  On	  Soviet	  development	  in	  Tajikistan,	  see:	  Artemy	  Kalinovsky,	  Laboratory	  of	  Socialist	  Development:	  
Cold	  War	  Politics	  and	  Decolonization	  in	  Soviet	  Tajikistan	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2018);	  on	  Vakhstroi,	   Patryk	   Reid,	   “‘Tajikistan’s	   Turksib’:	   Infrastructure	   and	   Improvisation	   in	   Economic	  Growth	   of	   the	   Vakhsh	   River	   Valley,”	   Central	   Asian	   Survey	  36,	   no.	   1	   (2017).	   	   On	   regional	  development,	  see	  Zikriyo	  Akramov,	  Natsional’nye	  osobennosti	  rosta	  rabochego	  klassa	  Tadzhikistana	  (60-­‐80-­‐e	  gg.)	  (Dushanbe:	  Irfon,	  1999).	  4	  For	  representative	  examples,	  see	  Roy,	  The	  New	  Central	  Asia;	  Markowitz,	  State	  Erosion.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion,	  see	  the	  Introduction.	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unused	   archival	   data,	   this	   analysis	   focuses	   on	   both	   the	   underlying	   successes	   of	  Soviet	   development	   in	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   structural	   imbalances	   that	  accompanied	   its	   long-­‐term	  growth.	   	   This	   chapter	   also	   challenges	   the	   established	  view	   that	   Tajikistan	   remained,	   notwithstanding	   Soviet	   modernization	   attempts,	  fundamentally	   undeveloped.	   Rather	   than	   a	   republic	   singularly	   dependent	   upon	  subsidies	  and	  outside	   funding,	   this	   chapter	  argues	   that	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  by	   the	  1980s	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	  Soviet	   economy,	  providing	   to	   the	   federal	  budget	   at	  least	  as	  much	  revenue	  as	  it	  received	  in	  return.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  a	  highly	  representative	   Soviet	   republic:	   while	   its	   economy	   may	   have	   been	   especially	  interlinked	  with	  other	  republics	  and	  the	  Soviet	  center,	  this	  made	  it	  an	  outlier	  only	  in	   terms	   of	   degree,	   not	   of	   form.	   	   	   All	   of	   the	   pieces	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economy	  were	  inherently	   inter-­‐reliant,	   a	   fact	   brought	   into	   the	   open,	   this	   chapter	   shows,	   by	   the	  particular	   fragility	  of	  Soviet	   stability	   in	  Tajikistan.	  This	   fragile	  but	   stable	  balance	  also	   conditioned	  Tajik	   elites’	   initial	   response	   to	   the	   ideas	  of	   reform	  proposed	  by	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev.	  	  Grounded	  in	  long	  experiences	  of	  late	  Soviet	  development	  and	  growth,	   they	   had	   little	   conception	   of	   what	   reform	   would	   mean	   –	   or	   even	   how	  Moscow	  had	  gone	  about	  deciding	  that	  it	  was	  necessary.	  	  	  
	  
I.	  Economic	  Growth	  On	  the	  surface,	  Tajikistan’s	  economic	  prospects	  could	  hardly	  have	  been	  better	   in	  1985.	   	   The	   republican	   economy	   had	   been	   growing	   by	   more	   than	   3%	   a	   year,	  outpacing	   both	   the	   Soviet	   average	   and	  many	   other	   countries	   stuck	   in	   the	   global	  recession	   of	   the	   early	   1980s.	   	   Industrial	   production	  was	   doing	   even	   better:	   new	  factories	   were	   opening,	   older	   factories,	   such	   as	   the	   enormous	   Tajik	   Aluminum	  Factory,	  were	   expanding,	   and	  hydroelectric	   dams	  were	  being	  built	   up	   and	  down	  the	  Vakhsh	  River.	   	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  industrial	  growth	  had	  reached	  5%	  per	  year,	  with	  the	  ambitious	  Rogun	  hydroelectric	  dam,	  built	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  tallest	  and	  most	  powerful	  in	  the	  world,	  taking	  the	  lead	  in	  both	  scope	  and	  investment.5	  	  	  Economic	  growth	  also	  led	  to	  improvements	  in	  Tajik	  Soviet	  citizens’	  daily	  lives.	  By	  the	  middle	  of	   the	  1980s	  both	  the	  production	  of	  consumer	  goods	   in	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For	  Tajikistan’s	   economic	  development	  during	   the	  early	  1980s,	   see	  XX	  S’’ezd	  Kommunisticheskoi	  
partii	  Tadzhikistana,	  24-­‐25	  ianvaria	  1986	  g.	  Stenograficheskii	  otchet	  (Dushanbe:	  Ifron,	  1987),	  19.	  On	  industrial	   growth	   over	   the	   same	   period,	   see	   Doklad	   ”Ob	   itogakh	   vypolneniia	   Gosudarstvennogo	  plana	   ekonomicheskogo	   i	   sotsial’nogo	   razvitiia	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   za	   ianvar’-­‐sentiabr’	   1985	   god,”	  GARF	   f.	  5446,	  op.	  145,	  d.	  361,	   ll.	  25-­‐26.	  For	  a	  supporting	  view,	  see:	  Masaaki	  Kuboniwa,	   "National	  Income	  in	  Postwar	  Central	  Asia,"	  Hitotsubashi	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  39,	  no.	  2	  (1998),	  69.	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and	   the	   import	   of	   similar	   goods	   from	   other	   Soviet	   republics	   was	   growing	  noticeably	   –	   in	   1985,	   for	   example,	   consumers	   in	   Tajikistan	   had	   access	   to	   and	  purchased	   5.5%	  more	   goods	   than	   the	   year	   before.	  6	  	   Access	   to	   income	  was	   also	  increasing.	   	   	  Per	  capita	  income	  reached	  nearly	  1000	  rubles	  per	  year	  in	  1985,	  and	  salaries	  continued	  to	  increase	  each	  year,	  whether	  in	  absolute	  terms	  or	  if	  adjusted	  for	  inflation.7	  	  	  While	  salaries	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  remained	  lower	  than	  in	  other	  Soviet	  republics	  –	  Tajik	  wages	   in	   the	  mid	  1980s	  were	  approximately	  83%	  of	   the	  Soviet	  average	  –	  they	  were	  rising	  almost	  twice	  as	  fast	  as	  salaries	  across	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  USSR.	  In	  1987,	  for	  example,	  the	  average	  monthly	  salary	  in	  Tajikistan	  reached	  169.5	  rubles,	   a	   6%	   increase	   over	   1986.	  8	  	   Jobs	   were	   also	   increasingly	   available,	   as	  factories	   and	   localized	   industry	   grew	   and	   expanded.	   Across	   the	   republic	   Tajik	  Soviet	   citizens	   could	   increasingly	   see	   the	   signs	  of	   economic	  development,	   just	   as	  they	   could	   feel	   them	   in	   their	   pocketbooks.	  9	  	   As	   a	   visiting	   anthropologist	   later	  noted,	   even	   for	   the	  Tajik	   villages	   this	  was	   a	   time	  of	   “political	   stability	   and	   rapid	  economic	  growth.”10	  	  Nor	  were	  the	  visible	  effects	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  Soviet	  modernization	  in	  Tajikistan	  restricted	  to	  monetary	  benefits.	  	  Crime	  remained	  exceedingly	  low	  in	  the	  years	   before	   perestroika.	   	   Recorded	   thefts	   of	   both	   private	   and	   state	   property	  (always	   a	   significant	   worry	   in	   the	   state-­‐dominated	   Soviet	   economy)	   were	  relatively	   low	   and	   even	   decreased	   in	   the	   early	   1980s;	   the	   majority	   of	   all	   such	  crimes,	   moreover,	   were	   essentially	   misdemeanors,	   leading	   to	   little	   more	   than	  fines.11	  	   Even	   in	   Dushanbe,	   where	   the	   urban	   environment	   statistically	   leaned	  towards	  higher	  crime,	  Tajik	  citizens	  enjoyed	  exceptionally	  low	  rates	  of	  murder	  (<1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Pis’mo	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  Tadzhikskoi	  v	  Sovet	  Ministrov	  SSSR	  ot	  12.09.1985	  “O	  khode	  vypolneniia	  plana	  roznichnogo	  tovarooborota	  za	  8	  mesiatsev	  1985	  g.”	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  147,	  d.	  967,	  l.	  14;	  also	  d.	  358,	  l.	  21.	  	  7	  Per	  capita	  income	  calculated	  from	  the	  reported	  figure	  of	  4.6	  billion	  rubles	  of	  “national	  income”	  for	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  in	  1985	  (XX	  S’’ezd,	  19),	  divided	  by	  the	  4.65	  million	  population	  of	  the	  republic	  in	  1985	  (TsGART	   f.	   18,	   op.	  8,	   d.	   3643,	   l.	   181).	   	  On	   salary	  growth,	   see:	  Mukhabat	  Zaidovna	  Abdunazarova,	  “Sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskie	   problemy	   sootnosheniia	   proizvoditel’nosti	   i	   oplaty	   truda	   v	  promyshlennosti	  (na	  materialakh	  promyshlennykh	  predpriiatii	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR)”	  	  (Dissertatsiia	  na	  soiskanie	  uchenoi	  stepeni	  kandidata	  ekonomicheskikh	  nauk.	  Akademiia	  nauk	  TSSR,	  1986),	  42.	  	  8	  In	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐1980s	  average	  salaries	  in	  the	  USSR	  grew	  by	  approximately	  2.7%	  per	  year;	  see	  RGAE	   f.	   4372,	   op.	   67,	   d.	   7950,	   l.	   11.	   	   For	   salaries	   in	   the	   TSSR	   over	   the	   same	   period,	   see	   G.F.	  Morozova,	  “Trudoizbytochna	  li	  Sredniaia	  Aziia?”	  Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  15,	  no.	  1	  (1989),	  76;	  RGAE,	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  7950,	  l.	  15.	  9	  N.	   Khonaliev,	   and	   I.	   Gurshumov,	   “Razvitie	   promyshlennostiy	   i	   problmy	   zaniatosti	   trudovuykh	  resursov	   v	   Tadzhikistane,”	   Izvestiia	   Akademii	   nauk	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR,	   Otdelenie	   obshchestvennykh	  
nauk,	  4,	  no.	  122,	  (1985),	  59.	  10	  Tett,	  “Ambiguous	  Alliances,”	  51.	  11	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3636,	  l.	  138;	  d.	  3642,	  l.	  112.	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per	  100,000	  citizens),	  assault	  (<4	  per	  100,000)	  and	  other	  violent	  crimes.12	  	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  residents’	  access	  to	  non-­‐material	  goods	  also	  increased.	  	  Each	  year,	  more	  and	  more	  students	  attended	  the	  republic’s	  universities	  and	  other	  institutions	  of	  higher	  education.13	  	  	  Hospitals	  were	  opened	  and	  doctors	  from	  across	  the	  USSR	  were	   sent	   to	  work	   in	  Tajikistan.	   (By	   the	  1980s	   the	  Tajik	   State	  Medical	  Institute	   named	   for	   Abuali	   ibn	   Sino	   was	   in	   fact	   considered	   one	   of	   the	   leading	  medical	   universities	   in	   the	   country.) 14 	  	   Even	   given	   Tajikistan’s	   difficult	   and	  mountainous	   terrain,	   new	   roads	   were	   constantly	   being	   built	   in	   the	   republic;	  according	   to	  one	  set	  of	  calculations,	  by	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  actually	  had	  more	  roads	  per	  square	  kilometer	  of	  territory	  than	  the	  Soviet	  average.15	  	   	  Life	  was	  improving	  each	  year,	  slowly	  but	  noticeably,	  and	  resources	  were	  clearly	  being	  spent	  to	  modernize	  and	  develop	  the	  Tajik	  economy.	  	  As	  Pyotr	  Luchinskii,	  then	  the	  Second	  Secretary	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Communist	   Party,	   argued	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1980s:	   “There	   is	   no	  republic	   in	   the	   USSR	  with	  more	   ideal	   conditions	   for	   industrial	   growth	   than	   our	  own.”	  16	  	  It	  was	  no	  accident,	  moreover,	  that	  Tajik	  economy	  found	  itself	  in	  this	  position.	   	  As	  one	  of	   the	  USSR’s	   less	  developed	  republics,	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  privy	  to	   the	  Soviet	  policy	  of	  “equalization”	  (vyravnivanie),	  which	  was	  meant	  to	  help	  bring	  the	  levels	  of	  economic	  development	   in	   less	   advanced	   republics	  up	   to	   the	   standard	  of	  Russian	  Soviet	  Federated	  Socialist	  Republic	  (RSFSR),	   the	  Baltic	  republics,	  and	  other	  more	  economically	   advanced	   regions	  of	   the	  USSR.	   	  Rather	   than	  an	  empty	   statement	  of	  policy,	   equalization	   led	   to	   significant	   investments	   in	   those	   republics	   –	   primarily	  those	   in	   Central	   Asia	   –	   deemed	   to	   be	   economically	   behind.17	  	   In	   the	   1970s	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Calculated	  from	  internal	  Tajik	  government	  statistics.	  See:	  Informatsionnaia	  zapiska	  Prokuratury	  Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   No.	   16/5-­‐8949	   ot	   23.11.1989,	   TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   41,	   d.	   389,	   l.	   35;	   Pis'mo	  Polkovnika	   militsii	   Rakhmanova	   v	   Gosudarstvenno-­‐pravovoi	   otdel	   TsK	   KP	   TSSR,	   tov.	  Khuvaidullaevu,	  N.Kh.,	  No.	  10/-­‐3195	  ot	  02.11.1989,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  389,	  l.	  41.	  	  13	  N.M.	  Nazarshoev,	  Intelligentsiia	  Tadzhikistana	  v	  1961-­‐1985	  gg.	  (Dushanbe:	  Donish,	  1989),	  22.	  	  14	  Interviews	  with	   former	   and	   current	   employees	   of	   the	  Tajik	  medical	   system,	  Dushanbe,	   August	  2014;	  February	  2015;	  London,	  July	  2015.	  15	  Shukhrat	   Vakhidovich	   Asrorov,	   “Proizvodstvennaia	   infrastruktura	   i	   ee	   vliianie	   na	   regional’noe	  razvitie	   i	   razmeshchenie	   proizvodstva	   (na	   materialakh	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR)”	   (Dissertatsiia	   na	  soiskanie	  uchenoi	  stepeni	  kandidata	  ekonomicheskikh	  nauk,	  AN	  TSSR,	  1987),	  91.	  16	  Stenogramma	   Zasedaniia	   Soveta	   Ministrov	   Tadzhikistana	   31.09.1987,	   TsGART	   f.	   18,	   op.	   8,	   d.	  3647,	  l.	  44.	  17	  Western	   literature	  has	  often	  suggested	   that	  equalization	  was	   little	  more	   than	   lip	   service	   to	   the	  less	  developed	  regions	  of	   the	  USSR	  or	  a	  policy	   that	   failed	   to	  have	  much	   impact.	   	  Such	  arguments,	  however,	   tend	   to	   avoid	   consideration	   of	   economic	   data	   showing	   equalization’s	   real	   impact	   on	  economic	  outcomes	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  focusing	  instead	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  region	  remained	  relatively	  less	  developed	  up	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  While	  it	  is	  clearly	  true	  that	  the	  USSR	  could	  have	  done	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1980s,	  rates	  of	  fixed	  capital	  investment	  in	  Central	  Asia	  were	  much	  higher	  than	  in	  the	   country’s	   developed	   republics.	   	   Rates	   of	   capital	   investment	   per	   capita	   in	   the	  region,	  for	  example,	  were	  2	  to	  4	  times	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  RSFSR.18	  	  Republics	  such	  as	  Tajikistan	  also	  had	  the	  right	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  nearly	  100%	  of	  the	  revenue	  collected	  locally	   through	   the	   “turnover	   tax”	   (nalog	   s	   oborota)	   and	   other	   similar	   taxes.19	  	  	  Long	   ingrained	   in	  Soviet	  policy,	  moreover,	  equalization	   frequently	   found	  support	  on	  the	  highest	   levels	  of	  Soviet	  government	   in	   the	  decade	  before	  1985.	   	  Brezhnev	  mentioned	   the	   need	   to	   promote	   the	   equalization	   of	   Soviet	   republics	   on	  multiple	  occasions,	   and	   the	   principle	   remained	   embedded	   in	   the	   1981	   Communist	   Party	  platform.20 	  	   	   Equalization	   was	   considered	   so	   important,	   in	   fact,	   that	   one	   of	  Chernenko’s	  closest	  advisors	  later	  recalled	  conversations	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  about	  the	  need	   to	  promote	  policies	  of	   “zero	  overall	   growth”	   in	   the	  USSR	  as	   a	  whole	   to	  guarantee	  funds	  for	  the	  development	  of	  less	  advanced	  republics.21	  	  	  	  In	  Tajikistan,	  equalization	  was	  directly	   linked	  to	  the	  higher	  than	  average	  rates	  of	  economic	   growth	   and	   industrial	   development	   enjoyed	   in	   the	   republic.	   	   Rates	   of	  industrial	  growth	  from	  1975-­‐1985	  were	  clearly	  higher	  in	  Tajikistan	  than	  the	  Soviet	  average.22	  	   The	   agricultural	   sector,	   which	   through	   the	   1980s	   still	   formed	   the	  backbone	  of	   the	  Tajik	   economy,	   also	  benefitted	   from	  Soviet	  policies	  of	   economic	  equalization.	   	   From	   1965	   on,	   the	   “bulk	   prices”	   (zakupochnie	   tseny)	   paid	   to	  kholkhozes	   and	   agricultural	   enterprises	   for	   raw	  produce	   rose	   consistently	  while	  retail	  prices	  remained	  stagnant.	   	  Since	   the	  state	  eventually	  paid	  more	   to	   farmers	  for	  meat,	  milk,	  and	  many	  other	  food	  products	  than	  consumers	  paid	  in	  stores,	  this	  represented	   a	   state	   transfer	   to	   the	   agricultural	   sector,	   providing	   support	   for	  increased	  and	  increasingly	  standardized	  wages	  for	  farmers.	  	  	  By	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
more	  to	  equalize,	  this	  does	  not	  prove	  that	  no	  efforts	  –	  or	  monies	  –	  were	  spent	  to	  equalize.	  	  There	  is	  in	  fact	  strong	  evidence	  for	  equalization’s	  real	  and	  important	  impact	  in	  republics	  such	  as	  Tajikistan.	  	  Cf.	  Boris	  Z.	  Rumer,	  Soviet	  Central	  Asia	  –	  A	  Tragic	  Experiment	  (Boston:	  Unwin	  Hyman,	  1989),	  20;	  G.	  Gleason,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Dependency	  under	  Socialism:	  The	  Asian	  Republics	  in	  the	  USSR,”	  
Studies	  in	  Comparative	  Communism	  24	  ,	  no.	  4	  (1991);	  Walker,	  Dissolution,	  43.	  18	  Rumer,	  Soviet	  Central	  Asia,	  31-­‐33;	  on	  the	  RSFSR,	  see	  Pikhoia,	  “Pochemu	  raspal’sia,”	  409.	  19	  Donna	  Bahry,	  Outside	  Moscow:	  Power,	  Politics,	  and	  Budgetary	  Policy	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Republics	   (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  55.	  20	  “Doklad	  L.I.	  Brezhnev	  XXVI	  S’’ezdu	  KP	  SSSR,	  23	  fevrial’ia	  1981	  g.”	  In	  Materialy	  XXVI	  S’’ezda	  KPSS	  (Moscow:	  Politizdat,	  1982),	  54;	  also,	  Gleason,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Dependency,”	  336.	  	  21	  Vadim	  Pechenev,	  Gorbachev:	  k	  vershinam	  vlasti	   (Moscow:	   Izdatel’stvo	  “Gospodin	  Narod”,	  1991),	  50.	  22	  Doklad	   ekonomicheskogo	   otdela	   TsK	   KPSS	   “Osnovnie	   itogy	   ekonomicheskogo	   i	   sotsial’nogo	  razvitiia	   SSSR	   za	   1976–1985	   gg.,”	   RGASPI,	   f.	   653,	   op.	   1,	   d.	   41,	   l.	   19.	   Also:	   Kuboniwa,	   “National	  Income,”	  69,	  85-­‐87.	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early	   1980s	   agricultural	  wages	   had	   reached	  nearly	   90%	  of	   industrial	  wages	   and	  were	  rising	  at	  faster	  rates	  than	  the	  latter;	  the	  state	  spent	  nearly	  19	  billion	  rubles	  a	  year	   keeping	   the	   system	  afloat.23	  	   Insofar	   as	  many	  of	   the	  USSR’s	   least	   developed	  regions,	   such	   as	   Tajikistan,	   were	   also	   its	   most	   agricultural,	   efforts	   to	   raise	  agricultural	   salaries	   were	   also	   understood	   as	   part	   of	   the	   broader	   push	   for	  equalization.	   	   “Categories	   of	   workers	   receiving	   low	   and	   middle	   levels	   of	   pay,”	  which	   overwhelmingly	  meant	   agricultural	   workers,	   were	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	  decades	  before	  1985	  provided	  with	  consistent	  and	  centralized	  pay	  raises,	  part	  of	  a	  broader	   plan	   to	   even	   out	   (vyravnit’)	   Soviet	   citizens’	   (and	   regions’)	   purchasing	  power.24	  	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  equalization’s	  value	  for	  Tajikistan	  was	  inarguable.	  	  As	  Izatullo	   Khayoev,	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	  summarized:	   “In	   our	   republic	   alone	   great	   sums	  have	  been	   invested	   –	   during	   the	  10th	  and	  11th	   five	  year	  plans	  [1976-­‐1986]	  2.3	  billion	  rubles	  were	   invested.”	   	  This	  was	  more	   than	  equal	   to	   the	   republic’s	   entire	  annual	  budget,	   and	  a	   sum	   that	  was	  clearly	  linked	  to	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  booming	  “productive	  capacity.”25	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  Nor	  were	   the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  elites	  alone	   in	   their	  optimism.	   	   In	   the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  many	  residents	  of	  Dushanbe	  and	  Tajikistan’s	  other	  towns	  and	  villages	  were	  equivalently	  positive	   and	   hopeful	   about	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   local	   economy	   and	   the	   societal	  benefits	   it	   entailed.	   	   Basic	   standards	   of	   living	   were	   on	   the	   rise	   throughout	   the	  republic,	   a	   tendency	   remarked	   upon	   by	   local	   and	   Western	   economists	   alike.	  26	  Importantly,	   moreover,	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   was	   managing	   to	   balance	   wage	   increases	  against	   production	   and	   productivity	   growth,	   which	   guaranteed	   that	   for	   every	  additional	  ruble	  earned	  in	  the	  republic	  more	  than	  one	  additional	  ruble’s	  worth	  of	  material	   product	   would	   be	   produced.	   	   For	   the	   eight	   months	   of	   January-­‐August	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  On	  the	  “agricultural	  subsidy”	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  promoting	  equalization	  in	  agricultural	  regions,	  see	  Valentin	  Litvin,	  The	  Soviet	  Agro-­‐Industrial	  Complex	  –	  Structure	  and	  Performance	   (Westview	  Press:	  Boulder,	  1987),	  5;	  Hosking,	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  393.	   	  On	  relative	   levels	  of	  salary	  growth,	  see	  Spravka	  o	  dotatsiiakh	  iz	  biudzheta	  na	  produktsiiu	  sel’skogo	  khoziaistva,	  GARF,	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  147,	  d.	  116,	  l.	  167;	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  7950,	  l.	  11.	  24	  L.S.	  Bliakhman	  and	  T.S.	  Zlotinskaia,	  “Differentsiatsiia	  zarabotnoi	  platy	  kak	  faktor	  stimulirovaniia	  truda,”	  Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  10,	  no.	  1	  (1984),	  39.	  	  25	  Stenogramma	  Zasedaniia	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  ot	  26.05.1987,	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3647,	  l.	  162.	  	  26 A.	   Gazibekov,	   “Sotsial'no-­‐ekonomicheskie	   preobrazovaniia	   na	   sele	   i	   razvitie	   kooperativnoi	  torgovle	   v	   tadzhikskoi	   SSR,”	   Izvestiia	  Akademiii	   nauk	   tadzhikskoi	   SSR,	   otdelenie	   obshchestvennykh	  
nauk	  1,	  no.	  95	  (1979),	  80;	  Donna	  Bahry	  and	  Carol	  Nechemias,	  “Half	  Full	  or	  Half	  Empty?	  	  The	  Debate	  over	  Soviet	  Regional	  Equality,”	  Slavic	  Review	  40,	  no.	  3	  (1981),	  370-­‐371.	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1985,	   for	   example,	   the	   average	  worker	   in	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	  produced	  1.72	   rubles	   of	  value	  for	  every	  1	  ruble	  he	  received	  in	  salary.	  	  For	  the	  year	  as	  a	  whole,	  it	  was	  later	  reported,	   per	   capita	   consumption	   in	   the	   republic	   had	   come	   to	   927	   rubles	  compared	  to	  per	  capita	  production	  of	  971	  rubles.	  27	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  was	  no	  large	  “overhang”	  of	  unspent	  rubles	  in	  Soviet	  Tajik	  consumers’	  pockets	  or	  bank	  accounts,	  which	   could	   have	   led	   to	   deficits.28	  	   In	   fact,	   evidence	   indicates	   that	   deficits	   and	  shortages	  of	  consumer	  goods	  became	  increasingly	  rare	   in	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐1980s	  in	  Tajikistan.29	  	  	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   citizens	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	  would	   have	   seen	   definite	   and	   concrete	  improvements	   to	   their	   lives	   each	   year.	   	   Rather	   than	   making	   horizontal	  comparisons	  to	  life	  in	  other	  Soviet	  republics	  or	  foreign	  countries	  where	  standards	  of	   living	  may	  have	  been	  higher,	   they	  made	  temporal	  comparisons	  to	  the	  past.	   	  At	  worst,	  they	  would	  have	  made	  comparisons	  to	  close	  neighbors	  such	  as	  Afghanistan,	  where	  things	  were	  clearly	  worse	   in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	   In	  the	  novel	  Dushanbe,	  for	   example,	   one	   of	   the	   characters	   says,	   “Lenin	   is	   pointing	   in	   the	   direction	   of	  Afghanistan.	  	  He	  is	  saying:	  ‘we	  have	  taken	  all	  the	  lands,	  but	  Afghanistan	  is	  left.’”	  30	  	  This	  characterization	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  the	  “backwards”	  neighbor	  was	  in	  fact	  very	  common	  in	  Soviet	  Tajikistan.	   	   In	  either	  case,	  Tajikistan	  came	  out	   looking	  better	  –	  compared	   to	   decades	   past,	   life	   in	   the	   republic	   was	   clearly	   and	   inarguably	  improving.	  	  Sitting	  in	  his	  idyllic	  garden	  in	  a	  village	  outside	  of	  Khujand	  in	  1984,	  the	  local	  village	  chairman	  Kh.	  Kenjaev	  would	  have	  had	  no	  doubts	  about	  his	  cause	  for	  sanguinity.	  	  A	  veteran	  of	  the	  war	  with	  Germany	  and	  Hero	  of	  the	  USSR,	  Kenjaev	  had	  watched	   his	   republic	   grow	   exponentially	   in	   the	   past	   forty	   years.	   	   Sitting	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  For	   the	   USSR	   as	   a	   whole,	   however,	   the	   average	   citizen	   in	   1985	   produced	   goods	   and	   services	  valued	  at	  approximately	  600	  rubles	  more	  than	  he	  or	  she	  consumed.	  	  	  In	  the	  most	  developed	  parts	  of	  the	   country,	   this	   gap	  was	   as	   high	   as	   900.	   See	   Rustam	  Narzikulov,	   “Dvulikii	   Ianus	   v	   serdtse	   Azii:	  nekotorie	   itogy	   70-­‐letnogo	   razvitiia	   sredneaziatskikh	   respublik	   v	   sostave	   SSSR,”	   Vostok	   5,	   1991,	  123.	  28	  In	   a	   command	   economy	   such	   as	   the	   USSR,	   deficits	   are	   best	   understood	   as	   “passive	   inflation,”	  resulting	  from	  consumers’	  access	  to	  more	  money	  than	  the	  total	  value	  of	  available	  goods.	   	  Because	  prices	   do	   not	   rise	   dynamically	   in	   response	   to	   increased	   monetary	   levels,	   consumers	   tend	   to	  increase	  their	  purchases	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  further	  systemic	  changes.	  29 	  Interviews	   with	   Georgii	   Koshlakov,	   Dushanbe,	   July	   2016;	   Zaragul	   Mirrasanova,	   Dushanbe,	  September	  2014.	  	  30	  Abror,	  Dushanbe,	  6.	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reading	   a	   book	   to	   his	   laughing	   grandchildren,	   it	  would	   have	   been	   impossible	   to	  convince	  him	  that	  life	  was	  doing	  anything	  but	  getting	  better.31	  	  	  Perspectives	   such	   as	   Kenjaev’s	   would	   have	   been	   common	   throughout	   the	   Tajik	  SSR,	  much	  as	  they	  were	  in	  many	  less	  developed	  Soviet	  republics	  during	  the	  USSR.	  	  While	   Soviet	   sociological	   surveys	   tended	   to	   skip	   over	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   instead	  treating	   Uzbekistan	   as	   a	   sample	   representative	   of	   the	   entire	   region,	   the	   surveys	  conducted	  did	  frequently	  demonstrate	  particularly	  high	  levels	  of	  social	  satisfaction	  and	  optimism	  amongst	  the	  citizens	  of	  Central	  Asian	  republics.32	  	  In	  Tajikistan,	  the	  idea	   that	   life	  was	  getting	  better	  was	  shared	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  groups	  and	  geographic	   regions:	   even	   those	   politicians	   who	   complained	   about	   geographical	  imbalances	   in	  development	  pointed	   to	   the	   republic’s	   increasing	  capacity	   to	  build	  factories	  and	  create	  jobs.33	  	  For	  many,	  moreover,	  there	  was	  little	  doubt	  that	  things	  were	  going	  to	  improve:	  as	  one	  local	  engineer	  recalled,	  there	  was	  a	  “feeling	  of	  being	  part	  of	  a	  great	  development	  project,”	  and	  Tajik	  Soviet	  citizens	  were	  proud	  of	  their	  growing	   republic	   and	   its	   increasing	   economic	   potential.34	  	   “We	   felt	   lucky,”	   the	  former	  Tajik	  Gosplan	  worker	  Rahmat	  Khakulov	   later	   summed	  up,	   “to	   have	   been	  living	  during	  the	  dawn	  of	  Soviet	  development.”35	  	  
II.	  Under	  the	  Surface:	  the	  Fragility	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Economy	  Unfortunately,	  not	  everything	  was	  developing	  as	  smoothly	  as	  it	  may	  have	  seemed	  to	  the	  residents	  of	  Dushanbe	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  	  Tajikistan’s	  growing	  economy	  hid	  many	   structural	   imbalances	   and	   growing	   inequalities	   under	   its	   calm	   surface	   of	  societal	  aplomb,	  held	  in	  check	  only	  by	  the	  greater	  superstructure	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	   support	   provided	   to	   Tajikistan	   from	   the	   central	   Soviet	   authorities.	   	   Most	  immediately	  obvious	  was	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  unchanging	  position	  as	  the	  USSR’s	  most	  agrarian	   republic.	   	   Even	   as	   equalization	   brought	   increased	   investment	   and	  productive	  capacity	  to	  the	  republic,	  the	  absolute	  majority	  of	  its	  citizens	  continued	  to	   live	   in	   rural	   areas	   and	   work	   in	   agriculture.	   	   By	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   1980s,	   for	  example,	  67%	  of	  the	  population	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  lived	  outside	  of	  cities,	  making	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  GAKRT,	   k.ia.	   “Iu-­‐7.2”,	   no.	   0-­‐93335.	   	   Predsedatel’	   ilpolkoma	   Kistakuzskogo	   kishlachnogo	   soveta	  Khodzhentskogo	  raiona	  veteran	  Velikoi	  Otechestvennoi	  Voiny,	  geroi	  SSSR,	  Kh.	  Kendzhaev	  so	  svoimi	  vnukami.	  	  M.	  Babadzhanov,	  1984.	  	  32	  See	   Iu.	   V.	   Arutiunian	   and	   L.M.	   Drobizheva,	   “Natsional’nye	   osobennosti	   kul’tury	   i	   nekotorye	  aspekty	  sotsial’noi	  zhizni	  sovetskogo	  obshchestva,”	  Voprosy	  istorii	  61,	  no.	  7	  (1987),	  26.	  33	  For	  example:	  Hikmatullo	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish	  (Dushanbe:	  Afsona,	  1995),	  22.	  	  34	  Interview	  with	  a	  Tajik	  Soviet	  engineer	  and	  cooperative	  founder,	  Dushanbe,	  September	  2016.	  35	  Interview	  with	  Rahmat	  Khakulov,	  Dushanbe,	  February	  2015.	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republic	  the	  least	  urbanized	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  36	  Agriculture	  also	  dominated	  the	  economy,	  with	  more	   than	  40%	  of	   the	  entire	  population	  of	   the	  TSSR	  employed	   in	  the	   sector,	   also	   amongst	   the	   highest	   rates	   in	   the	   USSR.	  37	  Worse,	   and	   uniquely	  amongst	   all	   Soviet	   republics,	   Tajikistan	   had	   actually	   deurbanized	   over	   the	   past	  decade	  –	  the	  republic	  was	  becoming	  more	  rural	  over	  time,	  rather	  than	  less.38	  	  Deurbanization	  and	  an	  unending	  emphasis	  on	  agricultural	  output	  went	  against	  all	  Soviet	   principles	   of	   development	   and	   modernization,	   yet	   no	   matter	   how	   much	  money	   was	   spent	   on	   equalization,	   opening	   factory	   “outlets”	   in	   rural	   areas	   or	  exhorting	   the	  Tajik	  population	   to	  move	   to	   cities,	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	  proved	  unable	   to	  change	   the	   rural	   distribution	   of	   its	   population.	   	   A	   number	   of	   factors	   proved	   to	  exacerbate	   the	   situation,	   but	   the	   central	   culprit	   for	   this	   structural	   intransigence	  was	   unavoidable:	   cotton.	   	   	   While	   long-­‐term	   economic	   projections	   called	   for	  economic	  equalization	  in	  the	  USSR,	  short-­‐term	  plans	  and	  the	  constant	  struggle	  to	  meet	  growing	  output	  targets	  meant	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  relied	  upon	  a	  “division	  of	  labor”	  (razdelenie	  truda)	  amongst	  its	  various	  regions	  to	  boost	  production	  through	  economies	  of	  scale.	   	  When	  cotton	  had	  been	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  in	   the	   1920s,	   there	   seemed	   little	   cause	   for	   argument	   about	   the	   place	   Tajikistan	  should	   take	   in	   this	   division:	   with	   an	   almost	   complete	   lack	   of	   industry	   in	   the	  republic,	   agriculture	   was	   the	   economic	   sphere	   that	   offered	   the	   most	   reward.	  	  Expanding	   on	   the	   Tsarist	   heritage	   in	   the	   region,	   moreover,	   the	   early	   Soviet	  government	  expanded	  cotton	  production	  across	  Tajikistan,	   filling	   in	  swamps	  and	  building	   irrigation	   canals	   in	   order	   to	   fill	   local	   fields	   with	   a	   cash	   crop	   in	   high	  demand	   by	   Soviet	   enterprises	   and	   on	   the	   world	   market	   as	   a	   source	   of	   hard	  currency. 39 	  	   Thus	   Tajikistan	   had	   been	   long	   assigned	   the	   role	   of	   producing	  agricultural	  goods,	  and,	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  cotton.	  	  As	  this	  chapter	  will	  show,	  moreover,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  cotton	  created	  strong	  incentives	  for	  workers	  to	  remain	  in	  villages	  –	  which	  in	  turn	  drove	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  rural	  sector	  and	  the	  statistical	  deurbanization	  worried	  over	  by	  Soviet	  economists.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  V.I.	  Mukomel',	  “Vremia	  otvetstvennykh	  reshenii,”	  Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  15,	  no.	  1	  (1989),	  10.	  37	  Narzikulov,	  “Dvulikii	  Ianus	  v	  serdtse	  Azii,”	  121-­‐122.	  	  38 	  Kh.	   Umarov	   and	   N.	   Matkupov,	   “Migratsionnie	   protsessy:	   motivy	   i	   otsenki,”	   Kommunist	  
Tadzhikistan,	  November	  17,	  1989.	  39	  On	  cotton	  farming	  in	  Tajikistan	  in	  the	  1920s,	  see:	  Bergne,	  The	  Birth	  of	  Tajikistan.	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By	   the	   mid-­‐1980s	   cotton	   absolutely	   dominated	   the	   Tajik	   economy.	   	   Each	   year	  cotton	   was	   planted	   on	   kolkhozes	   and	   sovkhozes	   throughout	   Tajikistan,	   where	  nearly	  half	  of	  the	  republic’s	  total	  farmed	  acreage	  was	  seeded	  with	  cotton.	  40	  Nearly	  1,200,000	  agricultural	  workers	   toiled	  on	  specialized	  cotton-­‐producing	   farms	   that	  generated	  75%	  of	  the	  republic’s	  cotton	  output.41	  	  In	  total,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  produced	  approximately	   900,000	  metric	   tons	   of	   raw	   cotton	   each	   year	   during	   the	   early	   to	  mid-­‐1980s,	   for	  which	   its	   farms	  and	  enterprises	  were	  paid	  more	  than	  800	  million	  rubles	  annually.	  	  This	  was	  equivalent	  to	  20-­‐25%	  of	  the	  total	  revenues	  generated	  in	  the	  republic	  each	  year,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  monetary	  value	  and	  total	  weight,	  more	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  republic’s	  agricultural	  production	  combined.42	  	  No	  other	  single	  product	  or	  even	  productive	  sector	  could	  compete	  with	  cotton	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Cotton	  Production	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  1983-­‐198643	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Yuri	  G.	  Alexandrov,	  “Central	  Asia:	  specific	  case	  of	  economic	  underdevelopment,”	  in	  State,	  Religion	  
and	  Society	  in	  Central	  Asia:	  A	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Critique,	  ed.	  Vitaly	  Naumkin	  (Reading:	  Ithaca	  Press,	  1993),	  108.	  41	  Calculated	  from	  “Svodnyi	  plan	  ekonomicheskogo	  i	  sotsial’nogo	  razvitiia	  kolkhozov,	  sovkhozov,	   i	  mezhkhoziaistvennykh	  predpriiatii	  na	  1984	  god,”	  TsGART	  f.	  288,	  op.	  14,	  d.	  5293,	  ll.	  15,	  44,	  46.	  	  42	  In	   1986,	   for	   example,	   payments	   of	   825.2	  million	   rubles	  were	   provided	   to	   Tajik	   kolkhozes	   and	  sovkhozes	   for	  922,187	   tons	  of	   cotton,	  while	   the	   total	   revenue	  produced	   in	  and	  distributed	   to	   the	  republic	  that	  year	  was	  according	  to	  various	  estimates	  approximately	  4	  billion	  rubles.	   	  See	  RGAE	  f.	  1562,	  op.	  68,	  d.	  2104,	   ll.	  26–28,	  59;	  d.	  1773,	   l.	  1–3;	  Misha	  V.	  Belkindas	  and	  Matthew	   J.	   Sagers,	   “A	  Preliminary	   Analysis	   of	   Economic	   Relations	   Among	   Union	   Republics	   of	   the	   USSR:	   1970s-­‐1988,”	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While	  cotton	  may	  have	  helped	  to	  guarantee	  a	  steady	  stream	  of	  rubles	  to	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	   during	   the	   1980s,	   the	   exclusive	   emphasis	   on	   its	   production	   had	   over	   the	  decades	   led	   to	   a	   number	   of	   seemingly	   insurmountable	   economic	   contradictions.	  	  First	   and	   foremost,	   cotton	   kept	   the	   republic	   agrarian,	   insofar	   as	   the	   greatest	  proportion	   of	   funding	   was	   directed	   to	   the	   farming,	   tending,	   and	   harvesting	   of	  cotton	  in	  rural	  areas.	  	  Notwithstanding	  frequent	  demands	  to	  change	  the	  situation,	  moreover,	   even	   the	   primary	   processing	   of	   raw	   seed	   cotton	   (khlopok-­‐syrets)	   into	  cotton	  lint	  (khlopok-­‐volokno)	  occurred	  outside	  of	  the	  republic:	  in	  the	  1980s	  only	  a	  third	  of	  local	  seed	  cotton	  was	  processed	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  with	  the	  majority	  going	  for	   processing	   to	   Russia	   and	   Ukraine.44	  	   Cotton	   processing	   could	   have	   boosted	  employment	   and	   economic	   growth	   in	   regional	   cities,	   but	   the	   shipment	   of	   the	  majority	  of	  the	  republic’s	  raw	  cotton	  to	  other	  regions	  for	  processing	  blocked	  this	  opportunity.	  	  This	  meant	  that	  jobs	  remained	  outside	  of	  cities,	  helping	  to	  guarantee	  the	  population’s	  limited	  incentive	  to	  move.	  	  	  	  	  In	  addition,	  cotton	  helped	  to	  keep	  salaries	  particularly	  low	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  	  While	  agricultural	   salaries	   had	   increased	   significantly	   in	   comparison	   to	   industrial	   and	  service	  workers’	  pay	  since	  the	  1960s,	  they	  continued	  to	  lag	  noticeably	  behind.	  	  As	  noted	   above,	   by	   the	   mid	   1980s	   they	   were	   on	   average	   only	   83%	   of	   the	   Soviet	  standard.	  	  In	  Tajikistan,	  salaries	  were	  often	  even	  lower.	  	  Agricultural	  production	  in	  the	   USSR	  was	   divided	   between	   kolkhozes,	   “collective”	   farms	  where	   the	  workers	  were	  “members”	  and	  received	  a	  mix	  of	  set	  salaries	  and	  performance-­‐related	  pay,	  and	   sovkhozes,	   “state”	   farms	  where	   the	  workers	   received	   standardized	   salaries.	  	  Considered	   more	   efficient	   by	   Soviet	   economic	   planners,	   sovkhozes	   were	  incentivized	   by	   higher	   payments	   for	   agricultural	   products,	   and	  were	   able	   to	   pay	  higher	  salaries	  to	  their	  workers.45	  	  In	  practice,	  kolkhoz	  workers	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s	  received	   approximately	  15%	   less	   than	   sovkhoz	  workers	   –	   as	   little	   as	  150	   rubles	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  In	   1985	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	  processed	  91,700	  metric	   tons	   of	   cotton	   lint.	   As	   a	   rough	   guideline,	   three	  kilograms	  of	  seed	  (raw)	  cotton	  can	  be	  processed	  into	  one	  kilogram	  of	  cotton	  lint,	  meaning	  that	  this	  production	   represented	  275,100	  metric	   tons	   of	   seed	   cotton,	   or	   29%	  of	   the	   total	   produced	   in	   the	  republic.	  	  For	  seed	  cotton	  and	  cotton	  lint	  production	  in	  1985,	  see	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  147,	  d.	  358,	  l.	  11;	  d.	  791,	  l.	  1	  and	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  145,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  28,	  respectively.	  	  On	  the	  relationship	  between	  seed	  cotton	   and	   cotton	   lint	   production,	   see	   John	   Baffes,	   “Cotton-­‐Dependent	   Countries	   in	   the	   Global	  Context,”	   in	   The	   Cotton	   Sector	   in	   Central	   Asia:	   Economic	   Policy	   and	   Development	   Challenges,	   ed.	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti	  (London:	  SOAS,	  2007),	  45.	  	  45	  In	  Tajikistan	  payments	   to	   sovokhozes	   for	  one	  kilogram	  of	   cotton	   fiber	  were	  approximately	  5%	  higher	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  than	  equivalent	  payments	  to	  kolkhozes	  (TsGART	  f.	  288,	  op.	  14,	  d.	  5299,	  l.	  48).	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per	  month.46	  	  While	  this	  was	  enough	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	  one	  or	  two	  people,	   it	   was	   hardly	   sufficient	   for	   a	   family	   with	   children.	   	   Unfortunately,	  moreover,	   many	   kolkhoz	   workers	   in	   Tajikistan	   earned	   far	   less	   than	   even	   this	  minimum.	  	  For	  the	  whole	  of	  1986,	  for	  example,	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  in	  the	  village	  of	  Shamtuchi	   in	   Aini	   district	   “the	   husband	   and	   wife	   Sultan	   Kurbonov	   and	   Zebi	  Sultonova…earned	   910	   rubles.”	   	   The	   journalist	   writing	   about	   their	   lives	   was	  aghast:	  “Is	  this	  really	  enough	  for	  a	  family	  of	  7	  people?	   	  Can	  this	  suffice	  for	  [their]	  yearly	  earnings?”47	  	  	  Even	   attempts	   to	   improve	   the	   lives	   of	   agricultural	   workers	   had	   only	   seemed	   to	  complicate	   matters.	   	   Considering	   the	   lower	   efficiency	   and	   “labor	   productivity”	  (proizvoditel’nost’	  truda)	  of	  kolkhozes	  in	  comparison	  to	  sovkhozes	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  long-­‐term	   ideological	   goal	   of	  uniting	   cooperative	   and	   state	  property	  –	   the	  Soviet	  state	   had	   since	   the	   1960s	   engaged	   in	   a	  Union-­‐wide	   policy	   of	  merging	   kolkhozes	  into	  sovkhozes.48	  	  Combined	  into	  larger	  sovkhozes,	  former	  kolkhozes	  became	  more	  efficient	   by	   taking	   advantage	   of	   economies	   of	   scale,	   as	   well	   as	   by	   shedding	  workers,	   which	   increased	   productivity	   rates.	   In	   Tajikistan,	   for	   example,	   in	   1965	  there	  were	  419	  kolkhozes	  and	  55	  sovkhozes;	  by	  1984	  this	  ratio	  had	  shifted	  to	  158	  kolkhozes	  and	  175	  sovkhozes.	  	  On	  average,	  however,	  each	  sovkhoz	  employed	  only	  around	  3,000	  workers,	  far	  less	  than	  the	  equivalent	  figure	  of	  8,250	  on	  the	  average	  kolkhoz.49	  	  As	  the	  Soviet	  ethnographer	  Sergei	  Poliakov	  first	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	   this	   emphasis	   on	   sovkhozes	   and	   improving	   agricultural	   productivity	   had	  the	  effect	  of	  pushing	  a	  notable	  part	  of	   the	  rural	  population	  out	  of	  employment.50	  	  While	  the	  statistics	  are	  unclear,	  numbers	  produced	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Central	  Statistics	  Agency	  in	  1985	  appear	  to	  show	  that	  up	  to	  200,000	  “possible”	  kolkhoz	  members	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  had	  ended	  up	  unemployed.51	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  GARF,	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  147,	  d.	  116,	  l.	  167.	  47	  Mukhiddin	  Olimpur,	  “Zdorov’ia	  za	  den’gi	  ne	  kupish,”	  Pamir	  39,	  no.	  7	  (1988),	  164.	  	  48	  A.S.	  Tsipko,	  “Vozmozhnosti	  i	  reservy	  kooperatsii,”	  Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  12,	  no.2	  (1986),	  48.	  	  49	  For	   1965,	   see	   N.N.	   Shatskikh	   and	   A.G.	   Khadzhibaev,	   Ispol’zovanie	   trudovykh	   resursov	   v	   sel’skov	  
khoziastve	  Tadzhikistana	  (Donish:	  Dushanbe,	  1969),	  18,	  32.	  On	  the	  figures	  from	  1984	  and	  average	  number	  of	  workers,	  see	  Svodnyi	  plan	  ekonomicheskogo	  i	  sotsial’nogo	  razvitiia…,	  TsGART	  f.	  288,	  op.	  14,	  d.	  5293.	  	  For	  supporting	  evidence,	  see	  Tett,	  “Ambigious	  Alliances,”	  52-­‐53.	  50 	  S.P.	   Poliakov,	   Traditsionalizm	   v	   sovremennom	   sredneaziatskom	   obshchestve	   (Moscow:	  obshchestvo	  “Znanie”,	  1989),	  100.	  51	  RGAE	  f.	  1562,	  op.	  68,	  d.	  2368,	  l.	  22,	  57.	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Unemployment	   was	   the	   unavoidable	   risk	   that	   lurked	   behind	   all	   attempts	   to	  improve	  agricultural	  salaries	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  rural	  workers	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  While	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  unemployment	  was	  always	  hidden	  in	  official	  Soviet	  discourse	  behind	   code-­‐words	   such	   as	   “labor	   over-­‐availability”	   (trudoizbytochnost’)	   or	   the	  “population	   unengaged	   in	   social	   production”	   (ne	   zaniatoe	   v	   obshchestvennom	  
proizvodstve	  naselenie),	  as	  early	  as	  the	  late	  1960s	  it	  was	  clear	  to	  everyone	  involved	  that	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  not	  “engaging”	  the	  whole	  its	  population	  in	  work.52	  	  	  By	  1985	  figures	  varied,	  but	  it	  was	  calculated	  that	  between	  120,000	  and	  270,000	  workers	  in	  Tajikistan	  were	  “outside	  of	  work	  collectives.”	  53	  	  As	  resources	  had	  been	  shifted	  to	  improving	  agricultural	  outputs	  and	  productivity	  –	  as	  well	  as	  workers’	  salaries	  –	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  workers	  were	  being	   left	  behind.	   	  This	  was	   the	  same	  riddle	  the	  state	   faced	   in	   its	  struggle	   to	   increase	  the	  use	  of	  cotton-­‐picking	  machines.	   	  On	  the	   one	   hand,	   mechanized	   cotton-­‐harvesting	   improved	   per-­‐acre	   yields,	   boosted	  both	  productivity	  and	  salaries,	  and	  appeased	  the	  central	  planners	  in	  Moscow	  and	  Dushanbe	  who	  were	  always	  advocating	  for	  more	  and	  more	  combines.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   mechanizing	   the	   harvest	   further	   reduced	   the	   need	   for	   laborers.	   As	   A.	  Maksumov,	   the	   chairman	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   State	   Agricultural-­‐Industrial	   Committee	  (Gosagroprom),	  later	  mused,	  “There	  was	  a	  strong	  feeling	  that	  harvesting	  cotton	  by	  hand	   provided	   the	   possibility	   of	   engaging	   free	   labor	   resources	   from	   the	   rural	  population.”54	  	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   cotton	   harvest	   was	   a	   constant	   struggle	   between	  central	   planners	   pushing	   for	   mechanization	   and	   local	   harvesters	   both	   trying	   to	  save	   money	   (hand-­‐picking	   was	   also	   cheaper)	   and	   keep	   their	   local	   kolkhoz	  members	  employed.55	  	  Mechanization	  grew,	  but	  slowly	  –	  paralleling	  the	  slow	  rise	  of	  unemployment	  in	  Tajikistan’s	  rural	  areas.56	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Shatskikh	  and	  Khadzhibaev,	  Ispol’zovanie	  trudovykh	  resursov,	  38,	  table	  23.	  53	  For	  the	  higher	  figure,	  see:	  Protokol	  tret'ego	  plenuma	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  14.12.1985,	  RGASPI,	   f.	  17,	  op.	  154,	  d.	  2375,	   l.	  11;	   for	  the	  lower	  –	  Rasporiazhenie	  Gosplana	  SSSR	  no.	  1645-­‐P	  ot	  27.09.1985,	  GARF,	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  147,	  d.	  647	  l.	  8-­‐9.	  	  54	  A.	  Maksumov,	  “Bez	  pomoshchnikov,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  February	  18,	  1987.	  55	  For	  the	  relatively	  low	  cost	  of	  non-­‐mechanized	  harvesting,	  see:	  Artemy	  M.	  Kalinovsky,	  “Tractors,	  Power	  Lines,	  and	  the	  Welfare	  State:	  The	  Contradictions	  of	  Soviet	  Development	  in	  Post-­‐World	  War	  II	  Tajikistan,”	  Asiatische	  Studien	  69,	  no.	  3	  (2015).	  56	  The	  percentage	  of	  the	  cotton	  harvest	  collected	  by	  machine	  in	  the	  TSSR	  rose	  from	  22%	  in	  1970	  to	  around	   40%	   in	   the	   early	   to	   mid	   1980s.	   	   See:	   Khairula	   Abduzhaborov,	   “Industrializatsiia	  sel’skokhoziaistvennogo	  proizvodstva	  Tadzhikistana	  i	  izmenenie	  kul’turno-­‐tekhnicheskogo	  urovnia	  truzhenikov	   sela”	   (Dissertatsiia	   na	   soiskanie	   uchenoi	   stepeni	   kandidata	   istoricheskikh	   nauk,	   AN	  TSSR,	  1990),	  22,	  30,	  45.	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Ultimately,	   the	   Tajik	   SSR’s	   contradictory	   attempts	   to	   concurrently	   improve	  agricultural	   outputs	   and	   livelihoods	   while	   also	   guaranteeing	   rural	   employment	  and	   retain	   the	   necessary	   population	   to	   produce	   massive	   quantities	   of	   cotton	  cheaply	   only	   proved	   to	   exacerbate	   the	   situation.	   	   As	   the	   sociologist	   Vladimir	  Mukomel’	   argued	  during	   the	   final	   years	   of	   the	  USSR,	   republics	   such	   as	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  had	  created	  a	  status	  quo	  in	  which	  rural	  citizens	  were	  provided	  with	  many	  of	  the	  benefits	   of	   Soviet	  modernity	  without	   its	   attendant	   social	   change.	   	   Promoting	  equalization	   and	   modernization,	   the	   Soviet	   state	   had	   built	   roads,	   phone	   lines,	  electricity	   poles,	   running	   water	   and	   pumps,	   schools	   and	   many	   other	  accoutrements	  of	  modern	  society	   in	  villages	  and	  kolkhozes,	   such	  as	   those	   tasked	  with	  producing	  thousands	  of	  tons	  of	  cotton	  a	  year.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  even	  as	  many	  of	  the	  kolkhoz	  workers	  might	  have	  been	  factually	  or	  partially	  pushed	  out	  of	  work,	  opportunities	   and	   incentives	  were	  not	   created	   for	   them	   to	  urbanize	  or	   leave	   the	  village.	  	  	  Job	  creation	  in	  urban	  areas	  was	  spotty,	  inconsistent,	  and	  concentrated	  in	  a	  few	  large	  cities	  that	  were	  often	  relatively	  geographically	  inaccessible.	  In	  addition,	  Soviet	   restrictions	   on	   movement,	   built	   around	   the	   institution	   of	   “propiska”	   or	  registration,	  meant	  that	  rural	  workers	  would	  be	  denied	  access	  to	  resources	  if	  they	  were	   to	   move	   to	   cities	   without	   official	   sanction.	   Thus,	   the	   very	   guarantees	   and	  strictures	   of	   the	   Soviet	   system	   stopped	   rural	   Tajik	   workers	   from	   organically	  overcoming	  the	  localized	  unemployment	  they	  faced	  in	  their	  villages	  and	  moving	  to	  the	  republic’s	  cities.57	  	  Of	  the	  options	  available,	  remaining	  in	  rural	  areas	  was	  often	  the	  most	  comfortable.	  	  	  	  As	  Mukomel	  pointed	  out,	  by	  avoiding	  urbanization,	   the	  rural	  citizens	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  also	  had	   little	   reason	   to	  embrace	  many	  of	   the	  norms	  of	   Soviet	   society.	   	  This	  tended	   only	   to	   further	   exacerbate	   the	   same	   social	   contradictions	   the	   republican	  leaders	   in	  Dushanbe	  had	  been	   long	   trying	   to	   address.	   	   Limited	   in	   their	   access	   to	  Russian	   speakers	   and	   Russian-­‐language	   education,	   but	   still	   structurally	  encouraged	   to	   pursue	   higher	   education,	   rural	   citizens	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	  overwhelmingly	  chose	   to	  study	   language,	   literature,	  and	  other	  humanities,	  which	  privileged	  their	  Tajik-­‐language	  schooling	  (technical	  subjects	  and	  the	  sciences	  were	  almost	   exclusively	   taught	   in	   Russian).58	  In	   the	   early	   1980s,	   for	   example,	   41%	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Mukomel’,	  “Vremia	  otvetstvennykh	  reshenii.”	  58	  On	   the	   complications	   caused	   by	   encouraging	   non-­‐Russian	   enrollment	   in	   higher	   education,	   see	  S.V.	  Chesko,	  “Rol’	  ethnonatsionalizma	  v	  raspade	  SSSR,”	  in	  Tragediia	  velikoi	  derzhavoi:	  natsional’noi	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surveyed	  10th-­‐form	  students	  in	  Tajikistan	  expressed	  a	  plan	  to	  pursue	  a	  humanities	  degree,	   while	   only	   10%	  were	   interested	   in	   technical	   or	   science	   degrees.59	  	   As	   a	  result,	   fewer	  students	  applied	  to	   technical	  schools	  each	  year	   than	  to	  universities,	  even	   though	   the	   republic	   was	   constantly	   in	   need	   of	   welders,	   tractor	   drivers,	  factory	  workers,	  and	  other	  blue-­‐collar	  specialists.60	  	  This	  further	  slowed	  down	  the	  mechanization	   of	   agriculture:	   by	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	   the	   state	   had	   plenty	   of	   tractors	  and	   combines,	   but	   simply	   could	   not	   produce	   enough	   properly	   trained	   drivers.61	  	  	  Literature	  specialists	  and	  translators,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  unable	  to	  find	  jobs.	  	  As	   the	   recent	   graduate	   B.S.	   Avezova	   complained	   at	   a	   meeting	   with	   Tajik	  Communist	  Party	  leaders	  in	  1986:	  	  
“Four	  of	  us	  graduated	  from	  TGU	  [Tajik	  State	  University]	  with	  degrees	  
in	   Eastern	   languages,	   but	   after	   receiving	   our	   degree	  we	   don’t	   know	  
what	  to	  do	  with	  ourselves…some	  have	  even	  left.	  	  When	  we	  studied,	  we	  
thought	  that	  we	  would	  work	  as	  Hindi	  literature	  translators,	  but,	  as	  it	  
turns	  out,	  our	  profession	  isn’t	  needed.”	  62	  	  The	   factor	   that	  made	   of	   all	   of	   these	   difficulties	   logarithmically	  worse,	  moreover,	  was	   the	   unrelentingly	   high	   birth	   rate	   in	   Tajikistan’s	   villages.	   	   Across	   the	   USSR	  urbanization	   and	   its	   attendant	   social	   changes	   had	   long	   been	   linked	   to	   lowered	  birth	  rates;	  in	  Tajikistan,	  the	  opposite	  trend	  towards	  deurbanization	  had	  helped	  to	  guarantee	  rates	  that	  remained	  amongst	  the	  USSR’s	  highest.	  	  While	  these	  rates	  had	  dropped	   since	   decades	   past,	   they	   still	   remained	   at	   around	   5.7	   children	   born	   to	  each	   rural	  Tajik	   family	   in	   the	  mid	  1980s	  –	   far	  more	   than	  enough	   to	   guarantee	   a	  rapidly	   growing	   population.63	  	   The	   population,	  moreover,	   was	   growing	   at	   a	   rate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vopros	   i	   raspad	   Sovetskogo	   soiuza,	   ed.	   G.N.	   Sevost’ianov	   (Moscow:	   Izdatel’stvo	   “Sotsial’no-­‐politicheskaia	  mysl’”,	  2005),	  448;	  Narzikulov,	  “Dvulikii	  Yanus	  v	  serdtse	  Azii.”	  	  59	  B.	  Orazmuradov	  and	  D.I.	  Ziuzin,	  Molodezh’	  respublik	  Srednei	  Azii:	  trud,	  obrazovanie,	  professiia,	  byt	  (Askhabad:	  Ylym,	  1987),	  84.	  	  60	  In	  1985	   there	  were	  58,900	  undergraduate	   students	   studying	  at	   the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  10	  universities,	  and	   only	   41,900	   students	   at	   its	  many	   technical	   schools	   and	   colleges.	   	   See:	  Makhmud	   Abdulloev,	  “Narodnoe	   obrazovanie	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan	   v	   60-­‐80	   gody	   XX	   veka:	   istoriia	   i	   problemy	  razvitiia”	   (Dissertatsiia	   na	   soiskanie	   uchenoi	   stepeni	   doktora	   istoricheskikh	   nauk,	   AN	  RT,	   2012),	  115,	  122.	  	  61	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  the	  cotton	  sector	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  had	  81%	  of	  the	  cotton-­‐picking	  machines	  needed	  to	  fully	  mechanize	  the	  harvest,	  but	  was	  missing	  5,000	  machine	  operators	  to	  drive	  these	  machines	  (perhaps	  half	  of	  the	  total	  needed	  work	  force).	  	  See:	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3634,	  l.	  175;	  f.	  288,	  op.	  14,	  d.	  5544,	  l.	  59.	  	  62	  Kriticheskie	  zamechaniia	   i	  predlozheniia,	  vyskazannye	  molodymmi	  spetsialistami	  na	  vstreche	  s	  chlenami	  biuro	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  v	  dekabre	  1986	  goda.	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3635,	  l.	  229.	  	  63	  Calculated	   from	   Morozova,	   “Trudoizbytochna	   li.”	   Rather	   than	   focus	   on	   urbanization,	   actions	  taken	   by	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   during	   the	   1980s	   tended	   to	   emphasize	   family	   planning	   in	   rural	  environments,	  with	  limited	  effect.	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op	  8,	  d.	  3634,	  l.15-­‐16;	  d.	  3941,	  l.	  94.	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faster	  than	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  economy	  as	  a	  whole,	  meaning	  that	  attempts	  to	  increase	  rural	  employment	  and	  pay,	  labor	  productivity,	  or	  even	  simple	  school	  construction	  kept	  running	  into	  the	  dead	  end	  of	  more	  and	  more	  mouths	  to	  feed.	  	  “It	  is	  impossible	  not	  to	  see,”	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  Izatullo	  Khayoev	  noted	  in	   the	  mid-­‐1980s,	   “that	  GNP	  per	  capita	   figures	  are	  worsening	   in	  connection	  with	  the	   high	   rates	   of	   population	   growth”	   in	   the	   republic.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   he	   concluded,	  overall	  “standard	  of	  living	  growth”	  was	  also	  coming	  to	  a	  standstill,	  unable	  to	  keep	  up	   with	   the	   growing	   population’s	   demand	   for	   resources.64	  	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1980s,	  resources	  were	   stretched	   increasingly	   thin	   across	   the	  whole	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   as	  high	  birth	  rates,	  growing	  unemployment	  and	  workers’	   low	  salaries	  all	  dampened	  the	  republic’s	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  for	  growth	  and	  development.	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  As	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	   struggled	  each	  year	   to	   find	   funds	   to	  pay	   for	  new	  kindergartens,	   increased	  salaries,	  and	  the	  occasional	  village	  outlet	   factory	  (filial),	  they	   also	   found	   themselves	   bound	   by	   the	   underlying	   structure	   of	   Soviet	   budget	  policy.	  	  As	  a	  provider	  of	  agricultural	  goods	  within	  the	  Soviet	  “division	  of	  labor,”	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  access	   to	  budget	   funds	  was	   inherently	  restricted.	   	  Although	   the	  USSR	  had	   a	   well-­‐deserved	   reputation	   for	   economic	   centralization,	   its	   budgetary	  structure	  was	   in	   fact	  hierarchically	  divergent	   and	   locally	   focused.	   	   In	   addition	   to	  the	  federal	  Soviet	  budget,	  which	  controlled	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  the	  state’s	  resources	  and	   financed	   federal	   programs	   and	   centrally-­‐directed	   industries,	   each	   individual	  republic	   was	   provided	   with	   its	   own	   budget,	   which	   was	   nominally	   meant	   to	   be	  drawn	   from	   locally	   collected	   tax	   revenues.	   	   	   For	   the	   majority	   of	   Central	   Asian	  republics,	   including	   Tajikistan,	   the	   main	   sources	   of	   revenue	   for	   the	   republican	  budget	   were	   the	   profits	   from	   “locally	   controlled”	   (mestnogo	   podchineniia)	  enterprises	  (15-­‐20%	  in	  the	  decade	  before	  1985)	  –	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  the	  so-­‐called	   “turnover	   tax”	   (nalog	   s	   oborota),	   which	   constituted	   around	   50%	   of	  Tajikistan’s	  annual	  budget	  throughout	  the	  early	  1980s	  (see	  Figure	  2,	  below).	  While	  different	  republics	  were	  allowed	  to	  retain	  different	  percentages	  of	  the	  turnover	  tax	  collected	   on	   their	   territories,	   by	   the	   1980s	   the	   USSR	   was	   placing	   increased	  emphasis	   on	   localized	   development	   funding,	   and	   had	   shifted	   the	   majority	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Stenogramma	  Zasedaniia	  Prezidiuma	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  ot	  05.03.1987,	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3636,	  l.	  16.	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turnover	   tax	   revenue	   to	   republican	   budgets.	   	   As	   one	   of	   the	   least	   developed	  republics,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  allowed	  to	  keep	  91%	  of	  these	  tax	  revenues.65	  	  	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  Tajikistan,	  this	  high	  percentage	  hid	  the	  fact	  that	  turnover	  taxes	  were	   only	   levied	   on	   finished	   consumer	   goods.	   	   Representing	   the	   difference	  between	  a	  product’s	  retail	  price	  and	  the	  combined	  cost	  of	  the	  product’s	  bulk	  price	  and	  established	  retail	  profit	  margin,	  turnover	  taxes	  were	  generally	  collected	  by	  an	  enterprise	  at	  the	  point	  when	  they	  transferred	  goods	  to	  retail	  stores.	   	  The	  “Pamir”	  refrigerators	  produced	  by	  Dushanbe’s	  Refrigerator	  Factory,	  for	  example,	  had	  a	  set	  retail	   price	  of	   250	   rubles.	   	   This	  price	   included	  a	  7%	  profit	  markup	   for	   the	   retail	  store	   where	   it	   was	   sold;	   of	   the	   remaining	   232.5	   rubles	   paid	   by	   the	   store	   for	   a	  refrigerator,	   220.39	   rubles	  were	  kept	  by	   the	   factory	   and	  12.11	   rubles	  were	   split	  between	   the	   Tajik	   republican	   and	   Soviet	   federal	   budgets.66	  	   Turnover	   tax	   rates	  were	  individually	  established	  for	  different	  sectors	  and	  goods,	  with	  rates	  ranging	  as	  high	  as	  15-­‐20%;	  the	  5%	  mark-­‐up	  on	  “Pamir”	  refrigerators	  was	  actually	  quite	  low.67	  	  In	   Tajikistan,	   however,	   enterprises	   such	   as	   the	   Dushanbe	   Refrigerator	   Factory	  represented	  only	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  the	  republican	  economy,	  and	  factories	  that	  could	   provide	   turnover	   taxes	   were	   very	   sparsely	   represented.	   	   Instead,	   cotton	  remained	   king	   –	   but	   a	   poor	  monarch	  who	   brought	   no	   turnover	   tax	   to	   the	   Tajik	  SSR’s	  budget.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Bahry,	  Outside	  Moscow,	  55.	  66	  The	  majority	  (91%)	  went	  to	  the	  republican	  budget.	  	  TsGART	  f.	  1935,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  65,	  l.	  13.	  	  67 	  As	   regulated	   by	   the	   Postanovlenie	   Sovmina	   SSSR	   ot	   30.06.1975	   (#522)	   “Ob	   utverzhdenii	  polozheniia	  o	  naloge	  s	  oborota.”	  For	  average	  1980	  rates,	  see:	  Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  Ministra	  finansov	  SSSR	  ot	  12.05.1986	  “O	  stabil’nosti	  stavok	  naloga	  s	  oborota,”	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  147,	  d.	  121,	  l.	  1.	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Figure	  2:	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  Republican	  Budget,	  1982-­‐198568	  	  	  The	   problem	   was	   that	   raw	  materials,	   including	   cotton,	   were	   excluded	   from	   the	  turnover	  tax	  structure,	  which	  was	  meant	  to	  tax	  the	  “added	  value”	  applied	  to	  goods	  through	  labor.69	  	  When	  cotton	  was	  harvested,	  cleaned,	  or	  even	  processed	  on	  Tajik	  soil,	   no	   taxes	   were	   collected;	   when	   cotton	   lint	   or	   fiber	   was	   sent	   to	   primarily	  Ukrainian	  and	  Russian	  factories,	  these	  enterprises	  also	  paid	  no	  taxes	  to	  Tajikistan.	  	  When	   the	   latter	   factories	   produced	   cotton	   cloth	   or	   clothing	   and	   sold	   it	   to	  consumers,	   however,	   they	   did	   collect	   turnover	   taxes	   -­‐	   but	   only	   for	   the	   Russian,	  Ukrainian,	  or	  other	  more	  developed	  republics’	  budgets.70	  	  Given	  the	  limited	  level	  of	  industrial	   development	   in	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	  moreover	   –	   and	  with	   both	   agricultural	  salaries	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  raw	  materials	  depressed,	  thus	  further	  lowering	  local	  profit	  margins	  –	  the	  republican	  budget	  was	  constantly	  starved	  for	  funds.71	  	  As	  a	  result,	  by	  the	  early	  1980s	  around	  10%	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  annual	  budget	  had	  to	  be	  made	  up	  through	  direct	  transfers	  from	  the	  federal	  budget	  in	  Moscow	  (see	  Figure	  2,	  above).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  See	   Gosudarstvennyi	   biudzhet	   SSSR	   i	   biudzhety	   soiuznykh	   respublik	   1976-­‐1980.	   Statisticheskii	  
sbornik	   (Moscow:	   Finansy	   i	   statistika,	   1982);	   Gosudarstvennyi	   biudzhet	   SSSR	   1981-­‐1985,	  
statisticheskii	   sbornik	   (Moscow:	   Finansy	   i	   statistika,	   1987);	   Gosudarstvennyi	   biudzhet	   SSSR	   1990,	  
kratkii	  statisticheskii	  sbornik	  (Moscow:	  Finansy	  i	  statistika,	  1990).	  69	  For	   an	   overview,	   see:	   A.N.	   Anchishkin,	   Nalog	   s	   oborota	   –	   konkretnaia	   forma	   pribavochnogo	  
produkta	  sotsialisticheskogo	  proizvodstva	  (Moscow:	  Vysshaia	  shkola,	  1962).	  	  70	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9340,	  l.	  253.	  For	  the	  distribution	  of	  tax	  revenues	  and	  profits,	  see	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  147,	  d.	  116,	  l.	  168.	  	  71	  While	   the	   USSR	   had	   for	   decades	   increased	   payments	   for	   agricultural	   goods,	  many	   –	   including	  cotton	  –	  remained	  undervalued.	  By	  1986	  average	  payments	  for	  one	  kilogram	  of	  raw	  cotton	  to	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  kolkhozes	  and	  sovkhozes	  had	  only	  risen	  to	  90	  kopeks.	  	  See	  RGAE	  f.	  1562,	  op.	  68,	  d.	  2104,	  l.	  59.	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Nor	   was	   it	   only	   the	   budget:	   if	   the	   entire	   republican	   national	   material	   product	  (NMP)	   is	   considered,	   then	   the	   figures	   are	   even	   larger.	   	   Statistics	   from	   the	   late	  1980s	  show	  that	  between	  15-­‐20%	  (between	  800	  million	  and	  1200	  million	  rubles)	  of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR’s	   NMP	   had	   originated	   in	   other	   republics.	  72	  	   In	   practice,	   these	  figures	   represented	   both	   the	   Soviet	   government’s	   ongoing	   investiture	   in	   the	  republic,	  as	  well	  as	  constant	  claims	  on	  extra-­‐budgetary	  funds.	  The	  archives	  are	  full	  of	   requests	   for	   additional	   monies:	   for	   roads,	   for	   reconstruction	   after	   an	  earthquake,	   for	  new	   factories,	   and	  even	   for	  expansions	   to	  government	  buildings.	  	  Many	   new	   initiatives	   had	   to	   be	   approved	   in	   Moscow.	   	   As	   the	   former	   head	   of	  Tajikistan’s	  Gosplan	  later	  complained,	  “We	  came	  to	  Moscow	  literally	  every	  month	  –	  everything	  had	  to	  be	  decided	  through	  the	  center.”73	  	  In	  the	  decades	  since	  the	  Soviet	  collapse,	  this	  system	  of	  centralized	  investments	  and	  the	   delineation	   of	   extra-­‐budgetary	   funds	   has	   earned	   Tajikistan	   the	   epithet	   of	  “subsidized”	   (dotatsionyi),	   as	   both	   Western	   and	   Russian	   commentators	   have	  decried	   the	   apparent	   largesse.	   	   At	   the	   time,	   however,	   the	   practice	   of	   directing	  central	   budget	   funds	   to	   Tajikistan	   was	   seen	   as	   neither	   irrational	   largesse	   nor	  unjustified	   subsidies.	   	   Instead,	   it	   was	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   Soviet	   “division	   of	  labor,”	   in	  which	  Tajikistan’s	  role	  was	  to	  produce	  raw	  materials	  (cotton)	  for	  other	  republics,	   the	   role	   of	   which	   was	   to	   process	   these	   materials	   and	   turn	   them	   into	  consumer	  goods.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  capitalist	  empires	  of	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  and	  their	   colonial	   subject	   states,	   however,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   explicitly	   intended	   not	  simply	   to	   pull	   out	   raw	   goods	   –	   but	   also	   to	   spend	  money	   to	   develop	   the	   regions	  from	   which	   the	   materials	   were	   taken. 74 	  	   Internal	   statistical	   analyses	   also	  demonstrated	   an	   understanding	   of	   this	   relationship.	   	   As	   the	   Soviet	   Central	  Statistics	  Agency	  (TsSU)	  reflected	  in	  a	  late	  1980s	  report:	  	  
“The	   geographical	   location	   of	   the	   extraction	   and	   processing	   of	   raw	  
materials	   and	   energy	   resources,	   or,	   alternatively,	   the	  manufacture	   of	  
final	   products	   from	   these	   materials,	   has	   a	   notable	   impact	   on	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   volume	   of	   gross	   national	   product	   produced	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  176,	  l.	  27.	  Also	  see	  Appendix	  I:	  Cotton	  Taxes	  and	  “Subsidies.”	  73	  Interview	  with	  Buri	  Karimov,	  Moscow,	  March	  2015.	  74	  On	   the	   Soviet	   dedication	   to	   spending	   money	   in	   its	   periphery	   in	   direct	   contrast	   to	   colonial	  empires,	  see	  Adeeb	  Khalid,	  “The	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  an	  Imperial	  Formation:	  A	  View	  from	  Central	  Asia,”	  in	   Imperial	  Formations,	   eds.	  Ann	  Laura	  Stoler,	  Carole	  McGranahan	  and	  Peter	  C.	  Perdue	  (Santa	  Fe:	  School	   for	   Advanced	   Research	   Press,	   2007);	   Adrienne	   Edgar,	   “Bolshevism,	   patriarchy	   and	   the	  nation:	  The	  Soviet	   ‘emancipation’	  of	  Muslim	  women	  in	  pan-­‐Islamic	  perspective,”	  Slavic	  Review	  65,	  no.	  2	  (2006).	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and	  spent	  in	  one	  or	  another	  republic.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  significant	  gap	  
between	  prices	  on	  the	  world	  market	  and	  internal	  bulk	  prices	  for	  inter-­‐
republic	   (mezhrespublikanskii)	   exchanges	   (raw	   material	   prices	   are	  
lower	   than	   world	   prices,	   while	   finished	   consumer	   products	   are	   more	  
expensive).	   	  The	   geographic	   location	   of	   agricultural	   production	   or	  
industrial	  processing	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  one	  or	  another	  republic	  is	  also	  
notable,	   insofar	   as	   turnover	   taxes	   from	   agricultural	   products	   are	  
realized	  in	  the	  final	  retail	  prices	  set	  for	  industrially	  produced	  consumer	  
goods.	   	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   defining	   feature…is	   a	   republic’s	   place	   in	   the	  
USSR’s	  division	  of	  labor."75	  	  As	   the	   TsSU	   argued,	   the	   Soviet	   Union’s	   historical	   underpricing	   of	   raw	  materials	  and	   foodstuffs,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   exclusion	   of	   these	   goods	   from	   the	   tax	   structure,	  meant	  that	  certain	  republics	  simply	  had	  access	  to	   less	  revenue	  than	  others.	   	  This	  was	   not	   to	   suggest	   immediate	   changes	   to	   the	   system,	   as	   it	   also	   provided	  advantages	   in	   terms	   of	   cheap	   foodstuffs	   for	   consumers	   and	   industrial	   inputs	   for	  factories.	   	   Instead,	   the	  TsSU	  meant	   simply	   to	  highlight	   the	   “relationship	  between	  the	   volume	   of	   gross	   national	   product	   produced	   and	   spent	   in	   one	   or	   another	  republic”	  and	  point	  out	   that	   certain	   republics,	   such	  as	  Tajikistan,	   required	  direct	  and	  indirect	  payments	  to	  make	  up	  the	  noted	  gap.	  	  	  	  The	  TsSU’s	  sanguinity	  over	  the	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  rubles	  sent	  each	  year	  from	  Moscow	  to	  Dushanbe	  may	  also	  have	  been	  due	  to	  the	  internal	  understanding	  among	  planning	  bodies	  that	  the	  exchange	  was	  actually	  close	  to	  even.	  	  The	  value	  of	  cotton	  to	  the	  USSR	  was	   far	  greater	  than	  the	  amount	  the	  state	  paid	  to	  the	  kolkhozes	  and	  sovkhozes	   that	   farmed	   it:	   if	  utilized	   in	   the	  USSR	  to	  produce	  cloth	  and	  clothing,	   it	  derived	  notable	  turnover	  taxes,	  and	  if	  exported	  abroad,	  it	  provided	  the	  state	  with	  not	   insignificant	   hard	   currency.	   	   	   Beginning	   in	   1987,	  moreover,	   various	   Gosplan	  bodies	  began	  running	  the	  numbers,	  developing	  statistics	  that	  showed	  that	  the	  total	  value	  of	   annual	  payments	   to	   all	   republics	   to	   indirectly	   “make	  up	   the	   cost	   of	   raw	  cotton”	  was	  around	  3	  billion	  rubles	  –	  almost	  exactly	   the	  same	  amount	  earned	  by	  other	  republics	  in	  turnover	  taxes	  on	  cotton	  clothes.76	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Tajikistan,	  the	  republican	   Gosplan	   calculated	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   that	   if	   provided	   with	   a	  conservative	   portion	   of	   the	   turnover	   taxes	   collected	   on	   clothing	   produced	   from	  Tajik	  cotton,	  Tajik	  budget	  revenues	  could	  have	  been	  increased	  by	  25%	  annually.77	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Doklad	   Goskomstata	   “O	   proizvodstve	   i	   ispol’zovanii	   valovogo	   obshchestvennogo	   produkta	   po	  soiuznym	  respublikam	  za	  1989	  god”.	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  176,	  ll.	  28-­‐29.	  	  76	  RGAE	  f.	  7733,	  op.	  65,	  d.	  5443,	  l.	  13.	  	  77	  Spravka	  svodnogo	  otdela	  gosbiudzhetov	  Gosplana	  TSSR,	  TSGART	  f.	  306,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  1130,	  l.	  79.	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This	  would	  have	  been	  more	  than	  enough	  to	  cover	  the	  budget	  deficits	  filled	  in	  each	  year	  from	  federal	  Soviet	  coffers.	  	  While	  this	  still	  left	  part	  of	  the	  15%	  of	  Tajik	  NMP	  produced	  outside	  of	  the	  republic	  unaccounted	  for,	  statistics	  indicate	  that	  together	  with	  the	  value	  of	  Tajik	  cotton	  exported	  abroad,	  the	  calculation	  also	  came	  close	  to	  even.	   	  Each	  year	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  produced	  an	  amount	  of	  cotton	  that	  was	  ultimately	  worth	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  amount	  as	  the	  financial	  transfers	  it	  received.	  78	  	  	  This	  engendered	   an	   exchange	   that	   was	   more	   or	   less	   equal:	   Tajik	   production	   was	  systematically	   undervalued,	   but	   financial	   infusions	   from	   Moscow	   kept	   the	   final	  balance	   sheets	   fair.	   	   Rather	   than	   strictly	   “subsidized”	   by	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   Soviet	  economy,	   Tajikistan	   was	   instead	   bound	   by	   a	   thousand	   financial	   threads	   to	   the	  Soviet	  center,	  along	  which	  cotton	  and	  raw	  materials	  were	  exchanged	  for	  financial	  support	  and	  economic	  development.	  	  	  	  
III.	  Perestroika’s	  First	  Stirrings	  	  Surveying	  the	  state	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  social	  and	  economic	  development	   in	  1985,	   the	  leaders	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  would	  have	  faced	  a	   fragile	  but	  stable	  status	  quo.	   	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Tajikistan’s	  place	  within	  the	  Soviet	  “division	  of	   labor”	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  cotton	  had	  led	  to	  serious	  challenges.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  Tajikistan	  was	  the	  USSR’s	  most	   agrarian	   republic,	   and	   one	   that	   boasted	   some	   of	   the	   lowest	   rates	   of	   labor	  productivity.	   	   The	   consistently	   high	   birth	   rate	   in	   the	   republic,	   moreover,	   meant	  that	  more	  and	  more	  people	  were	  added	   to	   the	  waiting	   lists	   for	  housing,	   schools,	  and	   even	   kindergartens	   each	   year.79	  (As	   one	   minister	   sighed	   in	   the	   late	   1980s,	  “We’ll	   never	   get	   ahead	   of	   kindergartens	   or	   schools	   unless	   we	   do	   something	  decisive.”)80	  	  Yet	   it	  would	  have	  been	  equally	  clear	   to	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  that	  the	  calculations	  showing	  Tajikistan’s	  birth	  rate	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  its	  economic	  growth	  rate	  were	  artificially	  kept	  down	  by	  the	  undervaluing	  of	  cotton	  and	  the	  lack	  of	   tax	   revenues	   sent	   to	   the	   republic.	   	   In	   practice,	   things	  were	   often	  much	  better	  than	   the	   statistics	   showed.	   Each	   year	   life	   was	   improving:	   schools	   and	  kindergartens	   were	   expanded,	   housing	   was	   built,	   and	   industrial	   jobs	   were	  expanded.	   	   It	  was	   inarguable	   that	  problems	  remained,	  most	  notably	   the	  growing	  unemployment	  in	  rural	  areas	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  local	  Tajik	  technical	  workers	  available	  to	   fill	   the	   republic’s	   available	   jobs,	   but	   these	   were	   not	   taken	   as	   a	   sign	   that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  For	  a	  full	  explanation	  of	  these	  calculations,	  see	  Appendix	  I:	  Cotton	  Taxes	  and	  “Subsidies.”	  79	  On	  housing,	  see	  Kalinovsky,	  Laboratory	  of	  Socialist	  Development,	  ch.	  5.	  80	  Stenogramma	  Zasedaniia	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR,	  08.01.1987.	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3634,	  ll.	  15-­‐16.	  
	  	   54	  
system	  itself	  was	  broken.	   	  On	  the	  contrary,	   they	  were	  seen	  as	  eminently	  solvable	  
within	   the	   Soviet	   system.	   	   	   On	   balance,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  was	   seen	   as	   providing	  more	   than	   it	   took	  away:	  why	  buck	  a	   system	   that,	  warts	   and	  all,	   had	  managed	   to	  modernize	  much	  of	  Tajikistan	  in	  as	  little	  as	  70	  years?	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  factual	  benefits	  Soviet	  society	  provided	  for	  the	  residents	  of	  the	  Tajik	   SSR,	   however,	   the	   makeup	   and	   experience	   of	   the	   Tajik	   leadership	   just	   as	  equally	   inclined	   them	   to	   support	   the	   existing	   Soviet	   order.	   The	   leaders	   of	   the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	  (CPT)	  and	  the	  Tajik	  Soviet	  government	  were	  drawn	  from	  a	  small	  and	  established	  circle	  of	  urbane	  Party	  members.	   	  Once	  reaching	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  power,	  moreover,	  they	  had	  a	  tendency	  to	  remain	  established	  for	  decades.	   	  Amongst	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  republic	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s,	  for	  example,	  CPT	  Bureau	   member	   Guljakhon	   Bobosadykova	   had	   held	   the	   same	   position	   since	  1961;81	  other	  Bureau	  members,	  such	  as	  Ivan	  Dedov	  and	  Hikmatullo	  Nasreddinov,	  had	   also	   worked	   for	   the	   CPT	   Central	   Committee	   for	   more	   than	   a	   decade.82	  	   In	  addition,	  the	  republican	  Finance	  Minister,	  Jonobiddin	  Lafizov,	  had	  been	  in	  his	  post	  since	  1973;	  the	  deputy	  chairperson	  of	  the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  Nizoramoh	  Zarifova,	  had	  held	  her	  position	  since	  1966;83	  and	  Mahmudullo	  Kholov,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Presidium,	  had	  just	  calmly	  retired	  in	  1984	  after	  21	  years	  in	  his	  post.84	  	   While	   Rahmon	   Nabiev	   had	   just	   been	   elected	   as	   First	   Secretary	   of	   the	  Communist	   Party	   of	   Tajikistan	   in	   1982,	   he	   had	   previously	   spent	   a	   comfortable	  decade	   as	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Council	   of	  Ministers	   of	   the	  Tajik	   SSR,	   and	   could	  have	  expected	   a	   long	   run	   at	   the	   top	   of	   the	   political	   pyramid:	   his	   predecessor,	   Jabbor	  Rasulov,	  had	  been	  First	  Secretary	  for	  18	  years	  before	  passing	  away	  at	  his	  desk.	  	  Their	  lengthy	  stays	  in	  power	  helped	  to	  solidify	  the	  Tajik	  elite’s	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Soviet	  political	  and	  economic	  system.	  	  This	  link	  was	  further	  strengthened	  by	  the	  benefits	  this	  group	  could	  claim	  as	  a	   result	  of	   their	   connections	   to	   the	  ultimate	   sources	  of	  power	  and	  finance	  in	  Moscow.	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  were	   drawn	   from	   one	   group	   of	   families	   or	   that	   political	   power	   was	   passed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  156,	  d.	  1957,	  ll.	  130-­‐131.	  	  82	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  22-­‐23.	  83 	  On	   Lafizov,	   see	   TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1246.	   On	   Zarifova	   -­‐	   “Zarifova,	   Nizoramoh,”	  
Entsiklopediiai	  sovetii	  tojik	  (Dushanbe:	  Akademiiai	  fanhoi	  RSS	  Tojikiston,	  1980),	  v.	  2,	  469.	  84	  “Kholov,	  Mahmadullo,”	  Entsiklopediiai	  sovetii	  tojik	  (Dushanbe:	  Akademiiai	  fanhoi	  RSS	  Tojikiston,	  1988),	  v.	  8,	  557.	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hereditarily	   from	  one	  generation	   to	  another.	   	  Far	   from	   it:	  much	  as	   in	   the	  highest	  echelons	  of	  Soviet	  politics,	  the	  Tajik	  elite	  actually	  allowed	  for	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  social	  movement,	   and	   the	   Tajik	   political	   system	   constantly	   generated	   new	   cadres	  through	  the	  Komsomol	  and	  Party	  structures.	  85	  Born	  in	  many	  regions	  of	  Tajikistan,	  the	   leaders	   of	   the	   Republic	   often	   came	   from	   working	   class	   or	   even	   poor	  backgrounds.86	  	   Having	   arrived	   at	   university,	   however,	   they	   would	   spend	   the	  majority	  of	  their	  lives	  in	  the	  relative	  privilege	  of	  Dushanbe,	  completing	  university	  there	  and	  only	  leaving	  for	  brief	  periods	  of	  further	  study	  in	  Moscow	  or	  Tashkent	  or	  practical	  work	   in	   the	   regions	  of	  Tajikistan.	   	  While	   it	  has	  often	  been	   claimed	   that	  Tajik	   Soviet	   politics	   was	   dominated	   by	   a	   unified	   “Leninabad”	   clan,	   this	   is	   not	  entirely	  supported	  by	  available	  evidence.	   	  Archival	   records	  show	  that	  ministerial	  and	   Party	   roles	   were	   filled	   by	   cadres	   from	   around	   Tajikistan,	   and	   political	  networks	  often	  had	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  shared	  work	  experience	  as	  with	  geographic	  belonging.87	  	  	  	  In	   addition,	   although	   the	   First	   Secretaries	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Communist	   Party	   were	  traditionally	   representatives	  of	   the	  Tajik	  north,	   all	   of	   them	  had	   spent	  decades	   in	  the	   South	   and	   Dushanbe	   before	   taking	   on	   leadership	   roles.	   In	   contrast	   to	   some	  other	  republics,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  has	  often	  emphasized	  the	  “clan-­‐based”	   nature	   of	   political	   networks	   in	   Central	   Asia,	   these	   politicians’	   lives	  demonstrate	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   Soviet	   internationalist	   and	   transregional	  acculturation	  in	  Tajikistan.88	  	  “I	  moved	  to	  Dushanbe	  when	  I	  was	  17,”	  a	  former	  Tajik	  Bureau	  member,	  now	  around	  80	  years	  old,	  asked	  sardonically	  –	   “Does	   this	  make	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Much	  as	  in	  Moscow,	  there	  was	  no	  recorded	  case	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  in	  which	  the	  child	  of	  a	  Party	  of	  state	  leader	  later	  also	  became	  a	  Party	  or	  state	  leader.	  	  	  86	  Of	  the	  leaders	  mentioned	  above,	  one	  was	  from	  Garm	  (Kholov),	  one	  from	  Kulyab	  (Nasreddinov),	  one	   from	  Vose	   in	   the	   south	   (Zarifova),	  one	   from	   Isfara	   (Lafizov),	   and	   two	   from	   the	  Khujand	  area	  (Bobosadykova	  and	  Nabiev).	  	  87	  In	   the	  mid	   to	   late	   1980s,	   for	   example,	   the	   First	   Secretary	   of	   the	   CPT	  was	   from	   a	   village	   near	  Leninabad,	   but	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Presidium	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   was	   from	   Pamir,	   and	   the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  from	  the	  south.	  	  The	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  had	  members	  from	  Kulyab	  in	  the	  south,	  Isfara	  in	  the	  north,	  Pamir,	  Garm	  in	  the	  East,	  Dushanbe,	  and	  many	  other	  regions	  (see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1246,	   ll.	  43-­‐89).	   	  On	  personal	  networks,	  Hikmatullo	  Nasreddinov,	  a	  southerner,	  was	   brought	   to	  Dushanbe	   and	   promoted	   by	  Rahmon	  Nabiev,	   a	   northerner.	   	   Once	   he	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  Tajik	  Communist	  Party’s	  Bureau	  in	  1986,	  Nasreddinov’s	  successor,	  Vahhob	  Vohidov	   (a	   northerner)	   promoted	   Qadriddin	   Aslonov,	   a	   politician	   from	   Garm	   in	   the	   East	   (see	  Nasreddinov,	   Tarkish,	   36;	   Nurali	   Davlat,	   “Qadriddin	   Aslonov:	   Sarnavishti	   imzoguzori	   e’’lomiyai	  istiqlol,”	  Ozodagon,	  October	  26,	  2016).	  88	  On	  Uzbekistan	  as	  a	  political	  sphere	  dominated	  by	  clans,	  see	  Riccardo	  Mario	  Cucciolla,	  “The	  Crisis	  of	  Soviet	  Power	  in	  Central	  Asia:	  The	  ‘Uzbek	  cotton	  affair’	  (1975-­‐1991)”	  (PhD	  diss.,	   IMT	  School	  for	  Advanced	  Studies,	  Lucca,	  Italy,	  2017).	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer	  have	  attempted	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  “clan-­‐based”	  nature	  of	  Tajik	  politics,	  but	   their	  argument	  relies	  upon	  a	  series	  of	  unconvincing	  and	  confusing	  charts	  (Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  132,	  136).	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me	  a	  northerner?	  	  Or	  a	  Dushanbe	  resident?”89	  	  Given	  their	  socialization	  into	  Soviet	  politics,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  should	  be	  best	  understood	  as	  loyal	  not	  to	  their	  individual	  places	  of	  birth	  –	  but	  instead	  to	  the	  Soviet	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  When	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  became	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  USSR	   in	  March	  1985,	  Tajikistan’s	   top	   echelon	  of	   state	   and	  Party	  posts	  was	   filled	  with	   individuals	  who	   exemplified	   these	   principles	   of	   conservative	   loyalty	   to	   the	  Soviet	  state	  and	  ideology.	  	  Rahmon	  Nabiev,	  the	  first	  secretary	  of	  the	  CPT,	  had	  been	  born	  in	  1930	  in	  a	  northern	  village.	  	  An	  engineer	  by	  training,	  he	  had	  entered	  “Party	  work”	  in	  the	  1960s,	  and	  had	  since	  worked	  in	  the	  CPT	  and	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  before	  becoming	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  in	  1973.	  	  Nabiev’s	  factual	  deputy,	  Kahhor	  Mahkamov,	  had	  held	  the	  position	  of	  Chairman	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Minister’s	   since	   1982.	   	   Also	   an	   engineer	   from	   a	  northern	  village	  like	  Nabiev,	  Mahkamov	  had	  been	  educated	  in	  Leningrad	  and	  had	  the	  reputation	  of	  being	  especially	  Russified.	  The	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  Supreme	   Soviet	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   Ghoibnazar	   Pallaev,	   had	   just	   replaced	   his	  predecessor	  Kholov	  in	  1984.	  	  A	  contemporary	  of	  Nabiev	  and	  Mahkamov’s,	  Pallaev	  was	  from	  the	  Pamir	  region	  of	  eastern	  Tajikistan,	  although	  he	  had	  worked	  in	  Party	  positions	  across	  much	  of	  the	  republic.	   	  All	  three	  figures,	  along	  with	  many	  of	  their	  subordinates,	   shared	   many	   of	   the	   same	   characteristics:	   technical	   educations,	  practical	   experience	   in	   collective	   farms,	   and	   long	   government	   careers.	   	   While	  growing	  up	   in	   poverty	   (Pallaev	   had	  been	  partially	   raised	   in	   an	   orphanage),	   they	  had	   all	   benefitted	   greatly	   from	   the	   Soviet	   system	   and	   were	   dedicated	   civil	  servants.90	  	  Given	  this	  Party	  makeup,	  it	  was	  unsurprising	  that	  Gorbachev’s	  calls	  for	  change	  and	  economic	  reform	  were	  initially	  met	  with	  skepticism	  by	  the	  local	  elites	  in	  Dushanbe.	  	  It	   seemed,	   the	   newly	   appointed	   Tajik	   Minister	   of	   Higher	   Education	   Shukur	  Sultonov	  later	  wrote,	  that	  “the	  new	  leadership	  didn’t	  have	  a	  particularly	  clear	  plan	  or	  perspective	  on	  the	  restructuring	  of	  society.”91	  	  For	  Sultonov	  and	  other	  members	  of	   the	  Tajik	   Soviet	   elite,	  moreover,	  Gorbachev’s	   early	   reform	  efforts	  were	  hardly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Interview	  with	  a	  former	  member	  of	  the	  CPT	  Bureau,	  Dushanbe,	  July	  2016.	  90	  For	   Nabiev’s	   biography,	   see	   Nomzad	   ba	   Raisi	   Jumhirii	   Tojikiston	   Rahmon	   Nabievich	   Nabiev	  (Dushanbe:	  Goskomiteta	  Tadzhikistana	  po	  pechati,	  1991);	  for	  Mahkamov’s	  –	  RGAPSI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  154,	  d.	  2375,	  l.	  3;	  for	  Pallaev’s	  –	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1287,	  l.	  95.	  	  91	  Shukur	  Sultonov,	  Yoddoshthoi	  ziyoii	  Shuravy	  (Khujand:	  Khoroson,	  2015),	  441.	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seen	  as	   a	   challenge	   to	   the	   established	  economic	   and	  political	   order.	   	  At	  worst,	   it	  seemed,	  they	  might	  be	  an	  empty	  show	  campaign	  –	  and	  at	  best,	  an	  opportunity	  to	  boost	   existing	   industrialization	   efforts.	   	   The	   highly	   publicized	   anti-­‐alcohol	  campaign,	   for	  example,	  which	  by	   the	  end	  of	  1985	  had	   led	   to	   lines	   for	  vodka	  and	  increasing	   dissatisfaction	   in	   Moscow,	   caused	   barely	   a	   ripple	   in	   Tajikistan.	  	  Although	   alcohol	   sales	   in	   1985	   decreased	   by	   up	   to	   55%	   in	   some	   parts	   of	   the	  republic,	  no	  one	  seemed	  disturbed;	  there	  was	  still	  plenty	  of	  vodka	  on	  the	  shelves	  to	   bring	   as	   gifts	   when	   visiting	   Moscow.92	  	   Gorbachev’s	   public	   discussion	   of	   the	  need	   for	   “speeding	   up”	   (uskorenie)	   in	   the	   economy	   and	   increased	   funding	   for	  machine	  building,	  moreover,	  seemed	  to	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  as	  a	  standard	  Soviet	   approach	   to	   economic	   growth,	   and	   one,	   moreover,	   that	   would	   help	   their	  own	  plans	  to	  open	  new	  factories	  in	  the	  republic.	  	  Speeding	  up	  economic	  growth,	  it	  was	  suggested,	  would	  mean	  expanding	  new	  “labor-­‐intensive”	  work	  projects,	  such	  as	   the	   building	   of	   hydroelectric	   stations	   in	   outlying	   regions	   of	   the	   republic.93	  	  Gorbachev,	   it	   seemed,	  had	   found	  a	   solution	   to	  Tajikistan’s	   central	  problem:	   “The	  focus	   should	   be	   on	   the	   complete	   use	   of	   the	   working-­‐age	   population	   in	   local	  areas.”94	  	  And	  yet	  before	  the	   leadership	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  could	  get	  started	  on	  any	  new	  development	  projects,	   the	  political	   rug	  was	  suddenly	  pulled	  out	   from	  under	  their	   feet:	   Rahmon	  Nabiev	  was	   unexpectedly	   removed	   from	  his	   position	   as	   First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	  after	  just	  three	  years	  in	  December	  1985.	  
	  Nor	   had	   there	   been	   any	   notice	   of	   the	   changes	   to	   come.	   	   On	  December	   12,	   1985	  Georgii	  Razumovskii,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  (CPSU)	  Department	  for	  Organizational	  and	  Party	  Work,	  arrived	  in	  Dushanbe.	  	  A	  career	  Central	  Committee	  employee,	  Razumovskii	  owed	  his	  rise	  to	  department	   head	   to	   Gorbachev,	   who	   had	   appointed	   him	   as	   deputy	   to	   Egor	  Ligachev,	   the	   Politbureau	   member	   and	   head	   of	   the	   Central	   Committee’s	  Organizational	   Bureau	   (Orgbiuro).	   	   Both	   his	   official	   position	   and	   allegiance	   to	  Gorbachev	   essentially	   made	   him	   the	   latter’s	   proxy	   when	   it	   came	   to	   overseeing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  154,	  d.	  2431,	  l.	  80.	  	  On	  trips	  to	  Moscow,	  see:	  Interview	  with	  Alisher	  Yarbabaev,	  Dushanbe,	  February	  2015.	  93	  Tohir	  Kalandarov,	  Shugnantsy	  (Moscow:	  Institut	  etnologii	  i	  antropologii	  RAN,	  2004),	  115.	  	  94 	  D.I.	   Ziuzin,	   “Varianty	   sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskogo	   razvitiia	   sredneaziatskogo	   regiona,”	  
Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  12,	  no.	  4	  (1986),	  18.	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republican	   Party	   apparatuses,	   including	   Tajikistan’s.95	  	   His	   unexpected	   arrival	   in	  Dushanbe	   clearly	   heralded	   some	   concern.	   	   A	   CPT	   Bureau	   meeting	   was	   called,	  where	  it	  was	  decided	  to	  hold	  a	  full	  Plenum	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Communist	  Party’s	  Central	  Committee	  on	  December	  14.96	  	  At	  this	  Plenum	  Nabiev	  made	  an	  official	  request	  to	  retire	   from	   his	   post	   as	   First	   Secretary	   “for	   health	   reasons,”	   and	   the	   Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPSU,	  in	  the	  person	  of	  Razumovskii,	  “granted	  his	  request.”	  97	  	  Of	  course,	  few	  in	  the	  Tajik	  elite	  believed	  the	  official	  statement	  issued	  by	  the	  Party.	  	  It	  was	  well	  known	  in	  Dushanbe	  that	  Nabiev	  had	  been	  set	  up.	  	  Taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  new	  leadership	  in	  Moscow	  and	  its	  focus	  on	  both	  reform	  and	  “sobriety”	  (trezvost’),	  someone	   had	   been	   both	   encouraging	   and	   documenting	   Nabiev’s	   habit	   of	  “organizing	   lush	   banquets	   with	   large	   amounts	   of	   alcohol	   consumption,”	   as	  Razumovskii	   put	   it	   during	   closed	   discussions	   following	   Nabiev’s	   resignation.98	  	  This	   information	   had	   then	   been	   passed	   on	   to	   Ligachev	   and	   Gorbachev	   in	   the	  Central	   Committee,	   who	   judged	   it	   hardly	   proper	   behavior	   for	   the	   Party’s	  leadership	   in	   Dushanbe.	   	   The	   new	   course	   of	   reform,	   Razumovskii	   emphasized,	  required	  a	  different	  sort	  of	  leader.	  	  	  	  In	   and	   of	   itself,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  members	   of	   the	   political	   elite	   in	  Dushanbe	   had	  been	  scheming	  against	  each	  other	  was	  hardly	  cause	  for	  particular	  worry:	  internal	  conflicts	  and	  political	  backstabbing	  were	  as	  common	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  as	  anywhere	  else.	   	   Instead,	   what	   took	   elite	   and	   intellectual	   circles	   by	   surprise	  was	  Moscow’s	  quick	  and	  decisive	  reaction.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  conflicts	  in	  Dushanbe	  were	  rarely,	  if	  ever,	  cause	   for	   intervention	   from	   the	   center;	   as	   long	   as	   the	   economic	   bargain	   of	   raw	  resources	  in	  exchange	  for	  development	  funding	  held,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  CPSU	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  See:	  “Razumovskii,	  Georgii	  Petrovich,”	  Ivestiia	  TsK	  KPSS,	  1	  (1989),	  26.	  96	  Protokol	  no.	  156	  zasedaniia	  biuro	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  12.12.1985,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  154,	  d.	  2382,	  l.	  198.	  	  97	  Protokol	  dvadtsat'	  tret'ego	  plenuma	  TsK	  Kompartii,	  14.12.1985,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  154,	  d.	  2375,	  l.	  3.	  	  98	  Ibid.,	   l.	  14.	  This	  account	  has	  been	  confirmed	  by	  a	  number	  of	   contemporary	  witnesses,	   and	   it	   is	  undeniable	   that	  Nabiev	  had	  a	  well-­‐documented	  drinking	  problem.	   	  See	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	   27-­‐28;	  interview	  with	  Firuza	  Yarbabaeva	  (a	  close	  family	  friend	  of	  Nabiev's),	  Dushanbe,	  February	  2015;	  interview	   with	   an	   anonymous	   member	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Communist	   Party's	   Bureau.	   On	   Nabiev’s	  drinking,	  see	  Ibrohim	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev	  (Dushanbe:	  Matbaai	  bayni	  donishkadhoi	  oli,	  1995),	  15-­‐16.	  Different	  individuals	  are	  accused	  of	  feeding	  information	  to	  Moscow,	  but	  fingers	  are	  most	  often	  pointed	  at	  Ghoibnazar	  Pallaev.	  	  While	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer	  argue	  that	  Nabiev’s	  drinking	  was	  just	  a	  proxy	  for	  a	  deeper	  conflict	  over	  his	  opposition	  to	  Moscow-­‐directed	  personnel	  changes,	  this	  is	  not	  supported	   by	   available	   evidence.	   	   Changes	   in	   the	   Tajik	   Communist	   Party	   were	   implemented	   by	  Mahkamov	  and	  were	  related	  to	  his	  own	  internal	  preferences;	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  these	  changes	  having	  been	  planned	  before	  1986.	   	  Cf.	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  160	  (following	  Nazrullo	  Dustov,	  Zahm	  bar	  jismi	  vatan	  (Dushanbe:	  Irfon,	  1994),	  132).	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been	   willing	   to	   leave	   Dushanbe	   well	   enough	   alone.	   	   Gorbachev’s	   aggressive	  response	   to	   Nabiev’s	   improprieties	   suggested	   that	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   bargain	   had	  now	   been	   radically	   changed.	   	   From	   now	   on,	   it	   seemed,	   Tajikistan	   would	   be	  expected	   to	   do	  more	   than	   just	   produce	   cotton	   and	   build	   hydroelectric	   dams:	   no	  matter	  its	  relative	  level	  of	  development,	  it	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  same	  standards	  as	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  republics.	   	  This	  was	  driven	  home	  by	  comments	  made	  by	   Razumovskii,	   who	   berated	   the	   Tajik	   leadership	   for	   its	   “formalism,	   paper-­‐pushing	  (bumagotvorchestvo)	  and	  other	  faults.”	  	  He	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  conditions	  of	  reform	   promoted	   by	   Gorbachev	   the	   Tajik	   leaders’	   “inappropriate	   and	   outdated	  methods	   of	   leadership”	   and	   emphasis	   on	   “protecting	   Soviet	   and	   economic	  institutions”	   would	   have	   to	   be	   changed.	  Worse	   of	   all,	   he	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   the	  established	   policy	   of	   equalization	   that	   had	   helped	   to	   develop	   the	  Tajik	   economy	  was	  on	  its	  way	  out:	  	  
“It	   seems	  that	  you	  wish	   in	   the	   future	   to	  direct	  your	  hopes	   to	  subsidies	  
from	  the	  federal	  budget.	  	  To	  consider	  this	  your	  eternal	  right	  is	  to	  accept	  
the	  stagnation	  in	  your	  own	  development…The	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  
CPSU	  expects	  better	  from	  you.”99	  	  Returning	   to	   Moscow	   shortly	   thereafter,	   Razumovskii	   left	   a	   befuddled	   Tajik	  leadership	   in	   his	   wake	   in	   Dushanbe.	   	   	   While	   Nabiev	   was	   quickly	   replaced	   by	  Kahhor	   Mahkamov,	   many	   other	   questions	   remained	   unanswered	   –	   and	   highly	  worrying.100	  	  Moscow’s	  willingness	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   party	   politics	   of	   the	  Tajik	  Communist	  Party	  and	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  underlying	  economic	  bargain	  between	  the	  Tajik	   SSR	   and	   the	   center	   was	   now	   void	   was	   anything	   but	   positive.	   It	   was	   also	  unclear	   how	   Moscow	   planned	   to	   address	   the	   fundamental	   –	   and	   growing	   –	  problems	  in	  the	  republic,	  such	  as	  unemployment	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  industrial	  workers,	  without	   increased	   levels	   of	   investiture.	   	   It	   was	   all	   well	   and	   good	   to	   talk	   about	  promoting	  “rationalization”	  and	  improved	  levels	  of	  productivity,	  but	  Tajikistan	  all	  the	  same	  remained	  amongst	  the	  least	  developed	  corners	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  This	  hardly	  seemed	   an	   opportune	   moment	   to	   abandon	   equalization,	   especially,	   as	   the	  leadership	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   believed,	   given	   how	   successful	   it	   had	   been	   over	   the	  previous	  decades.	  	  Members	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  and	  Communist	  Party	  began	   to	   wonder	   if	   “Moscow	   had	   any	   idea	   at	   all	   about	   what	   was	   going	   on	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  154,	  d.	  2375,	  l.	  10.	  	  100	  RGASPI,	  f.	  17,	  op.	  154,	  d.	  2375,	  l.	  3.	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  101	  Interview	  with	  Georgii	  Koshlakov,	  Dushanbe,	  July	  2016.	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Chapter	  Three	  
The	  Statistics	  Must	  be	  Lying:	  Moscow’s	  Case	  for	  Structural	  Reform	  
	  While	   the	   peripheral	   Soviet	   elite	   in	   places	   like	   Dushanbe	   remained	   deeply	  skeptical	   about	   the	   need	   for	   reform,	   by	   the	   mid-­‐to-­‐late	   1980s	   the	   central	  leadership	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (CPSU)	  had	  far	  more	  mixed	  feelings.	   For	   many,	   including	   Mikhail	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors,	   there	   was	  something	   deeply	   and	   perniciously	   wrong	  with	   Soviet	   society.	   “We	   simply	   can’t	  keep	  living	  like	  this,”	  Gorbachev	  never	  tired	  of	  saying	  in	  private	  after	  taking	  over	  as	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  CPSU.1	  	  His	  pick	  for	  Foreign	  Minister,	  the	  Georgian	  Eduard	  Shevardnadze,	   would	   put	   it	   even	   stronger:	   “Everything	   has	   rotten.	   	   It	   must	   be	  changed.”2	  	  While	  the	  exact	  source	  of	  malaise	  was	  often	  amorphous	  and	  frequently	  disagreed	  upon,	  Gorbachev	  and	  his	  supporters	  agreed	   that	   the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  first	  and	  foremost	  its	  economy,	  was	  at	  a	  crossroads.	  If	  significant	  efforts	  were	  not	  made	   to	   fix	   the	  economy,	   the	  whole	  of	  Soviet	   society	  would	  be	  under	   threat:	   the	  state	   would	   no	   longer	   be	   able	   to	   provide	   for	   the	   growing	   demands	   of	   its	  increasingly	   educated	   and	  modern	   population.	   	   Over	   time,	  moreover,	   Gorbachev	  and	   his	   team	   came	   to	   accept	   the	   arguments	   of	   a	   reform-­‐minded	  wing	   of	   Soviet	  economics,	   which	   had	   for	   decades	   been	   advocating	   a	   shift	   to	   capitalist-­‐style	  markets	  as	  the	  only	  solution	  to	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  the	  USSR’s	  increasing	  woes.	   	  By	  the	   time	  he	   set	   about	   reforming	   the	   economy	   in	   late	  1986	  and	  1987,	  Gorbachev	  had	   largely	   accepted	   these	   arguments	   for	   change,	   finding	   in	   them	   theoretical	  backing	   for	  his	   own	  personal	   sense	   that	   something	  needed	   to	  be	   changed	   in	   the	  Soviet	  economy.	  	  While	   Gorbachev’s	   push	   for	   economic	   reform	   is	   inarguable,	   the	   reasons	   for	   his	  belief	   in	   its	   inevitability	   are	   not	   as	   obvious	   as	   they	   are	   often	   presented.	   	   These	  reasons,	  complicated	  as	  they	  were,	  moreover,	  would	  help	  to	  determine	  the	  course	  of	   reform	   taken.	   Although	   popular	   memory	   and	   many	   histories	   of	   perestroika	  suggest	   that	  by	  1985	   the	  Soviet	  economy	  was	  close	   to	   collapsing,	  brought	   to	   the	  edge	   by	   decades	   of	   ‘stagnation’	   (zastoi),	   this	   is	   not	   supported	   by	   economic	  evidence. 3 	  Both	   official	   Soviet	   statistics	   and	   independently	   modeled	   figures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  M.S.	  Gorbachev,	  Naedine	  s	  soboi	  (Moscow:	  Grin-­‐Strit,	  2012),	  386.	  2	  Eduard	  Shvardnadze,	  Moi	  vybor.	  	  V	  zashchitu	  demokratii	  i	  svobody	  (Moscow:	  Novosti,	  1991),	  79.	  3	  Amongst	   many	   other	   sources	   highlighting	   the	   “impending”	   economic	   collapse	   of	   the	   Soviet	  economy,	  see	  Abel	  Aganbegian,	  Moving	  the	  Mountain:	  Inside	  the	  Perestroika	  Revolution,	  trans.	  Helen	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produced	   by	   the	   CIA	   demonstrated	   actual	   economic	   growth	   throughout	   the	   late	  1970s	   and	   early	   1980s,	   even	   as	   rates	   of	   growth	   diminished.	   While	   the	   figures	  produced	   by	   the	   CIA	   tended	   to	   assume	   a	   lower	   baseline	   for	   Soviet	   economic	  growth,	   they	   essentially	   paralleled	   the	   trajectories	   shown	   in	   official	   Soviet	  statistics,	   pointing	   to	   the	   underlying	   strength	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economy	   up	   to	   and	  through	  1985.4	  Even	  the	  most	  critical	  analyses	  of	   the	  Soviet	  economy	  during	  this	  period,	   such	   as	   those	   produced	   by	   G.I.	   Khanin,	   a	   harsh	   critic	   of	   Soviet	   statistics,	  generally	  aligned	  with	  official	  picture.5	  	  There	  were,	  of	  course,	  reasons	  for	  concern.	  	  Nearly	  all	  official,	  Western,	  and	   independent	  Soviet	  analyses	  agreed	   that	   rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  had	  continuously	  decreased	  from	  an	  average	  of	  6-­‐8%	  in	  the	  mid	  1960s	  to	  2-­‐3%	  by	  the	  mid	  1980s.6	  	  Labor	  productivity	  rates	  had	  equally	  tapered	  off	  beginning	   around	  1975.7	  	  A	   series	  of	   related	   factors	  had	  even	   led	   to	   an	   actual,	   if	  short,	  recession	  in	  1979,	  when	  output	  may	  have	  contracted	  by	  up	  to	  0.5%	  before	  rebounding	  in	  1980	  and	  rising	   in	  the	  early	  1980s.8	  	   	  Yet	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  these	  declines,	   these	   same	  sources	  all	  pointed	   to	   the	  economy’s	   continued	  growth	  and	  predicted	  resilience	   into	   the	  1980s.	   	  Rates	  of	  growth	  might	  have	  been	  down,	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Szamuely	  (London:	  Bantam	  Press,	  1989);	  Aron	  Katsenelinboigin,	  The	  Soviet	  Union:	  Empire,	  Nation,	  
and	   System	   (London:	   Transaction	   Publishers,	   1990),	   5-­‐6;	   Khanin,	   Dinamika	   ekonomicheskogo;	  Pryce-­‐Jones,	  The	  War	  that	  Never	  Was;	  Brzeski,	  “The	  End	  of	  Communist	  Economics”;	  McCauley,	  The	  
Rise	   and	   Fall;	   Yegor	   Gaidar,	   Collapse	   of	   an	   Empire:	   Lessons	   for	   Modern	   Russia	   (Washington:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2007).	  4	  US	   Congress	   Joint	   Economic	   Committee,	  USSR:	  Measures	   of	   Economic	   Growth	   and	   Development,	  
1950-­‐1980	   (Washington.	  US	  Gov.	  Printing	  Office,	  1982).	   	  The	  CIA’s	   estimates	  of	   Soviet	   economics	  have	   been	   heavily	   criticized,	   insofar	   as	   they	   predicted	   Soviet	   growth.	   	   As	   Angus	   Maddison	   has	  argued,	   however,	   this	   criticism	  was	   “not	  well	   founded”	   and	   circular:	   the	   USSR	   collapsed,	   so	   any	  calculations	  showing	  economic	  stability	  cannot	  be	  correct,	  because	  the	  USSR	  collapsed.	  	  See:	  Angus	  Maddison,	  “Measuring	  the	  Performance	  of	  a	  Communist	  Command	  Economy:	  An	  Assessment	  of	  the	  CIA	   Estimates	   for	   the	  USSR,”	  Review	  of	   Income	  and	  Wealth	   44,	   no.	   3	   (1998):	   309-­‐313;	   also	  Mark	  Harrison,	  “Postwar	  Russian	  Growth:	  Not	  a	  Riddle,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	  55,	  no.	  8	  (2003).	  5	  Mark	  Harrison,	   “Soviet	   Economic	   Growth	   Since	   1928:	   The	   Alternative	   Statistics	   of	   G.I.	   Khanin,”	  
Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	   45,	   no.	   1	   (1993);	   also:	   Khanin,	  Dinamika	  ekonomicheskogo;	   V.	   Kudrov,	   Soviet	  
Economic	  Performance	  in	  Retrospect:	  A	  Critical	  Re-­‐Examination	  (Goringen:	  INTAS,	  1998),	  63.	  6	  Estimates	  of	  annual	  Soviet	  growth	  from	  1965	  to	  1985	  diverge	  based	  upon	  the	  data	  under	  analysis,	  but	  all	  calculations	  show	  the	  same	  trajectory.	  Soviet	  Gosplan	  figures	  for	  “national	  income”	  indicate	  that	  annual	  growth	  dropped	   from	  an	  average	  of	  7.1%	   in	  1966	   to	  3.9%	   in	  1980	  (L.B.	  Vid	  and	  E.A.	  Ivanov,	  Novaia	  filosofiia	  planirovaniia	  (Moscow:	  Ekonomika,	  1990),	  23,	  33,	  tables	  1	  and	  2).	  In	  1990,	  the	  IMF	  calculated	  that	  over	  the	  same	  period,	  the	  USSR's	  “net	  material	  product”	  growth	  rates	  had	  decreased	   from	   8%	   to	   3%	   (International	   Monetary	   Fund,	   The	   World	   Bank,	   Organisation	   for	  Economic	   Co-­‐Operation	   and	   Development,	   and	   the	   European	   Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   and	  Development,	  The	  Economy	  of	  the	  USSR:	  Summary	  and	  Recommendations.	  	  Washington:	  World	  Bank,	  1990),	   3-­‐4).	  Robert	  C.	  Allen	  has	   also	   argued	   that	   Soviet	  GDP	  growth	  decreased	   from	  5.2%	   in	   the	  1960s	  to	  2%	  in	   the	  1980s	  (Robert	  C.	  Allen,	  From	  Farm	  to	  Factory:	  A	  Reinterpretation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
Industrial	  Revolution	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  190).	  7	  Labour	  productivity	  growth	  rates	  track	  the	  annual	  rise	  in	  workers’	  average	  productivity	  levels.	  In	  the	  USSR,	   these	  rates	  reached	  a	  peak	  of	  6.8%	  in	  the	  1960s.	  By	  1982,	   they	  had	  fallen	  to	  2.9%.	  See	  Doklad	   TsK	   KPSS	   Ministra	   finansov	   SSSR	   t.	   Garbuzova	   i	   zamestitelia	   nachal’nika	   TsSU	   SSSR	   t.	  Koroleva	  “O	  tempakh	  rosta	  natsional’nogo	  dokhoda	  SSSR,”	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  46,	  l.	  30.	  	  8	  Kudrov,	  Soviet	  Economic	  Performance,	  55.	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the	  economy	  was	  after	  all	  still	  growing.	  	  The	  information	  available	  to	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  USSR	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid	  1980s	  was	  at	   best	   ambiguous:	   while	   it	   may	   have	   indicated	   a	   need	   for	   reform,	   this	   reform	  could	  have	  legitimately	  taken	  a	  variety	  of	  forms,	  including	  the	  most	  mild.	  Reports	  about	   the	   structural	   decline	   in	   Soviet	   economic	   performance	   were	   balanced	  against	   information	   showing	   overall	   economic	   stability	   and	   even	   improving	  markers	   of	   economic	   performance.	   The	   leaders	   of	   the	   USSR	  were	   privy	   to	   both	  Soviet	  and	  Western	  estimates	  showing	  Soviet	  economic	  growth;	  archival	   records	  show,	  for	  example,	  that	  Nikolai	  Ryzhkov,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	   the	  USSR	   from	  1985	   to	   1990,	   read	   translated	   articles	   by	  Western	   economists	  that	  cited	  CIA	  figures	  and	  other	  contemporary	  research.9	  Ryzhkov	  and	  others	  were	  also	   receiving	   increasingly	   positive	   internal	   reports	   about	   both	   macroeconomic	  growth	  and	  the	  rising	  standard	  of	  living	  enjoyed	  by	  Soviet	  citizens:	  “the	  abundance	  of	   household	   electronics	   (kul’turno-­‐bytovaia	   tekhnika),”	   as	   one	   report	   sent	   to	  Ryzhkov	   in	   1984	  declared,	   “has	   notably	   intensified.”10	  	   Another	   report	   from	   that	  year,	   written	   by	   the	   Chairman	   of	   Gosplan’s	   Council	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Productive	  Powers	   (SOPS),	   Vladimir	   Mozhin,	   was	  more	   triumphant.	   	   “The	   aim	   of	   satisfying	  workers’	  basic	  needs	  has	  been	   fulfilled	  across	   the	  whole	  of	   the	  country.”11	  	  More	  than	  simple	  propaganda,	   these	  were	  reflections	  of	  economic	  reality,	  as	  shortages	  grew	   infrequent	   and	   standards	   of	   living	   rose	   throughout	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	  1980s.12	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  this	  ambiguous	  evidence,	  however,	  Gorbachev	  continued	  to	  advocate	  a	   course	   of	   fundamental	   reform,	   emphasizing	   the	   “rotten”	   nature	   of	   the	   Soviet	  economy	  and	   the	  need	   for	  structural	   change.	   	  Although	  many	  historical	  accounts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  In	  1985,	   for	  example,	  Ryzhkov	  read	  and	   initialed	   two	  articles	  by	   the	  Western	  academics	  Rumer	  and	  Schroeder	  citing	  CIA	  data.	  	  See:	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  59,	  ll.	  31-­‐59.	  10 	  Iu.V.	   Iaromenko,	   “Problemy	   formirovaniia	   otraslevoi	   struktury	   ekonomiki	   v	   dolgosrochnoi	  perspektive,”	  sent	  to	  Ryzhkov	  on	  03.09.1984.	  	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  39,	  l.	  382.	  	  11	  Doklad	   Mozhina	   ot	   02.08.1984	   “Voprosy	   sotsial’nogo	   regional’nogo	   razvitiia	   i	   ratsional’nogo	  ispol’zovaniia	  trudovykh	  resursov,”	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  39,	  l.	  419.	  	  12	  While	  deficit	  –	  the	  imbalance	  arising	  from	  purchasing	  power	  outweighing	  the	  worth	  of	  available	  goods	   –	   was	   an	   endemic	   part	   of	   Soviet	   life,	   actual	   shortages	   of	   basic	   consumer	   goods	   were	  uncommon	   in	   the	   latter	   decades	   of	   the	   USSR.	   	   Concrete	   data	   about	   shortages,	   however,	   remain	  scarce.	   	   See:	   Michael	   Aleexev,	   “Are	   Soviet	   Consumers	   Forced	   to	   Save?”	   Comparative	   Economic	  
Studies	   30,	   no.	   4	   (1988);	  Byung-­‐Yeon	  Kim,	   “Causes	   of	   repressed	   inflation	   in	   the	   Soviet	   consumer	  market,	   1965-­‐1989:	   retail	   price	   subsidies,	   the	   siphoning	  effect,	   and	   the	  budget	  deficit,”	  Economic	  
History	  Review	  55,	  no.	  1	  (2002):	  105-­‐106.	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have	  supported	  Gorbachev’s	  assertion	  that	  this	  was	  the	  only	  plausible	  response	  to	  the	  USSR’s	   long-­‐term	  economic	  decline,	  the	  objective	  state	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  (and	   the	   information	   Gorbachev	   was	   receiving)	   calls	   this	   version	   of	   events	   into	  question.13	  	   It	   is	   also	   doubtful	   that	   Gorbachev’s	   turn	   towards	   markets	   was	   the	  inevitable	   consequence	   of	   contact	   with	   Western	   ideas	   of	   capitalism	   and	  democracy14	  or	  the	  unavoidable	  conclusion	  of	  certain	  pro-­‐market	  economic	  ideas’	  rise	   in	   Soviet	   science, 15 	  as	   has	   been	   argued	   by	   other	   authors.	   Western	  triumphalism	   aside,	   particular	   ideas	   about	   society	   (even	   capitalism)	   are	   not	  inherently	  stronger	  than	  others	  or	  gain	  political	  credence	  on	  their	  own	  –	  they	  are	  instead	   promoted	   and	   popularized	   by	   politicians	   and	   political	   factions.	  	  	  Gorbachev,	  as	  this	  chapter	  will	  argue,	  chose	  to	  promote	  a	  course	  of	  structural	  and	  marketizing	   reform	   as	   the	   consequence	   of	   three	   interrelated	   factors.	   	   First,	   he	  rejected	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  Soviet	  statistics,	  arguing	   instead	   in	   favor	  of	  his	  and	  his	  advisors’	   subjective	   feelings	   about	   the	   state	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economy.	   	   Second,	  Gorbachev	   worked	   in	   and	   was	   influenced	   by	   an	   urban	   environment	   that	   was	  especially	   frustrated	  by	   the	   state	  of	   the	  Soviet	   economy	  as	   the	   result	   of	   growing	  consumer	  demand	  in	  the	  face	  of	  limited	  growth.	  And	  finally,	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  USSR	   increasingly	   came	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   advice	   of	   a	   particular	   group	   of	   Soviet	  economists,	   which	   aligned	   with	   and	   provided	   scientific	   support	   for	   their	   own	  broader	  worldview.	  	  Importantly,	  however,	  there	  was	  nothing	  inevitable	  about	  the	  choice	  that	  was	  made	  in	  favor	  of	  more	  radical	  economic	  reform.	  There	  were	  many	  paths	   available	   to	   Gorbachev	   in	   1985.	   That	   he	   chose	   one	   that	   would	   eventually	  lead	  to	  profound	  reform	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  and	  eventually	  even	  marketization	  was	   reflective	   of	   both	   the	   forces	   on	  which	   he	   relied	   and	   the	   broader	   social	   and	  intellectual	  milieu	  of	  Moscow	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s.	  	  
I.	  False	  Statistics	  	  When	   Mikhail	   Gorbachev	   took	   office	   in	   1985,	   Soviet	   statistics	   were	   relatively	  upbeat.	  	  Economic	  returns	  were	  rising	  after	  the	  hiccup	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	   and	   most	   ministries	   and	   planning	   agencies	   seemed	   relatively	   positive.	  	  Amongst	   the	   new	   leadership	   of	   the	   USSR,	   however,	   the	   feeling	   remained	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Cf.	  Chris	  Miller,	  The	  Struggle	  to	  Save	  the	  Soviet	  Economy:	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  and	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  
USSR	   (Durham:	  University	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2016);	  Gaidar,	  Collapse	  of	  an	  Empire;	  Brown,	  The	  
Gorbachev	  Factor.	  14	  English,	  Russia	  and	  the	  Idea;	  Fukuyama,	  “The	  End	  of	  History?”;	  Huntington,	  The	  Third	  Wave.	  15	  Egle	  Rindzeviciute,	   “A	   Struggle	   for	   the	   Soviet	   Future:	   The	  Birth	   of	   Scientific	   Forecasting	   in	   the	  Soviet	  Union,”	  Slavic	  Review	  75,	  no.	  1	  (2016);	  Feygin,	  “The	  Making	  of	  an	  Economics	  Internationale.”	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something	   just	  wasn’t	   right	  with	   the	  data	   they	  were	   receiving.	   	   	   	   From	   the	   early	  1980s	  on	  arguments	  had	  resounded	  in	  Moscow	  about	  just	  how	  much	  –	  or	  perhaps	  how	  little	  –	  the	  country’s	  political	  leaders	  were	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  populace	  and	  the	  average	  demands	  of	  daily	  life	  in	  the	  USSR.	  	  Andropov	  had	  famously	  declared	  upon	  his	  election	  to	  the	  post	  of	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  that	  “We	  still	  do	  not	  adequately	  understand	  the	  society	  in	  which	  we	  live	  and	  work,”16	  and	  in	  the	  years	   that	   followed	  debates	   raged	   in	   the	  Communist	  Party	  Secretariat	  about	   this	  level	   of	   understanding.	   	   Initially	   these	   arguments	   took	   on	   something	   of	   a	  theoretical	   character	   –	   could	   the	   current	   state	   of	   the	   USSR	   truly	   be	   called	  “developed	  socialism”	  or	  was	  a	  new	  formulation	  necessary	  to	  encompass	  the	  many	  remaining	  shortcomings?17	  –	  but	  upon	  Gorbachev’s	  ascension	  to	  power	  they	  began	  to	  be	  applied	   to	   the	  realities	  of	   the	  Soviet	  economy.	   	   	  As	   the	  debates	  heightened,	  that	  economy	  began	  to	  appear	  worse	  and	  worse.	  	  As	   Aleksandr	   Yakovlev,	   one	   of	   Gorbachev’s	   closest	   advisors,	   later	   argued,	   the	  statistics	   the	   Politburo	   had	   access	   to	   simply	   did	   not	   comport	   with	   the	   “general	  structural	   collapse	   of	   the	   social	   order”	   that	   he	   and	   others	   sensed	   around	   him.	  	  	  Yakovlev	  chose	  to	  believe	  his	  feelings	  about	  social	  collapse	  and	  reject	  the	  statistics:	  it	  was	  the	  endemic	  Soviet	  overstatement	  of	  achievements,	  he	  argued,	  that	  had	  led	  the	   leadership	   away	   from	   a	   true	   understanding	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economy.18	  	   Both	  Gorbachev	   and	  Nikolai	   Ryzhkov	   have	   also	   recorded	   similar	   feelings:	   as	   Ryzhkov	  put	   it,	   they	   “did	   not	   believe”	   the	   official	   statistics	   and	   instead	   trusted	   their	  instincts,	  which	  told	  them	  that	  the	  economy	  had	  actually	  been	  contracting	  during	  the	   10th	   and	   11th	   five	   year	   plans	   (1976-­‐1985).19	  Gorbachev	   was	   more	   succinct:	  “Our	   statistics	   simply	   do	   not	   know	   how	   much	   we	   produce.”20	  As	   the	   Soviet	  economist	   and	   Politburo	  member	   Vadim	  Medvedev	   put	   it,	   after	   1985	   the	   Soviet	  leadership	  “proceeded	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1980s	  the	  growth	  of	  industrial	  production	  had	  stopped,	  and	  the	  real	  income	  of	  the	  population	  had	   actually	   declined,	   even	   though	   this	   was	   not	   confirmed	   by	   the	   data	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  “Rech’	   general’nogo	   sekretaria	   Tsentral’nogo	   komiteta	   KPSS	   tovarishcha	   Yu.	   V.	   Andropova	   na	  Plenume	  TsK	  KPSS	  15	  iiunia	  1983	  goda,”	  Pravda,	  June	  16,	  1983.	  17	  See:	  Pechenev,	  Gorbachev.	  	  18	  A.	  Yakovlev,	  Predislovie.	  	  Obval.	  	  Posleslovie	  (Moscow:	  Novosti,	  1992),	  139.	  	  	  19	  Nikolai	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika:	  Istoriia	  predatel’stv	  (Moscow:	  Novosti,	  1992),	  33.	  20	  A.	   Cherniaev,	   A.	   Veber,	   and	   V.	   Medvedev,	   eds.,	   V	   Politbiuro	   TsK	   KPSS…Po	   zapisiam	   Anatoliia	  
Cherniava,	   Vadima	   Medvedeva,	   Georgiia	   Shakhnazarova	   (1985-­‐1991).	   	   Izdanie	   vtoroe.	   (Moscow:	  Gorbachev-­‐Fond,	   2008),	   159;	   also	   see	  M.S.	   Gorbachev,	  Zhizn’	   i	   reformy	   (Moscow:	  Novosti,	   1995),	  142-­‐143.	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Central	  Statistical	  Agency	  (TsSU).”21	  	  In	  the	  higher	  echelons	  of	  Moscow	  politics,	  this	  proved	   to	   be	   a	   relatively	   common	   point	   of	   view:	   economists	   suggested	   that	  “contrary	   to	   reports	   from	   the	   central	   government,	   industrial	   output	   and	   the	  availability	   of	   goods	   was	   falling,”22 	  or	   highlighted	   the	   “frailty”	   of	   the	   Soviet	  economy	  that	  “had	  been	  only	  masked	  for	  a	  time	  by	  the	  extensive	  overuse	  of	  human	  and	  natural	  resources.”	  23	  Journalists,	  such	  as	  the	  editor	  of	  Kommunist,	  Otto	  Latsis,	  held	   back	   even	   less,	   arguing	   that	   “By	   the	   1970s	   the	   economy	   had	   stopped	  developing…by	   1979	   it	   was	   obvious	   that	   the	   economy	   was	   disintegrating.”24	  Ultimately,	  no	  matter	  the	  data	  available	  from	  both	  Western	  and	  Soviet	  sources	  that	  pointed	   to	  ongoing	  but	   slow	  growth	   in	   the	  USSR	  and	   room	   for	  debate	   about	   the	  overall	  strength	  of	   the	  Soviet	  planned	  economy,	   the	  answer	  voiced	   in	  Moscow	  to	  Andropov’s	   question	   was	   singular	   and	   negative:	   no,	   we	   don’t	   know	   our	   own	  country	  or	  economy,	  and	  what	  we	  are	  learning	  about	  it	  now	  is	  deeply	  disturbing.	  	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  Gorbachev	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Soviet	  government	  came	  to	  this	   conclusion	   solely	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   intuition	   or	   simple	   feeling.	   	   And	   although	  Gorbachev,	   Yakovlev,	   Ryzhkov,	   and	   many	   of	   their	   advisors	   had	   grown	   up	   in	  Russian	  villages	  and	   continued	  on	  occasion	   to	  visit	   less	  developed	   rural	   areas	  of	  the	   USSR,	   individual	   comparisons	   of	   life	   “on-­‐the-­‐ground”	   to	   relatively	   rosy	  statistics	   can	   only	   partially	   explain	   their	   rejection	   of	   official	   Soviet	   economic	  analyses.	  25	  	   Having	   spent	   decades	   living	   and	  working	   in	   the	   highest	   echelons	   of	  Soviet	  power	  in	  Moscow,	  Gorbachev	  and	  the	  other	  leaders	  of	  the	  USSR	  were	  in	  fact	  most	   strongly	   influenced	   by	   the	   environment	   in	  which	   they	   lived	   and	   operated.	  	  While	   alternative	   statistics	  were	   also	   not	   available	   to	   the	   Soviet	   leadership	   –	   as	  Philip	   Hanson	   and	   others	   have	   shown,	   “Soviet	   officials	   did	   not	   operate	   with	   a	  secret	   set	   of	   numbers,”	   and	   were	   only	   as	   informed	   as	   official	   statistics	   would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Michael	  Ellman	  and	  Vladimir	  Kontorovich,	  eds.,	  The	  Destruction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Economic	  System:	  An	  
Insider’s	  History	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1998),	  14.	  22	  Interview	  with	  Tatiana	  Zaslavskaya,	  27.06.1990,	  2RR	  1/3/6	  69,	  2-­‐3;	  also	  Aganbegyan,	  Moving	  the	  
Mountain,	  155.	  23 	  Proekt	   programmy	   stabilizatsii	   ekonomiki	   i	   perekhoda	   k	   rynku	   [signed	   by	   Shatalin	   and	  Aganbegian,	  11.09.1990],	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9320,	   l.	  322;	   for	  similar	  statements,	  also	  see:	  S.	  Shatalin	   and	   E.T.	   Gaidar,	   Ekonomicheskaia	   reforma:	   prichiny,	   napravleniia,	   problemy	   (Moscow:	  Ekonomika,	  1989),	  13.	  24	  Interview	   with	   Otto	   Rudol’fovich	   Latsis,	   April	   1990,	   2RR	   1/3/9,	   76,	   2;	   also	   Victor	   Afanas’ev,	  
Chetvyortaia	  vlast’	  i	  chetyre	  genseka:	  ot	  Brezhneva	  do	  Gorbacheva	  v	  ‘Pravde’	  (Moscow:	  KEDR,	  1994),	  71.	  25	  On	   Gorbachev’s	   base	   in	   a	   Stavropol’	   village,	   see	   A.A.	   Korobeinikov,	   Gorbachev:	   drugoe	   litso	  (Moscow:	  Respublika,	  1996),	  13.	  	  Yakovlev,	  who	  was	  from	  a	  village	  near	  Yaroslavl,	  also	  frequently	  visited;	  see	  RGASPI	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  147,	  l.	  5.	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allow26	  –	  other	   sources	  of	   information	   remained.	   	   	   In	  part,	   from	   their	  position	  of	  Party	   leadership,	   Gorbachev	   and	   those	   around	   him	   were	   now	   privy	   to	   greater	  information	   about	   plan	   fulfillment	   –	   and	   equally,	   about	   plan	   falsifications.	   	   As	  Gorbachev	   emphasized	   during	   the	   27th	   Party	   Congress	   in	   1986,	   significant	   plan	  fulfillment	  figures	  had	  been	  overstated	  and	  falsified	  during	  the	  10th	  and	  11th	  five-­‐year	  plans:	  strong	  indication,	  he	  felt,	  that	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  was	  hardly	  living	  up	  to	   the	   level	   shown	   in	  official	   statistics.27	  	   From	  1985	  on,	  moreover,	   the	   tendency	  for	   five	   year	   plans	   to	   have	   been	   “somewhat	   unfulfilled”	   was	   increasingly	  emphasized	  in	  internal	  party	  documents.28	  	  Given	  their	  many	  years	   living	  and	  working	   in	  Moscow,	  moreover,	  Gorbachev	  and	  other	   Communist	   Party	   leaders	   were	   also	   strongly	   influenced	   by	   the	   views	   and	  opinions	   of	   their	   urban	   and	   cosmopolitan	   environment.	   	   Increasingly,	   this	  environment	   was	   growing	   dissatisfied	   with	   the	   demands	   and	   rewards	   of	   Soviet	  life:	   the	   growth	   of	   standards	   of	   living	   appeared	   to	   be	   leveling	   out,	   calling	   into	  question	   the	  USSR’s	   forward	  progress	   to	  communism.	   	  Salaries	  had	  grown	   faster	  than	  the	  production	  of	  consumer	  goods,	  leaving	  metropolitan	  Soviet	  citizens	  with	  excess	   cash	   and	   unfulfilled	   demand	   for	   durable	   and	   prestige	   goods.	   	   While	   this	  perspective	  was	  not	  shared	   in	  all	  parts	  of	   the	  USSR	  –	  as	  Chapter	   II	  has	  shown,	   it	  was	  largely	  absent	  on	  the	  periphery,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  –	  it	  was	  the	  dominant	  view	  that	  surrounded	  Gorbachev	  and	  his	  advisors	   throughout	   the	  early	  and	  mid-­‐1980s.	   	   When	   Gorbachev	   suggested	   that	   the	   statistics	   were	   lying,	   he	   was	   both	  drawing	  on	  this	  bubble	  of	  social	  frustration	  and	  finding	  support	  for	  his	  own	  belief	  that	  something	  serious	  had	  to	  be	  done	  to	  reform	  the	  economy.	  	  	  	  
II.	  The	  Origins	  of	  Urban	  Elite	  Dissatisfaction	  in	  the	  USSR	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  1980s,	  residents	  of	  Moscow,	  Leningrad,	  and	  other	  large	  urban	  cities	  in	  the	  European	  regions	  of	  the	  USSR	  were	  more	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  express	  dissatisfaction	   with	   their	   overall	   standard	   of	   living.	   	   While	   access	   to	   material	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Philip	  Hanson,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Economy:	  An	  Economic	  History	  of	  the	  USSR	  from	  1945	  (London:	  Pearson,	  2003),	  3-­‐4.	  	  As	  the	  Soviet	  economist	  Valentin	  Kudrov	  later	  noted,	  this	  did	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  many	  Soviet	  public	  servants,	  who	  had	  been	  long	  convinced	  that	  the	  leadership	  was	  privy	  to	  an	  alternative	  set	  of	  numbers	  (Kudrov,	  Soviet	  Economic	  Performance,	  35).	  27	  Materialy	   XXVII	   s’’ezda	   Kommunisticheskoi	   partii	   Sovetskogo	   Soiuza	   (Moscow,	   1986),	   22,	   101.	  	  This	  same	  point	  was	  made	  in	  an	  internal	  document	  distributed	  by	  Ryzhkov	  in	  1983;	  see:	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  38,	  l.	  6.	  28	  See,	   for	   example,	   “O	   poriadke	   otsenki	   rezul’tatov	   khoziaistvennoi	   deiatel’nosti	   v	   1981-­‐1985,”	  GARF,	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  145,	  d.	  59,	  l.	  1.	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goods,	   education,	   healthcare,	   and	   many	   of	   the	   other	   benefits	   of	   Soviet	  modernization	   was	   generally	   smoother	   and	   more	   widespread	   in	   such	   urban	  environments,	  their	  residents	  had	  begun	  to	  doubt	  the	  overall	  positive	  trajectory	  of	  the	   Soviet	   economy.	   	   	   In	   this	   view,	   based	   on	   both	   internal	   and	   external	  observations,	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economy	   for	   the	   average	   citizen	   had	  stagnated,	  and	  since	  the	  early	  1980s	  most	  likely	  even	  had	  shrunk.	  	  It	  was	  as	  if	  they	  literally	   lived	  on	  the	  pages	  of	  Vladimir	  Sorokin’s	  brilliant	  satirical	  novel,	  Ochered’	  (The	  Queue):	  “there	  was	  a	  line	  for	  oranges,	  and	  no	  cabbage”	  and	  in	  the	  end	  no	  one	  was	  quite	  sure	  where	  the	  whole	  process	  was	  leading.29	  	  	  	  While	   discontent	   amongst	   urban	   Soviet	   citizens	   seems	   to	   have	   grown	   rapidly	   in	  the	  1980s,	  its	  roots	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  at	  least	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1950s.	  	  Following	  Stalin’s	  death	   in	  1953,	   increasing	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  by	   the	  Soviet	   state	  on	   increasing	  citizen’s	   overall	   standard	   of	   living.	   	   Efforts	  were	   taken	   to	   boost	   the	   volume	   and	  quality	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  available	  to	  Soviet	  workers,	  while	  at	   the	  same	  time	  increasing	  wages	  and	  pensions	  and	  retaining	  artificially	  low	  and	  subsidized	  prices	  on	  foodstuffs	  and	  many	  other	  goods.	  	  	  This	  changing	  emphasis	  on	  citizens’	  material	  wellbeing	  and	  their	  access	  to	  consumer	  goods	  reflected	  both	  theoretical	  and	  more	  immediate	  political	  concerns.	  	  For	  Stalin’s	  successors,	  including	  Nikita	  Khrushchev,	  the	  USSR’s	  increasing	  steps	  towards	  “developed	  socialism”	  dictated	  an	  equivalent	  increase	   in	   citizens’	   standards	   of	   living	   to	   reflect	   this	   progression.	   At	   the	   same	  time,	  moreover,	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  drive	  to	  dismantle	  previously	  dominant	  structures	  of	   physical	   repression	   dictated	   the	   creation	   of	   alternative	   ways	   to	   guarantee	  citizens’	  loyalty.30	  	  Finally,	  by	  the	  1950s	  it	  had	  become	  clear	  that	  earlier	  policies	  of	  excluding	   certain	   “undesirable	  elements”	   (former	  aristocrats,	   “kulaks,”	   etc.)	   from	  social	   support	   and	   providing	   real	   guarantees	   only	   to	   the	   most	   economically	  valuable	  industrial	  workers	  was	  in	  fact	  retarding	  overall	  growth	  by	  tamping	  down	  consumer	  demand.31	  Increasing	  access	  to	  consumer	  goods	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  many	  of	   the	   social	   issues	   the	  Soviet	   government	   faced	   in	   the	  early	  1950s.	   	  As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Vladimir	  Sorokin,	  Ochered’	  (Paris:	  Sintaxis,	  1985),	  7.	  30	  Mark	  Harrison,	   “Coercion,	  Compliance,	  and	  the	  Collapse	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Command	  Economy,”	  The	  
Economic	  History	  Review	  55,	  no.	  3	  (2002).	  31	  G.M.	   Ivanova,	  Na	  poroge	   ‘gosudarstva	  vseobshchego	  blagosostoianiia’:	  Sotsial’naia	  politika	  v	  SSSR	  
(seredina	  1950-­‐kh	  –	  nachalo	  1970-­‐kh	  godov)	   (Moscow:	   Institut	   rossiiskoi	   istorii	  RAN,	  2011),	  8-­‐13.	  	  At	   the	   26th	   Party	   Congress	   in	   1971,	   Brezhnev	  went	   as	   far	   as	   to	   argue	   that	   “increasing	  workers’	  standard	  of	  living	  has	  become…one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  economic	  conditions	  for	  swift	  industrial	  growth”	  (“Otchetnyi	  doklad	  General’nogo	  sekretaria	  L.I.	  Brezhneva	  na	  26-­‐om	  s’’ezde	  KPSS,”	  Pravda,	  March,	  31,	  1971).	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Peter	  Hauslohner	  has	  phrased	  it,	  the	  Soviet	  state	  chose	  enact	  to	  a	  “social	  contract”:	  in	   exchange	   for	   participation	   in	   and	   acceptance	   of	   the	   political	   order,	   Soviet	  citizens	   were	   provided	   with	   guarantees	   of	   increasing	   material	   welfare	   and	  economic	  growth.32	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  these	  changes	  had	  already	  led	  to	  structural	  changes	  in	  the	  Soviet	  economy:	   in	   the	  eighth	   five-­‐year	  plan	   (1966-­‐1970),	   the	  growth	  rate	  of	   consumer	  goods	   production	   was	   for	   the	   first	   time	   greater	   than	   that	   of	   industrial	   goods.33	  Enterprise	  reforms	  enacted	   in	  1965	   further	  emphasized	   the	  need	  to	   increase	   the	  production	  of	  consumer	  goods.34	  	  Wages	  also	  continued	  to	  rise	  for	  many	  categories	  of	  workers,	   as	  well	   as	   for	   pensioners.35	  Soviet	   consumers	  were	   now	   privy	   to	   an	  increasingly	   widening	   assortment	   of	   durable	   goods	   (refrigerators,	   gas	   stoves,	  televisions,	   cars,	   etc.),	   foodstuffs,	   clothing,	   furniture	   and	   the	   other	   many	  accoutrements	  of	  modern	  urban	  living.	  	  “The	  result,”	  as	  Nataliya	  Chernyshova	  has	  written,	   “was	   a	   consumer	   boom	  which	   kicked	   up	   all	   sorts	   of	   contradictions	   and	  problems	   for	   the	   regime	   and	   left	   it	   dealing	  with	   citizens	  who	  had	   very	   different	  aspirations	  than	  their	  predecessors.”36	  	   	   In	  contrast	   to	   the	  previous	  generation	  of	  Soviet	   citizens,	   those	   who	   came	   of	   age	   during	   the	   height	   of	   the	   Soviet	   social	  contract	   in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  understood	  their	  relation	  to	  the	  state	  at	   least	   in	  part	   as	   one	   revolving	   around	   the	   latter’s	   guarantees	   of	   increasing	   material	  welfare.37	  	  	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  urban	  Soviet	  citizens	  in	  Moscow	  or	  other	  major	  cities,	  the	  social	  contract	  developed	   in	   the	  1950s	  held	   firm	  through	  at	   least	   the	  mid-­‐1970s.	  	  Average	   per-­‐capita	   expenditures	   on	   consumer	   goods	   grew	   rapidly	   during	   these	  decades,	   rising	   39%	   from	   1964	   to	   1970,	   and	   another	   27%	   between	   1970	   and	  1975. 38 	  Material	   goods,	   whether	   produced	   in	   the	   USSR	   or	   imported,	   were	  increasingly	  available	  and	  accessible;	  shortages	  of	  basic	  goods	  were	   less	  and	   less	  observable	  and	  by	  the	  late	  1970s	  an	  infrequent	  aspect	  of	  daily	  life.	  Around	  the	  end	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Peter	  Hauslohner,	  “Gorbachev’s	  Social	  Contract,”	  Soviet	  Economy	  3,	  no.	  1	  (1987),	  58.	  33	  Vid	  and	  Ivanov,	  Novaia	  filosofiia,	  34-­‐36.	  	  34	  For	  more	  detail	  on	  the	  1965	  reforms,	  see	  Chapter	  Four.	  35	  Between	  1960	  and	  1980,	  for	  example,	   industrial	  workers’	  monthly	  salaries	  rose	  by	  106%,	  from	  89.9	  to	  185.5	  rubles	  (RGASPI	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  59,	  l.	  7).	  Also	  see:	  Ivanova,	  Na	  poroge,	  14.	  36	  Natalya	  Chernyshova,	  Soviet	  Consumer	  Culture	  in	  the	  Brezhnev	  Era	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2013),	  3.	  37	  Ibid,	  17-­‐19.	  38	  Ibid,	  28.	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of	   the	   1970s,	   however,	   a	   rapid	   change	   occurred	   in	   Soviet	   urban	   residents’	  perceptions:	  satisfaction	  with	  economic	  growth	  and	  the	  material	  goods	  it	  provided	  was	  quickly	  replaced	  with	  growing	  dissatisfaction	  and	  frustration.	  More	  and	  more	  Western	  and	  Soviet	  studies	  began	  to	  show	  urban	  citizens’	  worries	  over	  economic	  performance	  and	  growth,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  basic	  access	  to	  goods,	  services,	  and	  the	  social	  benefits	  of	  the	  Soviet	  system.39	  	  The	  social	  contract	  appeared	  to	  be	  fraying	  at	  the	  edges.	  	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  A	   number	   of	   related	   factors	   help	   to	   explain	   the	   rapid	   decline	   in	   satisfaction	  expressed	   by	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	   Moscow	   and	   other	   urban	   environments	   around	  1980.	   	   First,	   overall	   growth	   rates	   decreased	   in	   the	   late	   1970s,	   which	   had	   a	  corresponding	  effect	  on	  rates	  of	  consumption.	  	  Numerous	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  Soviet	  per-­‐capita	  consumption	  expenditures	  continued	   to	  grow	   in	   the	   late	  1970s	  and	   early	   1980s,	   but	   at	   a	   rate	   half	   as	   fast	   as	   in	   the	   preceding	   decade.40	  While	  peoples’	   material	   well-­‐being	   continued	   to	   improve,	   the	   decreasing	   speed	   of	  improvements	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  past	  two	  decades’	  booming	  changes	  led	  Soviet	  citizens	   to	   doubt	   the	   promises	   made	   in	   the	   Social	   contract.	   	   It	   appeared	  increasingly	   plausible	   that	   something	   might	   be	   awry	   with	   the	   broader	   Soviet	  economic	  apparatus.	  	  	  Two	  important	  structural	   imbalances	  helped	  to	  make	  these	  concerns	  particularly	  immediate	  to	  the	  residents	  of	  major	  Soviet	  cities.	  	  First	  and	  foremost,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	   Soviet	   citizens’	  wages	  were	   notably	   outpacing	   the	   production	   and	   sale	   of	  consumer	  goods.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  was	  increasing	  imbalance	  between	  Soviet	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  On	   Soviet	   citizens’	   growing	   dissatisfaction	   from	   the	   late	   1970s,	   see:	   Iu.	   F.	   Vorob'ev,	   N.D.	  Leliukhina	  and	  A.A.	  Skorbov,	  eds.,	  Ocherki	  ekonomicheskikh	  reform	  (Moscow:	  Rossiskaia	  akademiia	  nauk,	   1993),	   231;	  Hosking,	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	   378,	   382;	  Mervyn	  Matthews,	  Patterns	  of	  
Deprivation	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  Under	  Brezhnev	  and	  Gorbachev	   (Stanford:	  Hoover	  Institution	  Press,	  1989).	   	   Although	   Matthews	   and	   others	   present	   their	   data	   as	   representative	   of	   dissatisfaction	  amongst	   all	   Soviet	   citizens,	   their	   samples	  are	   largely	  drawn	   from	  residents	  of	  major	  Soviet	   cities	  (Moscow,	  Leningrad,	  et	  cetera).	  	  	  40	  For	  example,	  the	  Muscovite	  family	  whose	  per-­‐capita	  spending	  had	  risen	  by	  27%	  between	  1970-­‐1975	   would	   have	   seen	   an	   approximately	   13-­‐14%	   rise	   in	   spending	   between	   1975-­‐1980.	   	   This	  general	   trend	   has	   been	   confirmed	   by	   a	   number	   of	   sources;	   see:	   Central	   Intelligence	   Agency,	  
Measures	   of	   Soviet	   Gross	   National	   Product	   in	   1982	   Prices	   (Washington:	   US	   Government	   Printing	  Office,	   1990),	   6;	   Hanson,	   Rise	   and	   Fall,	   99;	   Shatalin	   and	   Gaidar,	   Ekonomicheskaia	   reforma,	   13;	  Gertrude	  E.	   	  Schroeder,	   “Soviet	  Living	  Standards	   in	  Comparative	  Perspective,”	   in	  Quality	  of	  Life	  in	  
the	  Soviet	  Union,	  ed.	  Horst	  Herlemann	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1987),	  21.	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wages	  and	  consumption:	  citizens	  simply	  had	  access	  to	  more	  cash	  than	  there	  were	  goods	   on	   which	   to	   spend	   it.	   While	   this	   problem	   did	   not	   affect	   everyone,	   an	  increasing	   number	   of	   relatively	   well-­‐off	   Soviet	   families	   were	   reaching	   ruble	  saturation,	   having	   bought	   all	   of	   the	   available	   durable	   goods	   and	   retaining	  unspendable	  rubles	  in	  their	  pockets.	  In	  some	  ways,	  this	  problem	  had	  accompanied	  the	  command	  economy	  since	  its	  inception	  in	  the	  late	  1920s.	  	  	  David	  Woodruff	  has	  shown	   that	   from	   the	   beginning	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   was	   presented	   with	   “an	  unresolved	  tension	  between	  facilitating	  production	  and	  monetary	  stability,”	  which	  was	   expressed	   through	   the	   twin	   demands	   of	   making	   sure	   workers	   were	   paid	  enough	  –	  and	  enterprises	   rewarded	  enough	  –	   to	   incentivize	  production,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  producing	  enough	  goods	  to	  fulfill	  workers’	  spending	  capacity.41	  The	  efforts	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  to	  increase	  the	  production	  of	  consumer	  goods	  were	  also	  meant	  to	  target	  this	  imbalance,	  and	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  frequently	  made	  explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  need	  for	  “balance	  between	  the	  quantity	  of	  produced	  consumer	  goods	  and	   the	  population’s	  ability	   to	   spend.”42	  By	   the	  1980s,	  however,	  the	  state’s	  attempts	   to	  balance	  workers’	  wages	  with	  a	  sufficient	  volume	  of	  goods	  began	  to	  sputter.	  	  By	   historically	   focusing	   on	   the	   production	   of	   consumer	   goods,	   Soviet	   planning	  bodies	  had	  tended	  to	  overlook	  the	  other	  half	  of	  the	  equation:	  the	  growth	  of	  salaries	  provided	   to	   workers	   to	   incentivize	   increasing	   production.	   Since	   the	   1960s,	   as	   a	  result,	   when	   enterprises	   were	   given	   greater	   leeway	   in	   assigning	   and	   increasing	  worker	  salaries,	   the	  spending	  capacity	  of	  Soviet	  workers	  had	  grown	  rapidly,	  and	  often	  at	  rates	  greater	  than	  increases	  in	  production	  or	  labour	  productivity.43	  	  By	  the	  mid	   1980s	   wages	   were	   growing	   a	   rate	   much	   faster	   than	   any	   increases	   in	  production.44	  	  Reforms	  under	  Brezhnev	  and	  Andropov	  had	  aimed	  at	  restricting	  the	  growth	   of	   salaries	   and	   other	   wages,	   but	   their	   effect	   was	   generally	   muted.	  Continuing	   to	   emphasize	   increases	   in	   production	   over	   restrictions	   on	   salaries,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  David	   Woodruff,	   Money	   Unmade:	   Barter	   and	   the	   Fate	   of	   Russian	   Capitalism	   (Ithaca:	   Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  23;	  also	  Vladimir	  Mau,	  The	  Political	  History	  of	  Economic	  Reform	  in	  Russia,	  
1985-­‐1994	  (London:	  The	  Center	  for	  Research	  into	  Communist	  Economies,	  1996),	  14.	  42	  A.N.	  Kosygin,	  “Ob	  ulushchenii	  upravleniia	  promyshlennost’iu,	  sovershenstvovanii	  planirovaniia	  i	  usilenii	  ekonomicheskogo	  stimulirovaniia	  promyshlennogo	  proizvodstva.	  Doklad	  na	  Plenume	  TsK	  KPSS,	   27.09.1965,”	   in	   K	   velikoi	   tseli.	   Izbrannye	   rechi	   i	   stat’i	   (Moscow:	   Politizdat,	   1979),	   329.	  Andropov	  was	  also	  focused	  on	  this	  wage-­‐goods	  imbalance.	  	  See	  E.K.	  Ligachev,	  Zagadka	  Gorbacheva	  (Novosibirsk:	  Interbuk,	  1992),	  24.	  43	  Hanson,	  Rise	  and	  Fall,	  88-­‐90.	  44	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  38,	  l.	  3.	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moreover,	   these	   early	   reforms	  had	   the	  unintended	   result	   of	   actually	  heightening	  the	   imbalance. 45 	  As	   Nikolai	   Ryzhkov,	   then	   head	   of	   the	   Economics	   Division	  (ekonomicheskii	  otdel)	  of	  the	  CPSU	  Central	  Committee	  argued	  in	  1983,	  “The	  growth	  in	   current	   retail	   sales	   is	   only	   enough	   to	   cover	   the	   ongoing	   growth	   of	   monetary	  wages;	   it	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   lower	   the	   level	   of	   previously	   built	   up	   unfulfilled	  demand.”46	  In	  fact,	  as	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  reported	  that	  same	  year,	  retail	  sales	  growth	  was	  actually	  falling	  behind	  wage	  increases.	  	  Between	  1980	  and	  1983	  average	  wages	  in	  the	  USSR	  had	  grown	  by	  14%	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  13%	  growth	  in	  average	  consumption.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  average	  percentage	  of	  Soviet	  workers’	  wages	   that	  were	   spent	   on	   ‘goods	   and	   services’	   dropped	   over	   the	   same	  period	  from	  the	  already	  worrying	  86%	  to	  84%.47	  	  Each	  year,	  more	  and	  more	  rubles	  were	  going	  unspent.	  As	  Ryzhkov	  more	  succinctly	  put	  it	  in	  his	  memoirs,	  “There	  was	  money,	  but	  nothing	  to	  spend	  it	  on.”	  48	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  this	  led	  to	  a	  spike	  in	  both	  deficits	  and	  consumer	  dissatisfaction	  as	  more	  and	  more	  salaries	  ended	  up	  unspent	  and	  left	  in	  savings	  accounts.	   	  By	  1983,	  the	  total	  value	  of	  Soviet	  citizens’	  unspent	  savings	  had	  reached	  187	  billion	  rubles,	  more	  than	  half	  the	  value	  of	  the	  total	  Soviet	  government	  budget	  that	  year.49	  	  Worse,	  savings	   had	   been	   increasing	   by	   a	   consistent	   5-­‐6%	   per	   year	   since	   1981,	  demonstrating	   a	   growing	   proportion	   of	   Soviet	  wages	   that	  were	   “uncaptured”	   by	  the	   economy,	   neither	   spent	   nor	   invested	   in	   any	   productive	   activity.50 	  While	  unspent	  wages	  and	  the	  excessive	  liquidity	  they	  engender	  can	  lead	  to	  inflation	  and	  economic	  overheating	  in	  capitalist	  economies,	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  strict	  price	  controls	   in	   the	   Soviet	   economy	   their	   consequences,	   primarily	   expressed	   through	  goods	  deficits,	  were	  all	  the	  harsher	  and	  more	  obvious.51	  	  By	  the	  early	  1980s	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  A	  commission	  chaired	  by	  Ryzhkov	  and	   involving	  Gorbachev	  was	  appointed	  by	  Andropov	   in	   the	  early	  1980s	  to	  develop	  economic	  reforms.	  	  The	  reforms	  passed	  in	  1983	  largely	  built	  upon	  Kosygin’s	  1965	   attempt.	   See	   N.I.	   Ryzhkov,	   Desiat’	   let	   velikikh	   potriasenii	   (Moscow:	   Assotsiatsiia	   ‘Kniga.	  Prosveshchenie.	   Miloserdie’,	   1995),	   48-­‐49;	   Vladislav	   Zubok,	   “The	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   China	   in	   the	  1980s:	  reconciliation	  and	  divorce,”	  Cold	  War	  History	  17,	  no.2	  (2017):	  132.	  	  	  46	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  oп.	  1,	  d.	  38,	  l.	  6	  47	  Spravka	  o	  dokhodakh	  i	  raskhodakh	  naseleniia	  v	  1983	  godu.	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  38,	  l.	  29.	  	  Also	  see	  Kim,	  “Causes	  of	  repressed	  inflation.”	  48	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika,	  239.	  49	  RGASPI	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  38,	  l.	  27.	  50	  For	  1981-­‐1982,	  see	  Spravka	  ot	  Gosbanka	  SSSR	  ot	  17.12.1982,	  RGASPI	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  38,	  l.	  21.	  For	  later	  years,	  see	  the	  IMF	  data	  presented	  in	  Woodruff,	  Money	  Unmade,	  65;	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika,	  239;	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  8404,	  l.	  5.	  51	  Deficits	   in	   a	   command	   system	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   form	   of	   passive	   inflation,	   caused	   by	  consumers’	  access	  to	  more	  money	  than	  the	  equivalent	  monetary	  value	  of	  all	  available	  goods.	   	  In	  a	  capitalist	  economy,	  when	  consumers	  have	  more	  money,	  producers	  raise	  prices,	  leading	  to	  inflation.	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unspent	   wages	   were	  making	   themselves	   known	   through	   increasingly	   unfulfilled	  consumer	  demand	  for	  all	  types	  of	  goods,	  leading	  to	  the	  growing	  return	  of	  deficits	  for	  even	  basic	  goods	  and	  foodstuffs.52	  	  	  This	  growing	  wage-­‐goods	  imbalance	  was	  structured,	  moreover,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  made	  its	   negative	   consequences	   most	   obvious	   to	   well-­‐off	   citizens	   in	   the	   economically	  developed	  cities	  of	  the	  Soviet	  west.	  	  The	  1965	  enterprise	  reforms,	  which	  had	  been	  meant	  in	  part	  to	  increase	  the	  production	  of	  consumer	  goods,	  but	  which	  had	  come	  to	  more	  notably	  increase	  workers’	  salaries,	  gave	  especial	  preference	  to	  industrial	  workers.	   	   In	   theory,	   the	   reformers	   posited,	   it	   was	   industrial	   workers	  who	  were	  producing	   the	   consumer	   goods	   the	   state	   needed	   the	   most:	   their	   greater	  productivity	   (and	   thus	  salaries)	  should	  be	  prioritized.53	  	  While	   later	  reforms	  also	  increased	   salary	   rates	   for	   kolkhoz	   members	   and	   non-­‐industrial	   workers,	   these	  latter	  categories	  continued	  to	  lag	  behind	  industrial	  workers.	  In	  1980,	  for	  example,	  industrial	  workers	  in	  the	  USSR	  earned	  on	  average	  between	  149	  and	  185	  rubles	  per	  month,	   which	   was	   20-­‐35%	   more	   than	   agricultural	   workers. 54 	  	   Given	   the	  imbalanced	   Soviet	   “distribution	   of	   labour”	   described	   in	   Chapter	   Two,	   in	  accordance	  with	  which	  certain	  regions	  (Siberia,	  Central	  Asia)	  provided	  raw	  goods	  to	   be	   industrially	   processed	   in	   other	   regions	   (Russia,	   Ukraine,	   other	   European	  territories),	   this	  meant	   that	  wages	   increased	  with	   particular	   speed	   in	   the	   urban	  centers	  of	  the	  USSR,	  such	  as	  Moscow,	  Leningrad,	  and	  other	  large	  cities.	  Statistical	  tables	   produced	   by	   the	   Soviet	   State	   Statistics	   Committee	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1980s,	   for	  example,	   showed	  wages	   particularly	   outstripping	   expenditures	   in	   republics	  with	  major	  cities,	  such	  as	  Russian	  or	  Ukraine.55	  	  The	  only	  categories	  of	  workers	  whose	  earnings	   outpaced	   industrial	  wages,	  moreover,	  were	   academics	   and	   government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  a	  command	  economy,	  prices	  cannot	  be	  dynamically	  raised,	  and	  so	  consumers	  purchase	  a	  greater	  volume	  of	   goods,	   leading	   to	  deficits.	   	  Alternatively,	   they	   can	   choose	  not	  to	  purchase	  more	   goods,	  leaving	  both	  unwanted	  goods	  on	  the	  shelf	  and	  money	  in	  circulation.	  	  See:	  N.	  Petrakov,	  “Potrebelenie	  i	  effektivnost’	  proizvodstva.	  	  Rost	  blagosostoianiia	  –	  predposylka	  rosta	  proizvodstva,”	  Novii	  Mir	  47,	  no.6	  (1971):	  192.	  52	  Vladislav	   Zubok,	   A	   Failed	   Empire:	   The	   Soviet	   Union	   in	   the	   Cold	   War	   from	   Stalin	   to	   Gorbachev	  (Durham:	  UNC	  Press,	  2009),	  269;	  Chris	  Miller,	  “Gorbachev’s	  Agricultural	  Agenda:	  Decollectivization	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Perestroika,”	  Kritika	  17,	  no.1	  (2016):	  101.	  53 	  G.	   Popov,	   Reformirovanie	   nereformiruemogo.	   	   Popytka	   Alekseia	   Kosygina	   (Moscow:	  Mezhdunarodnii	   universitet	   v	   Moskve,	   2009),	   317-­‐330;	   Nikolai	   G.	   Egorychev,	   “On	   shyol	   svoim	  putyom,”	  in	  Kosygin	  –	  vyzov	  prem’era,	  ed.	  N.K.	  Baibakov	  (Moscow:	  Algoritm,	  2012),	  46.	  54	  GARF,	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  147,	  d.	  116,	  l.	  167.	  55	  RGAE,	  f.	  1562,	  op.	  68,	  d.	  1773,	  ll.	  1-­‐3;	  d.	  2565,	  ll.	  2,	  4.	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and	  party	   functionaries.56	  	   By	   the	  1980s	   senior	   academic	   researchers	   could	   earn	  between	   300	   and	   450	   rubles	   per	   month	   –	   up	   to	   twice	   as	   much	   as	   industrial	  workers	  and	  three	   times	  as	  much	  as	  kolkhoz	  members.57	  	  Government	  and	  party	  workers	  were	  paid	  even	  more,	  with	  average	  salaries	  ranging	  between	  500	  and	  700	  rubles	   per	   month	   and	   some	   even	   receiving	   more	   than	   1000.58 	  	   Since	   these	  bureaucrats	  and	   intellectuals	  were	  also	  concentrated	   in	  Moscow	  and	  a	   few	  other	  European	   cities,	   this	   only	   served	   to	   further	   accentuate	   the	   imbalance	   between	  purchasing	  power	  and	  available	  goods	  in	  these	  cities,	  most	  especially	  in	  the	  capital.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  was	  actually	  the	  most	  well-­‐off	  and	  well-­‐paid	  workers	  –	  those	  working	  in	   the	   central	   government	   in	   Moscow	   or	   laboring	   in	   industrial	   factories	   in	   the	  USSR’s	  European	  cities	  –	  who,	  by	  the	  early	  1980s,	  were	  the	  most	  affected	  and	  most	  dissatisfied	   by	   the	   burgeoning	   wage-­‐product	   imbalance.	   	   As	   Jerry	   Hough	   has	  argued,	  “the	  educated	  elite	  (the	  bureaucrats)	  even	  more	  than	  the	  masses	  yearned	  for…transition	   to	   a	   consumer-­‐oriented	   economy.”59 	  This	   was	   also	   noticed	   by	  Gorbachev’s	  advisors	  and	  ministers,	  who	  found	  that	  it	  was	  “society’s	  leading	  edge”	  (peredovaia	   chast’	   obshchestva)	   that	   had	   been	   pushing	   for	   reform	   in	   the	   1980s.	  	  Given	  the	  Soviet	  elite’s	  higher	  salaries	  and	  greater	  than	  average	  access	  to	  free	  and	  subsidized	  state	  services,	  the	  gap	  between	  their	  excess	  income	  and	  the	  availability	  of	   spending	   opportunities	   had	   led	   by	   the	   late	   1970s	   led	   to	   high	   levels	   of	  dissatisfaction.60	  The	   greater	   their	   level	   of	  material	  wealth,	   it	   seemed,	   the	   lower	  Soviet	  citizens	  had	  come	  to	  rank	  the	  benefits	  and	  prospects	  of	  developed	  socialism.	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  The	  negative	  relationship	  between	  relative	  material	  wealth	  and	  overall	  satisfaction	  with	  life	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  more	  than	  just	  speculation.	  	  The	  trend	  had	  in	  fact	  been	   well	   documented	   by	   Soviet	   sociologists	   throughout	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s.	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  Zemstov,	   Il’ya,	  Chastnaia	  zhizn’	  sovetskoi	  elity	   (London:	  Overseas	  Publications	   Interchange	  Ltd.,	  1986),	  25.	  57	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  59,	  l.	  7.	  58	  Yurii	   Churbanov,	   for	   example,	   received	   a	  monthly	   salary	   of	   around	  1100	   rubles	   as	   the	  Deputy	  Minister	  of	   Internal	  Affairs	  of	   the	  USSR	   in	   the	  early	  1980s.	   See	   Iu.	  Churbanov,	  Ya	  rasskazhu	  vsyo,	  
shto	  bylo…(Moscow:	  Nezavisimaia	  gazeta,	  1991),	  41.	  	  For	  average	  government	  salaries	  in	  the	  1980s,	  see	  RGAE,	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9340,	  ll.	  109-­‐167;	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3660,	  l.	  182.	  59	  Jerry	  F.	  Hough,	  Democratization	  and	  Revolution	  in	  the	  USSR,	  1985-­‐1991	   (Washington:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  1997),	  59.	  60	  Valerii	   Boldin,	   Krushenie	   p’edestala:	   Shtrikhi	   k	   portretu	  M.S.	   Gorbachevu	   (Moscow:	   Respublika,	  1995),	   99;	  Valentin	  Pavlov,	  Upushchen	   li	   shans?	  Finansovyi	  kliuch	  k	  rynku	   (Moscow:	  Terra,	   1995),	  37.	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According	   to	   numerous	   studies	   conducted	   during	   these	   decades,	   sharp	  divergences	   in	   opinion	   had	   opened	   up	   between	   the	   less	   developed	   Soviet	  periphery	   and	   the	  more	   developed	   and	   urbanized	   European	   regions.	   	   The	   latter	  increasingly	  felt	  the	  Soviet	  state	  was	  stagnating,	  while	  the	  former	  continued	  to	  see	  economic	   improvements	   and	   a	   bright	   future.	   	   One	   multiyear	   study	   conducted	  around	   1979-­‐1980,	   for	   example,	   found	   that	   80%	   of	   surveyed	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	  Uzbekistan	  thought	  that	  “life	  was	  getting	  better”	  with	  time,	  whereas	  only	  60%	  of	  those	   surveyed	   in	  Estonia	   felt	   the	   same.61	  	   Another	   study	   from	  around	   the	   same	  time	   confirmed	   this	   trend,	   emphasizing	   that	  Azerbaijani	   respondents	  were	  more	  “satisfied”	  with	  their	  lives	  than	  the	  Soviet	  average	  –	  and	  that	  agricultural	  workers	  across	   the	   USSR	   were	   more	   satisfied	   than	   better	   paid	   industrial	   or	   service	  workers.62	  	  	  These	  and	  other	  studies	  clearly	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  most	  developed	  regions	   of	   the	   USSR	   –	   whether	   tracked	   in	   terms	   of	   average	   salaries,	   material	  welfare,	  or	  even	  education	  levels	  –	  were	  the	  least	  satisfied	  with	  the	  conditions	  of	  work	  and	  life	  provided	  by	  the	  USSR.63	  	  These	   tendencies	   continued	   to	   grow	  worse	   throughout	   the	   1980s.	   As	   the	   years	  passed,	  there	  seemed	  an	  especially	  large	  and	  growing	  gap	  not	  only	  between	  social	  satisfaction	  in	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  USSR	  –	  but	  most	  notably	  between	  the	  Soviet	  metropole	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  	  A	  particularly	  extensive	  study	  conducted	  by	  the	   Institute	  of	  Social	   and	  Economic	  Problems	  at	   the	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	   the	  USSR	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  for	  example,	  demonstrated	  that	  residents	  of	  Moscow	  and	  Leningrad	  were	   the	   least	   satisfied	   of	   all	   Soviet	   citizens.	   	   Across	   all	   categories	   of	  questions	   asked,	  whether	   about	  work,	   home	   life,	  material	  welfare,	   or	   pay,	   these	  respondents	   were	   at	   least	   5-­‐10%	   less	   satisfied	   than	   the	   Soviet	   average,	  notwithstanding	   the	   absolute	   advantage	   they	   enjoyed	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   actual	  standard	   of	   living.64	  	   Moscow	   in	   particular	   showed	   uncharacteristic	   levels	   of	  dissatisfaction:	   a	   meta-­‐study	   of	   Soviet	   sociological	   surveys	   later	   found	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Arutiunian	  and	  Drobizheva,	  “Natsional’nye	  osobennosti	  kul’tury,”	  26.	  62	  V.Kh.	  Bigulov,	  A.O.	  Kryshtanovskii	  and	  A.S.	  Michurin,	   “Material’noe	  blagosostoianie	   i	   sotisal’noe	  blagopoluchie:	  opyt	  postroeniia	   indeksov	   i	  analiz	  vzaimosviazi,”	  Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  10,	  no.	  4	  (1984):	  91-­‐92.	  	  63	  On	   education	   levels,	   see	  Gerhard	   Simon,	  Nationalism	  and	  Policy	  Toward	  the	  Nationalities	   in	   the	  
Soviet	   Union:	   From	   Totalitarian	   Dictatorship	   to	   Post-­‐Stalinist	   Society	   (Boulder:	   Westview,	   1991),	  267,	  271.	  64	  O.B.	   Bozhkov	   and	   V.B.	   Golofast,	   “Otsenka	   naseleniem	   uslovii	   zhizni	   v	   krupnykh	   gorodakh,”	  
Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  11,	  no.	  3	  (1985):	  97-­‐100.	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together	  with	  the	  Baltic	  republics,	  residents	  of	  Moscow	  were	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  the	  least	  satisfied	  amongst	  all	  Soviet	  citizens.65	  	  The	   link	   between	   increased	   material	   wealth	   and	   Soviet	   citizens’	   dissatisfaction	  grew	   increasingly	   clear	   to	   researchers	   in	   the	   1980s.	   	   In	   1984,	   for	   example,	   one	  sociologist	  calculated	   that	  after	  a	  certain	   increase	   in	  wages	  each	  additional	   ruble	  was	   actually	  more	   likely	   to	   cause	   frustration	   than	   incentive	   to	  work.	   	   In	   fact,	   he	  argued,	   the	   cutoff	   was	   as	   low	   as	   90	   rubles	   per	   person	   per	   month:	   any	   greater	  overall	  income	  would	  statistically	  only	  lead	  to	  a	  greater	  sense	  of	  unfulfilled	  social	  demands.66	  Commenting	  on	   this	  and	  other	   trends	   in	  1984,	  moreover,	   the	  Central	  Committee	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   admitted	   that	   they	   were	   faced	   with	   a	  fundamentally	   new	   set	   of	   challenges.	   “The	   manifold	   growth	   of	   the	   population’s	  material	  wealth,	   education,	   and	   cultural	   level	   has	   called	   forth	   a	   completely	   new	  series	  of	  demands	  on	  the	  part	  of	  both	  society	  and	  each	  of	  its	  individual	  members.	  	  We	  were	  not	  ready	   for	   these	  changes.”67	  	  Soviet	  citizens	  were	  no	   longer	  satisfied	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  basic	  goods	  and	  services:	  given	  the	  level	  of	  development	  they	  had	   achieved,	   they	   began	   to	   ask	   for	   more.	   	   As	   a	   group	   of	   Soviet	   sociologists	  suggested	   in	   1984,	   “contemporary	   tendencies	   in	   the	   way	   of	   life	   amongst	   Soviet	  individuals	  have	  led	  to	  evaluations	  of	  social	  wellbeing	  that	  are	  increasingly	  based	  on	  a	  desired	  situation.”68	  Rather	  than	  judge	  social	  and	  economic	  developments	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  relative	  improvements	  with	  the	  past,	  Soviet	  citizens	  were	  choosing	  to	  compare	   them	  to	  a	  desired	   level	  of	  development	  –	  not	   to	  what	   they	  were,	  but	   to	  what	  they	  would	  have	  wanted	  them	  to	  be.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	   what	   the	   dissatisfied	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	  Moscow	   and	   other	   urban	  environments	  wanted	  were	  “prestige	  goods,”	  durables	  (better	  apartments,	  cars,	  et	  cetera)	  and	  specialized	  services	  that	  they	  felt	  ought	  to	  be	  available	  and	  which	  their	  paychecks	   would	   have	   allowed	   them	   to	   enjoy. 69 	  	   “Today	   qualified	   workers,	  technical	   cadres,	   engineers,	   scientists,	   and	   civil	   servants	   have	   found	   that	   their	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  Matthews,	  Patterns	  of	  Deprivation,	  45-­‐46.	  66 	  A.A.	   Ovsiannikov,	   “Vzaimosviaz’	   truda	   i	   potrebleniia:	   opyt	   tipologicheskogo	   analiza,”	  
Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  10,	  no.	  1	  (1984):	  86.	  	  67	  Internal	  CC	  CPSU	  report,	  “Sostoianie	  sovetskogo	  obshchestva	  k	  seredine	  80-­‐kh	  godov	  i	  mery	  po	  uskoreniiu	  sotsial’no-­‐eknomicheskogo	  razvitiia	  strany,”	  RGASPI,	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  62,	  l.	  117.	  	  68	  V.Kh.	  Bigulov,	  A.O.	  Kryshtanovskii	  and	  A.S.	  Michurin,	  “Material’noe	  blagosostoianie,”	  89.	  69	  As	  the	  chairman	  of	  Gosplan,	  N.V.	  Talyzin,	  put	  it	  in	  a	  1985	  letter,	  as	  Soviet	  citizens’	  paychecks	  rose,	  so	  did	  their	  demand	  for	  “especially	  fashionable”	  (osobenno	  modniye)	  goods.	  GARF,	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  147,	  d.	  960,	  l.	  6.	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unfulfilled	  needs	  are	   for	  better	  housing,	  proper	  entertainment	   facilities,	  qualified	  medical	   services,	   and	   so	   forth,”	   the	   economist	   Rem	   Belousov	   wrote	   in	   1984	   to	  Nikolai	  Ryzhkov.	   	  While	   these	  services	  were	  to	  some	  degree	  available,	   they	  were	  “distributed	   for	   free	   or	   on	   a	   discounted	   basis	   through	   social	   funds	  (obshchestvennye	   fondy),”	   meaning	   that	   additional	   access	   to	   earnings	   did	   not	  equate	   greater	   access	   to	   better	   goods.	   	   Expressing	   the	   frustration	   of	   the	  intelligentsia,	   Belousov	   noted	   that	   in	   “developed	   capitalist	   countries”	   the	  population	   spent	   on	   average	   between	   30	   and	   40%	   of	   its	   wages	   on	   comparable	  services.	  70	  	  In	  the	  USSR,	  earning	  power	  was	  at	  best	  indirectly	  connected	  to	  citizens’	  standard	  of	  living	  –	  while	  in	  the	  West	  wages	  were	  directly	  connected	  to	  the	  volume	  and	   quality	   of	   material	   wealth	   to	   which	   workers	   had	   access.	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1980s	  complaints	   such	   as	   Belousov’s,	  moreover,	  were	   growing	   in	   number	   and	   volume.	  For	   the	   Soviet	   urban	   elite,	  who	   had	   “money	   to	   spend”	   but	   “did	  worse	   than	   they	  might	   otherwise	   have	   expected	   to,”71	  the	   capitalist	   West	   had	   become	   central	   to	  comparative	  arguments	  about	  everything	  that	  was	  wrong	  with	  the	  USSR.	  	  Comparisons	  with	  the	  West	  were	  nothing	  new	  in	  the	  USSR:	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  famous	  call	   to	   “catch	  up	  and	  overtake	  America”	   to	   the	  press’	   frequent	  comments	  on	  social	   ills	  and	  unemployment	  under	  capitalism,	  the	  West	  had	  long	  served	  as	  a	  counterpoise	  to	  socialism.	  	  In	  the	  1980s,	  however,	  the	  Soviet	  elite’s	  comparison	  of	  the	   USSR	   against	   the	   West	   took	   on	   a	   qualitatively	   new	   character,	   whereby	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  came	  out	  looking	  badly.	   	   	  Increasing	  access	  to	  Western	  goods	  meant	  that	  Soviet	  analogues	  came	  out	  looking	  sloppy,	  poorly	  engineered,	  or	  simply	  ugly;	  increasing	   travel	   to	   Europe	   and	   the	  West	  meant	   Soviet	   housing,	   in	   comparison,	  began	   to	   look	   gray	   and	   flat,	   and	   overall	   living	   standards	   lower.72	  	   Rather	   than	  making	   the	   temporally	   vertical	   comparisons	   of	   the	   past,	   in	   which	   Soviet	   living	  standards	  were	  contextualized	  in	  the	  history	  of	  World	  War	  II’s	  destruction	  and	  the	  subsequent	   economic	   growth,	   the	   new	   elite	   in	  Moscow	   chose	   to	   compare	   its	   lot	  horizontally	  with	  the	  lives	  of	  contemporary	  Europeans.	  	  Visiting	  Europe	  as	  tourists	  or	  on	  business,	  Soviet	  elites	  would	  return	  home	  laden	  down	  with	  consumer	  goods,	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  R.	   Belousov,	   “Materialy	   k	   razrabotke	   programmy	   kompleksnogo	   sovershenstvovaniia	   sistemy	  upravleniia	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  39,	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  125.	  	  71	  Hauslohner,	  “Gorbachev’s	  Social	  Contract,”	  59.	  72	  Kotkin,	  Armageddon	  Averted,	  28-­‐29;	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  Trushkov,	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  analiz,”	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humiliated	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  similar	  goods	  for	  sale	  in	  Moscow	  shops.73	  	  Ultimately,	  in	  this	  “shop-­‐window”	  comparison	  the	  USSR	  could	  hardly	  compete:	  consumer	  goods	  were	  simply	  available	  in	  the	  West	  in	  greater	  quantities	  and	  varieties.74	  	   	  Even	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  USSR	  were	  not	  immune	  to	  the	  charms	  of	  the	  West.	  	  In	  his	  memoirs,	  Gorbachev	  reports	  that	  after	  visiting	  Europe	  as	  a	  tourist	  his	  overwhelming	  feeling	  was	   one	   of	   frustration:	   “Why	   do	   we	   live	   worse	   than	   in	   other	   developed	  countries?”75	  	  	  	  While	  consumerism	  and	  its	  attendant	  negative	  comparisons	  of	  Soviet	  life	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  the	  West	   spread	   through	   the	   upper	   echelons	   of	   the	   Soviet	   elite	   as	   the	   result	   of	  Western	   travel,	   the	   idea	   that	   life	  was	   just	   better	   in	   the	   capitalist	  West	  was	   also	  disseminated	   amongst	   those	   urban	   Soviet	   citizens	   who	   remained	   in	   Moscow,	  Leningrad,	  and	  other	  large	  cities.	  	  As	  Vladimir	  Kriuchkov,	  the	  KGB	  chief	  who	  would	  help	  to	  lead	  the	  failed	  putsch	  against	  Gorbachev,	   later	  recalled,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  ideas	  were	   being	   spread	   throughout	  Moscow	   about	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	  Western	  path	  and	  the	  failings	  of	  socialism.	  76	  	  	  Partly	  these	  ideas	  were	  spread	  by	  those	  who	  travelled	   abroad	   and	   returned	   bearing	   consumer	   goods	   for	   families	   and	   friends;	  partly	   they	   were	   spread	   by	   the	   apparent	   wealth	   of	   the	   Western	   tourists	   who	  increasingly	   visited	   Moscow	   and	   the	   European	   USSR.	   	   In	   the	   mid-­‐1980s	   nearly	  800,000	  tourists	  from	  Western	  (“developed	  capitalist”)	  countries	  visited	  the	  USSR	  each	  year,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  whose	  time	  was	  spent	  in	  Moscow,	  Leningrad,	  and	  a	  few	  other	  European	  Soviet	  cities,	  including	  the	  resorts	  of	  Sochi	  and	  Yalta.77	  	  These	  middle-­‐to-­‐upper	  class	  Western	  tourists,	  with	  access	  to	   foreign	  clothing,	  currency,	  and	  goods	  –	  not	   to	  mention	  stories	  of	   life	   in	   the	  West	  –	  would	  have	  presented	  a	  picture	   of	   relative	  wealth	   and	   prosperity	   to	   the	   Soviet	   citizens	  with	  whom	   they	  interacted.	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  John	   Bushnell,	   “The	   ‘New	   Soviet	   Man’	   Turns	   Pessimist,”	   in	   The	   Soviet	   Union	   Since	   Stalin,	   eds.	  Stephen	   F.	   Cohen,	   Alexander	   Rabinowitch,	   and	   Robert	   Sharlet	   (Bloomington:	   Indiana	   University	  Press,	  1980),	  191-­‐192;	  Vladislav	  Zubok,	  Zhivago’s	  Children	   (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  90.	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  S.V.	  Chesko,	  Ideologiia	  raspada	  (Moscow:	  Rossiskaia	  akademiia	  nauk,	  1993),	  36.	  	  75 	  Gorbachev,	   Zhizn’	   i	   reformy,	   169.	   Andrei	   Grachev	   also	   attributes	   a	   similar	   complaint	   to	  Gorbachev’s	  wife,	  Raisa	  Gorbacheva.	  	  See	  Andrei	  Grachev,	  Gorbachev	  (Moscow:	  Vagrius,	  2001),	  56.	  76	  Vladimir	  Kriuchkov,	  Lichnoe	  delo	  (Moscow:	  Olimp,	  1996),	  v.	  1,	  256.	  	  77	  In	  1985,	  for	  example,	  approximately	  775,500	  Western	  tourists	  visited	  the	  USSR.	  	  Of	  the	  days	  they	  spent	  in	  the	  USSR,	  76%	  was	  in	  Moscow,	  Leningrad,	  Sochi,	  Yalta,	  and	  Kiev.	  	  Calculated	  from	  figures	  compiled	   by	   Intourist	   in	   1985	   and	   interviews	  with	   a	   former	   Soviet	   tour	   guide	   (Moscow,	   August	  2015).	  	  For	  the	  Intourist	  figures,	  see:	  RGAE	  f.	  1562,	  op.	  68,	  d.	  1604,	  ll.	  3-­‐6,	  20-­‐21.	  	  Also	  see	  English,	  
Russia	  and	  the	  Idea,	  62.	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No	  matter	   the	   exact	   source	   of	   disaffection,	   by	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   1980s	   negative	  comparisons	   of	   the	   USSR	   to	   the	   West	   had	   become	   a	   common	   element	   of	   elite	  discourse	   throughout	  Moscow.	   	   This	  was	   true	   of	   both	  private	   conversations	   and	  public	  pronouncements.	  As	  Philip	  Hanson	  has	  written,	  in	  the	  1980s	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  USSR’s	  relative	  decline	  against	  the	  West	  was	  a	  major	  concern	  in	  Moscow,	  insofar	  as	  it	  “undermined	  the	  self-­‐confidence	  of	  Soviet	  elites	  and	  their	  belief	  that	  their	  system	  could	  deliver.”78	  	  Following	  Gorbachev’s	  ascension	  to	  power	  in	  1985,	  this	  concern	  began	   to	   be	   voiced	   by	   Soviet	   economists,	   who	   frequently	   phrased	   the	   need	   for	  economic	   reform	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   West’s	   relative	   advantage	   against	   socialism.79	  	  Such	   comparisons,	   moreover,	   came	   to	   form	   an	   important	   element	   of	   internal	  economic	  planning.	  	  In	  an	  internal	  report	  distributed	  by	  the	  State	  Price	  Committee	  (Goskomtsen)	   in	   1987,	   for	   example,	   it	   was	   explicitly	   argued	   that	   the	   overall	  standard	   of	   living	   in	   the	   USSR	   was	   60%	   lower	   on	   average	   than	   in	   developed	  capitalist	   nations,	   a	   calculation	   based	   on	   the	   USSR’s	   lower	   wages	   and	   rates	   of	  consumer	  goods	  production.	   	  This	  claim	  was	  used	  to	  further	  argue	  for	   increasing	  the	   production	   of	   goods	   in	   the	   USSR,	   increasing	   salaries,	   and	   bringing	   Soviet	  standards	  of	  living	  in	  line	  with	  Western	  levels.80	  	  What	  this	  report	  made	  particularly	  clear	  was	  that	  the	  USSR	  was	  being	  more	  than	  just	  compared	  to	  the	  West:	  it	  was	  being	  compared	  to	  the	  West	  on	  the	  West’s	  terms.	  (Standards	  of	   living	   in	   the	  report	  were	  calculated	   in	  ways	  that	   failed	  to	   take	   into	  consideration	   the	   relative	   advantages	   socialism	   provided	   in	   terms	   of	   education,	  healthcare,	  or	  the	  cost	  of	  basic	  goods.)	  	  It	  reflected	  the	  perspective	  voiced	  by	  urban	  European	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	   private	   conversations,	   sociological	   surveys,	   and	   in	  print:	   the	  Soviet	  state	  was	  failing	  to	  provide	  enough	  material	  goods,	  standards	  of	  living	  had	  stagnated,	  and	  life	  in	  the	  West	  was	  simply	  better.	  	  For	  those	  living	  in	  the	  relative	   privilege	   of	   Moscow,	   Leningrad,	   or	   other	  major	   Soviet	   cities,	   moreover,	  this	   was	   in	   fact	   true.	   	   Salaries	   had	   mildly	   but	   systematically	   outpaced	   the	  production	  of	  consumer	  goods,	   there	  were	  more	  rubles	   in	  workers’	  pockets	   than	  they	   could	   use,	   and	   life	   truly	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   getting	   any	   better.	   It	   is	   worth	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Hanson,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall,	  5.	  79	  See,	   for	   example,	   Abel	   Aganbegian,	   “Odin	   iz	   ekonomicheskikh	   urokov	   perestroika,”	   in	   Etot	  
trudnyi,	  trudnyi	  put’,	  eds.	  L.I.	  Abalkin	  and	  P.M.	  Bunich	  (Moscow:	  Mysl’,	  1989),	  159;	  “Kuda	  my	  idem?	  Dialog	  Raira	  Simoniana	  i	  Anatoliia	  Druzenko,”	  Ogonyok,	  September	  9-­‐16,	  1989,	  1.	  	  80	  This	   report	   was	   authored	   by	   Valenitin	   Pavlov.	   	   See:	   Doklad	   Goskomtsena	   “Ob	   urovne	   tsen	   i	  zarabotnoi	  platy	  v	  Mosckve	  i	  krupneishikh	  gorodakh	  kapitalisticheskikh	  stran,”	  GARF,	   f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  362,	  L.	  17.	  
	  	   80	  
emphasizing,	  however,	  that	  this	  remained	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  relatively	  small	  elite	  minority:	  the	  best	  paid	  industrial	  workers,	  engineers	  and	  technical	  workers,	  party	  functionaries,	  academics,	  and	  the	  other	  small	  percentage	  of	  Soviet	  citizens	  whose	  individual	  earnings	  were	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	  nationwide	  average.	  	  It	  was	  this	  minority	  that	  most	  fervently	  supported	  the	  call	  for	  reform	  made	  by	  Gorbachev	  and	  his	  economic	  advisors	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  agreeing	  that	  the	  official	  statistics	  just	  couldn’t	  reflect	  reality:	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Moscow	  the	  economy	  really	  wasn’t	  getting	  any	  better.	  	  
III.	  Econometrics	  and	  Perestroika’s	  Theoretical	  Backing	  While	   the	   growing	   dissatisfaction	   of	  Muscovites	   and	   other	   urban	   Soviet	   citizens	  provided	   clear	   political	   support	   for	   Gorbachev’s	   own	   feelings	   about	   the	   Soviet	  economy	  and	  the	  need	  for	  significant	  reform,	  this	  growing	  pessimism	  continued	  to	  contradict	   the	   data	   provided	   by	   the	   Soviet	   government.	   	   It	   also	   left	   unclear	   the	  necessary	   path	   of	   reform.	   Fortunately	   for	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors,	   there	  existed	   an	   alternative	   school	   of	   Soviet	   economics	   that	   for	   decades	   had	   been	  pointing	   to	   the	   structural	   failings	  of	   the	   Soviet	   economy	  and	   suggesting	  possible	  solutions.	  	   Based	   on	   complicated	  mathematical	  models	   of	   the	   planned	   economy,	  these	   alternative	   figures	   showed	  decade-­‐on-­‐decade	   economic	   regression,	   serious	  and	   worsening	   drops	   in	   productivity	   rates,	   and	   impending	   collapse	   if	   market	  reforms	   were	   not	   soon	   implemented.	  	   While	   paralleling	   a	   Western	   economics	  discourse	   that	   similarly	   highlighted	   the	   structural	   flaws	   of	   central	   planning,	   the	  statistical	   models	   underlying	   such	   claims	   were	   an	   essentially	   Soviet	   initiative,	  produced	   largely	   without	   reference	   to	   similar	   Western	   works.81	  	   While	   often	  marginalized,	   moreover,	   proponents	   of	   mathematical	   economic	   modeling	   had	  remained	  an	  established	  part	  of	  Soviet	  economics	  since	  at	   least	   the	  1950s.	  	  	  Only	  after	   Gorbachev	   became	   party	   leader	   in	   1985,	   however,	   did	   its	   advocates	   attain	  positions	  of	  influence	  sufficient	  to	  make	  these	  models	  an	  important	  part	  of	  Soviet	  economic	  planning.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  See	   Arthur	  W.	  Wright,	   “Soviet	   economic	   planning	   and	   performance,”	   in	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  Since	  
Stalin,	   eds.	   Stephen	   F.	   Cohen,	   Alexander	   Rabinowitch	   and	   Robert	   Sharlet	   (Bloomington:	   Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  118;	  cf.	  Miller,	  The	  Struggle	  to	  Save,	  93,	  95.	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Initially,	   there	   seemed	  nothing	   radical	   about	   the	  mathematical	   economic	  models	  developed	   by	   Soviet	   economists	   in	   the	   1950s.	  82	  	   Drawing	   upon	   earlier	   work	   by	  Stanislav	   Strumlin	   in	   the	   1920s	   and	   the	   pioneering	   methods	   of	   “linear	  programming”	   developed	   by	   L.V.	   Kantorovich	   in	   the	   1930s	   and	   1940s,	   Soviet	  economic	   modeling	   was	   at	   first	   directed	   at	   improving	   plan	   fulfillment	   and	  attempting	   to	   find	   “optimal”	   solutions	   to	   the	   constant	   issues	   of	   bottlenecks	   and	  input	   shortages. 83 	  	   From	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   command	   economy,	   Soviet	  enterprises	  had	  been	  plagued	  by	  relative	  shortages	  of	  inputs	  and	  the	  constant	  need	  to	  produce	  the	  most	  possible	  goods	  with	  the	  least	  possible	  input	  mix	  (much	  as	  any	  capitalist	   enterprise	   would	   also	   want	   to	   minimize	   costs	   and	   maximize	   output,	  although	   for	   a	   different	   series	   of	   reasons).	   	   The	   linear	   programming	   models	  developed	   by	   Kantorovich	   demonstrated	   that	   an	   enterprise’s	   “optimal”	   mix	   of	  inputs	  could	  be	  determined	  ahead	  of	  time	  through	  mathematical	  modeling,	  rather	  than	   through	   the	   standard	   process	   of	   trial	   and	   error,	   whereby	   enterprises	  incrementally	   modified	   their	   input	   mix	   to	   cut	   down	   on	   costs.	   	   For	   example,	  Kantorovich	   demonstrated,	   an	   enterprise	   that	   was	   assigned	   to	   cut	   out	   an	   exact	  number	  of	  two	  different	  sized	  boards	  from	  a	  set	  of	  larger	  sheets	  of	  wood	  could,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  series	  of	  mathematical	  regressions,	  determine	  ahead	  of	   time	  which	  sizes	  to	  cut	  from	  which	  sheets	  and	  in	  which	  number.	  	  All	  that	  was	  required	  from	  a	  theoretical	   perspective	   was	   the	   definition	   of	   an	   “optimal”	   input	   mix,	   which	  Kantorovich	  worked	  out	  to	  be	  the	  set	  of	  inputs	  with	  the	  minimal	  overall	  cost.	  	  	  	  On	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  enterprises,	  modeling	  appeared	  to	  hold	  great	  promise	  for	  the	   planned	   economy:	   using	   such	   mathematical	   models	   ought	   to	   lead,	   it	   was	  argued,	   to	   increased	   efficiency	   and	   a	   decrease	   in	   bottlenecks	   caused	   by	   input	  misallocation	   and	   shortage.	   	   As	   models	   began	   to	   be	   applied	   to	   inter-­‐enterprise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82 	  Soviet	   economists	   involved	   in	   the	   body	   of	   analysis	   termed	   here	   “mathematical	   economic	  modeling”	   had	   no	   one	   label	   for	   their	   work.	   	   At	   different	   times	   such	   efforts	   were	   entitled	  “mathematical	   programming”	   (matematicheskoe	   programmirovanie);	   “mathematical	   methods”	   of	  analysis	   (matematicheskie	   metody);	   “cybernetics”	   (kibernetika);	   “optimal	   planning”	   (optimal’noe	  
planirovanie);	  et	   cetera.	   	  The	   term	  “mathematical	  economic	  modeling”	  has	  been	  chosen	  here	  as	  a	  generally	  descriptive	  (if	  perhaps	  overly	  unifying)	  terminology.	   	  This	  follows	  the	  general	  definition	  provided	  by	  L.V.	  Kantorovich,	  who	  argued	  that	  the	  key	  element	  of	  mathematical	  methodology	  was	  the	   use	   of	   “mathematical	   models	   of	   one	   or	   another	   set	   of	   [economic]	   conditions.”	   	   See	   L.V.	  Kantorovich	  and	  A.B.	  Gorstko,	  Optimal’nye	  resheniia	  v	  ekonomike	  (Moscow:	  Nauka,	  1972),	  8.	  83	  L.V.	  Kantorovich	   remained	   convinced	   that	  his	  work	  would	  be	  best	  used	  as	  part	   of	   the	  planned	  economy	   (Kantorovich	   and	   Gorstko,	   Optimal’nie	   resheniya,	   9-­‐14).	   	   	   Reviewing	   “optimizing”	  mathematical	  models,	  Michael	  Ellman	  also	  concluded	  that	  their	  implementation	  did	  not	  present	  any	  threat	  to	  a	  planned	  economic	  system.	  	  See:	  Michael	  Ellman,	  Soviet	  Planning	  Today:	  Proposals	  for	  an	  
Optimally	  Functioning	  Economic	  System	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1971),	  59.	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exchanges	  and	   the	  analysis	  of	  entire	  economic	  sectors,	  however,	   it	  became	  more	  and	   more	   difficult	   to	   align	   the	   models’	   demands	   for	   “optimality”	   with	   the	  constraints	   of	   the	   planned	   economy.	   	   As	   Kantorovich	   and	   many	   others	  demonstrated,	   for	   large-­‐scale	  mathematic	   economic	  modeling	   to	  work,	   values	   of	  some	  sort	  had	  to	  be	  assigned	  to	  inputs;	  without	  exchangeable	  values	  there	  was	  no	  way	   of	   comparing	   or	   calculating	   possible	   optimal	   solutions	   for	   multiple	  enterprises	   or	   sectors.	   	   Since	   the	   actual	   prices	   paid	   by	   enterprises	   for	   material	  inputs	  in	  the	  USSR	  were	  dictated	  from	  above	  by	  Goskomtsen	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  failed	  to	  represent	  relative	  value	  or	  scarcity,	  Kantorovich	  and	  similar	  economists	  began	  to	  assign	  “objectively	  conditioned	  values”	  (ob’ektivno	  uslovnye	  otsenki,	  often	  translated	  as	   “shadow	  prices”	   in	  English)	   to	   the	   inputs	  and	  output	  products	   they	  were	   working	   with.	   	   On	   the	   level	   of	   a	   single	   enterprise,	   this	   remained	  unproblematic:	  the	  shadow	  prices	  of	  inputs	  and	  goods	  simply	  represented	  relative	  value	   for	   the	   enterprise	   and	   did	   not	   compete	   at	   all	   with	   the	   legally	   established	  prices	   that	   were	   assigned	   to	   the	   goods	   once	   they	   left	   the	   enterprise.	   	   On	   the	  regional	   or	   sectorial	   level	   the	   situation	  was	   entirely	   different.	   	   Here	   enterprises	  traded	  amongst	   themselves	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   static	  prices	  dictated	  by	  Goskomtsen,	  whereas	   the	   mathematical	   models	   dictated	   that	   they	   trade	   more	   efficiently	  (“optimally”)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  dynamic	  “shadow	  prices”	  worked	  out	  in	  the	  models.	  	  Over	  time,	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  economic	  models	  and	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  Soviet	  planned	  economy	  became	  impossible	  to	  bridge:	  rather	  than	  predict	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  command	  economy,	  mathematical	  modeling	  began	  to	  be	  used	  to	  advocate	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  market	  reforms,	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  “decentralized	  decision	  making”	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   dynamically	   shifting	   shadow	   prices.	   	  While	   government	  institutions	  would	  still	  set	  real	  retail	  prices	  and	  plan	  targets,	  such	  arguments	  went,	  an	  alternative	  set	  of	  market-­‐like	  prices	  ought	  to	  be	  used	  to	  find	  “optimal”	  product	  mixes	  and	  direct	  that	  very	  planning.84	  	  Other	  proposals	  went	  further,	  arguing	  that	  the	   clash	   between	   the	   models	   and	   the	   Soviet	   economy	   could	   not	   be	   overcome	  without	   changes	   being	   made	   to	   the	   latter:	   as	   academic	   economists	   such	   as	   V.S.	  Nemchinov,	  V.A.	  Volkonsky,	  N.	  Petrakov	  and	  others	  argued,	  modern	  mathematical	  models	   clearly	   indicated	   a	   need	   to	   incorporate	   market	   structures,	   including	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Kantorovich	   and	   Gorstko,	  Optimal’nie	   resheniia,	   30.	   	   On	   Soviet	   economic	  modeling’s	   shift	   from	  prediction	   to	  prescription,	   see	  Pekka	   Sutela,	  Socialism,	  Planning,	  and	  Optimality:	  A	  Study	   in	  Soviet	  
Economic	  Thought	  (Helsinki:	  Finnish	  Soviet	  of	  Sciences	  and	  Letters,	  1984).	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decentralized	   decision	   making,	   profit	   incentives,	   and	   even	   dynamic	   prices	   for	  marketed	  goods.85	  As	  Petrakov	  put	   it	   in	  1970,	  “The	  proper	  balance	  of	  supply	  and	  demand,”	  as	  brought	  about	  by	  market	  prices,	  “is	  the	  best	  medicine	  for	  queues.”86	  	  	  	  Any	  middle	   ground,	   the	   advocates	   of	   economic	  mathematical	   modeling	   came	   to	  argue,	   was	   essentially	   doomed	   to	   failure.	   As	   Nemchinov	   wrote	   in	   1959,	  Kantorovich’s	  “shadow	  prices”	  were	  an	  unstable	  half	  measure:	  an	  attempt	  to	  make	  the	  exchange	  theory	  of	  value	  apply	  in	  a	  system	  based	  on	  the	  Marxist	  labour	  theory	  of	  value.87	  	  While	  in	  capitalist	  economies	  the	  “real	  price”	  of	  any	  good	  is	  the	  market	  (exchange)	  value	  established	  by	  buyers	  and	  sellers,	  socialist	  economies	  such	  as	  the	  USSR	  held	   that	  a	  good’s	   “real	  price”	  was	  based	  on	   the	  scientifically	  determinable	  value	   of	   the	   labour	   that	   had	   gone	   into	   creating	   the	   good.	   This	   calculation	   could	  later	  be	   translated	   into	  an	  exchange	  value	   (price),	  depending	  on	   the	  demands	  of	  the	   economy	   and	   consideration	   of	   the	   good’s	   social	   use	   value.	   Planning	   bodies	  balanced	   various	   exchange	   values	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   workers	   received	   a	   wage	  equivalent	   to	   the	   value	   of	   their	   labour	   –	   and	   to	   guarantee	   that	   goods	   were	  distributed	  to	  enterprises	  and	  workers	  on	  an	  equitable	  basis.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  price	  listed	   for	   any	   good	   in	   rubles	   was	   essentially	   a	   convenient	   method	   of	  accommodating	   the	  allocation	  and	  exchange	  of	   goods	  –	   and	   it	   remained	  abstract	  from	  the	  “real”	  (labour-­‐based)	  value	  of	  that	  good.	   	   	   In	  concrete	  terms,	   if	  a	  factory	  purchased	   a	   shipment	   of	   boards	   for	   10	   rubles	   each,	   the	   price	   of	   10	   rubles	  represented	   the	  cost	  of	   labour	   involved	   in	   the	  board’s	  production,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  calculation	  of	  the	  social	  value	  of	  the	  boards	  to	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  figure	  of	  10	  rubles,	  however,	  represented	  neither	  the	  “market	  value”	  of	  the	  boards,	  based	  on	  relative	  scarcity	  and	  demand,	  nor	  the	  “optimal”	  value	  of	  the	  boards;	  nor	  was	  it	  useful	  as	  a	  figure	  with	  which	  to	  calculate	  the	  costs	  of	  optimal	  input	  mixes.88	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Nemchinov	  argued,	  econometrics	  required	  the	  use	  of	  market	  prices,	  which	  in	   turn	   implied	   shifting	   to	   something	   similar	   to	   the	   exchange	   theory	   of	   value	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85 	  V.S.	   Nemchinov,	   O	   dal’neishem	   sovershenstvovanii	   planirovaniia	   i	   upravleniia	   khoziaistvom	  (Moscow:	   Ekonomika,	   1965);	   V.A.	   Volkonsky,	   Model’	   optimal’nogo	   planirovaniia	   i	   vzaimosviazi	  
ekonomicheskikh	   pokazatelei	   (Moscow:	   TsEMI,	   1967);	   N.	   Federenko,	   “Nauchno-­‐tekhnicheskaia	  revoliutsiia	  i	  upravlenie,”	  Novii	  Mir	  46,	  no.	  10	  (1970):	  esp.	  168;	  A.	  I	  Katsenelinboigen,	  I.L.	  Lakhman,	  Yu.V.	  Ovsienko,	  Optimal’nost’	  i	  tovaro-­‐denezhnie	  otnosheniya	  (Moscow:	  TsEMI,	  1969,)	  esp.	  82-­‐123.	  86	  N.	  Petrakov,	  “Upravlenie	  ekonomiki	  i	  ekonomicheskie	  interesy,”	  Novii	  Mir	  46,	  no.	  8	  (1970):	  179.	  87	  V.S.	   Nemchinov,	   “Introduction,”	   in	   L.V.	   Kantorovich,	  The	  Best	  Use	  of	  Economic	  Resources,	   trans.	  P.F.	  Knightsfield	  (Oxford:	  Pergamon	  Press,	  1965),	  xiv-­‐xv.	  88 	  For	   a	   theoretical	   discussion	   of	   the	   labor	   theory	   of	   value,	   see	   G.	   Dumenil,	   “Beyond	   the	  Transformation	  Riddle:	  A	  Labor	  Theory	  of	  Value,”	  Science	  &	  Society	  47,	  no.	  4	  (1983/1984).	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employed	  by	  Western	  economists,	  whereby	  prices	  were	  both	  dynamically	  assigned	  by	   the	   market	   and	   representative	   of	   a	   good’s	   “real”	   value.	   	   As	   the	   Hungarian	  economist	  Janos	  Kornai	  later	  concluded,	  “No	  computational	  price	  system	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  long-­‐term	  decisions	  will,	  however,	  substitute	  for	  an	  adequate	  system	  of	  actual	  prices.”89	  	  Although	  some	  ideas	  promoted	  by	  the	  mathematical	  modelers	  were	  incorporated	  into	  1960s-­‐era	  economic	  reforms,	  this	  implied	  attack	  on	  the	  labour	  theory	  of	  value	  led	  to	  their	  general	   isolation	  after	  the	  early	  1960s.90	  	  As	  Pekka	  Sutela	  has	  shown,	  however,	   these	   ideas	   survived	   at	   the	   Institute	   of	   Economics	   and	  Organization	   of	  Industrial	   Production	   (IEiOPP)	   in	   Novosibirsk	   and	   the	   Moscow-­‐based	   Central	  Mathematical	   Economics	   Institute	   (TsEMI),	   both	   of	   which	   employed	   economists	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Academy	  of	  Sciences.91	  	  	  Having	  been	  founded	  by	  Nemchinov	   in	   1963	   and	   under	   the	   direction	   of	   its	   long-­‐serving	   director,	   N.P.	  Federenko,	  TsEMI	  systematized	  much	  of	  the	  Soviet	  pro-­‐reform	  modeling	  tradition	  into	  what	   was	   termed	   the	   “System	   of	   Optimally	   Functioning	   Socialist	   Economy”	  (SOFE),	   a	   theoretical	   platform	   that	   was	   subsequently	   applied	   to	   arguing	   for	  increasingly	  market-­‐based	  reforms	  to	  the	  Soviet	  economy.92	  	   	  At	  both	  IEiOPP	  and	  TsEMI,	   moreover,	   modeling	   practices	   and	   methods	   were	   professionalized	   and	  grew	   into	   a	   sophisticated	   body	   of	   Soviet	   econometrics,	   in	   which	   complicated	  statistical	  tests	  were	  applied	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  socialist	  economy.	  	  Throughout	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   the	   economists	  working	   at	   TsEMI	   and	   IEiOPP	  continued	   to	   call	   for	   radical	   change	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   planned	   economy.93	  	  Although	   their	   hopes	   were	   raised	   when	   Leonid	   Brezhnev	   explicitly	   mentioned	  “mathematical	  economic	  models”	  during	  his	  speech	  to	   the	  24th	  Party	  Congress	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89 	  Jonas	   Kornai,	   Mathematical	   Planning	   of	   Structural	   Decisions	   (Amsterdam:	   North-­‐Holland	  Publishing	  Company,	  1975),	  315.	  Masaaki	  Kuboniwa,	  while	  arguing	  for	  the	  ultimate	  compatibility	  of	   the	   labour	   theory	   of	   value	   with	   a	   dynamic	   pricing	   system,	   has	   also	   highlighted	   a	   number	   of	  practical	   and	   theoretical	   problems	   associated	   with	   the	   efforts	   to	   bind	   the	   two	   together.	   	   See:	  Masaaki	  Kuboniwa,	  Quantitative	  Economics	  of	  Socialism:	  Input-­‐Output	  Approaches	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  37-­‐43.	  90	  Michael	  Ellman,	  Soviet	  Planning	  Today,	  4.	  91	  Pekka	  Sutela,	  Economic	  Thought	  and	  Economic	  Reform	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  3,	  23.	  92	  The	   content	   of	   SOFE	   has	   been	   dealt	   with	   at	   length	   in	   Sutela,	  Economic	  Thought	  and	  Economic	  
Reform	  and	  Ellman,	  Soviet	  Planning	  Today.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  different	   versions	   of	   Soviet	   econometrics	   diverged	   is	   less	   important	   than	   the	   overall	   focus	   on	  marketization.	  93	  Sutela,	  Economic	  Thought	  and	  Economic	  Reform,	  19-­‐20.	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1971,	  calls	  for	  market	  reforms	  continued	  to	  fall	  on	  largely	  deaf	  ears.	  	  The	  director	  of	   IEiOPP,	  A.G.	  Aganbegian,	  who	  would	   in	   the	  1980s	  become	  one	  of	  Gorbachev’s	  close	   economic	   advisors,	   later	   recalled	   presenting	   evidence	   in	   the	   early	   1970s	  from	   “dynamic	   inter-­‐sectorial	   models,”	   which	   predicted	   a	   drop	   in	   long-­‐term	  growth	  rates	  across	  the	  USSR	  if	  marketization	  was	  not	  implemented.	  Although	  his	  recommendations	   were	   given	   to	   commissions	   headed	   by	   Brezhnev	   and	   Aleksei	  Kosygin,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  USSR,	  Aganbegian’s	  calls	  for	  change,	   including	  the	  introduction	  of	  dynamic	  pricing	  structures,	  he	  reported,	  went	   unheeded.94	  	   Other	   economists	   sympathetic	   to	   econometrics	   and	   market	  reforms	  have	  reported	  similar	  experiences.95	  	  	  	  Continuing	  to	  work	  with	  econometric	  models,	  these	  economists	  increasingly	  came	  to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   overall	   structure	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economy	   itself	   was	   at	  fault,	   rather	   than	  any	  particular	  decision-­‐making	  structure	  or	  planning	  decisions.	  Their	  models,	  which	   tended	   to	   include	  assumptive	   criteria	  about	   the	   inefficiency	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  planned	  economy,	  failed	  to	  work	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  USSR,	  or	   at	   best	   demanded	   revolutionary	   change.96	  In	   this	   form,	   econometrics	   was	  simply	  incompatible	  with	  the	  planned	  economy:	  its	  application	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  Soviet	   planning	   “worked	   only	   on	   paper.”97	  Rather	   than	   modify	   their	   criteria	   or	  models,	   however,	   the	   econometricians	   chose	   instead	   to	   lobby	   the	   USSR’s	  leadership	   in	  Moscow	   to	   change	   the	   Soviet	   economy	   to	   accord	  with	   the	  models.	  	  Yet	   econometrics’	   inapplicability	   to	   Soviet	   conditions	   had	   made	   it	   “remarkably	  unproductive,”	   and	   over	   time	   the	   Soviet	   economic	   establishment	   turned	   away	  from	  the	  approach,	  notwithstanding	  its	  apparent	  early	  promise.98	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	   moreover,	   many	   of	   the	   leading	   Soviet	   econometricians	   had	   come	   under	  pressure	   for	   their	   ideological	   heterodoxy	   and	   links	   to	   foreign	   economic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Aganbegian,	  Moving	  the	  Mountain,	  152,	  155.	  	  95	  Kudrov,	   Soviet	   Economic	   Performance,	   36;	   Albina	   Tretyakova	   and	   Igor	   Birman,	   “Input-­‐Output	  Analysis	   in	   the	   USSR,”	   Soviet	   Studies	   28	   (2),	   1976,	   note	   82;	   Andrei	   Kolesnikov,	   “Sovetskii	   flirt	   s	  profitom:	  istoriia	  voprosom,”	  Forbes	  Rossiia,	  October	  2009.	  96	  Hanson,	  Rise	  and	  Fall,	   69,	   footnote	   2.	   	   Also	   see	   English,	  Russia	  and	   the	   Idea,	   97;	   142.	   	   Built	   on	  assumptions	  about	  market	  efficiency	  and	  the	  need	  for	  “real”	  prices,	  econometric	  models	  inevitably	  led	  to	  pessimistic	  conclusions	  about	  the	  Soviet	  economy.	  See	  Vladimir	  Kontorovich,	  “Soviet	  Growth	  Slowdown:	   Econometric	   vs.	   Direct	   Evidence,”	   American	   Economic	   Review	   76,	   no.	   2	   (1986):	   181;	  “1987	  Panel	  on	   the	  Soviet	  Economic	  Outlook:	  Perceptions	  on	  a	  Confusing	  Set	  of	  Statistics,”	  Soviet	  
Economy	  3,	  no.	  1	  (1987).	  97	  Slava	  Gerovitch,	  From	  Newspeak	  to	  Cyberspeak:	  A	  History	  of	  Soviet	  Cybernetics	  (Boston:	  MIT	  Press,	  2006),	  278.	  98	  Hanson,	  Rise	  and	  Fall,	  96.	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institutions.99	  This	  also	   tended	   to	   stymy	   the	  careers	  of	   its	  advocates:	  Aganbegian	  and	   the	   sociologist	   Tatiana	   Zaslavskaia	   were	   isolated	   in	   Novosibirsk’s	   IEiOPP,	  while	   Federenko	   and	   Petrakov	   found	   their	   influence	   largely	   limited	   outside	   of	  TsEMI.	  	  	  	  This	  situation	  changed	  abruptly	   in	  1982,	  when	  Gorbachev,	  already	  a	  full	  member	  of	   the	   CPSU	   Politburo	   and	   Central	   Committee	   Secretary	   for	   Agriculture,	   invited	  Zaslavskaia	  and	  Federenko	  to	   the	  Kremlin	  the	  discuss	   the	  USSR’s	  economy.	   	  This	  initial	   meeting	   developed	   into	   frequent	   informal	   consultations	   with	   Zaslavskaia,	  Federenko,	  and	  other	  econometricians,	  including	  Petrakov	  and	  Aganbegian,	  on	  the	  “agricultural	  mechanism”	  and	  “economic	  development”	  of	  the	  USSR.100	  	  Gorbachev	  was	  impressed,	  later	  writing	  in	  his	  memoirs	  that	  Aganbegian	  those	  like	  him	  were	  the	   only	   ones	   who	   really	   understood	   the	   Soviet	   economy	   before	   perestroika.101	  When	   Gorbachev	   became	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   CPSU,	   he	   also	   made	   notable	  effort	  to	  include	  these	  economists	  more	  formally	  in	  his	  reform	  efforts.	  As	  a	  result,	  Gorbachev’s	   ascension	   to	   power	   in	   1985	   opened	   the	   Kremlin’s	   doors	   to	   many	  previously	   marginalized	   econometricians,	   including	   those,	   such	   as	   Aganbegian,	  Petrakov	   and	   Shatalin,	   who	   ultimately	   came	   to	   hold	   official	   posts	   and	   directly	  affect	   state	   policy. 102 	  For	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	   political	   allies,	   this	   form	   of	  econometric	   modeling	   provided	   a	   scientific	   explanation	   for	   the	   general	   malaise	  they	  had	  observed:	  models	  provided	  the	  necessary	  proof	  that	  official	  statistics	  had	  been	  falsified.	  	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  econometric	  models	  support	  Gorbachev’s	  drive	  for	  reform,	   moreover,	   they	   represented	   “real”	   mathematical	   economics,	   free	   from	  Marxist	   ideology	  and	  the	  Soviet	  “whitewashing”	  (ochkovtiratel’stvo)	  that	  was	  said	  to	  have	  warped	  the	  study	  of	  economics	   in	  the	  USSR.	  Gorbachev	  went	  as	   far	  as	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Feygin,	  “The	  Making	  of	  an	  Economics	  Internationale.”	  100	  On	   the	   initial	   meeting	   with	   Gorbachev,	   see	   Interview	   with	   Tatiana	   Zaslavskaya,	   27.06.1990,	  Moscow.	   2RR	  1/3/6	  69.	  On	   later	   consultations,	   see	   Interview	  with	  Nikolai	   Petrakov,	   14.07.1990,	  2RR	   1/215,	   54a;	   “Predlozheniia	   uchenykh-­‐ekonomistov	   po	   voprosam	   sovershenstvovaniia	  upravleniia	   narodnym	   khoziaistvom,”	   01.07.1982,	   RGASPI,	   f.	   653,	   op.	   1,	   d.	   43,	   ll.	   4-­‐16;	   also	  Interview	  with	  Abel	  Aganbegian,	  04.11.2012.	   	  Conducted	  by	  the	  Yelstin	  Center,	  Moscow.	  Online	  at	  http://www.yeltsincenter.ru/decryption/intervyu-­‐s-­‐abelom-­‐aganbegyanom?page=0,0.	  101	  Gorbachev,	  Zhizn’	  i	  reformy,	  335.	  102	  Anders	  Aslund,	  “Gorbachev’s	  Economic	  Advisors,”	  Soviet	  Economy	  3,	  no.	  3	  (1987);	  Pekka	  Sutela,	  “The	   Views	   of	   Gorbachev’s	   Advisors:	   Leonid	   Abalkin,	   Nikolai	   Petrakov	   and	   Stanislav	   Shatalin,”	  
Communist	   Economies	   and	   Economic	   Transformation	   3,	   no.	   1	   (1991).	   	   Other	   econometrics-­‐associated	  economists	  who	  attained	  positions	  of	  political	   influence	  during	  perestroika	  include	  the	  future	   Politburo	   member	   Vadim	   Medvedev	   and	   the	   academics	   Yegor	   Gaidar,	   Evgenii	   Yasin,	   and	  Zaslavskaia.	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explicitly	   cite	   one	   of	   Nemchinov’s	   articles	   during	   a	   1987	   speech	   to	   a	   Central	  Committee	  plenum:	  	  perestroika,	  it	  seemed,	  had	  found	  its	  theoretical	  footing.103	  	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  When	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  became	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  USSR	   in	  March	   1985,	   three	   important	   elements	   aligned	   to	   dictate	   the	   structural	  economic	  reforms	  that	  would	  be	  implemented	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  “perestroika.”	  	  First,	   the	   General	   Secretary	   and	   his	   advisors’	   underlying	   belief	   that	   the	   Soviet	  economy	  and	  society	  had	  “stagnated”	  and	  that	  official	  statistics	  were	  false	  led	  them	  to	  seek	  out	  alternative	  sources	  of	  information	  and	  support.	  	  Moreover,	  Gorbachev	  found	   political	   support	   for	   his	   economic	   reforms	   amongst	   the	   relative	   elite	   of	  Moscow	   and	   other	   major	   urban	   centers	   in	   the	   USSR.	   In	   these	   cities	   many	  sophisticated	  urbanite	  Soviet	  citizens	  had	  also	  come	  to	  doubt	  the	  official	  statistics	  and	  pronouncements	  made	  by	  the	  state	  –	  and	  also	  felt	  that	  significant	  change	  was	  necessary	   to	   improve	   the	   standard	   of	   living	   with	   which	   they	   were	   no	   longer	  satisfied.	   	  Finally,	   the	  Soviet	  school	  of	  econometrics,	  which	  had	  developed	  within	  Soviet	  economics	  since	  the	  1950s,	  provided	  an	  alternative	  model	  of	  Soviet	  decline	  –	  one	  that	  overlapped	  with	  the	  new	  leadership’s	  views	  and	  provided	  the	  necessary	  theoretical	   support	   for	   the	   chosen	   direction	   of	   reform.	   Facing	   the	   economic	  slowdown	  of	  the	  early	  1980s,	  all	  three	  of	  these	  groups	  pushed	  for	  a	  new	  approach:	  not	  the	  limited	  and	  incremental	  reforms	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  a	  new	  and	  far	  more	  radical	  series	  of	  reforms.	  	  By	  choosing	  to	  believe	  the	  econometrists’	  predictions	  of	  doom	  and	  urbane	  Soviet	  consumers’	   gloomy	   disposition,	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors	   were	   also	   aligning	  with	  the	  growing	  tendency	  to	  compare	  the	  USSR	  to	  the	  West	  on	  the	  West’s	  terms.	  	  Having	  satisfied	  Soviet	  consumers	  demands	  for	  basic	  goods	  and	  services,	  the	  USSR	  now	   faced	   the	   challenge	   of	   fulfilling	   their	   demands	   for	   prestige	   goods,	   reliable	  durables,	   and	   the	  Western	   lifestyle	   that	  was	   increasingly	   visible	   to	  many	   Soviet	  citizens.	  	  Travel	  to	  both	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  West	  was	  increasingly	  available	  to	  many	  well-­‐off	  Soviets,	  and	  the	  influences	  of	  global	  consumerism	  were	  increasingly	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  “O	   zadachakh	   partii	   po	   korennoi	   perestroiki	   upravleniia	   ekonomikoi.	   	   Doklad	   General'nogo	  sekretaria	  TsK	  KPSS	  M.S.	  Gorbacheva	  na	  Plenume	  TsK	  KPSS,	  25	   iiunia	  1987	  goda,”	  Kommunist	  10	  (1987):	  28.	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felt	   at	   home.	   For	   those	   living	   relatively	   comfortable	   lives	   in	  Moscow,	   Leningrad,	  Kiev,	  or	  even	  Novosibirsk,	   the	  temptations	  of	  Western	  models	  were	  clear.	   	   In	  the	  West,	   there	  were	  more,	   and	  better	  quality	  goods;	   in	   the	  West,	   increased	   salaries	  actually	   meant	   increased	   access	   to	   consumer	   goods.	   	   This	   broad	   wave	   of	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  relative	  benefits	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economic	  system	  supported	  Gorbachev	  and	   the	  econometrists’	   shared	   feeling	   that	   ideas	   from	   the	  West	  –	  and	  primarily,	   some	  sort	  of	  market	  distribution	  –	  was	   the	  real	   solution	   to	   the	  USSR’s	  woes.	  	  This	   was,	   however,	   a	   perspective	   that	   almost	   exclusively	   focused	   on	   the	  experiences	   and	   perspective	   of	   the	   USSR’s	   relative	   elite	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   vast	  swaths	   of	   Soviet	   territory	   and	   population.104	  	   Developed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   urban	  dissatisfaction	   and	   academic	   theories	   in	   a	   small	   number	   of	   large	   (and	   largely	  European)	   Soviet	   cities,	   Gorbachev’s	   push	   for	   radical	   reform	   took	   no	   account	   of	  peripheral	   views.	   The	   perspective	   of	   local	   elites	   or	   workers	   in	   places	   such	   as	  Dushanbe,	  Tajikistan	  –	  where	  the	  majority	  saw	  no	  need	  for	  change	  and	  was	  largely	  satisfied	  with	  the	  Soviet	  system	  –	  were	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  whatsoever.	  	  In	  fact,	  Gorbachev	   and	   his	   group	   of	   close	   advisors	   were	   surprisingly	   uninterested	   and	  uninformed	  about	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  USSR,	  demonstrating	  limited	  knowledge	  of	  Central	  Asia	  and	  much	  of	  the	  outlying	  and	  less	  developed	  republics.	  	  At	  one	  point,	  Gorbachev	   confused	   the	   Aral	   and	   Caspian	   seas	   during	   a	   Politburo	   discussion	   in	  early	   1986;	  105	  later,	   he	   mistakenly	   referred	   to	   Tajikistan	   as	   “Tajikia.”106	  	   His	  advisor	   Georgii	   Shakhnazarov	  mixed	   up	   the	   names	   of	   Tajik	   newspapers	   he	  was	  nominally	   in	   charge	   of	   overseeing.	  107	  Another	   advisor,	   Anatolii	   Cherniaev,	   was	  simply	  dismissive	  of	  the	  USSR’s	  Muslim	  republics.	   	  In	  1988	  he	  advised	  Gorbachev	  that	  “Islamic	  values	  don’t	  really	  fit	  with	  universal	  human	  values,”	  and	  thus	  Central	  Asia	  was	   unlikely	   to	   support	   “the	  moral	   perestroika	   of	   Soviet	   society.”	  108	  	  When	  representatives	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  would	  arrive	  in	  Dushanbe,	  moreover,	  it	   often	   seemed	   “like	   they	   did	   not	   know	   anything	   beyond	   MKAD	   [the	   edge	   of	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   Irina	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   “Perestroika	   v	   sovetskoi	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   Azii	   i	  sotsiolisticheskoi	  Mongolii:	  novye	   formy	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  skvoz’	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  obshchestvennykh	  diskussii,”	  in	   The	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   2016;	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   sovetskii	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Chapter	  Four	  
Building	  a	  “Socialist”	  Market:	  Gorbachev’s	  Economic	  Reforms	  	  Settling	  into	  the	  office	  of	  the	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  USSR	  on	  Moscow’s	  Old	  Square	   in	  March	  1985,	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  was	   ready	   for	   change	  –	  even	   for	   structural	   reform.	   	   This	   included	   political	   change:	   Gorbachev,	   with	   the	  help	  of	  allies	  like	  Yegor	  Ligachev,	  quickly	  went	  about	  removing	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Politburo	  who	  had	  opposed	  his	  election,	  as	  well	  as	  updating	  the	  Party	  leadership	  of	  various	  republics	  and	  oblasts,	  much	  as	  any	  new	  First	  Secretary	  was	   likely	  to	  do.1	  	  More	   pressingly,	   however,	   it	   meant	   economic	   reform.	   	   Having	   spent	   years	  developing	  ideas	  in	  the	  Moscow	  circles	  of	  econometrists,	   intellectuals,	  politicians,	  and	   other	   Soviet	   urbanites	   all	   increasingly	   disappointed	   with	   Soviet	   production	  and	   stagnant	   living	   standards,	   Gorbachev	   had	   come	   to	   share	   the	   belief	   that	  something	   had	   to	   be	   changed.	   	   While	   the	   form	   of	   this	   change	   seemed	   initially	  unclear,	   both	   Gorbachev’s	   own	   experience	   with	   the	   West	   and	   the	   influence	   of	  Muscovite	   intellectual	   opinion	   pointed	   in	   a	   single	   direction:	   the	   Soviet	   economy	  could	  only	  be	  saved	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  market-­‐like	  practices.	  	  Over	   the	   course	   of	   1986-­‐1988,	   as	   this	   chapter	   will	   show,	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	  supporters	   in	   the	   Soviet	   government	   passed	   a	   series	   of	   economic	   reforms	   that	  taken	   as	   a	   whole	   introduced	   significant	   market-­‐style	   practices	   to	   the	   planned	  Soviet	   economy.	   	   In	   particular,	   the	   1987	   Soviet	   Law	   on	   State	   Enterprises	  (Conglomerates)	   and	   the	   1988	   Law	   on	   Cooperatives	   created	   internal	   conditions	  for	   the	   functioning	   of	   private	   and	   semi-­‐private	   businesses	   within	   the	   USSR.	   	   In	  many	  ways,	  together	  with	  perestroika’s	  numerous	  secondary	  reforms,	  these	  laws	  significantly	   undermined	   the	   Soviet	   state’s	   control	   over	   the	   productive	   sector,	  providing	   ripe	   conditions	   for	   Soviet	   enterprises	   to	   hoard	  profits,	   stop	  producing	  affordable	  consumer	  goods,	   and	  embezzle	   funds	   through	  cooperative	  businesses.	  	  The	   impact	   of	   these	   reforms	  was	   visible	   as	   early	   as	   1988,	   the	   first	   year	   the	   full	  reform	   package	   went	   into	   effect:	   deficits	   increased	   and	   the	   production	   of	  important	   consumer	  goods	  began	   to	  wobble.	  By	  1989	   the	   situation	  was	  growing	  out	   of	   hand,	   with	   unemployment	   growing,	   the	   gap	   between	   earned	   wages	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Members	  of	  the	  Politburo	  opposed	  to	  Gorbachev’s	  selection	  included	  Grigorii	  Romanov	  (retired	  in	  July	  1985),	  Nikolai	  Tikhonov	  (retired	  in	  Ocotober	  1985),	  Viktor	  Grishin	  (retired	  in	  February	  1986),	  Dinmukhamad	  Kunaev	   (retired	   in	  December	   1986)	   and	  Vladimir	   Shcherbitskii	   (retired	   in	   1989).	  	  See	  Ryzhkov,	  Desiat’	  let,	  76;	  M.S.	  Solomentsev,	  Zachistka	  v	  Politbiuro.	  	  Kak	  Gorbachev	  ubiral	  ‘vragov	  
perestroiki’	  (Moscow:	  Algoritm,	  2011).	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available	   products	   increasing,	   and	   modest	   economic	   growth	   turning	   into	   an	  economic	  recession.	   	  Market	  practices	  were	  making	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  money	  for	  the	  directors	  of	   individual	   enterprises	   and	   cooperatives’	  new	  owners	  –	  but	   certainly	  not	  for	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  or	  population	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  While	  Gorbachev’s	  economic	  reform	  program	  has	  unavoidably	  received	  attention	  as	  a	  central	  element	  of	  perestroika,	  the	  clear	  links	  between	  these	  reforms	  and	  the	  economic	   disintegration	   of	   the	   USSR	   have	   been	   left	   surprisingly	   understudied.2	  	  	  Instead,	  historiographical	   research	  has	  generally	  circled	  around	  the	   idea	   that	   the	  reform	  program	  essentially	   failed	  and	  was	  secondary	  to	  other	  causes	  of	  collapse,	  economic	   or	   political.	   	   Some	   scholars	   have	   emphasized	   alternative	   explanations,	  such	  as	  the	  simple	  “loss	  of	  faith”	  in	  the	  Soviet	  System,	  as	  Stephen	  Solnick	  has	  put	  it.	  	  In	   this	   view,	   the	   reform	   program	   was	   essentially	   irrelevant:	   the	   Soviet	   state	  collapsed	  under	  the	  weight	  of	  its	  own	  inefficiencies	  and	  the	  history	  of	  violence	  that	  Gorbachev	  revealed	  through	  glasnost.	  3	  Other	  authors,	  however,	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  reform	  program	  held	  real	  promise	  for	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  –	  but	  was	  unable	  to	  overcome	   entrenched	   bureaucratic	   interests,	   conservative	   politicians,	   or	   simple	  worker	   intransigence.4	  	   In	   either	   case,	   reform	   failed	   to	   have	   any	   real	   impact,	  leaving	  the	  USSR	  to	  flounder	  towards	  its	  downwards	  spiral	  in	  1990-­‐1991.	  	  Based	   for	   the	   most	   part	   on	   memoirs	   written	   by	   Gorbachev	   and	   many	   of	   his	  supporters	   (as	   well	   as	   notes	   from	   Politburo	   and	   other	   central	   Party	   meetings),	  these	   accounts	   tend	   to	   paint	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   USSR	   in	   a	   relatively	   positive	  light.	  	  While	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  economy	  may	  have	  taken	  a	  spectacular	  nosedive	  in	  the	  years	  immediately	  after	  Gorbachev’s	  reform	  program,	  they	  imply,	  this	  had	  little	  to	   do	   with	   the	   actual	   reforms.	   	   Yet	   this	   overlooks	   the	   great	   deal	   of	   historical	  evidence	  pointing	  to	  the	  contrary.	  	  By	  turning	  to	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  Gorbachev’s	  economic	   reform	   program	   and	   its	   consequences	   for	   the	   Soviet	   economy,	   this	  chapter	   argues,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   establish	   clear	   and	   inarguable	   links	  between	   the	  introduction	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   “socialist	   market”	   reforms	   of	   1986-­‐88	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Exceptions	   include	   Donald	   Filtzer,	   Soviet	   Workers	   and	   the	   Collapse	   of	   Perestroika	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   1994);	   Terry	   Cox,	   From	   Perestroika	   to	   Privatisation:	   The	   Politics	   of	  
Property	  Change	  in	  Russian	  Society,	  1985-­‐1991(Avebury:	  Aldershot,	  1996).	  3	  Solnick,	   Stealing	   the	   State;	   also	   Ellman	   and	   Kontorovich,	   The	   Destruction	   of	   the	   Soviet;	   Brown,	  
Gorbachev	  Factor;	  McCauley,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall.	  4	  Miller,	   The	   Struggle	   to	   Save;	   Kotkin,	   Armageddon	   Averted;	   Filtzer,	   Soviet	   Workers;	   Cox,	   From	  
Perestroika	  to	  Privatisation.	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subsequent	  downturn	  in	  the	  Soviet	  planned	  economy.	  	  These	  reforms	  were	  in	  fact	  one	  of	   the	   central	   causes	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economy’s	   collapse:	   as	   this	   thesis	   argues,	  their	   impact	  was	  visible	  across	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  USSR	  within	  a	  few	  years	  of	  their	  implementation.	  	  Although	  Soviet	  leaders	  in	  both	  Dushanbe	  and	  Moscow	  observed	  the	  economic	  decline,	  however,	   it	  was	  only	   in	   the	  periphery	   that	  problems	  were	  explicitly	  connected	  to	  the	  reforms.	  	  In	  the	  offices	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  on	  the	  Old	   Square,	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors	   saw	   a	   different	   picture,	   one	   in	   which	  reforms	   had	   failed,	   blocked	   by	   “entrenched	   interests”	   and	   “conservative	  bureaucrats.”	   	   Blind	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   his	   own	   reforms	   had	   torpedoed	   the	  economy,	   Gorbachev	   for	   years	   continued	   to	   assert	   their	   overall	   “failure.”	   	   This	  stance	  would	   help	   to	   define	   the	   fate	   of	   the	   USSR	   in	   its	   final	   years,	   as	   economic	  chaos	   was	   compounded	   by	   further	   political	   innovation	   meant	   to	   overcome	   this	  bureaucratic	   “intransigence”	  –	  but	  which	  would	  serve	   to	  only	   further	  undermine	  the	  fabric	  of	  Soviet	  society.	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  One	   of	   the	   first	   indications	   of	   Gorbachev’s	   focus	   on	   reform	   could	   be	   seen	   in	   his	  choice	  of	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Council	   of	  Ministers	  of	   the	  USSR.	   	  Replacing	   the	   aging	  Nikolai	   Tikhonov	   in	   October	   1985	   with	   Nikolai	   Ryzhkov,	   Gorbachev	   selected	   a	  candidate	  with	  whom	  he	  had	  previously	  worked	  on	  economic	  reform,	  albeit	  on	  a	  smaller	   scale.	   	   Long	   associated	   with	   Gosplan	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Medium	  Engineering	   (Minsredmash),	   Ryzhkov	   also	   had	   a	   notable	   history	   of	   overseeing	  economic	   change.	   	   As	   the	   head	   engineer	   and	   then	   director	   of	   the	   giant	   tractor	  factory	  “Uralmash”	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  Ryzhkov	  had	  been	  in	  charge	  of	  one	  of	  the	  first	  enterprises	  to	  implement	  the	  famous	  “Kosygin	  reforms”	  of	  1965,	  the	  first	  time	  the	  USSR	   had	   toyed	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   market	   incentives.	   	   As	   a	   Central	   Committee	  secretary	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  moreover,	  he	  had	  been	  tasked	  by	  Andropov	  to	  work	  with	   Gorbachev	   on	   a	   program	   of	   economic	   revitalization,	   which	   had	   ultimately	  resulted	   in	   a	   series	   of	   limited	   reform	   laws	   passed	   in	   1983.5 	  	   A	   less	   brash	  personality	  than	  Gorbachev,	  Ryzhkov’s	  long	  experience	  in	  the	  economic	  apparatus	  made	   him	   an	   effective	   choice	   as	   a	   partner	   to	   help	   work	   out	   the	   details	   of	   the	  coming	  reform	  program.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Ryzhkov.	  Desiat’	  let,	  48-­‐49;	  Gorbachev,	  Zhizny	  i	  reformy,	  244-­‐245.	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  Given	  their	   joint	  experience	  developing	  reforms	  under	  Andropov,	  Gorbachev	  and	  Ryzhkov’s	  initial	  ideas	  tended	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  general	  reform	  program	  the	  former	  had	   proposed	   during	   his	   short	   tenure	   as	   First	   Secretary.	   	   In	   part,	   this	  meant	   an	  emphasis	   on	   workplace	   discipline:	   cutting	   work-­‐hours	   lost	   due	   to	   laziness,	  inattentiveness,	   absentness,	   or	   simple	   drunkenness.	   	   It	   also,	   more	   immediately	  than	   anything	   else,	   was	   focused	   on	   productivity.	   	   The	   challenge	   of	   increasing	  productivity	   growth	   had	   been	   a	   major	   concern	   for	   Andropov,	   and	   it	   remained	  central	   for	   Gorbachev,	   Ryzhkov,	   and	   their	   advisors.6	  	   Soviet	   economic	   planners	  were	  obsessed	  with	  productivity.	  Factories,	  ministries,	  and	  whole	  republics	  were	  constantly	  under	  pressure	  to	  increase	  productivity	  rates:	  in	  1984,	  for	  example,	  the	  Soviet	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  berated	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  for	  its	  “tendency	  towards	  salary	  growth	   rates	   that	   are	   higher	   than	   productivity	   growth	   rates.” 7 	  	   Yet	   these	  exhortations	  seemed	  to	  have	  little	  immediate	  effect:	  for	  years	  productivity	  growth	  rates	  had	  been	  dropping.	   	  New	  methods	  of	  calculating	  productivity	   introduced	  in	  the	   late	   1970s,	   moreover,	   increasingly	   showed	   that	   Soviet	   output	   growth	   was	  essentially	   “extensive”	   –	   predicated	   on	   increased	   inputs	   (materials,	   workers,	   or	  salaries)	  rather	  than	  boosts	  in	  labour	  organization	  or	  technology.	  8	  	  	  	  These	  low	  rates	  of	  real	  productivity	  growth	  threatened	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  economy	  for	   two	   main	   reasons.	   	   First,	   the	   total	   number	   of	   workers	   in	   the	   USSR	   was	  objectively	  limited	  –	  and	  in	  the	  European	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  already	  largely	  at	  its	  limit.	  Adding	  workers	  ad	  nasueam	  was	  not	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution.	  	  Second,	  and	  even	  more	   problematic,	   providing	   monetary	   incentives	   to	   boost	   productivity	   growth	  ran	  afoul	  of	  the	  already	  growing	  imbalance	  between	  wages	  and	  available	  goods	  in	  the	  USSR.	   	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  salaries	  had	  been	  growing	  in	  the	  USSR	  for	  decades,	  at	  rates	  that	  frequently	  outstripped	  increases	  in	  productivity.	  	  By	  the	  early	   1980s	   salaries	   were	   increasing	   by	   around	   4-­‐5%	   a	   year	   while	   consumers’	  access	  to	  goods	  –	  predicated	  on	  increasing	  productivity	  rates	  –	  was	  stuck	  at	  3.5%	  growth.	   	  As	  a	  result,	  “over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  the	  population	  has	  built	  up	  large	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  Andropov’s	  views	  on	  productivity	  growth,	  see	  Ligachev.	  Zagadka	  Gorbacheva,	  24.	  7	  TsGART	  f.	  288,	  op.	  14,	  d.	  5299,	  l.	  121.	  	  8	  See	  Postanovlenie	  TsK	  KPSS	   i	   SM	  SSSR	  ot	   12.07.1979	  g.	   “Ob	  uluchshenii	   planirovaniia	   i	   usilenii	  vozdeistviia	   khosiastvennogo	   mekhanizma	   na	   povyshenie	   effektivnosti	   proizvodstva	   i	   kachestva	  raboty,”	  reprinted	  in	  Abdunazarova,	  “Sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskie	  problemy,”	  19.	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cash	   reserves.	   	   At	   the	   moment	   they	   are	   greater	   than	   273	   billion	   rubles.”9	  	   This	  massive	  reserve	  of	  unspent	  wages,	  equivalent	  to	  75%	  of	  the	  annual	  Soviet	  budget,	  threatened	  the	  state	  with	  a	  potential	  wave	  of	  consumer	  dissatisfaction,	  deficits,	  or	  even	  monetary	  collapse.	  	  Productivity	  had	  to	  be	  increased	  –	  and	  somehow	  without	  increasing	  total	  salary	  output.	  	  Initially,	   Gorbachev	   and	   Ryzhkov	   turned	   to	   traditional	   methods	   of	   increasing	  productivity	  that	  emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  state	  as	  regulator	  and	  economic	  planner.	  	  New	   standards	   for	   consumer	   products	  were	   passed	   under	   the	   heading	   of	   “State	  Approval”	   (Gospriemka),	   and	   enterprises	   were	   increasingly	   fined	   for	   failing	   to	  produce	   at	   least	   a	   percentage	   of	   goods	   that	  met	   these	   standards.	   The	  USSR	   also	  passed	   its	  unpopular	   “dry	   law”	  (sukhoi	  zakon)	   in	  May	  1985,	  which	  was	  meant	   to	  boost	   output	   by	   lowering	   alcohol	   consumption	   and	   drunkenness	   in	   the	  workplace.10	  	  While	  not	  banning	  alcohol	  outright,	   it	  dictated	  significant	  decreases	  of	   its	   production:	   factories	   were	   shut,	   vineyards	   chopped	   down,	   and	   whole	  industries	   cut	   back.	   	   One	   of	   the	  most	   controversial	   elements	   of	   perestroika,	   this	  law	   quickly	   led	   to	   deficits	   of	   both	   vodka	   and	   sugar,	   as	   Soviet	   citizens	   turned	   to	  brewing	  their	  own	  alcohol	  at	  home.11	  Finally,	  the	  Soviet	  government	  declared	  that	  it	   would	   be	   making	   significant	   investments	   in	   the	   machine-­‐building	   industry	  (mashinostroenie)	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   use	   of	   technology	   in	   many	   sectors.	  	  Some	   research	   had	   begun	   to	   point	   to	   a	   structural	   over-­‐focus	   on	   “final	   goods”	  instead	  of	  capital	  goods	  or	  the	  means	  of	  production,	  and	  it	  was	  felt	   that	  a	   lack	  of	  focused	   financing	  was	   also	   to	   blame	   for	   the	  woeful	   state	   of	   the	   Soviet	   computer	  industry.12	  	   As	  Gorbachev	  noted	   at	   a	   Politburo	  meeting	   in	  mid-­‐1985,	   funding	   for	  the	  machine	  industry	  and	  capital	  goods	  was	  “a	  broad	  frontal	  attack	  on	  solving	  the	  issues	  of	  speeding	  up	  the	  country’s	  social	  and	  economic	  development.”13	  	  Brought	  together	   under	   the	   heading	   of	   “speeding	   up”	   (uskorenie),	   these	   early	   steps	  were	  largely	   in	   line	   with	   earlier	   Soviet	   reform	   efforts:	   the	   conditions	   for	   increased	  productivity	  were	  dictated	  from	  above,	  rather	  than	  incentivized	  from	  below.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Spravka	  o	  dokhodakh	  i	  raskhodakh	  naseleniia	  v	  1983	  godu.	  	  RGASPI	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  38,	  l.	  29.	  10	  While	  the	  “dry	  law”	  was	  championed	  by	  Ligachev,	  whom	  Gorbachev	  had	  brought	  from	  Tomsk	  to	  head	  the	  Central	  Committee’s	  Personnel	  Division,	  it	  remained	  an	  element	  of	  the	  broader	  program	  of	  economic	  improvements	  pushed	  by	  Gorbachev.	  	  See	  Ryzhkov,	  Desiat’	  let,	  84-­‐86.	  	  11	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika,	  95.	  	  12	  On	  the	  historical	  production	  of	  capital	  goods	  see	  Vid	  and	  Ivanov,	  Novaia	  filosofiia.	  	  For	  the	  general	  state	  of	  the	  Soviet	  computer	  industry,	  see	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  295-­‐296.	  13	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  17.	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  At	   the	   same	   time,	   even	   uskorenie	   began	   to	   include	   certain	   provisions	   that	   went	  beyond	   the	   standard	  mode	   of	   Soviet	   reform.	   	   Facing	   both	   a	   deficit	   of	   industrial	  workers	   and	   rates	   of	   salary	   growth	   that	   outpaced	   productivity	   increases,	   the	  Soviet	  government	  made	  an	  attempt	  to	  both	  incentivize	  factories	  to	  operate	  with	  fewer	  workers	   and	   incentivize	   the	   remaining	  workers	   to	  work	  harder.	   	  After	   all,	  Gorbachev	  argued	  at	  a	  Politburo	  meeting	  in	  June	  1986,	  Soviet	  factories	  were	  lousy	  with	  unneeded	  workers:	  “The	  Japanese	  have	  developed	  a	  undergarment	  factory	  –	  it’s	   an	   automated	   factory.	   	   600	  workers	   have	   an	   output	   of	   600	  million	   items.	   	   It	  takes	  900,000	  of	  our	  workers	  to	  create	  the	  same	  output.”14	  	  Statisticians	  calculated	  in	   the	   mid-­‐1980s	   that	   between	   5-­‐10	   million	   Soviet	   workers	   were	   occupying	  “unneeded”	   positions	   and	   should	   be	   “freed”	   (vysvobozhdeni)	   to	   work	   in	   other	  industries. 15 	  	   In	   addition,	   it	   was	   believed	   that	   the	   long-­‐term	   “flattening”	  (uravnilovka)	  or	  standardization	  of	  wages	  in	  the	  USSR	  had	  disincetivized	  workers	  and	   factory	   directors	   alike	   from	   focusing	   on	   output.	   As	  Gosplan	   argued	   in	   1986,	  this	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  rewarding	  those	  who	  worked	  less	  –	  while	  failing	  to	  boost	  the	  standing	  of	  those	  who	  actually	  increased	  productivity.16	  	  With	  this	  is	  mind,	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPSU,	  the	  Soviet	  Government,	  and	  the	  All-­‐Union	  Central	  Soviet	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  passed	  a	  series	  of	  resolutions	  starting	  in	  September	  1986	  intended	  to	  “free	  up”	  workers	  and	  create	  imbalances	  in	  pay.17	  	  While	  Soviet	  labor	  law	  made	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  fire	  workers	  outright,	  natural	  turnover	  at	  most	  enterprises	  was	  quite	  high.18	  	  As	  the	  new	  resolutions	  emphasized,	  enterprise	  directors	  had	  the	  right	  to	  annually	  set	   the	  number	  of	  workers	  at	   their	  factories	  and	  could	  simply	  choose	  to	  rehire	   fewer	  workers	  than	  the	  number	  who	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Ibid.,	  50.	  15	  For	   the	   lower	   figure	   of	   “unneeded”	   positions,	   see	   “Predlozheniia	   po	   povysheniiu	   effektivnosti	  proizvodstevennogo	  apparata	  i	   ispol’zovaniia	  ekonomicheskogo	  potentsiala,”	  RGASPI	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	   39,	   l.	   61;	   for	   the	   higher,	   “O	   zadachakh	   partii	   po	   korennoi	   perestroiki	   upravleniia	   ekonomiki,”	  	  Doklad	   General’nogo	   sekretaria	   TsK	   KPSS	   M.S.	   Gorbachev	   na	   Plenume	   TsK	   KPSS,	   25.06.1987,	  	  
Kommunist	  10,	  1987,	  9.	  16	  Pis’mo	  Gosplana	  SSSR	  Sovetu	  Ministrov	  SSSR	  ot	  imeni	  Zampreda	  Gosplana	  Sitariana,	  03.01.1986,	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  153,	  ll.	  1-­‐2.	  	  17	  See	   Postanovlenie	   TsK	   KPSS,	   Soveta	   Ministrov	   SSSR	   i	   VTsSPS	   ot	   17.09.1986	   no.	   1115	   and	  Postanovlenie	  TsK	  KPSS,	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  SSSR	  i	  VTsSPS	  ot	  22.12.1987	  no.	  1457	  “Ob	  obespechenii	  effektivnosti	   zaniatosti	   naseleniia,	   sovershenstvovanii	   sistemy	   trudoustroistva	   i	   usilenii	  sotsial’nykh	  garantii	  dlia	  trudiashchikhsia,”	  cited	  in	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3656,	  l.	  112.	  18	  Annual	   labor	   turnover	   rates	  were	   close	   to	   20%.	   	   See	   David	   E.	   Powell,	   “Labor	   Turnover	   in	   the	  Soviet	  Union,”	  Slavic	  Review	   36,	   no.	   2	   (1977);	  David	  Granick,	   Job	  Rights	   in	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  Their	  
Consequences	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  15.	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had	   left.	   	   The	   resolutions	   incentivized	   this	   effective	   “freeing	   up”	   of	   workers	   by	  pointing	  out	  how	  savings	  on	  salaries	  (kept	  in	  the	  factory’s	  “Salary	  Fund”)	  could	  be	  moved	  around	  to	  meet	  other	  needs.19	  	  The	  resolutions	  also	  encouraged	  enterprises	  to	  increase	  salaries	  and	  bonuses	  for	  those	  workers	  who	  over-­‐fulfilled	  work	  norms	  and	   otherwise	   boosted	   rates	   of	   productivity.	   The	   math	   was	   simple:	   as	   long	   as	  salary	  increases	  were	  lower	  than	  the	  percentage	  of	  workers	  cut,	  savings	  would	  be	  significant	  even	  without	  any	  increase	  in	  productivity.	   	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  bakery	  in	  Dushanbe	   reduced	   its	   staff	   by	   10%	   and	   then	   increased	   average	   salaries	   for	   the	  remaining	  bakers	  by	  3%,	  total	  savings	  would	  still	  be	  more	  than	  7%.	  	  Overall,	  this	  was	   seen	   as	   benefiting	   both	   individual	   enterprises,	  which	  would	   save	  money	   on	  salary	  expenditures,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  as	  a	  whole,	  which	  would	  gain	  needed	  industrial	  workers,	  more	  consumer	  goods,	  and	  a	  lowered	  salary	  burden.	  	  While	   these	   resolutions	   explicitly	   avoided	   the	   language	   of	   capitalism	   –	   workers	  were	   “freed,”	   not	   fired,	   and	   the	   word	   “unemployment”	   was	   never	   mentioned	   –	  there	   was	   already	   a	   hint	   of	   the	   market	   about	   them.	   	   Workers	   were	   to	   be	  incentivized	   through	  both	   increased	  salaries	   for	  higher	  output	  and	  possible	   fines	  for	  low-­‐quality	  production	  (“brak”).	  Moreover,	  enterprises	  were	  now	  supposed	  to	  compete	  for	  a	  pool	  of	  “freed	  up”	  workers.	  This	  in	  particular	  was	  seen	  as	  central	  in	  the	  search	  for	  “reserves”	  of	  untapped	  productivity.20	  	  As	  Donald	  Filtzer	  has	  pointed	  out,	   elements	   of	   Gosplan	   and	   Goskomtrud	   had	   been	   quite	   interested	   in	   creating	  frictional	  unemployment	  in	  the	  USSR,	  which	  would	  in	  turn	  engender	  a	  more	  fluid	  labour	   market.21	  This	   contradicted	   socialist	   principles	   of	   a	   guaranteed	   right	   to	  labor	  –	  but	  did	  promise	  increased	  economic	  growth.	   	  It	  was	  still	  early	  to	  speak	  of	  the	   market,	   but	   those	   involved	   in	   the	   reforms	   understood	   very	   well	   what	   they	  were	   promoting.	   	   “The	   word	   “market”	   was	   forbidden	   then,”	   Gorbachev’s	   close	  economic	  advisor	  Abel	  Aganbegian	  later	  recalled,	  “so	  I	  wrote	  about	  the	  activation	  of	  monetary-­‐goods	  exchange	  (tovaro-­‐denezhnie	  otnosheniia).”22	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Technically,	   enterprises	  had	  held	   this	   right	   since	  1983,	   but	   it	   seems	   to	  have	  been	   infrequently	  invoked	  before	  1986.	  	  See	  Ryzkhov,	  Perestroika,	  47-­‐48;	  Zemstov,	  Chastnaia	  zhizn’,	  31-­‐32.	  	  20	  L.I.	  Abalkin,	  Kurs	  uskoreniia	  (Moscow:	  Izadetel’stvo	  politicheskoi	  literatury,	  1986),	  66.	  	  21	  Filtzer,	  Soviet	  Workers,	  16.	  22	  Interview	  with	  Abel	  Aganbegian,	  04.11.2012.	  	  Conducted	  by	  the	  Yelstin	  Center,	  Moscow.	  Online	  at	  http://www.yeltsincenter.ru/decryption/intervyu-­‐s-­‐abelom-­‐aganbegyanom?page=0,0.	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  While	   its	   name	   may	   have	   been	   taboo,	   the	   market	   continued	   to	   creep	   into	   the	  reform	   program	   the	   Soviet	   government	   was	   developing.	   	   Throughout	   1986	  Gorbachev	  never	  stopped	  repeating	  the	  need	  for	  “economic	  methods,”	  “economic	  mechanisms,”	   or	   the	   “mechanism	   of	   economic	  management,”	   all	   code-­‐words	   for	  market-­‐like	  economic	  relationships.23	  	  As	  early	  as	  July	  1986	  he	  was	  ready	  to	  speak	  openly,	  declaring	  at	  a	  Politburo	  meeting:	  	  	  
“Our	   ideological	   approach	   is	  now	  based	  on	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  people	   should	  
live	  better.	  	  [We	  need]	  to	  open	  up	  the	  question	  of	  the	  market.	  	  To	  say	  that	  we	  
are	   in	   favor	   of	   healthy	   competition,	   of	   the	   development	   of	   cooperative	  
business,	  that	  we	  intend	  to	  develop	  people’s	  productive	  energies.”24	  	  	  In	   short,	   Gorbachev	   argued,	   the	   traditional	   Soviet	  methods	   of	   centrally	   directed	  planning	  had	  failed	  to	  overcome	  the	  weight	  of	  falling	  growth	  rates	  and	  the	  growing	  gap	  between	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  West.	  	  As	  the	  econometrists	  had	  long	  been	  arguing,	  it	  was	  time	  to	  try	  incorporating	  market	  practices	  into	  socialism.	  	  	  This	  approach	  quickly	  began	   to	   find	  reflection	   in	  reform	   legislation,	   first	  of	  all	   in	  the	   Law	   on	   Individual	   Labor	   Activity,	   which	   was	   passed	   in	   November	   1986.	  	  Contradictorily	   countering	  previous	   reforms	  –	   including	  a	   spring	  1986	  campaign	  against	  “non-­‐labor	  (netrudovye)	  incomes”	  –	  this	  law	  not	  only	  factually	  legalized	  but	  also	   encouraged	   what	   had	   long	   remained	   a	   legal	   gray	   zone:	   personal	  entrepreneurship.	   	  While	  private	  business	  had	   long	  remained	   illegal	   in	   the	  USSR,	  part-­‐time	   individual	  work	  was	   technically	   legal,	   as	   affirmed	   by	   Article	   17	   of	   the	  1977	  Soviet	  Constitution.	  As	  long	  as	  they	  did	  not	  hire	  other	  individuals	  or	  sell	  their	  labor	   power,	   workers	   had	   the	   right	   to	   engage	   in	   private	   paid	   activities,	   such	   as	  shoe	  repair,	  house	  remodeling,	  taxi	  services,	  and	  so	  forth	  –	  and	  in	  fact,	  many	  did.	  According	  to	  some	  estimates,	  nearly	  20	  million	  Soviet	  workers	  spent	  at	  least	  part	  of	   their	   time	   engaged	   in	   “individual	   service	   activity.”	   	   Insofar	   as	   it	   was	   almost	  impossible,	  although	  legally	  required,	  to	  register	  this	  activity,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  individuals	   operated	   in	   a	   tolerated,	   but	   legally	   unclear	   gray	   area.25	  	   At	   the	   same	  time,	   while	   the	  widespread	   existence	   of	   individual	   business-­‐like	   activity	   was	   an	  ideological	   challenge	   to	   the	   planned	   economy,	   the	   state	   recognized	   that	   these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  62-­‐63,	  99.	  	  	  24	  Ibid.,	  68.	  25	  Cox,	  From	  Perestroika	  to	  Privatisation,	  4,	  23-­‐24,	  32.	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individuals	   “fulfilled	   important	   social	   functions”	   and	   had	   little	   incentive	   to	  interfere.26	  	   Court	   cases	   from	   the	   early	   1980s	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   as	   long	   as	  entrepreneurs	   remained	  employed	  by	   the	   state	  and	  kept	   their	  personal	  business	  activities	  limited,	  they	  would	  be	  left	  alone.27	  	  	  The	   Law	   on	   Individual	   Labor	   Activity	   converted	   previous	   practices	   of	   tolerance	  into	  ones	  of	  promotion.	   	   	  Entrepreneurs	  were	  encouraged	  to	  bring	  their	  personal	  businesses	   out	   into	   the	   open:	   they	   were	   even	   legally	   allowed	   to	   dedicate	  themselves	   full-­‐time	   to	   their	   individual	   activity,	   as	   long	   as	   they	   paid	   the	  appropriate	  taxes.28	  While	  it	  was	  still	  forbidden	  to	  open	  large	  business	  enterprises	  with	  more	   than	  4-­‐5	  employees,	   individuals	  were	  given	  the	  right	   to	  hire	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  family	  members,	  which,	  it	  was	  hoped,	  would	  promote	  small-­‐scale	  food	  production.	  A	  family	  of	  bakers	  in	  Dushanbe,	  for	  example,	  quickly	  took	  up	  the	  call,	  producing	   bread	   that	   was	   both	   cheaper	   and	   (according	   to	   a	   newspaper	  correspondent)	   better	   than	   the	   state	   standard.29	  	   As	   the	   reform	   economist	   Gelii	  Shmelov	  argued	  in	  1986,	  the	  Law	  on	  Labor	  Activity	  was	  meant	  to	  bring	  this	  sort	  of	  family	  business	  (“chastniki”)	  into	  the	  legal	  and	  taxable	  sphere	  –	  and	  to	  help	  solve	  the	  state’s	  production	  and	  distribution	  problems	   in	   the	  meantime.30	  	  Rather	   than	  through	   diktat	   from	   the	   top,	   it	   was	   argued,	   local	   markets	   and	   producers	   would	  more	  effectively	  distribute	  goods	  and	  services.	  	  	  	  
I.	  1987	  Law	  on	  Enterprises	  	  Having	  encouraged	  individual	  Soviet	  citizens	  to	  embrace	  entrepreneurial	  activity,	  the	   Soviet	   state	   turned	   its	   reformist	   attentions	   to	   the	   lynchpin	   of	   the	   planned	  economy	  –	  state	  enterprises	  (predpriiatiia).	  	  Encompassing	  everything	  from	  small	  meat-­‐pie	  (sambusa)	  stands	  in	  rural	  Tajik	  bazaars	  to	  the	  massive	  Uralmash	  factory	  Ryzhkov	  had	  once	  managed,	  Soviet	  “enterprises”	  encompassed	  all	  of	  the	  country’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ivar	  Khel’mutovich	  Raig,	  “Shto	  mozhet	  individual’noe	  khoziaistvo?”	  Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  12,	  no.1	  (1986):	  34.	  27	  Roostam	  Sadri,	  “A	  Debate	  on	  Profitable	  “Hobbies”	  in	  Kazakhstan,”	  Radio	  Liberty	  Research	  Bulletin	  
1	  (3206),	  RL	  1/83,	  January	  05,	  1983.	  28	  Tax	   rates	   for	   individual	   entrepreneurs	  were	   established	   at	   rates	   similar	   to	   the	   tax	   burden	   on	  state-­‐employed	  workers:	   11-­‐13%	  up	   to	   3000	   rubles	   per	   year,	   and	   then	   between	   20-­‐65%	  on	   the	  amount	   earned	   over	   3000	   rubles.	   	   See	  Ukaz	   Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   ot	   23.04.1987	   (no.	  6881-­‐X1)	   “O	   vnesenii	   izmenenii	   i	   dopolnenii	   v	   nekotorye	   zakonodatel’nye	   akty	   po	   voprosam	  nalogooblazheniia	  grazhdan,”	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  173,	  ll.	  24-­‐27.	  	  29	  “U	  semeinogo	  tandyra,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  April	  30,	  1987.	  30	  L.	   Telen’,	   “Kustari	   protiv	   shabashnikov,”	   Sotsialisticheskaia	   industriia,	   August	   24,	   1986.	   	   Also:	  Matthews,	  Patterns	  of	  Deprivation,	  17.	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productive	  organizations.	  	   	  Enterprises	  represented	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  all	  Soviet	  economic	  output,	  and	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  USSR	  had	  long	  considered	  them	  central	  to	  any	   reform	   effort.	   	   This	   had	   been	   true	   of	   the	   1965	   Kosygin	   reforms,	  which	   had	  tried	   to	  boost	   enterprise	  productivity;	   and	   it	   remained	   true	  under	  Brezhnev	  and	  Andropov,	   who	   had	   also	   overseen	   discussions	   on	   how	   to	   get	   enterprises	   to	  respond	   to	   market-­‐like	   signals.	   	   Under	   Gorbachev,	   these	   discussions	   were	  restarted	  in	  1986,	  resulting	  at	  the	  end	  of	  June	  1987	  in	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  massive	  Law	  on	  State	  Enterprises	  (Associations).31	  	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	  many	   secondary	   provisions,	   the	   1987	   Law	   stipulated	   five	   central	  tenets,	  according	  to	  which	  enterprises	  were	  now	  expected	  to	  work.	   	  First,	  factory	  directors	  were	   to	  be	  more	  responsible	   to	  workers,	  and	  procedures	  were	   laid	  out	  by	   which	   directors	   could	   be	   elected	   by	   the	   workers	   themselves.	   Second,	  enterprises	   were	   required	   over	   a	   two-­‐year	   period	   to	   shift	   to	   a	   system	   of	   “self-­‐financing”	   (khozraschet),	   whereby	   they	   would	   be	   required	   to	   cover	   their	   own	  costs,	   rather	   than	   rely	   upon	   state-­‐directed	   funds.	   	   Third,	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  requirement	   to	   be	   self-­‐financing,	   enterprises	   were	   given	   direct	   control	   over	   a	  much	  greater	  proportion	  of	  their	  profits.	  	  Fourth,	  enterprises	  were	  encouraged	  to	  make	   direct	   contracts	   with	   other	   factories	   and	   organizations;	   only	   a	   portion	   of	  their	   contracts	   (called	   “Goszakaz”)	   would	   now	   be	   centrally	   directed	   and	  administered	  by	  state	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  State	  Provisioning	  Committee	  (Gossnab).	  	  And	   finally,	  enterprises	  were	  given	  nearly	   full	  control	  over	   the	  capital	  goods	  and	  property	  under	  their	  authority:	  they	  could	  now	  even	  “transfer”	  goods	  or	  monetary	  funds	  to	  other	  enterprises	  or	  “organizations”	  without	  any	  approval	  from	  the	  state	  planning	  committees.32	  	  	  On	   its	   face,	   the	   1987	   Law	   on	   State	   Enterprises	   initially	   seemed	   to	   be	   following	  earlier	   attempts	   to	   reform	   Soviet	   enterprises.	   	   In	   fact,	   it	   even	   seemed	   to	   repeat	  certain	   existing	   provisions.	   	   Since	   1965,	   for	   example,	   Soviet	   enterprises	   had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  For	  some	  of	  the	  first	  arguments	  about	  the	  law,	  see	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  
TsK	  KPSS,	  76.	  	  	  An	  extensive	  collection	  of	  notes	  and	  documents	  related	  to	  the	  law’s	  development	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  dd.	  2-­‐8.	  32	  For	  the	  content	  of	  the	  final	  1987	  Law	  on	  State	  Enterprises,	  see	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  3.	  For	  a	  discussion	   about	   the	   election	   of	   factory	   managers,	   see	   Postanovlenie	   Tsentral'nogo	   komiteta	  Kompartii	   Tadzhikistana,	   Soveta	   Ministrov	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR,	   Tadzhikskogo	   respublikanskogo	  soveta	  professional'nykh	  soiuzov	  no.	  84	  ot	  16.03.1988,	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3656,	  l.	  328.	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directly	  controlled	  a	  certain	  portion	  of	  their	  profits.33	  	  In	  1983,	  moreover,	  reforms	  directed	  by	  Andropov	  had	  already	  expanded	  enterprises’	  rights	  to	  distribute	  these	  profits	  relatively	   freely.	   	  Direct	  contracts	  had	  also	  been	  an	   integral	  part	  of	  Soviet	  industry	  since	  the	  very	  beginning:	  while	  nominally	  routing	  their	  contracts	  through	  Gossnab	  and	  other	  bodies,	  Soviet	  enterprises	  were	  adept	  at	  cutting	  deals	  with	  one	  another	   and	   reaching	   out	   to	   producers	   directly	   when	   in	   need	   of	   inputs.34	  	   The	  changes	   promoted	   seemed	   largely	   ones	   of	   scale,	   not	   of	   operational	   difference.	   A	  close	  comparison	  of	  the	  1987	  Law’s	  provisions	  with	  earlier	  laws,	  however,	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  simple	  scale	  of	  the	  new	  reform	  was	  enough	  to	  engender	  systemic	  change	  –	  to	  change,	  as	  Ryzhkov	  later	  put	  it,	  “the	  structure	  of	  the	  entire	  economic	  mechanism.”35	  	  	  While	   earlier	   attempts	   at	   enterprise	   reform	   had	   only	   cautiously	   toyed	   with	   the	  idea	  of	  market	  incentives,	  the	  1987	  Law	  on	  State	  Enterprises	  pushed	  far	  enough	  to	  make	  market	  relationships	  a	  central	  element	  of	  enterprise	  behavior.	  	  Nor	  was	  this	  any	   accident:	   written	   in	   part	   and	   influenced	   by	   econometrics-­‐associated	  economists,	   including	   Aganbegian,	   Anchishchkin,	   Bogomolov,	   Petrakov,	   Sitarian,	  and	  others,	  the	  1987	  Law	  was	  intended	  to	  revitalize	  Soviet	  production	  through	  the	  implementation	   of	  market	   structures.	  36	  	   Disappointed	   by	   the	   restrictions	   placed	  on	  earlier	  reforms	  –	  which	  many	  of	  them	  had	  also	  been	  involved	  in	  developing	  –	  these	   economists	   quickly	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	   opportunity	   provided	   by	  Gorbachev	   to	   finally	  put	   their	   “nonstandard”	   ideas	   to	  work.	  37	  Although	  since	   the	  1965	  reform	  Soviet	  enterprises	  had	  been	  able	  to	  keep	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  profits,	  the	  percentage	  was	   relatively	   low	   (often	   around	   10%),	   and	   restricted	   to	   a	   series	   of	  four	  “funds,”	  which	  were	  earmarked	  for	  particular	  needs	  –	  research,	  salaries	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Since	   1965	   the	   intent	   and	   consequence	   of	   the	   “Kosygin	   reforms”	   have	   remained	   a	   matter	   of	  academic	   debate.	   	   Many	   authors	   (Popov,	   Reformirovanie	   nereformiruemogo;	   Ellman,	   Socialist	  
Planning,	   17;	  Chernyshova,	  Soviet	  Consumer,	  15)	  have	  argued	   that	   the	   reforms	   “failed,”	   insofar	  as	  they	  did	  not	   (a)	   liberalize	   the	   Soviet	   economy	  or	   (b)	   lead	   to	   long-­‐term	  growth	   increases.	   	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   the	  Kosygin	   reforms	  provided	  Soviet	   enterprises	  with	   the	   right	   to	   retain	   a	  portion	  of	  their	   profits,	   a	   right	   that	   they	   did	   not	   have	   before.	   	   This	   right	   remained	   constant	   thereafter,	  representing	  a	  fundamental	  change	  to	  Soviet	  enterprise	  law	  and	  behavior.	  34	  See,	  for	  example,	  K.	  Klimenko,	  “Uskorenie	  nauchno-­‐tekhnicheskogo	  progresa	  –	  obschenarodnogo	  zadacha,”	  Kommunist	  39,	  no.	  2	  (January	  1963):	  66.	  35	  Ryzkhov,	  Desiat’	  let,	  62.	  36	  On	   the	   involvement	   of	   particular	   economists	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   1987	   Law,	   see	   L.I.	  Abalkin,	  Zigzagi	  sud’by:	  razocharovaniia	   i	  nadezhdy	   (Moscow:	   Institut	   ekonomiki	  RAN,	  1996),	   18-­‐19;	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  19,	  l.	  1;	  Ryzhkov,	  desiat’,	  46.	  For	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  econometrists	  and	  their	  promotion	  of	  market	  incentives,	  see	  Chapter	  Three	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  	  37	  Pavlov,	  Upushchen	  li,	  257-­‐259.	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bonuses,	  and	  so	  forth.38	  	  The	  1987	  Law,	  building	  upon	  Andropov’s	  milder	  reforms	  of	  1983,	  radically	  changed	  this	  balance.	   	  Now,	  having	  switched	  to	  “self-­‐financing,”	  enterprises	  were	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  profits	  –	  sometimes,	  more	  than	  80%	   of	   them.	   	   Profits	   could	   also	   be	   moved	   around	   more	   easily,	   and	   even	  transferred	  to	  other	  organizations.39	  	  	  	  By	   making	   enterprises	   the	   masters	   of	   their	   own	   fates,	   it	   was	   thought,	   these	  enterprises	  would	  be	  freed	  to	  increase	  their	  profits	  through	  savings	  and	  increased	  production.40	  	   In	  addition,	  by	  switching	   the	  centralized	  contract	   system	   to	  a	  dual	  system	   of	   state	   orders	   (goszakazy)	   and	   direct	   contracts,	   the	   econometrists	   had	  argued	   for	   years,	   it	   would	   be	   possible	   to	   rationalize	   and	   streamline	   enterprise	  production:	   rather	   than	   a	   central	   government	   body,	   the	   logic	   went,	   enterprises	  knew	   better	   where	   their	   inputs	   and	   outputs	   should	   go.41	  Before	   the	   reform,	  Gorbachev	  argued	  in	  January	  1987,	  the	  level	  of	  state	  oversight	  had	  growing	  stifling	  –	   and,	   in	   his	   view,	   ridiculous.	   	   “Factories	   are	  wearing	   such	   a	   leash	   that	   they	   are	  gagging,”	   he	   mused,	   “It	   goes	   as	   far	   as	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   of	   the	   RSFSR	  confirming	   a	   factory’s	   toilet	   construction.”42	  	   The	   answer,	   as	   with	   the	   Law	   on	  Individual	   Labor	   Activity,	   was	   to	   encourage	   enterprises	   to	   embrace	   market	  incentives	   –	   to	   take	   previously	   tolerated	   but	   frowned-­‐upon	   practices	   and	   make	  them	  central	  to	  the	  Soviet	  economy.	  	  
II.	  Cooperatives	  Building	  on	  the	  1986	  Law	  on	  Individual	  Labor	  Activity	  and	  the	  1987	  Law	  on	  State	  Enterprises,	  by	  early	  1988	  Gorbachev	  and	  his	  team	  were	  ready	  to	  move	  one	  step	  further	   towards	   their	   conception	   of	   a	   “socialist”	   market.	   	   As	   Gorbachev	   had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  The	   1965	   reforms	   had	   initially	   created	   three	   “funds”	   –	   an	   “enterprise	   development	   fund”	   for	  research	  and	  capital	  purchases,	  a	  “socio-­‐cultural	  fund”	  to	  provide	  incentives	  to	  workers,	  including	  housing,	  and	  a	  “bonus	  fund.”	  	  In	  1983,	  a	  fourth	  fund	  (for	  “science	  and	  technology”)	  was	  added.	  	  See:	  	  	  Popov,	  Reformirovanie	  nereformiruemogo,	  317-­‐330;	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika,	  47-­‐48;	  TsGART	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  33,	  ll.	  90-­‐92.	  	  39	  For	   the	  provisions	  of	   implementation	  covering	  the	  1987	  Law,	  see	  Proekt	  Postanovleniia	  Soveta	  Ministrov	   “O	   poriadke	   i	   srokakh	   primeneniia	   Zakona	   SSSR	   “O	   gosudarstvennom	   predpriiatii	  (ob’’edinenii)”	  k	  predpriiatiiam,	  ob’’edininiam	  i	  organizatsiiam	  sfery	  material'nogo	  proizvodstva,	  ne	  perevedennym	  na	   polnyi	   khozaistvennyi	   raschet	   i	   samofinansirovanie,	   a	   takzhe	   k	   organizatsiiam	  neproizvodstvennoi	  sfery,”	  13.10.1987,	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  3,	  ll.	  10-­‐56.	  40	  Abalkin,	  Zigzagy	  sud’by,	  20-­‐21.	  41	  The	  economist	  Bogolmolov	  made	  this	  argument	  and	  promoted	  the	  “goszakazy”	  system	  in	  a	  paper	  sent	  to	  the	  CPSU	  Central	  Committee	  in	  April	  1984.	  	  See	  O.	  Bogomolov,	  “Soobrazheniia	  k	  iskhodnoi	  kontseptsii	   kompleksnogo	   sovershenstvovaniia	   khozaistvennogo	   mekhanizma,”	   07.04.1984,	  RGASPI	  f.	  653,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  39,	  l.	  358.	  42	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  130.	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signaled	   in	   1986,	   “cooperative	   business”	   was	   the	   final	   step	   towards	   “healthy	  competition”	  and	   improved	  production,	   a	  promise	  made	   real	  by	   the	  March	  1988	  Law	  on	  Cooperatives.	  	  Creating	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  private	  business	  in	  the	  Western	  sense,	   this	   1988	   law	   built	   upon	   a	   more	   limited	   February	   1987	   directive	   of	   the	  Council	   of	   Ministers	   of	   the	   USSR,	   which	   had	   provided	   for	   the	   creation	   of	  cooperatives	   as	   long	   as	   the	   new	   businesses	   produced	   consumer	   goods.43	  	   The	  March	   1988	   Law,	   however,	   freed	   cooperative	   businesses	   to	   operate	   in	   most	  economic	  spheres,	  and	  to	  determine	  (within	  some	  limits)	  the	  prices	  of	  their	  goods,	  the	   salaries	   of	   their	   employees,	   and	   their	   contracts	   with	   enterprises	   and	  individuals.	   	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	   incentivize	   cooperative	   business	   over	   individual	  entrepreneurship,	   moreover,	   a	   flat	   13%	   tax	   rate	   was	   set	   on	   all	   cooperative	  profits.44	  	  	  	  Even	  more	  than	  the	  earlier	  laws,	  the	  introduction	  of	  private	  businesses	  into	  Soviet	  society	   helped	   to	   guarantee	   that	   a	   semblance	   of	   a	   market	   –	   the	   undirected	  purchase	  and	  sale	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  –	  would	  begin	  to	  arise.	  As	  Gorbachev	  put	  it:	   “The	   cooperative	   is	   independent.	   	   It	  will	   go	   to	   the	  market	   –	   not	   to	   us.”45	  The	  Soviet	   state	   was	   staking	   a	   claim	   on	   the	   relative	   efficiency	   of	   privately	   directed	  production:	   even	   more	   than	   reformed	   state	   enterprises,	   they	   argued,	   private	  cooperatives	  would	   be	   able	   to	   provide	   the	   goods	   and	   services	   Soviet	   consumers	  needed.	   In	  turn,	   this	  would	  bring	  down	  deficits	  and	  improve	  overall	  standards	  of	  living.	   This	   initiative	   was	   also	   the	   most	   controversial	   element	   of	   Gorbachev’s	  reforms,	  as	  the	  promotion	  of	  cooperatives	  challenged	  central	  Soviet	  precepts	  about	  the	   proletariat’s	   ownership	   and	   control	   of	   industry.	   	   Yet	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	  supporters	  simply	  shrugged	  off	  these	  worries.	  	  “We	  have	  grown	  cross-­‐eyed	  in	  our	  dogmas,”	   Gorbachev	   countered	   during	   Politburo	   arguments	   about	   cooperatives.	  	  Instead	  of	  discussing	  theory,	  he	  suggested,	  the	  state	  should	  just	  “let	  the	  people	  go	  and	  work	  in	  cooperatives.”	  At	  least	  there	  they	  would	  be	  producing	  something	  for	  the	  market.46	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  See	   the	   February	   05	   1987	   Act	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   of	   the	   USSR,	   No.	   162	   “O	   sozdanii	  kooperativov	  po	  proizvodstvu	  tovarov	  narodnogo	  potrebleniia;”	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  137-­‐138.	  44	  Cox,	  From	  Perestroika	   to	  Privatisation,	   83-­‐84.	   	   This	  was	   also	   discussed	   by	   the	   Tajik	   Council	   of	  Ministers	   in	   early	   1987.	   	   See	   Stenogramma	  Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Soveta	  Ministrov	   Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  ot	  05.02.1987,	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3635,	  ll.	  19-­‐20.	  45	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  287.	  46	  Ibid.,	  138	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As	   controversial	   as	   it	  was	   ideologically,	   the	   Law	   on	   Cooperatives	   did	   draw	   on	   a	  long	  history	   of	   private	   business-­‐like	   structures	   in	   the	  USSR.	   	  While	   truly	   private	  business	  had	  been	  factually	  outlawed	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  since	  the	  end	  of	  Lenin’s	  New	   Economic	   Policy	   (NEP)	   in	   the	   early	   1930s,	   certain	   elements	   of	   non-­‐state	  production	  had	  survived	  over	  the	  decades.	  	  Most	  important	  to	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  were	   the	   “private	   plots”	   (priusadbennie	   uchastki)	   provided	   to	   kolkhoz	  members	  since	   the	   1930s.	   47 	  Under	   the	   heading	   of	   “consumer	   cooperative	   production”	  (potrebitel’skaia	  kooperatsiia)	  kolkhoz	  members	  were	  allowed	  to	  sell	  the	  produce	  from	   their	  private	  plots	   outside	  of	   state	   stores	   and	  distribution	  networks.	   	   	   This	  sale,	  moreover,	  occurred	  under	  largely	  market-­‐like	  conditions:	  there	  were	  official	  restrictions	  on	  “speculation,”	  but	  the	  sale	  of	  produce	  often	  occurred	  at	  markets	  or	  bazaars,	   and	   prices	   were	   set	   by	   supply	   and	   demand,	   not	   by	   the	   state.	   This,	  however,	   hardly	   undermined	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   “cooperative	   sector.”	   In	   the	  late	  1970s,	   for	  example,	  nearly	  half	  of	  the	  total	  value	  of	  all	   foodstuffs	  bought	  and	  sold	   in	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   represented	   “cooperative”	   (non-­‐state)	   production.48	  	   Some	  products	  were	   completely	  dominated	  by	   “cooperative”	   production:	   91%	  of	   all	   of	  the	  walnuts	   sold	   in	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	  were	   the	   product	   of	   kolkhoz	  workers’	   private	  plots.49	  	  In	  this	  perspective,	  the	  Soviet	  state’s	  1988	  Law	  on	  Cooperatives	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	   to	  harness	   the	  existent	  but	   frowned-­‐upon	  market	  structures	   that	  had	  long	   been	   part	   of	   Soviet	   society.	   	   The	   state	   spent	   millions	   of	   rubles	   every	   year	  building	  stores	  for	  “cooperative”	  produce	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  more	  effectively	  funnel	  it	   to	   the	  market	   at	   reasonable	  prices;	   it	   relied	  upon	   the	  production	  of	   individual	  kolkhoz	   workers	   to	   fill	   the	   gaps	   in	   centralized	   production.50	  	   Yet	   the	   parallel	  system	   remained	   inefficient,	   uncontrollable,	   and	   often	   untaxed.	   	   Giving	   the	  initiative	   to	  kolkhoz	  workers,	   industrial	   toilers,	  and	  other	  Soviet	   citizens	   to	   form	  their	   own	   private	   businesses	   appeared	   a	   ready	   fix:	   newly	   founded	   cooperatives	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  Technically,	   this	   right	   was	   “reestablished”	   in	   1965	   –	   it	   had	   been	   initially	   provided	   but	   then	  removed	  under	  Khrushchev.	  	  See	  V.V.	  Grishin,	  Ot	  Khrushcheva	  do	  Gorbacheva:	  Politicheskie	  portrety.	  
Memuary	   (Moscow:	   ASPOL,	   1996),	   74;	   I.	   Lakhman	   and	   R.	   Nazarov,	   “Sovetskaia	   torgovlia:	   ee	  uspekhi,	  trudnosti,	  problemy,”	  Kommunist	  41,	  no.	  3	  (1965):	  77.	  48	  Gazibekov,	  “Sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskie	  preobrazovaniia,”	  80-­‐83.	  	  49	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3646,	  l.	  55.	  	  50	  Gazibekov,	  “Sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskie	  preobrazovaniia.”	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would	   negotiate	   amongst	   themselves,	   establish	   a	  market	   for	   their	   products,	   and	  bring	  consumers	  the	  variety	  of	  goods	  that	  they	  had	  long	  been	  demanding.51	  
	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  reforms	  passed	  by	  Gorbachev	  and	  the	  Soviet	  government	  over	  the	  course	   of	   1986-­‐1988	   were	   brought	   together	   by	   their	   combined	   focus	   on	   the	  market	   as	   a	   method	   of	   increasing	   the	   production	   of	   consumer	   goods.	   	   This	  included	  both	  the	  three	  major	  reforms	  outlined	  above,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  reforms	  to	  the	  banking	  sector	  and	   those	  allowing	   “joint	  enterprises”	  with	   foreign	  capital	   (in	  both	  cases,	  to	  provide	  easier	  credit	  to	  businesses).	  52	  Drawing	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  the	  economists	  around	  Gorbachev,	  these	  reforms	  posited	  that	  enterprises,	  individuals,	  and	   private	   businesses	   were	   better	   placed	   to	   make	   decisions	   about	   production	  targets,	   sales,	   or	   internal	   research	   and	   development	   than	   centrally	   located	  planners	   and	   politicians.	   	   Left	   to	   their	   own	   devices	   and	   direct	   contracts,	   it	   was	  suggested,	   these	   same	   enterprises	   and	   businesses	   would	   fill	   the	   market	   with	  consumer	  goods	  and	  services,	  lowering	  deficits	  and	  prices.	  	  Nor	  was	  it	  any	  accident	  that	  Gorbachev’s	   reforms	  were	  centrally	   focused	  on	  consumer	  goods:	  as	  Chapter	  Three	  of	   this	  dissertation	  demonstrated,	   the	   lack	  of	  quality	  goods	  was	  one	  of	   the	  central	   concerns	   and	   complaints	   of	   citizens	   across	   the	   USSR.	   	   By	   staking	   his	  reforms	  on	  the	  market,	  Gorbachev	  was	  ultimately	  making	  a	  double	  bet:	   first,	  that	  market	   incentives	  would	   lead	   to	   economic	   growth,	   and	   second,	   that	   this	   growth	  would	  fill	  store	  shelves	  and	  consumer	  homes.	  	  Any	  alternative	  result	  was	  bound	  to	  be	  fraught	  with	  political	  risk.	  	  	  	  
III.	  	  The	  Initial	  Consequences	  of	  Reform	  At	  first,	  Gorbachev’s	  reform	  program	  seemed	  to	  have	  at	  best	  limited	  effect.	  	  While	  reforms	  continued	  to	  be	  debated	  and	  passed	  over	  the	  course	  of	  1986-­‐1987,	  their	  initial	   consequences	   were	   unclear.	   	   In	   Moscow,	   some	   economists	   heralded	  increases	   in	  productivity	  brought	   about	  by	   creating	  pay	   imbalances	   and	   “freeing	  up”	   workers.	   “Reserves	   [of	   productivity]	   are	   appearing,”	   wrote	   Gorbachev’s	  economic	  advisor	  Leonid	  Abalkin	   in	  1986,	   “about	  which	  before	  we	  had	  not	   even	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  For	   supporting	   interpretations,	   see	   Cox,	   From	   Perestroika	   to	   Privatisation;	   Morozova,	  “Trudoizbytochna	  li,”	  77;	  Matthews,	  Patterns	  of	  Deprivation,	  17.	  52	  On	  changes	  to	  the	  banking	  system,	  see	  Proekt	  Postanovleniia	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  SSSR	  “O	  strukture	  i	  shtatakh	  Bankov	  SSSR,”	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  68,	  l.	  2;	  on	  joint	  enterprises,	  Miller,	  The	  Struggle	  
to	  Save.	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guessed.”53	  In	  peripheral	  republics	  such	  as	  Tajikistan,	  however,	  the	  focus	  remained	  on	   the	   promises	   of	   uskorenie	   as	   a	   source	   of	   funds	   for	   the	   development	   of	   local	  factories	   and	   other	   labor-­‐intensive	   projects.	   	   	   As	   Kahhor	   Mahkamov,	   First	  Secretary	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   Tajikistan	   (CPT),	   characterized	   the	   central	  reform	  project	   to	  a	  CPT	  Central	  Committee	  Plenum	   in	  August	  1987,	   “The	  central	  element	  for	  the	  resolution	  of	  our	  economic	  and	  social	  problems	  is	  the	  speeding	  up	  (uskorenie)	   of	   national	   wealth	   production	   rates.”54	  A	   year	   later,	   Mahkamov	   and	  Izatullo	  Khayoev,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  sent	  a	  list	  of	  14	  factories	  and	  other	  “industrial	  objects”	  at	  various	  stages	  of	  construction	  to	  the	  Soviet	   Council	   of	  Ministers.	   	   These	   objects,	   they	   noted,	   could	   now	   be	   completed	  thanks	   to	   the	   state’s	   funding	   for	   “machine-­‐building”	   and	   other	   “labor	   intensive”	  industries.55	  	  Reforms	  aside,	  business	  seemed	  to	  be	  continuing	  as	  usual:	  the	  Tajik	  budget	   and	   economy,	   for	   example,	   grew	   much	   at	   the	   same	   rate	   in	   1987	   as	   in	  previous	  years.56	  	  	  By	   1988,	   however,	   the	   full	   force	   of	   Gorbachev’s	   reform	   package	   had	   been	  implemented,	  and	   its	  results	  were	   felt	   swiftly	  and	  negatively.	   	  Most	   immediately,	  the	   1987	   Law	   on	   State	   Enterprises	   had	   a	   sharp	   and	   significant	   impact	   on	  enterprise	   behavior	   once	   it	   came	   into	   effect	   on	   January	   01,	   1988.	   	   The	   new	   law	  required	  that	  all	  enterprises	  move	  to	  full	  “self-­‐financing”	  (khozraschet)	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1989.57	  	  Enterprises	  wasted	  no	  time	  in	  declaring	  themselves	  “self-­‐financing”:	  by	  some	  accounts,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1988	  between	  50-­‐60%	  of	  all	  enterprises	  had	  already	  moved	  to	  the	  new	  category.58	  While	  there	  were	  obvious	  doubts	  about	  the	  number	  of	   enterprises	   that	  were	   really	   “self-­‐sufficient,”59	  it	  was	   also	   eminently	   clear	   that	  benefits	  accrued	  to	  those	  enterprises	  that	  shifted	  categories.	  	  Once	  “self-­‐financing,”	  enterprises	  could	  retain	  a	  much	  higher	  proportion	  of	  their	  profits	  and	  make	  direct	  deals	  with	  other	  enterprises	  and	  cooperative	  businesses.	  While	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  production	  was	  still	  dictated	  by	  central	  planning	  authorities,	  this	  percentage	  (now	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Abalkin,	  Kurs	  uskoreniia,	  66.	  	  54	  Protokol	  sed’mogo	  plenuma	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  01.08.1987,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  156,	  d.	  1957,	  l.	  4.	  55	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  149,	  d.	  290,	  ll.	  91-­‐100.	  	  56	  Industrial	  growth	  in	  for	  1987	  was	  2.4%	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3638,	  l.	  128.	  	  	  57	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  3,	  l.	  1.	  	  58	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika,	  228.	  59	  Donald	   Filtzer	   has	   argued	   that	   by	   the	   end	   of	   1988	   only	   8.5%	   of	   all	   Soviet	   enterprises	   were	  actually	  “self-­‐financing.”	  	  See	  Filtzer,	  Soviet	  Workers,	  132.	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termed	  “goszakazy”	  or	  state	  orders)	  was	  also	  meant	  to	  decrease	  with	  time,	  giving	  enterprises	  more	  and	  more	  control	  over	  their	  own	  fates	  and	  profits.60	  	  What	   many	   enterprise	   directors	   quickly	   realized,	   moreover,	   was	   that	   greater	  profits	  did	  not	  actually	  require	  greater	  production.	  	  In	  fact,	  much	  in	  contradiction	  to	  Gorbachev	  and	  his	   advisors’	  plans,	   innumerable	  enterprises	  began	   to	  produce	  fewer	   but	   more	   expensive	   goods.	   	   Instead	   of	   filling	   the	   new	   Soviet	   consumer	  market	  with	   goods,	   they	   followed	   a	   standard	   profit	  motive	   (and	   not	   the	   logic	   of	  Gorbachev’s	  “socialist	  market”)	  and	  began	  filling	  their	  own	  coffers.	  At	  first,	  greater	  enterprise	   profits	   appeared	   to	   signal	   overall	   economic	   growth,	   but	   it	   didn’t	   take	  long	  for	  the	  central	  authorities	  to	  realize	  something	  was	  off.	  	  	  As	  early	  as	  February	  1988	  Gosplan	  committee	  members	  expressed	  concern	  over	  the	  growing	  imbalance	  between	  monetary	   returns	   shown	   by	   enterprises	   and	   actual	   production	   figures.	  	  Everyone	  was	  claiming	   that	   the	  plan	  would	  be	  met,	  Gosplan	  member	  V.G.	  Gribov	  complained	   at	   a	   closed	   meeting,	   but	   “there	   are	   no	   contracts	   for	   delivery”	   –	  something	  was	  not	  lining	  up.61	  	  In	  early	  1989,	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPSU	  confirmed	   Gosplan’s	   worries,	   writing	   that	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   past	   year	   the	  growth	   of	   “production	   volumes	   in	   monetary	   terms	   had	   been	   frequently	  accompanied	  by	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  absolute	  volume	  of	  products	  produced.”62	  	  This	  situation	   continued	   to	  worsen	  with	   each	   passing	  month.	   	   Throughout	   1989	   and	  1990	   both	   internal	   Gosplan	   figures	   and	   published	   reports	   continued	   to	   point	   to	  factual	   drops	   in	   the	   production	   of	   many	   important	   goods	   and	   industrial	   inputs,	  even	   as	   profits	   in	   cash	   continued	   to	   rise.63	  	   Enterprises,	   further	   emboldened	   in	  1988	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Party	  controls	  over	  the	  economy	  (see	  Chapter	  Five),	  also	  began	  to	  simply	  refuse	  to	  sign	  production	  contracts.	  In	  many	  cases	  it	  was	  more	  profitable	  to	   hold	   onto	  monetary	   resources:	   in	   1989,	   Gosplan	   reported,	   enterprises	   signed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  The	   portion	   of	   enterprise	   production	   dictated	   by	   goszakazy	   was	   set	   at	   around	   80%	   for	   most	  enterprises	  in	  1988,	  but	  then	  radically	  dropped	  to	  only	  25-­‐35%	  in	  1989.	   	  See	  Doklad	  Gosplana	  “O	  sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskom	  polozhenii	   strany	  v	  1989	  godu,”	  12.04.1990,	  RGAE	   f.	   4372,	   op.	   67,	   d.	  9355,	  ll.	  217-­‐218;	  Vid	  and	  Ivanov,	  Novaia	  filosofiia	  planirovaniia,	  67-­‐70.	  	  61	  Material	  zasedaniia	  kollegii	  Gosplana	  SSSR	  ot	  26.02.1988,	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  8405,	  l.	  270.	  	  62	  “O	  polozhenii	  del	   s	   roznichnymi	   tsenami	  na	   tovary	  narodnogo	  potrebleniia	   i	   tarifami	  na	  uslugi,	  okazyvaemye	  naseleniiu,”	  Izvestiia	  TsK	  KPSS	  1,	  1989,	  63-­‐64.	  	  63	  This	   situation	   was	   especially	   worrying	   in	   relation	   to	   capital	   goods,	   the	   production	   of	   which	  dropped	  by	  8%	  from	  1986	  to	  1989.	  	  The	  production	  of	  consumer	  goods,	  however,	  also	  decreased	  in	  total	  volume	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  See	  V.N.	  Pavlov,	  Iu.A.	  Petrov	  and	  A.V.	  Kiselev,	  “Otsenka	  dinamiki	  promyshlennoi	   produktsii	   v	   1986-­‐1989	   godakh,”	   Ekonomika	   i	   organizatsiia	   promyshelennogo	  
proizvodstva	   (EKO)	   20,	   no.	   5	   (1990):	   105-­‐107;	   also	   see	   Doklad	   Gosplana	   SSSR	   “O	   proekte	  Obshchesoiuznogo	  prognoza	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  SSSR	  o	   funktsionirovanii	   ekonomiki	   strany	  v	  1991	  godu,”	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9341,	  l.	  25.	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contracts	   equal	   to	   less	   than	   60%	  of	   expected	   volume.	   	   By	   1990,	   this	   percentage	  was	  less	  than	  30%.	  	  As	  Nikolai	  Nestorovich,	  the	  former	  deputy	  head	  of	  the	  Gossnab	  Research	  Institute,	   later	  recalled	  –	  “The	  producers	  curtailed	  the	  production	  of,	  or	  outright	   discontinued,	   products	   that	   were	   unprofitable,	   even	   if	   these	   enjoyed	  customer	   demand…	   An	   economic	   decline	   masked	   by	   a	   hidden	   growth	   of	   prices	  started	  in	  1988.”64	  	  Concrete	   examples	   of	   the	   broader	   trend	   observed	   in	   Moscow	   could	   be	   found	  across	  the	  USSR.	   	  In	  Tajikistan,	  for	  example,	  the	  silk	  factory	  “Tajikatlas”	  hurriedly	  modified	   its	   behavior	   to	   fit	   with	   the	   new	   law	   –	   and	   quickly	   began	   to	   lower	  production	  while	   increasing	   its	   profits.	   	   Long	   a	   profitable	   and	  widely	   celebrated	  enterprise,	   Tajikatlas	   posted	   average	   annual	   profits	   of	   2.2	   million	   rubles	   in	   the	  years	  before	  the	  1987	  Law	  on	  State	  Enterprises;	  of	  this,	  the	  factory	  kept	  between	  200,00	  and	  350,000	  rubles	  a	  year	  –	  the	  remaining	  85-­‐90%	  of	  its	  profits	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  republican	  and	  federal	  Soviet	  budgets.	  	  It	  also	  paid	  on	  average	  around	  5	  million	  rubles	   in	   “turnover	   taxes”	   a	   figure	   that	   provided	   a	   representation	   of	   total	   sales	  volume	   at	   the	   factory.65	  Once	   the	   factory	   declared	   itself	   “self-­‐financing”	   in	   1989,	  however,	  these	  numbers	  shifted	  radically.	  Total	  sales	  in	  monetary	  terms	  grew	  only	  incrementally	  in	  1989	  and	  1990,	  but	  profits	  soared:	  by	  6%	  in	  1989	  and	  by	  66%	  in	  1990.66	  	  The	   factory	  also	  began	  to	  retain	  the	  majority	  of	   its	  profits,	  holding	  on	  to	  76%	  of	  the	  1989	  profit	  and	  91%	  of	  the	  massive	  1990	  profit.67	  	  	  Importantly,	  these	  increased	  profits	  had	  not	  been	  made	  through	  an	  increase	  in	  production.	   	   Instead,	  the	  factory	  decreased	  its	  workforce	  by	  6%	  and	  increased	  prices.68	  	  Total	  physical	  sales	   actually	   dropped,	   represented	   by	   a	   15%	   drop	   in	   turnover	   taxes	   paid	  compared	   to	   pre-­‐perestroika	   figures.69	  	   Instead	   of	   making	   silk,	   Tajikatlas	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Nikolai	  Nestorovich,	  “Reform	  of	  the	  Supply	  System,”	  in	  Michael	  Ellman	  and	  Vladimir	  Kontorovich,	  eds.,	  The	  Destruction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Economic	  System:	  An	  Insider’s	  History	   (Armonk,	  New	  York:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  Inc.	  1998),	  264.	  65	  Since	  turnover	  taxes	  were	  levied	  against	  finished	  products	  and	  were	  generally	  around	  the	  same	  amount	   for	   similar	   but	   slightly	   differently	   priced	   products,	   tracking	   changes	   in	   tax	   volume	   can	  demonstrate	  changes	  in	  sale	  volumes.	  	  On	  Tajikatlas,	  see	  TsGART,	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  33,	  l.	  121;	  158;	  d.	  122,	  l.	  15.	  	  66	  Finansovyi	  plan	  na	  1989	  g.	  po	  P/O	  “Tadzhikatlas,”	  MMP	  Tad.	  SSR,	  TsGART	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  48,	  ll.	  134-­‐135;	  for	  1990,	  see	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  175,	  l.	  135.	  	  67 	  Ibid.	   Also	   see	   Raschet	   otchislenii	   v	   biudzhet	   ot	   fakticheskoi	   raschetnoi	   pribyli	   po	   p/o	  Tadzhikatlas	  za	  god	  1990,	  TsGART	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  175,	  l.	  138.	  	  68	  TsGART	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  122,	  l.	  1.	  	  69	  TsGART,	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  175,	  l.	  135.	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making	  a	  profit,	  and	  refusing	  to	  reinvest	  its	  newfound	  finances:	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1990,	  the	  enterprise	  was	  sitting	  on	  nearly	  3	  million	  unspent	  rubles.70	  	  	  	  Enterprises	  across	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  –	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  a	  whole	  –	  were	  engaged	  in	  similar	   behavior;	   in	   aggregate,	   the	   newly	   business-­‐like	   behavior	   of	   enterprises	  such	  as	  “Tajikatlas”	  began	  to	  undermine	  the	  fabric	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy.	   	   In	  the	  Tajik	   SSR	   tax	   revenues	   dropped	   from	   1988,	   and	   the	   entire	   republican	   economy	  went	   into	   recession	   in	   1989.71	  	   Enterprises’	   focus	   on	   lowering	   production	   and	  avoiding	   unprofitable	   contracts	   meant	   that	   innumerable	   products	   were	   simply	  never	   sent	   to	   the	   republic.	   	   	  Throughout	  1988-­‐1990	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  continuously	  wrote	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  USSR,	  complaining	  about	  the	  “systematic	   non-­‐delivery”	   of	   “construction	   machines,”	   “cables,”	   	   “lumber,”	  “excavators,”	   “buses,”	   “batteries,”	   “cement,”	   and	   many	   more	   industrial	   inputs.72	  	  Altogether,	   the	   situation	   led	   to	   increasing	   work	   slowdowns,	   decreases	   in	  production	   targets,	   and	   even	   growing	   deficits	   of	   consumer	   goods.73	  	   The	   same	  trend	   was	   also	   observable	   on	   the	   federal	   level,	   as	   dropping	   industrial	   output	  slowly	   wore	   away	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   Soviet	   economic	   system.	   	   Numerous	  observers	   have	   noted	   that	   the	   years	   1988-­‐1989	   marked	   the	   start	   of	   increasing	  deficits,	  lowered	  output,	  and	  general	  “malaise”	  in	  the	  economy,	  as	  Rafik	  Nishanov,	  then	   the	   First	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Uzbek	   Communist	   Party,	   put	   it	   in	   his	  memoirs.74	  	  Left	   to	   their	   own	   devices,	   enterprises	   had	   violated	   Gorbachev’s	   expectations:	  instead	   of	   reacting	   to	   “market”	   incentives	   by	   filling	   store	   shelves,	   they	   were	  instead	  taking	  advantage	  of	  increased	  freedoms	  to	  fill	  their	  own	  accounts.	  By	  June	  1989,	  these	  accounts	  already	  contained	  more	  than	  250	  billion	  unspent	  rubles.75	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70 	  Otchet	   o	   dvizhenii	   sredstv	   fondov	   i	   tselevogo	   finansirovaniia	   za	   1991	   god,	   Predpriiatie	  Tadzhikatlas,	  TsGART,	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  175,	  l.	  154.	  	  71	  On	  1988	  finances	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  see	  Otklonenie	  po	  otdel’nym	  pokazateliam	  proekta	  biudzheta	  respubliki	  na	  1988	  god	  protiv	  ustanovlennogo	  biudzheta	  na	  1987	  god,	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3649,	  ll.	  37-­‐38;	  on	  1989,	  Doklad	  zam.	  predsedatelia	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  TSSR	  Koshlakova	  v	  SM	  SSSR	  SM	  “Ob	  itogakh	   vypolneniia	   Gosudarstvennogo	   plana	   ekonomicheskogo	   i	   sotsial’nogo	   razvitiia	   TSSR	   za	  1989	  god,”	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  Op.	  162,	  d.	  260,	  ll.	  16-­‐18.	  72	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  149,	  d.	  290,	  ll.	  13,	  47;	  op.	  150,	  d.	  276,	  ll.	  25-­‐26,	  106-­‐107,	  134;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1235,	  l.	  80.	  73	  TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1230,	   ll.	   162-­‐163;	   also	   see	   interview	   with	   Tajik	   Communist	   Party	  Secretary	  Zaragul	  Mirrasanova,	  Dushanbe,	  September	  2014.	  74	  Rafik	  Nishanov,	  Derev’ia	  zeleneiut	  do	  metelei	  (Moscow:	  Molodaia	  Gvardiia,	  2012),	  250;	  for	  similar	  accounts,	  also	  see	  Kriuchkov,	  Lichnoe	  delo	   	  v.	  1,	  260;	  V.I.	  Vorotnikov,	  Gavana	  –	  Moskva.	  Pamiatnye	  
gody	  (Moscow:	  Fond	  imeni	  I.D.	  Sytina,	  2001),	  221-­‐261.	  	  75	  Figures	  quoted	  by	  Ryzhkov	  in	  June	  1989.	  See	  Pervyi	  s’’ezd	  narodnykh	  deputatov	  SSSR,	  25	  maia	  –	  9	  
iunia	  1989	  goda.	  Stenograficheskii	  otchet	   (Moscow:	   Izdanie	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  SSSR,	  1989),	  v.	  3,	  25.	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IV.	  (More)	  Cooperatives	  Hoarding	  profits	  only	  made	  sense,	  however,	  if	  enterprise	  directors	  could	  somehow	  benefit	   from	   them	   personally.	   	   Here,	   the	   growing	   “cooperative”	   business	   sector	  created	   in	   1988	   provided	   the	   necessary	   outlet.	   	   Although	   they	   had	   been	   called	  upon	   to	   fill	   the	  Soviet	   consumer	  market	  with	  goods	  and	   services,	   in	  practice	   the	  majority	  did	  anything	  but	  –	  instead	  largely	  helping	  enterprises	  to	  embezzle	  profits	  and	  avoid	  production.	  Rather	  than	  independent	  entrepreneurs	  setting	  up	  shop	  to	  fill	  market	  niches,	  the	  majority	  of	  “cooperatives”	  –	  by	  some	  estimates,	  up	  to	  86%	  of	  them	   –	   were	   founded	   “under”	   state	   enterprises	   and	   worked	   only	   with	   these	  enterprises,	  creating	  closed	  schemes	  aimed	  at	  siphoning	  off	  state	  funds.76	  	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  the	  state’s	  early	  attempts	  to	  promote	  cooperatives:	  in	  1988	  it	   was	   not	   unusual	   for	   enterprises	   to	   be	   encouraged	   to	   found	   an	   in-­‐house	  cooperative	   to	   “increase	   productivity.”77	  The	   larger	   reason,	   however,	   was	   brutal	  self-­‐interest.	   	   As	   an	   internal	   memo	   circulated	   among	   the	   Soviet	   Council	   of	  Ministers	  argued	  in	  1990:	  	  
“Cooperatives’	  attachment	  to	  enterprises	  is	  largely	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
is	   more	   profitable	   for	   them	   to	   secure	   contracts	   with	   enterprises	   and	  
organizations	   that	  have	  powerful	   financial	  and	  productive	   resources	  and	   that	  
control	  a	  large	  reserve	  of	  non-­‐cash	  funds	  (beznalichnykh	  sredstv),	  which	  can	  be	  
used	  to	  pay	  for	  cooperatives’	  services.”78	  	  As	   this	  memo	  went	   on	   to	   note,	  moreover,	   cooperatives	  were	   not	   restricted	   –	   in	  contrast	   to	  all	  other	  Soviet	  organizations	  –	   in	   the	  amount	  of	  non-­‐cash	   funds	  they	  could	   convert	   to	   cash.	   	   This	  meant	   that	   they	  were	   ideally	   positioned	   to	   act	   as	   a	  channel	   for	   corruption,	   converting	   non-­‐cash	   funds	   into	   cash	   and	   distributing	   it	  back	   to	   those	   enterprise	   directors	   and	   managers	   who	   had	   made	   the	   original	  transfer.	  79	  The	  example	  of	  a	  construction	  cooperative	   in	  Dushanbe	  demonstrates	  how	  this	  process	  worked.	  	  Founded	  in	  1988,	  the	  cooperative	  was	  then	  hired	  by	  the	  Tajik	   filial	   of	   the	   Soviet	   car	   manufacturer	   AvtoVAZ	   to	   build	   a	   repair	   shop	   in	  Kumsangir	   District	   in	   the	   south	   of	   the	   republic.	   	   The	   cooperative	   took	   the	   full	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  L.I.	  Abalkin,	  Neispol’zovanyi	  shans:	  Poltora	  goda	  v	  pravitel’stve	  (Moscow:	  Izdatel’stvo	  politcheskoi	  literatury,	  1991),	  249-­‐251.	  77	  In	  republics	  where	  cooperatives	  were	  rare,	  such	  as	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  this	  was	  particularly	  common.	  	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3647,	  ll.	  272-­‐274.	  	  78	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  163,	  d.	  1284,	  ll.	  120-­‐121.	  	  79	  Enterprises	   were	   limited	   in	   the	   amount	   of	   “non-­‐cash	   funds”	   they	   could	   convert	   to	   cash;	   this	  restriction	  was	  not	   applied	   to	   cooperatives.	   	   See	  Doklad	  Gosplana	   “O	   sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskom	  polozhenii	  strany	  v	  1989	  godu”	  ot	  12.04.1990,	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9355,	  l.	  230.	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payment	   for	   the	  construction	  of	  a	   large	   factory	  but	   instead	  built	  a	  small	  building	  where	   one	   or	   two	   cars	   could	   be	   repaired	   at	   a	   time.	   	   The	   remaining	   funds	  were	  converted	  to	  cash	  and	  shared	  between	  the	  cooperative	  owner	  and	  the	  director	  of	  the	  filial	  in	  Dushanbe.80	  	  In	  addition,	  enterprises	  would	  sometimes	  simply	  sell	  their	  inputs	  to	  cooperatives	  on	  the	  cheap;	  the	  cooperatives	  would	  then	  resell	  the	  goods	  for	  cash	  and	  distribute	  the	  profits.81	  	  	  Evidence	  from	  around	  the	  USSR	  made	  it	  clear	  that	   this	  was	  a	  Union-­‐wide	  problem:	  cooperatives	  were	   “regularly	  paying	  off	   the	  same	   [enterprise]	   employees”	   that	   had	   founded	   the	   cooperatives	   in	   the	   first	  place.82	  	  As	  the	  number	  of	  cooperatives	  grew,	  so	  did	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1988,	  there	  were	  approximately	  77,500	  active	  cooperative	  businesses	  in	  the	  USSR,	  which	   employed	   1,397,000	   individuals.	  83	  	   At	   the	   end	   of	   1989,	   these	   figures	   had	  risen	   to	   193,000	   cooperatives	   and	   nearly	   5	   million	   employees.84	  And	   the	   close	  relationship	   between	   cooperatives	   and	   enterprises	   only	   grew	   closer.	   	   Studies	   in	  Moscow,	  Dushanbe,	  and	  on	  a	  federal	  scale	  all	  demonstrated	  that	  by	  1989	  only	  15-­‐19%	   of	   all	   cooperative	   production	   was	   being	   sold	   to	   consumers,	   with	   the	   rest	  going	  to	  enterprises.85	  	  Cooperatives	  were	  also	  concentrated	  in	  areas	  of	  industrial	  production:	  66%	  were	   located	  in	  the	  RSFSR,	  while	  only	  1%	  of	  the	  total	  had	  been	  founded	  in	  the	  much	  less	  industrial	  Tajik	  SSR.86	  	  While	  the	  content	  of	  cooperative-­‐enterprise	   contracts	   remained	   opaque,	   they	   were	   overwhelmingly	   profitable.	  	  Cooperatives	  were	  reported	  to	  have	  transferred	  29	  billion	  rubles	  into	  cash	  by	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Interview	  with	  a	  former	  cooperative	  owner,	  Dushanbe,	  September	  2016.	  81 	  See,	   for	   example,	   Prikaz	   no.	   7	   Ministerstva	   mestnoi	   promyshlennosti	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   ot	  30.01.1989	  “Ob	  ispol’zovanii	  polimernogo	  syr’ia	  na	  DEZPiNO	  NPO	  “Voskhod”	  za	  1988	  god,	  TsGART	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  18,	  l.	  12	  82	  G.	   Popov,	   “Fundament	   reformy	   ekonomiki,”	   in	   L.I.	   Abalkin	   and	   P.	   Bunich,	   eds.,	   Etot	   trudnyi,	  
trudnyi,	  put’	  (Moscow:	  Mysl’,	  1989),	  175.	  	  83	  V.A.	  Tikhonov,	  “Sotsializm,	  kooperatsiia,	  gosudarstvo,”	  Ekonomika	  i	  organizatsiia	  promyshlennogo	  
proizvodstvo	  (EKO)	  20,	  no.	  4	  (1990):	  4.	  For	  supporting	  figures,	  see	  Tomas	  Bauer,	  “The	  Firm	  Under	  Perestroika,”	   Berichte	   des	   Bundesinstituts	   fur	   ostwissenschaftliche	   und	   international	   Studien	   37	  (1989):	  29;	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika,	  228.	  	  84	  Doklad	   Gosplana	   “O	   sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskom	   polozhenii	   strany	   v	   1989	   godu,”	   12.04.1990,	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9355,	  ll.	  218-­‐219.	  85	  For	   Moscow,	   see	   Semen	   Kuznetsov,	   “Moskovskaia	   kooperatsiia	   –	   glazami	   MGK	   i	   ispolkoma,”	  
Kommersant’	  no.	   2,	   January	  1990;	   for	  Dushanbe	   –	   Sadriddin	  Arslanbekovich	  Gazibekov,	   “Rezervy	  razvitiia	   proizvodstvennykh	   kooperativov	   v	   Tadzhikistane,”	   (Dissetatsiia	   na	   soiskanie	   uchenoi	  stepeni	   kandidata	   ekonomicheskikh	   nauk,	   AN	   RT,	   1992),	   37;	   for	   the	   USSR	   as	   a	  whole	   –	   GARF	   f.	  5446,	  op.	  163,	  d.	  1284,	  ll.	  120-­‐121.	  	  86	  Gazibekov,	  “Rezervy	  razvitiia,”	  3.	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end	  of	  1989,	  equal	  to	  more	  than	  two	  thirds	  of	  their	  total	  reported	  production	  since	  March	  1988.87	  	  	  	  Soviet	  consumers,	  however,	  saw	  little	  benefit:	  cooperatives	  “had	  limited	  influence	  on	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  population’s	  needs.”88	  	   In	  republics	  such	  as	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  they	   were	   represented	   in	   public	   only	   by	   a	   proliferation	   of	   new	   and	   expensive	  
shashlyk	   (barbeque)	   stands.89	  	   Across	   the	   USSR,	   moreover,	   sociological	   surveys	  showed	  that	  only	  a	  minority	  (29%)	  of	  Soviet	  citizens	  had	  actually	  bought	  goods	  or	  services	   from	   a	   cooperative.90	  In	   the	   background,	   however,	   cooperatives	   were	  quietly	  worsening	  the	  economic	  situation.	  	  Not	  only	  were	  the	  prices	  of	  cooperative	  goods	  and	  services	  uncontrolled	  and	  frequently	  inflationary,	  the	  flood	  of	  cash	  they	  brought	   to	   the	   market	   far	   exceeded	   any	   goods	   they	   produced.	   	   This	   led	   to	  worsening	  deficits	  and	  shortages,	  as	  Soviet	  consumers’	  access	  to	  income	  continued	  to	  surpass	  their	  access	  to	  goods.	  91	  Cooperatives	  also	  proved	  effective	  at	   lowering	  their	   tax	   burden,	  which	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   attracting	   previously	   illegal	   incomes	   in	  need	   of	   laundering.	   	   By	   lobbying	   the	   federal	   and	   republican	   governments,	  many	  cooperatives	  managed	   to	   pay	   a	   factual	   tax	   rate	   of	   around	   6%	   in	   1989	   –	   and	   by	  1990,	  the	  flat	  rate	  for	  all	  cooperatives	  was	  reduced	  to	  3%.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  great	  sums	  of	  money	  were	  simply	  shuffled	  through	  cooperatives:	  the	  Soviet	  grey	  economy	  was	  given	   a	   cost-­‐effective	   mechanism	   of	   cleaning	   its	   books,	   all	   without	   having	   to	  produce	  much	  of	  anything	  for	  the	  market.	  92	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  Paralleling	  changes	  to	  Soviet	  enterprises	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  cooperative	  sector,	  the	   Soviet	   labor	   market	   also	   underwent	   notable	   upheavals	   in	   1988	   and	   1989.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  early	  reforms	  of	  perestroika	  passed	  in	  1986	  and	  1987,	  this	  first	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  See	   Valerii	   Legostaev,	  Kak	  Gorbachev	   “prorvalsia	  vo	  vlast’”	   (Moscow:	   Eksmo,	   2011),	   122,	   citing	  internal	  CC	  CPSU	  data.	  The	  total	  value	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  produced	  by	  cooperatives	  in	  1988	  and	  1989	  was	  likely	  no	  more	  than	  42-­‐43	  billion	  rubles.	  	  See	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika,	  228;	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9355,	  ll.	  218-­‐219.	  	  88	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9355,	  l.	  219.	  	  89	  See	  Evgenii	  Tiuchkalov,	  “Glubinka	  –	  poniatie	  sotsial’noe,”	  in	  Partkom	  i	  Perestroika,	  ed.	  A.	  Rudenko	  (Dushanbe:	   Ifron,	   1990),	   101;	   also	   “Kooperativy:	   pervye	   shagi,	   trudnye	   shagi,”	   Kommunist	  
Tadzhikistana,	  February	  05,	  1988.	  90	  Tikhonov,	  “Sotsializm,	  kooperatsiia,”	  4.	  91	  Woodruff,	  Money	  Unmade,	  65-­‐66.	  92	  Pavlov,	  Upushchen	  li,	  219;	  Cox,	  From	  Perestroika	  to	  Privatisation,	  25;	  for	  an	  example	  of	   lobbying	  efforts,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.8,	  d.	  3660,	  l.	  224.	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foremost	   meant	   the	   “freeing	   up”	   of	   Soviet	   workers	   and	   the	   promotion	   of	   more	  divergent	  pay	  structures.	  	  As	  early	  as	  1987	  these	  initiatives	  had	  led	  to	  clear	  results,	  with	   “notable	   freeing	   of	   personnel	   noted	   at	   nearly	   all	   enterprises.”	  93	  	   Ministries	  and	   government	   agencies	   were	   admonished	   to	   enact	   30-­‐50%	   reductions	   in	   the	  total	   number	   of	   workers	   under	   their	   authority,	   as	   well	   as	   within	   their	   own	  apparatuses.94	  	  	  In	  consequence,	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  workers	  lost	  their	  jobs:	  in	   1987	   150,000	   workers	   were	   cut	   from	   factory	   jobs,	   280,000	   from	   railroad-­‐related	   positions,	   95,000	   from	   the	   oil	   industry,	   and	   34,350	   from	   positions	  overseen	  by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Communications.95	  Even	  Moscow’s	  many	   centralized	  bureaucracies	  were	   told	   to	  decrease	   their	  overall	   staff	  numbers	  by	  63,000.	  96	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1987,	  more	  than	  1	  million	  Soviet	  workers	  had	  been	  “freed	  up;”	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1988	  this	  figure	  had	  reached	  3	  million.97	  	  	  In	  theory,	  the	  policy	  of	  “freeing	  up”	  workers	  had	  been	  meant	  to	  create	  a	  dynamic	  labor	  market,	  where	   enterprises	  would	   compete	   for	   newly	   available	  workers	   by	  offering	  higher	  salaries	  for	  the	  best	  employees.	  	  In	  practice,	  matters	  turned	  out	  to	  be	   more	   complicated.	   	   As	   described	   in	   this	   chapter,	   changes	   to	   enterprise	   law	  mean	   that	   factories	   were	   actually	   economically	   incentivized	   to	   reduce	   workers	  instead	   of	   hiring	  more.	   	   Productivity	   improvements	   and	   increased	   profits,	   most	  enterprises	   found,	   required	   lowering	  personnel	  costs:	   the	  Khorog	  sewing	   factory	  “Guldast”	  in	  the	  east	  of	  Tajikistan,	  for	  example,	  reduced	  its	  staff	  by	  20	  seamstresses	  for	  these	  very	  reasons.98	  Cooperatives,	  which	  had	  also	  been	  meant	  to	  compete	  for	  the	   newly	   available	   workers,	   were	   equally	   unreliable.	   	   Statistically,	   most	  cooperatives	  across	  the	  USSR	  remained	  small	  operations,	  and	  their	  workers	  often	  overlapped	  with	   the	   staff	   of	   existing	   enterprises.	   	  Altogether,	  many	  of	   the	   “freed	  up”	  workers	   found	   themselves	  without	  new	  employment.	  Statistics	   from	  the	   late	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  As	  reported	  by	  Goskomtrud	  in	  July	  1987.	  	  See	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  153,	  ll.	  72-­‐73.	  94Stenogramma	   zasedaniia	   komissii	   Politbiuro	   o	   kompleksnoi	   sisteme	   mer	   po	   trudoustroistvu	   i	  obespecheniiu	  effektivnosti	  zaniatosti	  naseleniia,	  16.10.1987,	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  7,	  l.	  40.	  	  95	  GARF,	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  153,	  l.	  88,	  93;	  122-­‐123.	  	  96 	  Stenogramma	   soveshchaniia	   u	   Predsedatelia	   Soveta	   Ministrov	   SSSR	   t.	   Ryzhkov,	   N.I.	   ot	  14.09.1988,	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  6,	  l.	  30.	  	  97	  Doklad	  Goskomtruda	  SSSR	  “O	  sostoianii	  del	  po	  sovershenstvovaniiu	  zarabotnoi	  platy	  v	  otrasliakh	  proizvodstvennoi	  sfery,”	  06.03.1988,	  GARF	   f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  153,	   l.	  153;	  Filtzer,	  Soviet	  Workers,	  19.	  98	  TsGART	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  62,	  ll.	  1,	  7,	  11,	  58,	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1980s	   are	   inconsistent,	   but	   even	   the	   most	   optimistic	   estimates	   indicate	   that	   at	  least	  half	  a	  million	  of	  these	  workers	  remained	  unemployed	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1988.99	  	  	  	  The	   policy	   of	   “freeing	   up”	   workers	   and	   promoting	   competition	   for	   jobs	   also	  seemed	  to	  ignore	  regional	  differences	  in	  the	  USSR.	  	  In	  the	  republics	  of	  Central	  Asia,	  which	   had	   long	   been	   labeled	   “overfilled	   with	   labor”	   (trudoyzbytochnie),	   factual	  unemployment	   had	   already	   been	   a	   central	   problem.	   For	   years,	   economists	   had	  been	  promoting	  the	  development	  of	  industry	  in	  the	  region,	  if	  only	  to	  find	  jobs	  for	  the	   growing	   number	   of	   unemployed	   local	   workers.100	  	   Applying	   the	   policy	   of	  freeing	   up	   workers	   to	   Central	   Asia,	   as	   Ryzhkov	   pondered	   at	   a	   CPSU	   Politburo	  commission	   meeting	   in	   late	   1987,	   “brings	   up	   the	   problem	   of	   those	   excessive	  (ubytochnykh)	   workers’	   employment.”	   	   Perhaps,	   Ryzhkov	   asked,	   “it	   won’t	   be	  necessary	   to	   apply	   this	   order	   to	   Central	   Asia?”101	  	   Ryzhkov’s	   concerns,	   however,	  were	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  and	  unemployment	  only	  grew	  in	  the	  region.	  In	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  for	  example,	  the	  number	  of	  working	  age	  individuals	  “uninvolved	  in	  public	  production”	  –	  a	  Soviet	  code	  phrase	  for	  unemployment	  –	  had	  reached	  26%	  in	  1987.	  	  It	  would	  continue	  to	  rise	  to	  nearly	  30%	  over	  the	  next	  two	  years.102	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  1986-­‐1989,	  as	  this	  chapter	  has	  argued,	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  and	  the	  Soviet	  government	  developed	  and	  implemented	  a	  series	  of	  economic	  reforms	  meant	   to	  harness	  the	  power	  of	   the	  market	   for	   the	  Soviet	  economy.	   	  According	  to	  the	   logic	   of	   perestroika,	   Soviet	   enterprises	   would	   be	   freed	   from	   bureaucratic	  entanglements.	  	  Reacting	  to	  signals	  in	  the	  Soviet	  consumer	  market,	  they	  would	  hire	  workers	  from	  the	  increasingly	  dynamic	  labor	  market,	  boost	  productivity,	  and	  reap	  growing	  profits.	   	   Cooperatives	  would	   also	  be	   free	   to	  pursue	   their	   own	  economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  For	  various	   statistics	   about	   the	   total	  number	  of	  workers	   “freed	  up”	  and	   later	   rehired,	   see	   John	  Tedstrom,	   “Supreme	   Soviet	   Deals	   with	   Economy	   and	   Budget	   Deficit,”	   Radio	   Liberty	   Research	  
Bulletin	  484/88,	  October	  27,	  1988;	  GARF,	   f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  153,	   l.	  153;	  Bauer,	   “The	  Firm	  Under	  Perestroika,”	  29.	  100	  For	   example,	   V.	   Kostakov,	   “Zaniatost’:	   defitsit	   ili	   izbytok?”	   Kommunist	   63,	   no.	   2	   (1987);	   A.	  Madzhidov,	  “Razmeshchenie	  naseleniia	   i	  problema	  ispol’zovaniia	  trudovykh	  resursov	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR,”	  Izvestiia	  Akademii	  nauk	  tadzhikskoi	  SSR,	  otdelenie	  obshchestvennykh	  nauk	  4,	  no.	  102	  (1980).	  101 	  Stenogramma	   zasedaniia	   komissii	   Politbiuro	   o	   kompleksnoi	   sisteme	   po	   trudoustroistvu	   i	  obespecheniiu	  effektivnoi	  zaniatosti	  naseleniia,	  16.10.1987,	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  148,	  d.	  7,	  l.	  13.	  	  	  102	  On	   1987,	   see	   Vypiska	   iz	   protokola	   Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Soveta	   Ministrov	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR,	  08.10.1987,	   TsGART	   f.	   18,	   op.	   8,	   d.	   3644,	   l.	   139;	   for	   1988-­‐1990	   –	   Protokol	   No.	   11	   zasedaniia	  sekretariata	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  22.07.1991,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  160,	  d.	  1672,	  l.	  3.	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interests	   in	   the	   new	   Soviet	   system,	   which	   in	   theory	   meant	   creating	   consumer	  goods	   and	   filling	   store	   shelves.	   	   	   Yet	   this	  was	  not	   at	   all	  what	  had	  happened.	   	   By	  1989	   the	   economy	   was	   in	   fact	   much	   worse	   than	   it	   had	   been	   in	   1986,	   and	   the	  behavior	   of	   reformed	   enterprises	   and	   cooperatives	   was	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  economic	   downturn.	   	   Instead	   of	   producing	   consumer	   goods,	   enterprises	   and	  cooperatives	  alike	  had	  found	  it	  more	  profitable	  to	  cut	  workers,	  save	  on	  inputs,	  and	  produce	  a	  small	  number	  of	  (if	  any)	  expensive	  “prestige”	  goods.	  In	  addition,	  the	  vast	  sums	   of	   unspent	   rubles	   held	   by	   enterprises	   and	   converted	   into	   cash	   by	  cooperatives	  was	   further	  unbalancing	   the	   Soviet	  monetary	   system.	   	  By	  1989	   the	  amount	   of	   “uncaptured”	   Soviet	   income,	   unspent	   on	   goods	   and	   services,	   had	  doubled	  from	  its	  pre-­‐perestroika	  mark,	  reaching	  11%	  of	  all	  wages	  and	  incomes.103	  	  This	  quickly	  led	  to	  “galloping	  inflation,”	  which	  in	  the	  Soviet	  context	  meant	  deficits	  and	   a	   deeply	   imbalanced	   consumer	   market.104	  Many	   things	   were	   clearly	   going	  wrong	   with	   the	   Soviet	   economy,	   and	   there	   was	   no	   shortage	   of	   information	  available	   to	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   USSR	   about	   the	   worsening	   situation.	   	   As	   this	  chapter	  has	  shown,	  memos	  from	  Gosplan,	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPSU	  and	  other	  high-­‐level	  Soviet	  bodies	  all	   clearly	   linked	   the	  reforms	  of	  perestroika	   to	   the	  growing	   economic	   chaos	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   	   There	   should	   not	   have	   been	   any	  doubt	  about	  what	  was	  going	  on.	  	  	  In	   many	   ways,	   moreover,	   the	   economic	   downturn	   engendered	   by	   perestroika’s	  economic	  reforms	  should	  not	  have	  been	  terribly	  surprising.	  	  As	  Donald	  Filtzer	  has	  argued,	  the	  combined	  impact	  of	  Gorbachav’s	  reforms	  was	  to	  lead	  enterprises	  and	  cooperatives	   “to	   function	   according	   to	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   market,	   but	   without	   a	  market	  having	  been	  created”	  –	  i.e.,	  to	  compete	  for	  profits	  without	  the	  risk	  of	  going	  bankrupt.105	  	  Since	  enterprises	  still	  retained	  links	  to	  local	  and	  federal	  budgets,	  and	  were	  provided	  with	  operating	   revenue	   related	   to	  previous	  plans	  and	   “goszakaz,”	  they	  could	  plausibly	  produce	  nothing	  while	  still	  making	  a	  profit.	  	  In	  the	  long	  run,	  of	  course,	   this	   practice	   would	   have	   terrible	   results,	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	   state	   of	  industry	   in	  Russia	   after	   the	   collapse	  of	   the	  USSR.	   	   In	   the	   short	   term,	  however,	   it	  was	  a	  rational	  operating	  policy.	  	  This	  also	  aligned	  with	  the	  “soft	  budget	  constraint”	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  IMF	  data	  presented	  in	  Woodruff,	  Money	  Unmade,	  65.	  104	  S.M.	  Nikitin,	  “Infliatsiia,”	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that	   the	   Hungarian	   economist	   Jonas	   Kornai	   had	   warned	   against	   in	   1980.	   	   If	  enterprises	  were	  only	  constrained	  by	  the	  amount	  they	  could	  receive	  from	  external	  sources,	  Kornai	  argued,	   they	  would	  do	  everything	   in	   their	  power	  to	  produce	   less	  and	  hoard	  both	  profits	  and	  inputs.	  	  In	  many	  ways	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  occurred	  in	  1988-­‐1989.106	  	  	  Even	   faced	  with	   both	   theoretical	   issues	   and	   overwhelming	   factual	   evidence	   that	  the	  introduction	  of	  market	  elements	  to	  the	  Soviet	  system	  was	  breaking	  the	  Soviet	  economy,	   Gorbachev	   and	   the	   economists	   who	   designed	   the	   reforms	   refused	   to	  change	   tactics.	   	   Instead	   of	   acting	   to	   balance	   against	   the	   profit-­‐grabbing	   of	  enterprises	   and	   corruption	   of	   cooperatives,	   in	   fact,	   they	   called	   for	   more	   of	   the	  same	  style	  of	  reform.	   	  From	  this	  perspective,	   the	  undeniable	  economic	  downturn	  had	   been	   caused	   by	   a	   “lack”	   of	   any	   factual	   reform.	   	   At	   a	   roundtable	   held	   on	   the	  reforms	   in	  early	  1989,	   for	  example,	  a	  group	  of	  economists	   that	   included	  some	  of	  the	   reforms’	   architects	   declared	   that	   “The	   Law	   on	   Enterprises,	   which	   came	   into	  effect	  in	  January	  1989…did	  not	  become	  a	  real	  law:	  its	  central	  provisions	  are	  being	  ignored.”	  	  Enterprises	  and	  ministries	  alike	  were	  accused	  of	  simply	  declaring	  their	  acceptance	  of	   the	  new	   law	  without	  modifying	   their	   behavior.	  107	  	   That	   same	  year	  the	   economist	   Aganbegian,	   long	   at	   Gorbachev’s	   ear	   on	   economic	   issues,	   also	  blamed	   the	   country’s	   growing	   problems	   on	   the	   “improper	   implementation”	   of	  reform	   and	   opposition	   by	   conservative	   forces.	  108	  	   For	   his	   own	   part,	   Gorbachev	  made	  it	  very	  clear	  that	  he	  also	  saw	  no	  link	  between	  his	  reforms	  and	  the	  economic	  downturn.	   	  As	  Gorbachev’s	  advisor	  Valerii	  Boldin	  noted	  in	  his	  memoirs,	  the	  more	  the	   economy	   began	   to	   wobble,	   the	   more	   Gorbachev	   blamed	   the	   “stalling-­‐out“	  (probuksovka)	  of	  reforms	  and	  disobedience	  on	  the	  part	  of	  local	  party	  structures.109	  	  Throughout	   Perestroika,	   in	   fact,	   Gorbachev	   never	   tired	   of	   accusing	   government	  agencies	  of	  misdirection:	  statistical	  agencies	  had	  lied	  for	  decades,	  Soviet	  diplomats	  and	  ministries	  were	   lying,	   and	   enterprises	  were	   lying	   about	   engaging	   in	  market	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Janos	  Kornai,	  Economics	  of	  Shortage,	  Volume	  A	  (Amsterdam:	  North	  Holland	  Publishing	  Company,	  1980),	  188.	  107	  “Obzor	   otvetov	   uchastnikov	   ‘kruglogo	   stola’	   na	   voprosy	   ankety,”	   in	   Perestroika	   upravleniia	  
ekonomikoi:	  problemy,	  perspektivy,	  ed.	  N.I.	  Balashova	  (Moscow:	  Ekonomika,	  1989),	  165-­‐173,	  quote	  on	  165.	  	  108	  Aganbegian,	  “Odin	  iz	  ekonomicheskikh,”	  163-­‐164.	  Aganbegian	  repeated	  this	  idea	  in	  his	  English-­‐language	  memoir	  (Aganbegyan.	  	  Moving	  the	  Mountain,	  13).	  109	  Boldin,	  Krushenie	  p’edestala,	  189.	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behavior.110	  “Direct	   contracts	   between	   enterprises	   are	   stalling	   out,”	   Gorbachev	  complained	  to	  the	  Politburo,	  and	  “they	  want	  everything	  to	  be	  [centrally]	  dictated.”	  	  Worse,	   he	   later	   concluded	   in	   1988,	   “Administrative	   fiat	   continues	   everywhere;	  everywhere	  the	  law	  is	  disregarded.”111	  	  	  	  Gorbachev	  genuinely	  appears	  to	  have	  believed	  his	  own	  argument	  that	  established	  forces	  in	  the	  USSR	  were	  “blocking”	  (meshali)	  perestroika’s	  reforms,	  and	  since	  1991	  both	  he	  and	  many	  of	  his	  supporters	  have	  continued	  to	  promote	  this	  argument.112	  	  How	   he	   managed	   to	   miss	   the	   enormous	   evidence	   to	   the	   contrary	   was	   likely	   a	  combination	  of	  two	  interrelated	  factors.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  Gorbachev’s	  advisor	  Anatolii	  Cherniaev	  later	  lamented,	  Gorbachev	  became	  unable	  to	  see	  evidence	  that	  contradicted	   his	   expectations:	   “from	   actual	   facts	   Gorbachev	   came	   to	   “calming”	  conclusions…he	  “forced”	  [podgonial]	  what	  was	  occurring	  into	  a	  framework	  that	  he	  considered	   convenient	   for	   continuing	   his	   program.” 113 	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	  moreover,	  like	  many	  others	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Gorbachev	  was	  operating	  with	  an	  idealized	  conception	  of	  the	  “market,”	  in	  which	  competition	  between	  market	  actors	  inherently	  led	  to	  increased	  production,	  lower	  prices,	  and	  economic	  growth.	  	  When	  the	  introduction	  of	  market	  practices	  into	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  failed	  to	  lead	  to	  any	  of	   these	   results	   and	   instead	   caused	   theft,	   corruption,	   and	   economic	   crisis,	  Gorbachev	   simply	   could	  not	   square	   results	   and	   theory.	   	   Instead,	  he	   continued	   to	  wait	  for	  “capitalism	  with	  a	  human	  face,”	  refusing	  to	  see	  aspects	  of	  the	  market	  in	  the	  system	  he	  had	  introduced	  and	  insisting	  that	  the	  negative	  results	  on	  display	  could	  only	  be	  the	  result	  of	  blocked	  reforms.114	  	  	  Undeterred	   by	   contrary	   evidence	   or	   argument,	   Gorbachev	   pushed	   forward	   to	  overcome	   the	   “blockage”	   of	   his	   reforms.	   	   He	   identified,	   moreover,	   two	   social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  For	   Gorbachev’s	   views	   on	   TsSU	   and	   other	   statistical	   agencies,	   see	   Chapter	   Three.	   	   For	   his	  statements	   about	   “lying”	   ministries	   and	   diplomats,	   see	   Cherniaev,	   Veber,	   and	   Medvedev,	   V	  
Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  19.	  111	  Ibid.,	  241,	  295.	  112	  On	  Gorbachev’s	  belief,	  see	  Gorbachev,	  Zhin’	  i	  reformy,	  348-­‐352;	  Hough,	  Democratization,	  105;	  for	  accounts	  that	  exonerate	  Gorbachev,	  see	  Miller,	  The	  Struggle	  to	  Save;	  Brown,	  The	  Gorbachev	  Factor;	  Gaidar,	  Collapse	  of	  an	  Empire.	  	  113	  Cherniaev,	  Shest’	  let,	  387.	  114	  On	   the	   Socialist	   conception	   of	   “capitalism	   with	   a	   human	   face”	   and	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   market	  system	  that	  developed	  in	  the	   late	  Soviet	  period	  was	  not	  “real	  capitalism,”	  see	  Steven	  Greenhouse,	  “The	   World:	   In	   Search	   of	   Capitalism	   with	   a	   Human	   Face,”	  New	   York	   Times	   20	   May	   1990;	   for	   a	  general	  critique	  of	  the	  view	  that	  “real”	  markets	  inherently	  lead	  to	  growth,	  see	  John	  Quiggin,	  Zombie	  
Economics:	  How	  Dead	  Ideas	  Still	  Walk	  Among	  Us	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  174-­‐198.	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groups	   that	  were	   holding	   back	   change	   in	   the	  USSR:	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  Soviet	  people	  themselves.	  Long	  educated	  and	  inculcated	  into	  Soviet	  ideals,	  many	  Soviet	  citizens	  were	  skeptical	  of	  market	  reforms	  and	  “wanted	  to	   return”	   to	   life	   before	   Perestroika,	   as	   A.D.	   Migranian,	   a	   reform-­‐minded	   Soviet	  sociologist,	  put	  it	  in	  1989.115	  	  Or,	  as	  the	  academic	  V.A.	  Tikhonov	  more	  directly	  put	  it,	  “violence	  would	  be	  required”	  to	  bring	  much	  of	  the	  Soviet	  populace	  to	  capitalist	  ideas.	  116	  	   While	   Gorbachev	   also	   complained	   about	   the	   passivity	   of	   the	   Soviet	  population,	  he	  reserved	  particular	  ire	  for	  the	  Communist	  Party.	   	   It	  was	  the	  Party,	  he	  repeatedly	  stated	  in	  1987	  and	  1988,	  that	  “was	  falling	  behind	  the	  processes”	  of	  perestroika,	  was	  “unacceptably”	  promoting	  reform,	  and	  in	  many	  places	  “acting	  as	  though	  there	  is	  no	  perestroika	  at	  all,	  or	  frequently	  even	  failing	  to	  act	  at	  all.”117	  	   If	  perestroika	   failed,	  he	  harangued	  his	  Politburo	  colleagues,	   there	  would	  be	  no	  one	  else	  to	  blame:	  	  
“…[T]he	  stalling	  out	  [of	  perestroika]	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  connected	  to	  our	  own	  
work	  –	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  Oblast	  committees,	  and	  local	  district	  
committees.	  	  There	  is	  no	  one	  else	  for	  us	  to	  point	  at.”118	  	  With	   conservative	   industrialists	   and	   party	   workers	   spreading	   “terror”	   and	   the	  “darkest	  of	  darknesses”	  amongst	  the	  first	  Soviet	  entrepreneurs,	  as	  Yakovlev	  put	  it	  in	  a	  handwritten	  1988	  note	  to	  Ryzhkov,	  something	  clearly	  had	  to	  be	  done	  to	  save	  perestroika. 119 	  	   With	   the	   Party	   compromised	   and	   suspected	   of	   “blocking”	  perestroika,	  Gorbachev	  needed	  new	  allies	  –	  and	  new	  institutions	  of	  power	  outside	  of	   existing	   structures.	   	   He	   decided,	   as	   he	   later	   wrote,	   to	   “bring	   my	   ideas	   and	  conceptions	  about	  the	  future	  to	  the	  widest	  possible	  audience	  –	  to	  include	  people	  in	  the	  active	  development	  of	  politics.”	  120	  As	  Chapter	  Five	  will	  describe,	  Gorbachev’s	  plan	  to	  circumvent	  the	  Party	  would	  come	  to	   involve	  democratization,	  “openness”	  [glasnost],	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  non-­‐Party	  political	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  Congress	  of	   People’s	   Deputies.	   In	   practice,	   these	   new	   political	   platforms	   did	   little	   to	   save	  perestroika	  or	  build	   economic	   growth.	   	  They	  did,	   however,	   help	   to	   fray	   the	  very	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   ANP	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  15,	  no.	  4	  (1989):	  31.	  	  116	  V.A.	  Tikhonov,	  “Zhit’	  bez	  illiuzii,”	  Ogonyok,	  September	  2-­‐9,	  1989.	  117	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	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  KPSS,	  181,	  201	  118	  Ibid.,	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  119	  RGASPI	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  1,	  d.	  147,	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Chapter	  Five	  
National	  in	  Form,	  Imitation	  in	  Content?	  	  Glasnost	  and	  
Democratization	  in	  Tajikistan	  	  One	  Sunday	  afternoon	  in	  September	  1988,	  a	  journalist	  from	  Dushanbe	  visited	  the	  regional	  Tajik	  city	  of	  Gissar.	  September	  in	  Tajikistan	  is	  still	  a	  summer	  month:	  hot	  and	  dry,	  and	  the	  streets	  of	  small	  cities	  like	  Gissar	  are	  filled	  with	  rolling	  plumes	  of	  dust	  and	  bored	  teenagers.	   	  In	  the	  spirit	  of	  perestroika,	  this	  journalist	  noticed	  that	  these	   “spry	   underage	   sunflower-­‐seed	   sellers	   have	   gotten	   comfortable	   on	   the	  sidewalk	  and	  are	  testing	  themselves	  out	  as	  entrepreneurs.”	  	  Other	  than	  an	  increase	  in	  sunflower	  seed	  sales,	  however,	  absolutely	  nothing	  had	  changed	  in	  Gissar	  since	  1985;	  the	  reform	  and	  change	  promoted	  in	  Moscow	  had	  had	  almost	  no	  visible	  effect	  on	   life	   in	   the	   rural	   town.	   	   “In	   Gissar	   you	   can	   die	   from	   boredom,”	   one	   of	   the	  teenagers	   told	   the	   journalist.	   “If	   perestroika	   is	   happening	   somewhere,	   it	   hasn’t	  shuffled	  its	  way	  down	  to	  us.”1	  	  Nor	  was	  Gissar	  an	  unusual	  example.	  	  In	  many	  regional	  cities	  and	  towns	  across	  the	  USSR	   the	   first	   years	   of	   perestroika	   had	   brought	   little	   clear	   change.	   	   While	  enterprises	   and	   cooperatives	   were	   beginning	   to	   embrace	  market	   principles	   and	  bend	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   planned	   economy,	   life	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   Soviet	   citizens	  continued	  much	  as	  before.	  	  In	  Dushanbe,	  for	  example,	  an	  early	  1989	  survey	  found	  that	   only	   half	   of	   the	   city’s	   residents	   had	   “felt”	   the	   impact	   of	   perestroika.	   	   Many	  others	   expressed	   the	   feeling	   that	   “stories	   about	   perestroika	   look	   much	   more	  impressive	   on	   paper	   than	   in	   real	   life.”	  2	  	   While	   newspapers	   and	   Party	   meetings	  exhorted	  workers	  to	  form	  “family	  brigades,”	  push	  for	   increased	  productivity,	  and	  embrace	   perestroika,	   for	   many	   the	   whole	   project	   seemed	   largely	   opaque.	   	   As	  Chapter	  Two	  has	  shown,	  moreover,	   for	  many	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  there	  seemed	  little	  obvious	  reason	  for	  reform:	  on	  its	  face,	  the	  system	  was	  working.	  Faced	  with	  another	  reform	   program	   of	   unclear	   impact,	   Soviet	   citizens	   in	   both	   Dushanbe	   and	   many	  other	  cities	  seemed	  most	  likely	  to	  greet	  the	  call	  for	  reform	  with	  a	  simple	  shrug.	  	  It	   was	   this	   pan-­‐Soviet	   passivity	   that	   Mikhail	   Gorbachev	   aimed	   to	   overcome	  through	  his	  calls	  for	  mass	  participation	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  perestroika.	  	  By	  engaging	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A.	  Ziborov,	  	  “Skol’ko	  ni	  povtorai	  ‘khalva’,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  October	  6,	  1988.	  2	  Dil’bar	  Aminova,	  Dmitrii	   Karatygin,	   and	   Simon	  Rozenblat,	   “Pogovorim	  nachistotu,”	   in	  Partkom	  i	  
perestroika,	  ed.	  A.	  Rudenko	  (Dushanbe:	  Irfon,	  1990),	  61-­‐63.	  	  
	  	   120	  
the	  Soviet	  populace	   in	  his	  reform	  program,	  moreover,	  he	  believed	  he	  could	  tamp	  down	  the	  conservative	  forces	  in	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  which	  he	  felt	  were	  holding	  back	   economic	   reform	   (see	   Chapter	   Four).	   From	   1987	   on,	   Gorbachev	   began	   to	  strenuously	  call	  for	  “glasnost”	  (openness)	  and	  “democratization,”	  the	  two	  pillars	  of	  what	   would	   become	   his	   broader	   program	   of	   political	   reform.	   	   Although	  Gorbachev’s	   turn	   to	   political	   reform	   has	   often	   been	   represented	   by	   Western	  commentators	   as	   an	   ideological	   choice	   in	   favor	  of	  democracy	  and	  pluralism,	   this	  chapter	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  the	   initial	  push	  was	  far	   from	  democratic	  and	  more	  calculating	   than	   liberal.3	  	   Glasnost	   and	   democratization	   were	   at	   least	   partially	  intended	   to	   undermine	   Party	   authority	   and	   bypass	   its	   control	   over	   economic	  decision	  making	  by	   introducing	  new	  pro-­‐perestroika	  politicians	   and	  movements.	  	  By	   publicly	   criticizing	   Party	   bureaucrats	   and	   creating	   a	   new	   political	   body,	   the	  popularly	   elected	   Congress	   of	   People’s	   Deputies,	   Gorbachev	   thought,	   he	   could	  finally	  get	  perestroika	  to	  work.	  	  In	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  where	  both	  average	  citizens	  and	  political	  elites	  were	  skeptical	  of	  the	  need	  for	  change,	  glasnost	  and	  democratization	  found	  little	  initial	  support.	  This	  led	  to	  concerted	  efforts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Moscow	  politicians	  to	  foment	  glasnost-­‐style	  criticism	   and	   the	   development	   of	   new	   political	   movements,	   which	   slowly	   but	  inevitably	  helped	  to	  develop	  a	  rich	  local	  political	  sphere.	  	  Rather	  than	  representing	  an	   upwelling	   of	   long-­‐suppressed	   anger	   and	   frustration	   with	   the	   Soviet	   system,	  however,	   these	   new	   movements	   were	   often	   initially	   state-­‐promoted	   and	  frequently	  very	  tentative	  in	  their	  claims.	  	  They	  were	  also	  overwhelmingly	  focused	  on	  the	  deteriorating	  state	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy,	  only	  turning	  to	  religion,	  history,	  and	   language	   as	   ways	   of	   building	   support	   for	   their	   political	   platforms.	   	   This	  narrative	  helps	  to	  counter	  discourses	  that	  have	  frequently	   linked	  perestroika-­‐era	  political	  movements	   in	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   to	   simmering	   nationalism	   and	   inter-­‐ethnic	  frustrations	  kept	   just	  under	   the	  surface	  by	  Soviet	  authoritarianism.4	  	   Instead	  of	  a	  socially	  driven	  outburst	  of	  anger,	   in	  Tajikistan	  glasnost	  and	  democratization	  took	  the	   form	   of	   a	   slow	   and	   contradictory	   wave	   of	   criticism	   against	   the	   same	  authorities,	  local	  and	  central,	  that	  were	  promoting	  change.	  	  Only	  as	  time	  went	  on	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 	  For	   Western	   views	   on	   Gorbachev’s	   promotion	   of	   democracy	   and	   pluralism,	   see	   Kotkin,	  
Armageddon	  Averted;	  English,	  Russian	  and	  the	  Idea;	  Brown,	  The	  Gorbachev	  Factor.	  4	  Cf.	  Roy,	  The	  New	  Central	  Asia;	  Dudoignon,	  and	  Qalandar,	  “They	  were	  all”;	  Poliakov,	  Traditsionalizm	  
v	  sovremennom.	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and	  as	  the	  underlying	  problem	  of	  a	  collapsing	  economy	  went	  unresolved	  –	  would	  this	  wave	  begin	  to	  threaten	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  political	  order	  in	  Dushanbe.	  	  	  x	   	   x	  x	  	  Directed	  mass	  participation	   in	  Soviet	  politics	  was	  something	   that	  Gorbachev	  had	  spoken	   about	   since	   arriving	   in	   the	   offices	   of	   the	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	  Communist	   Party	   in	   early	   1985.	   	   Far	   too	   rarely,	   he	   harangued	   his	   Politburo	  colleagues,	  were	  local	  Party	  committees	  informing	  the	  Soviet	  people	  about	  political	  decisions;	  far	  too	  infrequently	  were	  they	  concerned	  at	  all	  about	  public	  opinion.5	  	  In	  his	   opening	   speech	   at	   the	   27th	   Congress	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   in	   February	   1986,	   he	   spoke	   forcefully	   of	   the	   need	   for	   “an	   active	   social	  policy…and	  the	  deepening	  of	  socialist	  democracy.”6	  It	  was	  only	  after	  perestroika’s	  initial	  “stalling	  out”	  (probuksovka)	  in	  late	  1987	  and	  early	  1988,	  however,	  that	  the	  exact	   contours	   of	   this	  mass	   participation	   began	   to	   take	   shape.	   	   Since	   Gorbachev	  believed	  that	  perestroika’s	  failures	  were	  entirely	  the	  fault	  of	  entrenched	  Party	  and	  industrial	   interests,	   the	   solution	  was	   to	   bypass	   these	   interests	   and	   remove	   their	  authority	  over	   economic	  decision-­‐making.	   	  As	  he	   told	  a	  Politburo	  meeting	  at	   the	  end	  of	  1987:	  
	  
“At	   long	   last,	  we	  need	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  Party’s	  role	  as	  the	  
political	  avant-­‐garde	  and	  free	  it	  from	  inappropriate	  functions…Right	  now	  
the	   Party	   not	   only	   develops	   theory	   and	   politics	   and	   provides	   ideological	  
direction,	  but	  also	  directly	  manages	  everything.”7	  	  Freeing	   the	   Party	   from	   “inappropriate”	   functions,	   in	   Gorbachev’s	   view,	   meant	  giving	  authority	   to	   the	  economic	  actors	  he	   thought	   likely	   to	  support	  perestroika:	  enterprises	  and	  Soviet	  workers.	  Over	  the	  next	  two	  years,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  previously	   unshakable	   authority	   of	   the	   CPSU	   was	   undermined	   by	   a	   policy	   of	  “glasnost,”	   which	   encouraged	   criticism	   of	   Party	   structures,	   statements,	   and	  eventually	  even	  Soviet	  history.	   	   In	  addition,	  democratizing	  reforms	   introduced	  at	  the	  19th	  Party	  Conference	  in	  mid-­‐1988	  created	  a	  new	  political	  body,	  the	  Congress	  of	   Peoples’	   Deputies,	   and	   a	   new	   body	   of	   perestroika-­‐minded	   politicians.	   	   These	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  51,	  12.	  6 	  M.	   Gorbachev,	   	   “Politicheskii	   doklad	   Tsentral’nogo	   komiteta	   KPSS	   XXVII	   S’’ezdu	  Kommunisticheskoi	  partii	   Sovetskogo	  soiuza,”	   in	  XXVII	  S’’ezd	  Kommunisticheskoi	  partii	  Sovetskogo	  
soiuza,	   25	   fevrialia	   –	   6	   marta.	   	   Stenograficheskii	   otchet	   (Moscow:	   Izdatel’stvo	   politicheskoi	  literatury,	  1986),	  v.	  1,	  42.	  7	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  280.	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politicians	  proved	  unreliable	  and	  unpredictable,	  but	  their	  impact	  on	  undermining	  the	  role	  and	  authority	  of	  the	  Party	  in	  Soviet	  society	  was	  undeniable.	  	  In	  Tajikistan	  and	   across	   the	   USSR	   as	   a	   whole,	   moreover,	   the	   joint	   influence	   of	   glasnost	   and	  democratization	  served	   to	  shake	   the	  established	  order	  of	  Soviet	  politics,	  opening	  up	  space	  for	  an	  unheralded	  pluralism	  of	  ideas	  about	  how	  to	  escape	  the	  increasingly	  desperate	  state	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy.	  	  	  
	  
I.	  Glasnost	  While	  a	  central	  element	  of	  Gorbachev’s	  political	  reforms,	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  “glasnost”	  (lit.	  “openness”)	  defied	  clear	  definition.	  	  Openness	  might	  be	  interpreted	  in	   two	   different	   ways:	   either	   freedom	   of	   speech	   and	   the	   press	   and	   the	   end	   of	  censorship,	  or	  a	  change	  in	  Party	  policy	  requiring	  increased	  self-­‐criticism	  and	  open	  interaction	  with	  the	  Soviet	  polity.	  	  This	  opacity	  was	  only	  heightened	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  clear	  legal	  backing	  for	  glasnost.	  A	  draft	  law	  “On	  glasnost”	  was	  developed	  over	  the	  course	  of	  1987-­‐1988	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Academy	  of	  Sciences’	  Institute	  of	  State	  and	  Law,	   but	   was	   never	   formally	   adopted	   or	   even	   supported	   with	   any	   fervor	   by	  Gorbachev.8	  	   With	   no	   obvious	   legal	   boundaries	   to	   glasnost,	   many	   Western	   and	  post-­‐Soviet	   authors	   have	   argued	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   first	   interpretation,	   emphasizing	  the	   explosion	   of	   critical	   and	   even	   anti-­‐Soviet	   and	   anti-­‐Party	   material	   that	   was	  published	  in	  Moscow	  after	  1987.9	  Yet	  the	  evidence	  for	  this	  argument	  is	  scarce:	   in	  Moscow	   and	   Dushanbe	   alike	   there	   was	   often	   little	   to	   indicate	   a	   true	   wave	   of	  “freedom	   of	   speech,”	   and	   Soviet	   censorship	   remained	   alive	   and	  well	   until	   1990,	  when	   it	   was	   finally	   overturned	   by	   a	   new	   Soviet	   “Law	   on	   the	   Press”	   [Zakon	   o	  
pechati].10	  	  In	  the	  1980s,	  censorship	  in	  the	  USSR	  was	  overseen	  by	  the	  Central	  Administration	  for	   the	   Protection	   of	   State	   Secrets	   in	   Publication,	   or	   “Glavlit.”	   Glavlit’s	   reviewed	  newspapers,	   journals,	   and	   other	   publications	   before	   and	   after	   their	   printing	   to	  ensure	  that	  material	  was	   in	  accordance	  with	  Soviet	  political,	  ethical,	  and	  military	  regulations.	   	   Until	   1990,	   it	   continued	   to	   fulfill	   these	   functions,	   and	   its	   censors	  continued	  to	  sit	  in	  the	  offices	  of	  most	  Soviet	  publications.	  	  The	  start	  of	  glasnost	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  On	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Law	  “On	  glasnost”	  and	  its	  provisions,	  see	  Yuri	  Baturin,	  	  “Popytka	  glasnosti:	  k	  istorii	  zakonodatel’noi	  neudachi,”	  Trudy	  po	  intellektual’noi	  sobstvennosti	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2009).	  9	  See,	  for	  example,	  Beissinger,	  Nationalist,	  59;	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  “Mirbobo	  Mirrahim:	  peshtozi	  harakati	  istiqlolkhohy,”	  Ozodagon,	  March	  15,	  2017.	  10	  GARF	  f.	  9425,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  1093,	  l.	  14	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1987	  actually	  saw	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  Glavlit	  budget,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  move	  to	  limit	  the	  agency’s	  authority.	  11	  	   Instead,	   there	  was	  a	   late	  1987	  change	  to	   the	  content	  of	  censorship:	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   official	   “list	   of	   materials	   forbidden	   for	   open	  publication.”	   	  More	  than	  100	  topics	  of	  “a	  political	  nature”	  were	  removed,	  opening	  up	  space	  for	  the	  political	  campaign	  of	  glasnost.12	  	  	  Considering	  the	  changes	  to	  Glavlit,	  glasnost	  appears	  less	  a	  call	  to	  end	  censorship	  –	  and	   more	   a	   directive	   to	   broaden	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   uncensored	   and	   reveal	  previously	  hidden	  aspects	  of	  Party	  policy	  and	  history	   to	  criticism.	   	  From	  his	   first	  references	   to	   glasnost,	   Gorbachev	   frequently	   mentioned	   the	   need	   to	   accentuate	  attention	   on	   the	   Party’s	   “failures	   and	   oversights.”	  13	  	   By	   1987	   he	   was	   informing	  journal	  editors	  and	  Party	  propagandists:	  “There	  should	  not	  be	  any	  hidden	  themes	  (belykh	  piaten)	  in	  either	  history	  or	  literature.”	  14	  	  Leading	  journals	  and	  newspapers	  were	   sent	   numerous	   critical	   articles,	   suggestions,	   and	   leaks	   from	   the	   Ideological	  Division	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPSU.	  	  As	  Viktor	  Afanas’ev,	  then	  the	  editor	  of	  Pravda,	   later	  recalled,	  there	  was	  no	  obligation	  to	  print	  these	  articles	  –	  but	  they	  had	  been	  “approved”	  at	  the	  highest	   levels,	  which	  provided	  strong	  incentive	  to	  do	  so.	  15	  	   In	   other	   words,	   while	   it	   is	   undeniable	   that	   after	   1987	   Soviet	   society	   was	  flooded	  with	  a	  deluge	  of	  information	  critical	  of	  Stalinism,	  economic	  policy,	  national	  development,	  and	  many	  other	  topics,	  this	  flood	  was	  not	  a	  completely	  spontaneous	  upwelling.	   It	  was,	   contradictory	   as	   this	  may	  be,	   at	   least	   partially	   directed	  by	   the	  very	  Party	   it	  criticized.	   	  On	  the	  rare	  occasion	  when	  glasnost	  was	  used	  to	  criticize	  not	  the	  Party	  but	  perestroika	  itself	  –	  such	  as	  in	  the	  infamous	  Nina	  Andreeva	  affair	  –	  the	   Party’s	   almost	   outraged	   response	   tended	   to	   emphasize	   the	   policy’s	   directed	  nature.16	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  GARF	  f.	  9425,	  op	  2,	  d.	  1030,	  ll.	  7,	  11.	   	  12	  GARF	  f.	  9425,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  1030,	  l.	  2.	  	  13	  M.	  Gorbachev,	  	  “Politicheskii	  doklad	  Tsentral’nogo	  komiteta,”	  83.	  14	  	   Pis’mo	   V.	   Bushueva,	   redaktora	   otdela	   istorii	   zhurnala	   “Kommunist”	   ot	   24.03.1987.	   	   RGASPI	   f.	  599,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  993,	  l.	  189.	  	  15	  Afanas'ev,	  Chetvertaia	  vlast',	  8-­‐9.	  16	  On	  March	  13,	  1988	  the	  newspaper	  Sovetskaia	  Rossiia	  published	  Nina	  Andreeva’s	  letter	  entitled	  “I	  Cannot	   Compromise	   Principles”	   (Ne	  mogu	   postupat’sia	   printsipami),	   which	   heavily	   criticized	   the	  course	   of	   perestroika	   and	   glasnost.	   	   The	   Politburo	   then	   spent	   two	   full	   days	   discussing	   and	  declaiming	  the	  letter,	  resulting	  in	  a	  counter-­‐article	  by	  Yakovlev	  appearing	  in	  Pravda	  on	  April	  5	  and	  forced	   retraction	   in	   Sovetskaia	   Rossiia	   (Cherniaev,	   Veber,	   and	   Medvedev,	   V	   Politbiuro	   TsK	   KPSS,	  298-­‐306;	  	  “Printsipy	  perestroiki:	  revoliiutsionnost’	  myshleniia	  i	  deistvii,”	  Pravda,	  April	  5,	  1988).	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On	  balance,	  glasnost	  was	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  Party-­‐directed	  campaign	  to	  promote	  criticism	  of	  past	  and	  present	  Party	  activity	  to	  a	  degree	  previously	  forbidden.	  This	  was	   meant	   to	   both	   undermine	   the	   Party’s	   “inappropriate”	   control	   over	   the	  economy	  and	   to	  help	  Gorbachev	  and	  his	  supporters	   to	  cull	   those	  Party	  members	  who	  were	  skeptical	  of	  reform.	  	  As	  Yegor	  Ligachev	  has	  argued,	  Aleksandr	  Yakovlev’s	  role	   as	   head	   of	   the	   Ideological	   Division	   gave	   him	   the	   authority	   to	   appoint	   the	  editors	   of	   Party-­‐associated	   journals	   and	   newspapers,	   which	   he	   used	   to	   emplace	  those	  who	   supported	   his	   (and	   Gorbachev’s)	   vision	   of	   a	   less	   uniformly	   dominant	  Party.17	  	  As	  one	  particularly	  adept	  Western	  observer	  noted	  in	  1988,	  this	  increased	  criticism	   in	   the	   Soviet	   press	   was	   also	   an	   important	   “instrument	   of	   factional	  politics”:	  it	  provided	  Gorbachev,	  Yakovlev,	  and	  others	  with	  a	  tool	  to	  “oust	  one	  elite	  and	  to	  bring	  in	  another.”18	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  In	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   where	   glasnost	   had	   since	   the	   beginning	   been	   interpreted	   as	   a	  Moscow-­‐directed	  campaign,	  there	  was	  little	  evidence	  of	  its	  widespread	  acceptance.	  As	   one	   contemporary	   Tajik	   observer	   later	   put	   it,	   it	   was	   as	   if	   “the	   winds	   of	  perestroika	  just	  didn’t	  want	  to	  blow	  down	  to	  Tajikistan.”19	  Kahhor	  Mahkamov,	  the	  First	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   Tajikistan	   (CPT),	   frequently	   gave	   lip	  service	   to	   glasnost,	   but	   in	   practice	   there	  were	   few	   changes.20	  	   Throughout	   1987	  and	  early	  1988,	   even	  as	  Gorbachev	   criticized	   “stagnation”	   and	  pushed	   through	  a	  “rejuvenation”	   of	   the	   Party	   in	  Moscow,	   nothing	   seemed	   to	   happen	   in	   Dushanbe.	  	  Local	  newspapers	  stayed	  largely	  passive,	  criticizing	  individuals	  or	  elements	  of	  the	  Soviet	   system,	   but	   staying	   away	   from	   locally	   sensitive	   issues,	   such	   as	  collectivization,	   the	  1920s	  Basmachi	  movement,	  or	   the	  economic	  development	  of	  rural	   villages.21	  	   Rather	   than	   follow	   the	   central	   Party	   line	   and	   promote	   internal	  criticism,	  Tajik	  politicians	  acted	  as	   though	  nothing	  significant	  had	  changed.	   	  This	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  Ligachev,	  Zagadka	  Gorbacheva	  80-­‐81;	  Also	  Legostaev,	  Kak	  Gorbachev,	  149.	  18	  David	   E.	   Howell,	   “Soviet	   Glasnost:	   Definitions	   and	   Dimensions,”	   Current	   History	   87,	   no.	   531	  (1988):	  344.	  19	  Davlat,	  “Mirbobo	  Mirrahim:	  peshtozi.”	  20	  See	  Sultonov,	  Yoddoshthoi	  ziyoii	  Shuravy,	  501-­‐503;	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  178.	  	  21	  Critical	  material	   in	   1986-­‐1988	  was	   largely	   limited	   to	   exposés of	   how	   reforms	  were	   not	   being	  implemented	   or	   how	   certain	   politicians	   had	   failed	   to	   “rebuild	   their	   approach	   to	   work”	  (perestraivat’sia).	   	   See,	   for	   example:	   “V	   storone	   ot	   perestroiki	   –	   poka	   nakhoditsia	   vakhshskaia	  raionnaia	   partiinaia	   organizatsiia,”	   Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana	   August	   22,	   1986;	   N.	   Gadoev,	   “Gde	  buksuet	  samookupaemost?”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  January	  15,	  1988.	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was	   particularly	   obvious	   to	   those	   travelling	   between	   Dushanbe	   and	   the	   Soviet	  capital.	  The	  Party	  worker	  D.A.	  Ashurov	  observed	  that:	  
	  
“I	  was	  working	  in	  Moscow	  in	  the	  CPSU	  Central	  Committee	  Apparatus,	  and	  
then	  I	  was	  invited	  in	  1988	  to	  work	  as	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  
Central	   Committee	   Ideological	   Division	   head.	   	   I	   had	   felt	   what	   sort	   of	  
processes	  were	  occurring	  in	  the	  country,	  but	  having	  arrived	  here,	  it	  was	  as	  
if	  I	  had	  fallen	  into	  a	  completely	  different	  environment…I	  tried	  to	  get	  work	  
done	  [on	  glasnost],	  but	  everything	  failed.”	  22	  
	  This	  lack	  of	  forward	  movement	  on	  glasnost	  was	  certain	  to	  have	  irked	  its	  architects	  in	   Moscow,	   most	   especially	   glasnost’s	   central	   advocate,	   Aleksandr	   Yakovlev.	   	   In	  early	  April	  1987,	  Yakovlev	  arrived	   in	  Dushanbe,	  nominally	   to	   speak	  on	  behalf	   of	  the	  Politburo	  at	  a	  CPT	  Central	  Committee	  Plenum	  on	  April	  7.	  	  There,	  he	  repeatedly	  criticized	   the	   local	   party	   for	   its	   “inertia,	   psychological	   conservatism,	   and	   social	  apathy.”23	  	  Behind	  closed	  doors	  he	  was	  especially	  harsh:	  “No	  matter	  the	  question,	  there	   are	   everywhere	   delays,	   everywhere	   dereliction…and	   the	   worst	   is	   that	  around	  these	  problems	  there	  is	  only	  talk	  and	  no	  progress.”	  24	  Moving	  forward	  with	  perestroika	   and	   glasnost,	   Yakovlev	   harangued	   the	   Tajik	   Communist	   Party’s	  leaders,	   meant	   overcoming	   the	   impulse	   to	   “keep	   things	   as	   they	   were,	   easy	   and	  familiar”	   and	   to	   embrace	   the	   need	   for	   change.	   	   In	   part,	   this	   meant	   promoting	  glasnost	   in	   Party	   work	   –	   but	   in	   part	   it	   also	   meant	   removing	   those	   Party	  functionaries	  who	  were	  opposed	  to	  change.	  	  “The	  approach	  taken	  to	  perestroika,”	  Yakovlev	   told	   the	  Plenum,	   “has	  been	  accepted	  as	   the	  central	   criteria	  by	  which	   to	  judge	  [Party]	  workers.”	  25	  	  	  Calls	  for	  personnel	  changes	  were	  disturbing	  for	  the	  conservative	  leadership	  of	  the	  Tajik	   SSR,	   which	   had	   done	   its	   best	   to	   avoid	   the	   turnover	   observed	   in	   other	  republics	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s.	  	  While	  Mahkamov	  had	  instigated	  some	  rearrangements	  since	   becoming	   First	   Secretary	   in	   1985,	   replacing	   half	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Communist	  Party’s	  Bureau	  and	  shuffling	  a	  number	  of	  cabinet	  ministers	  and	  local	  chairmen,	  the	  changes	  were	   nothing	   like	   those	   in	   Uzbekistan,	  where	  Moscow’s	   hand	   had	   been	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  TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1260,	   l.	   17.	   The	   filmmaker	   and	   politician	   Davlat	   Khudonazarov	   has	  reported	  similar	  feelings	  (Interview	  with	  Davlat	  Khudonazarov,	  Moscow,	  December	  2016).	  	  23	  “Vystuplenie	  A.N.	  Yakovleva,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  April	  8,	  1987.	  24	  Protokol	  sed'mogo	  plenuma	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  01	  avgusta	  1987	  goda,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  156,	  d.	  1957,	  l.	  34.	  	  25	  “Vystuplenie	  A.N.	  Yakovleva.”	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much	  heavier.26	  	  In	  Tajikistan,	  only	  the	  Second	  Secretary,	  Petr	  Luchinskii,	  had	  been	  sent	   from	   Moscow,	   with	   all	   other	   posts	   having	   been	   filled	   with	   local	   cadres.27	  	  Many	   of	   the	   “new”	   leaders	   in	   the	   CPT	   and	  Council	   of	  Ministers	   of	   the	  Tajik	   SSR,	  moreover,	  were	  hardly	  new	  at	  all:	  they	  had	  worked	  for	  years	  for	  the	  Tajik	  state	  or	  Party,	   simply	   in	   different	   positions.	   	   Further	   demonstrating	   the	   Tajik	   Party’s	  conservatism,	  three	  out	  of	  the	  republic’s	   four	  oblast	  Party	  Committee	  chairmen	  –	  Rif’’at	  Hojiev	  in	  Leninabad,	  A.K.	  Kasimov	  in	  Kurgan-­‐Tiube,	  and	  Salohiddin	  Hasanov	  in	  Kulyab	  –	  remained	  in	  their	  posts	  through	  1987.28	  	  Yakovlev’s	  vision	  for	  glasnost	  presented	  a	  significant	  challenge	  to	  this	  conservative	  core	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Communist	  Party.	  	  This	   conflict	   came	   into	   the	   open	   during	   Yakovlev’s	   last	   few	   days	   in	   Dushanbe,	  when	  he	  met	  with	  a	  group	  of	  local	  intelligentsia	  at	  the	  Tajik	  Academy	  of	  Sciences.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   leading	   CPT	   members,	   including	   Mahkamov,	   Luchinskii	   and	   the	  Bureau	   member	   Guljakhon	   Bobosadykova,	   a	   number	   of	   reform-­‐minded	  intellectuals	  were	  invited	  to	  speak,	  amongst	  them	  the	  poetess	  Gulurukhsor	  Safieva,	  the	   philosopher	   Akbar	   Tursun,	   and	   the	   controversial	   filmmaker	   Davlat	  Khudonazarov.	   	  Long	  a	  critical	  voice	  with	  an	  eye	   for	   the	  poverty	  of	  Tajik	  villages	  and	   the	   extremes	   of	   the	   Stalinist	   past,	   Khudonazarov	   had	   been	   elected	   a	   few	  months	   prior	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1986	   to	   the	   post	   of	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Union	   of	  Filmmakers.	   	   	   Since	   this	   position	   would	   automatically	   elevate	   him	   to	   candidate	  membership	  in	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT,	  his	  election	  was	  bitterly	  opposed	  by	  CPT	  conservatives,	  led	  by	  Bobosadykova,	  who	  felt	  his	  critical	  views	  should	  not	  be	   given	   a	   greater	   audience.	   	   Having	   brewed	   for	  months,	   the	   struggle	   exploded	  when	   Khudonazarov	   was	   given	   the	   floor	   at	   the	   Academy	   of	   Sciences.	   	   With	  Yakovlev’s	   approval,	   Khudonazarov	   excoriated	   Bobosadykova	   for	   her	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  While	   some	   accounts	   (cf.	   Karim	   Abdulov,	   Rohi	   Behbud	   (Dushanbe:	   Self-­‐published,	   1995),	   17)	  have	  accused	  Moscow	  of	  sending	  Russian	  or	  outsider	  Party	  workers	  to	  fill	  local	  posts,	  much	  as	  was	  done	  in	  1980s	  Uzbekistan,	  there	  is	  no	  contemporary	  evidence	  to	  support	  this	  claim.	  	  27	  Luchinskii	   arrived	   in	   Tajikistan	   in	   January	   1986	   from	   the	   Central	   Committee	   apparatus	   in	  Moscow	   (“Luchinskii,	   Petr	   Kirillovich,”	   Entsiklopediiai	   sovetii	   tojik	   (Dushanbe:	   Akademiiai	   fanhoi	  RSS	  Tojikiston,	  1988),	  v.	  8,	  540).	  	  	  	  28	  Hojiev	  retired	  in	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1987	  at	  the	  age	  of	  61	  after	  15	  years	  as	  First	  Secretary	  in	  Leninabad	  Oblast	   (“Hojiev,	   Rif’’at,”	  Entsiklopediiai	   sovetii	   tojik	   (Dushanbe:	   Akademiiai	   fanhoi	   RSS	   Tojikiston,	  1988),	  v.	  8,	  413);	  Kasimov	  remained	   in	  his	  post	  until	  May	  1988	  (see,	   for	  example,	  “Postanovlenie	  vos’mogo	   plenuma	   Kurgan-­‐Tiubinskogo	   oblastnogo	   komiteta	   Kompartii	   Tadzhikistana,”	   Kurgan-­‐
Tiubinskaia	  Pravda,	  April	  21,	  1988);	  Hasanov	  was	  removed	  in	  March	  1988	  (RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  157,	  d.	  1912,	   l.	   133-­‐136).	   	   The	   First	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Gorno-­‐Badakhshan	  Autonomous	  Oblast,	  Mukhitdin	  Zairov,	  was	   the	   only	   one	   replaced	   in	   early	   1987;	   he	   retired	   from	  his	   post	   that	  April	   (Aziia-­‐Plius,	  “Schast’e	  –	  byt’	  nuzhnym	  liudiam!”	  Asia-­‐Plus,	  February	  12,	  2016).	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conservatism	   and	   intransigence	   on	   allowing	   criticism	   of	   the	   party.29	  This	   sort	   of	  personal	  attack	  on	  a	  senior	  Party	  member	  was	  unheard	  of	  in	  Dushanbe:	  it	  seemed	  to	  many	   in	  the	  Party	  as	   if	   “anti-­‐Soviet	  activities”	  were	  being	  openly	  promoted	  by	  Moscow’s	  representative.	  30	  	  	  Yet	  Khudonazarov	  emerged	  the	  clear	  victor	  from	  the	  confrontation,	  with	  Bobosadykova	  “promoted”	  just	  a	  few	  months	  later	  to	  the	  post	  of	  Deputy	  Chairperson	  of	  the	  All-­‐Soviet	  “Znanie”	  (Knowledge)	  Society	  in	  Moscow.	  Recommended	  by	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  this	  transfer	  was	  obviously	  intended	  to	  remove	  Bobosadykova	   from	   the	  Tajik	  Party’s	   leadership.31	  	  The	   signal	  was	   clear:	  the	  CPT	  should	  expect	  intervention	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  in	  case	  it	  failed	  to	  follow	  the	  new	  Party	  line	  on	  glasnost.	  	  
II.	  Democratization	  As	   Yakovlev’s	   statements	   and	   actions	   in	   Dushanbe	   demonstrated,	   Moscow’s	  program	   of	   political	   reform	   went	   beyond	   internal	   Party	   criticism.	   	   It	   also	  envisioned	  transformations	  in	  Party	  staff	  and	  policy	  to	  bring	  forward	  those	  people	  as	   equally	   reform-­‐minded	   as	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors.	   	   It	   also	   demanded	  structural	   changes	   to	   the	   political	   order:	   the	   Party	  was	   still	   “overburdened	  with	  functions	  not	  inherent	  to	  it”	  –	  functions	  such	  as	  control	  over	  economic	  policy	  and	  reform. 32 	  	   	   Changes	   to	   Party	   regulations	   and	   administration	   required	   an	  extraordinary	  mandate,	  however,	  which	  Gorbachev	  aimed	  at	  by	  calling	   for	  a	  new	  All-­‐Union	  Party	  Conference,	   the	   first	   since	  February	  1941.	   (Much	   larger	   than	   the	  Party	   Congresses	   held	   each	   five	   years,	   a	   Party	   Conference	  was	   called	   irregularly	  and	   had	   greater	   constitutional	   authority.)	   	   Necessary	   for	   the	   “further	  democratization	   of	   the	   life	   of	   the	   party	   and	   of	   society	   as	   a	   whole,”33	  Gorbachev	  argued,	  the	  Conference	  would	  give	  new	  strength	  to	  perestroika’s	  reforms.	  A	  CPSU	  Central	  Committee	  Plenum	  duly	  approved	  Gorbachev’s	  request	   in	  June	  1987,	  and	  the	  19th	  Party	  Conference	  was	  scheduled	  for	  June	  1988.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Interview	  with	  an	  anonymous	  former	  member	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Communist	  Party’s	  Bureau,	  Dushanbe,	  July	  2016;	   Interview	  with	  Davlat	  Khudonazarov,	  Moscow,	  December	  2016;	  GAKRT,	  k.ia.	   I1	  03	  03,	  no.	  1-­‐13523.	  30	  Vladimir	  V.	  Petkel’,	  Zhiznennie	  ukhaby	  chekista	  (Donetsk:	  Astro,	  2010),	  145.	  31	  Protokol	  sed’mogo	  plenuma	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  01.08.1987	  goda,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  156,	  d.	  1957,	  l.	  130;	  Interview	  with	  an	  anonymous	  former	  member	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Communist	  Party's	  Bureau.	  32	  “Record	  of	  a	  Conversation	  of	  M.	  S.	  Gorbachev	  with	  President	  of	  Afghanistan,	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  CC	  PDPA	  Najibullah,”	   June	  13,	   1988,	  History	   and	  Public	   Policy	  Program	  Digital	  Archive,	   AGF.	  http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117252.	  	  33	  Quoted	   in	   Stephen	   White,	   “Gorbachev,	   Gorbachevism	   and	   the	   Party	   Conference,”	   Journal	   of	  
Communist	  Studies	  4,	  no.	  4	  (1988):	  128.	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  While	  heralded	   in	   the	  Soviet	  press	  as	  a	  victory	   for	  glasnost	  and	  democratization,	  the	   preparations	   for	   and	   elections	   to	   the	   19th	   Party	   Conference	   hardly	   differed	  from	   earlier	   Soviet	   elections.	   	   They	   remained	   largely	   undemocratic	   and	   planned	  from	  above,	  with	  candidates	  proposed	  by	  local	  Party	  committees	  passing	  through	  a	  vetting	  process	  on	  the	  regional	  and	  republican	  levels.34	  	  This	  allowed	  candidates	  to	  be	  judged	  and	  culled	  accordingly;	  as	  Gorbachev	  stated	  less	  than	  a	  week	  before	  the	  elections,	   “The	   principle	   political	   directive	   is	   to	   elect	   active	   supporters	   of	  perestroika	   to	   the	   conference.”35	  	   In	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   for	   example,	   the	   majority	   of	  proposed	   candidates	   were	   ultimately	   rejected	   by	   the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	  CPT,	  which	  accused	  many	   local	  Party	  organizations	  of	   “formalism”	  and	   “masking	  miscalculations	   and	   failures.”36	  	   Ultimately,	   33	   handpicked	   delegates,	   including	  many	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  leaders,	  were	  sent	  from	  the	  republic	  to	  join	  the	  5,000	  Party	  members	  gathered	  at	  the	  Party	  Conference	  in	  Moscow.37	  	  	  	  Provided	  with	  a	   loyal	  base	  of	  delegates	  at	   the	  Party	  Conference,	  Gorbachev	  faced	  minimal	   opposition	   to	   his	   proposals	   for	   “democratization”	   (democratizatsiia).	  Taken	  together,	  these	  proposals	  –	  and	  the	  resolutions	  passed	  by	  the	  Conference	  –	  called	  for	  a	  fundamental	  overhaul	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  party	  and	  state	  in	  the	  USSR.	   	  Previously,	   the	  CPSU,	   taking	  advantage	  of	   its	  “leading	  role”	   in	  society,	  had	  developed	   both	   political	   and	   economic	   policy,	   with	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet,	   as	   the	  USSR’s	   highest	   legislative	   body,	   essentially	   rubber-­‐stamping	   CPSU	   decisions	   and	  the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   implementing	   them.	   	   According	   to	   the	   Conference	  resolutions,	  this	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  case.	  	  A	  new	  legislative	  body,	  the	  Congress	  of	  Peoples’	  Deputies,	  would	  be	  created	  to	  democratically	  represent	  the	  will	  of	  the	  Soviet	  people;	  the	  Congress	  would	  then	  elect	  a	  new	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  which	  would	  dictate	  policy	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers.	  	  The	  Party	  itself	  would	  back	  off	  from	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Aryeh	  L.	  Unger,	  “The	  Travails	  of	  Intra-­‐Party	  Democracy	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  The	  Elections	  to	  the	  19th	  Conference	  of	  the	  CPSU,”	  Soviet	  Studies	  43,	  no.	  2	  (1991).	  35	  “Cherez	   Demokratizatsiiu	   –	   k	   novomu	   obliku	   sotsializma.	   	   Vstrecha	   v	   Tsentral’nom	   Komitete	  KPSS,”	  Pravda,	  May	  11,	  1988.	  36 	  For	   the	   selection	   process,	   see	   “Informatsionnoe	   soobshchenie	   o	   X	   plenume	   Tsentral’nogo	  Komiteta	   Kommunisticheskoi	   partii	   Tadzhikistana,”	  Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana,	   May	   22,	   1988;	   on	  the	   Party’s	   criticism,	   I.K.	   Kalandarov,	   Vsesoiuznaia	   partiinaia	   konferentsiia	   –	   demokratizatsiia	  
partiinoi	  zhizni	  (Dushanbe:	  Znanie,	  1988),	  11.	  	  37	  “Gruppa	   delegatov	   iz	   Tadzhikistana	   –	   uchastniki	   XIX	   vsesoiuznoi	   partkonferentsii,	   Moskva,”	  GAKRT,	  k.ia.	  I1	  06	  01,	  no.	  0-­‐107642;	  “Delegaty,	  isbrannye	  na	  XIX	  vsesoiuznuiu	  konferentsiiu	  KPSS	  ot	  Tadzhikskoi	  respublikanskoi	  partorganiatsii,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  May	  22,	  1988.	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day-­‐to-­‐day	   operations	   of	   the	   state	   (and	   most	   especially	   the	   economy):	   its	   staff	  would	  be	  cut,	  its	  oversight	  functions	  limited,	  and	  its	  authority	  restricted.38	  	  By	   July	   1988	   the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   CPSU	   had	   certifed	   the	   Conference’s	  resolutions,	   leading	   to	   immediate	   and	   irrevocable	   changes	   to	   the	   Party	   and	   its	  control	  over	  Soviet	  society.	  	  	  Nearly	  40%	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee’s	  staff	  was	  cut,	  including	   600	   “senior	   staff	   members”	   (otvetstvennye	   rabotniki),	   who	   had	  previously	   been	   responsible	   for	   developing	   and	   implementing	   political	   and	  economic	  policy.39	  In	  early	  1989,	  moreover,	  the	  Central	  Committee	  Apparatus’	  26	  Divisions	   (otdely)	   and	   Committees	   were	   consolidated	   into	   8	   Divisions,	   one	  Committee,	  and	  the	  Central	  Committee’s	  Administration	  (upravlenie	  delami).	  	  	  Lost	  in	  the	  shuffle	  were	  the	  seven	  Divisions	  that	  had	  answered	  for	  particular	  elements	  of	   the	   Soviet	   economy:	   the	   Division	   of	   Heavy	   Industry,	   the	   Division	   of	   Machine	  Building,	  The	  Division	  of	  Agricultural	  Machine	  Building,	   the	  Division	  of	  Chemical	  Industry,	   the	   Division	   of	   Light	   Industry	   and	   Consumer	   Goods,	   the	   Division	   of	  Construction,	   and	   the	  Division	   of	   Transport	   and	   Communications.40	  	   In	   line	  with	  Gorbachev’s	   vision	   to	   remove	   “inappropriate	   functions”	   from	   the	   Party,	   these	  divisions	  were	  not	  added	  to	  one	  of	  the	  10	  new	  units,	  but	  instead	  simply	  abolished.	  	  	  This	   had	   an	   immediate	   effect	   on	   the	   Central	   Committee’s	   ability	   to	   oversee	  economic	  policy,	  a	  situation	  that	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  decision	  to	  create	  a	  series	  of	   “CPSU	   Central	   Committee	   Commissions	   for	   key	   areas	   of	   internal	   and	  international	   policy.”	  41	  	   These	   commissions,	   operating	   parallel	   to	   the	   existing	  Central	  Committee	  Secretariat	  (made	  up	  of	  Division	  heads),	  took	  over	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  business	  of	  Party	  policy-­‐making	  and	  oversight.	  The	  Secretariat	   subsequently	  failed	   for	  meet	   for	  more	   than	   a	   year	   from	   September	   1988	   to	   September	   1989;	  when	  it	  began	  meeting	  again	  it	  did	  so	  infrequently.42	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  White,	  “Gorbachev,	  Gorbachevism,”	  154-­‐157.	  39	  Otchet	  o	  rabote	  partiinogo	  komiteta	  apparata	  TsK	  KPSS	  i	  zadachi	  partiinoi	  organizatsii	  v	  novykh	  usloviiakh	  deiatel’nosti	  apparata,	  RGANI	  f.	  74,	  op.	  6,	  d.	  286,	  l.	  84.	  40	  RGANI	   f.	   74,	   op.	   6,	   d.	   286,	   ll.	   149,	   154;	   “Zapiska	   t.	   Gorbacheva	   M.S,	   ot	   24	   avgusta	   1988	   g.	   ‘K	  voprosu	  o	  reorganizatsii	  partiinogo	  apparata,”	  Izvestiia	  TsK	  KPSS	  1,	  1989,	  86.	  	  For	  a	  representation	  of	   the	   pre-­‐reform	   structure	   of	   the	   Party	   and	   Central	   Committee,	   see	   Appendix	   II:	   Hierarchical	  Structure	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  	  41	  “V	  tsentral’nom	  komitete	  KPSS,”	  Izvestiia	  TsK	  KPSS	  1,	  1989,	  33.	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  commissions	  and	   their	   influence,	   see	   Stephen	   Kotkin,	   “Stealing	   the	   State,”	   New	   Republic,	   April	   13,	   1998;	  Legostaev,	  Kak	  Gorbachev,	  120.	  	  42	  Ligachev,	  Zagadka	  Gorbacheva,	  93,95.	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With	   the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   CPSU	   functionally	   out	   of	   the	  way,	   Gorbachev	  turned	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Congress	  of	  the	  People’s	  Deputies.	   	  A	  democratically	  elected	  parliament,	  the	  Congress	  was	  meant	  to	  become	  the	  highest	  legal	  authority	  in	   the	   USSR	   and	   legitimize	   the	   “transfer	   of	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   administrative	   functions	  over	   the	   economy	   from	   the	   various	   Central	   Committee	   Divisions	   to	   the	  government.”43	  	  In	  line	  with	  the	  resolutions	  approved	  at	  the	  19th	  Party	  Conference,	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  USSR	  passed	  both	  a	  new	  election	  law	  and	  constitutional	  amendments	  on	  December	  01,	  1988,	  which	  together	  created	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  the	  new	  democratic	  Congress.	   	  A	   total	  of	  2,250	  deputies	  were	   to	  be	  elected	   in	  multi-­‐candidate	   elections	   in	  March	  1989;	   of	   their	   total,	   1,500	  would	   be	   elected	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  open	  elections	  to	  individual	  mandates,	  while	  another	  750	  would	  be	  elected	  from	   various	   “social	   organizations”	   (obshchestvennye	   organizatsii),	   such	   as	   the	  Communist	  Party	  or	  the	  Writers’	  Union.44	  	  In	  turn,	  the	  Congress	  would	  elect	  a	  542-­‐member	   Supreme	   Soviet,	   which	   would	   act	   as	   the	   USSR’s	   factual	   parliament:	   in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Congress,	  which	  would	  meet	  only	   intermittently,	   it	  would	  sit	  on	  a	  permanent	   basis,	   taking	   over	   the	   business	   of	   political	   and	   economic	   policy-­‐making.45	  	  	  	  When	   elections	   took	   place	   in	  March	   1989,	   they	   proved	  markedly	   different	   from	  earlier	   exercises	   in	   Soviet	   “democracy”	   –	   in	   many	   ways,	   they	   were	   actually	  democratic.	  	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  750	  seats	  delineated	  to	  organizations	  were	  contested	  by	  only	  one	  candidate,	  the	  opposite	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  1,500	  directly	  elected	   mandates.	   	   Here,	   only	   380	   seats	   (25%)	   had	   only	   one	   candidate	   up	   for	  election;	   in	   all	   others	   at	   least	   two	   (and	   often	   many	   more)	   candidates	   actively	  campaigned	   amongst	   the	   population	   for	   votes. 46 	  	   	   More	   strikingly,	   many	  Communist	  Party	  candidates	  lost.	  	  Hamstrung	  by	  official	  Party	  directives	  dictating	  “democratization”	   and	   “non-­‐interference,”	   local	   Party	   officials	   and	   committees	  were	  often	  unsure	  how	  to	  promote	  their	  own	  candidates	  and	  in	  practice	  withheld	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  “Zapiska	  t.	  Gorbacheva	  M.S,”	  84.	  	  44	  The	  1,500	  individual	  mandates	  were	  divided	  across	  the	  USSR	  by	  both	  population	  (750	  mandates)	  and	   republic	   and	   oblast	   (another	   750	   mandates).	   	   This	   was	   meant	   to	   equalize	   representation	  between	  regions	  with	  higher	  and	  lower	  populations.	  See	  A.V.	  Berezkin	  et	  al.,	  Vesna	  89:	  Geografiia	  i	  
anatomiia	  parlamentskikh	  vyborov	  (Moscow:	  Progress,	  1990).	  	  45	  Stephen	  White,	  “The	  Elections	  to	  the	  USSR	  Congress	  of	  People’s	  Deputies	  March	  1989,”	  Electoral	  
Studies	  9,	  no.	  1	  (1990).	  46	  Vedomosti	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  SSSR	  no.	  11,	  March	  15,	  1989,	  130.	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administrative	   leverage. 47 	  As	   a	   result,	   38	   regional	   and	   district	   Party	   first	  secretaries	  lost	  their	  elections,	  and	  a	  full	  13%	  of	  the	  elected	  Congress	  was	  made	  up	  of	  non-­‐Party	  members.48	  	  	  	  Levels	  of	  “democratization”	  in	  the	  election	  results	  did	  vary	  geographically.	   	  In	  the	  Tajik	   SSR,	   numerous	   territorial	   mandates	   had	   only	   a	   single	   candidate,	   and	   on	  average	   slightly	   less	   than	   two	   candidates	   contested	   any	   one	   constituency.	  49	  In	  addition,	  although	  57	  deputies	  were	  elected	  from	  Tajikistan	  to	  the	  Congress,	  only	  20	  came	  from	  open	  elections	  for	  individual	  mandates.	  The	  remaining	  37	  had	  been	  elected	   from	   the	   republic’s	   “social	  organizations.”	   	  This	  helped	   to	   skew	   the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	   deputies	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   ruling	   elite:	   54%	   of	   the	   republic’s	   deputies	   were	  party	   leaders,	   party	   workers,	   or	   managers	   of	   state	   institutions.	   	   Another	   27%	  represented	  members	  of	   the	  “intelligentsia,”	  and	  only	  16%	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  working	  class.50	  	  Leading	  members	  of	  the	  CPT	  and	  republican	  government	  elected	  to	   the	  Congress	   included	  Kahhor	  Mahkamov,	   the	  First	  Secretary	  of	   the	  CPT,	  Petr	  Luchinskii,	   the	   Second	   Secretary,	   Jamshed	   Karimov,	   Dushanbe	   City	   Committee	  First	  Secretary,	  Goibnazar	  Pallaev,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   Izatullo	   Khayoev,	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Council	   of	  Ministers,	  and	  Vakhob	  Vakhidov,	  Khayoev’s	  First	  Deputy	  and	  also	  a	  member	  of	  the	  CPT	  Bureau.51	  	  Unsurprisingly,	   the	  Tajik	  delegation	   to	   the	  Congress	  showed	   little	  initiative,	   overwhelmingly	   supporting	   Gorbachev’s	   proposals	   –	   including	   the	  latter’s	  election	  to	  the	  post	  of	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet.	  For	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   the	   Congress	   seemed	   little	   more	   than	   a	   necessary	   step	   to	  reestablishing	  their	  legal	  authority	  in	  the	  new	  order.	   	  While	  hardly	  saying	  a	  word	  throughout	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  First	  Congress	  of	  People’s	  Deputies	  (May	  25-­‐June	  9,	  1989),	  both	  Mahkamov	  and	  Pallaev	  were	  summarily	  elected	  to	  the	  new	  Supreme	  Soviet.52	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Ligachev,	  Zagadka	  Gorbacheva,	  76.	  48	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika,	  284;	  White,	  “The	  Elections	  to	  the	  USSR,”	  63.	  49	  Berezkin,	  et	  al.,	  Vesna	  89,	  115,	  graphic	  3-­‐5;	  118,	  table	  3-­‐4.	  50	  Ibid.;	  also	  179,	  table	  5-­‐4.	  51	  All	  three	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  oblast	  committee	  first	  secretaries	  –	  Sohibnazar	  Beknazarov	  in	  GBAO,	  Izatullo	  Khalimov	  in	  Khatlon,	  and	  Temurbai	  Mirkhalikov	  in	  Leninabad	  –	  as	  well	  as	  Talbak	  Nazarov,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  Education	  Minister	  and	  Georgii	  Koshlakov,	  Deputy	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	   were	   also	   deputies.	   See:	   Pervyi	   s’’ezd	   narodnykh	   deputatov,	   v.	   1-­‐6;	   “Spisok	   narodnykh	  deputatov	   SSSR,	   izbrannykh	   ot	   territorial’nykh,	   natsional’no-­‐territorial’nykh	   okrugov	   i	   ot	  obshchestvennykh	  organizatsii,”	  Izvestiia,	  April	  05,	  1989,	  2-­‐12.	  52	  Pervyi	  s’’ezd	  narodnykh	  deputatov,	  v.	  1,	  211-­‐216;	  243-­‐251.	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A	  few	  intellectuals	  inclined	  towards	  reform	  and	  sympathetic	  to	  Yakovlev’s	  calls	  for	  increased	   criticism	   of	   the	   Party	  were	   all	   the	   same	   elected	   to	   the	   Congress	   from	  Tajikistan.	   	  Notable	  amongst	  them	  were	  the	  poets	  Gulrukhsor	  Safieva	  and	  Mumin	  Kanoat,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   filmmaker	  Khudonazarov.	   	  Already	   infamous	   in	  Dushanbe	  for	  his	  attack	  on	  Bobosadykova,	  Khudonazarov	  found	  himself	  nominated	  for	  one	  of	  the	  territorial	  mandates	  in	  his	  native	  Khorog	  in	  the	  east	  of	  Tajikistan.	  	  The	  central	  authorities	   in	   Dushanbe	   “put	   pressure	   on	   people	   not	   to	   vote	   for	   me,”	  Khudonazarov	   later	   recalled:	   “They	   even	   sent	   a	   delegation	   with	   Pallaev	   to	  campaign	  against	  me.”	   	  These	  efforts,	  however,	  had	  no	  effect,	   and	  Khudonazarov	  was	   elected	   to	   the	   Congress.53	  	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   small	   group	   of	   Tajik	  reformers	  faced	  an	  upward	  battle	  bringing	  their	  chosen	  issues	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  Safieva	  and	  Kanoat	  were	   elected	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet,	   but	   Khodonazarov	   remained	   in	  the	   mass	   of	   the	   Congress;	   all	   three	   of	   them	   struggled	   throughout	   1989	   to	   gain	  speaking	   time	   during	   the	   Congress’	   sessions.54	  	   In	   Dushanbe,	   moreover,	   they	  lacked	  support.	  	  The	  politics	  of	  glasnost	  and	  democratization	  had	  produced	  its	  first	  alternative	  Tajik	  politicians	  –	  but	  had	  yet	   to	  prepare	  a	  ready	  political	  base	   in	  the	  Tajik	  republic.	  	  
III.	  Glasnost	  and	  Democratization’s	  Delayed	  Arrival	  in	  Tajikistan	  Inevitably,	  though,	  the	  winds	  of	  perestroika	  were	  slowly	  making	  their	  way	  down	  to	  the	   Tajik	   SSR.	   	   Both	   individual	   efforts	   like	   Yakovlev’s	   and	   the	   broader	   political	  changes	  on	  display	   in	  Moscow	  were	  having	  an	   incremental	  but	  slowly	  noticeable	  effect	  upon	   life	   in	  Tajikistan.	   	  Still	  very	  much	  part	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Tajikistan	  could	   resist	   centrally	   promoted	   reform	   only	   for	   so	   long.	   	   	   At	   first,	   the	   impact	   of	  glasnost	   and	   democratization	   occurred	   behind	   the	   closed	   doors	   of	   the	   CPT	   and	  went	  unseen	  by	  the	  majority	  of	   the	  Tajik	  public.	   	   In	   line	  with	  the	  CPSU’s	  broader	  reorganization,	  the	  CPT	  was	  required	  to	  shed	  hundreds	  of	  party	  workers	  per	  year,	  reducing	  its	  total	  staff	  by	  nearly	  40%	  by	  1990.	  	  In	  addition,	  by	  early	  1988	  all	  four	  of	  the	  republic’s	  oblast	  first	  secretaries	  had	  been	  replaced,	  along	  with	  59%	  of	  district	  and	   city	   first	   secretaries.	  55	  	   In	   part	   this	   seemed	   to	   have	   been	   driven	   by	   normal	  personnel	   turnover	   –	   Leninabad’s	   Khojiev	   and	   GBAO’s	   Zairov	   quietly	   retired	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Interview	  with	  Davlat	  Khudonazarov,	  Moscow,	  December	  2016.	  54	  Pervyi	  s’’ezd	  narodnykh	  deputatov,	  v.	  1,	  211-­‐216;	  243-­‐251.	  	  55	  Otchet	   biuro	   TsK	   Kompartii	   Tadzhikistana	   o	   rabote	   po	   rukovodstvu	   perestroiki	   v	   respublike,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  156,	  d.	  1958,	  l.	  225.	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during	  this	  period	  after	  long	  Party	  careers	  –	  but	  Moscow’s	  push	  for	  more	  open	  and	  effective	   Party	   work	   also	   began	   to	   be	   felt	   here	   as	   well.	   	   A.K.	   Kasimov,	   the	   First	  Secretary	  of	   the	  Kurgan-­‐Tyube	  Oblast	  Committee,	   lost	  his	   job	   in	  May	  1988	  when	  the	  Kurgan-­‐Tyube	   and	  Kulyab	  Oblasts	  were	   combined	   into	   the	  Khatlon	  Oblast.56	  	  Based	  on	  “advice	  received	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPSU,”	  as	  stated	  by	  Goibnazar	  Pallaev,	   the	  unification	  of	   the	   two	  oblasts	  was	  meant	   to	   cut	   costs	   and	  overlapping	  staff	   in	   line	  with	  reforms	  to	  the	  CPSU	  and	  Soviet	  state.57	  	  This	  would	  have	  also	  cost	  the	  Kulyab	  First	  Secretary,	  Solihiddin	  Hasanov,	  his	  job	  as	  well	  –	  but	  he	  had	  already	  been	  arrested	  and	  removed	  from	  the	  Party	  in	  March	  1988	  as	  part	  of	  a	   broader	   Moscow-­‐backed	   anti-­‐corruption	   campaign. 58 	  	   	   State	   and	   Party	  “democratizing”	  reforms	  were	  beginning	  to	  be	  felt,	  with	  CPT	  leaders	  and	  staff	  alike	  finding	  themselves	  without	  their	  stable	  jobs	  of	  the	  past.	  	  With	   time,	   glasnost	   also	  began	   to	   creep	  out	   from	  behind	   the	   closed	  doors	  of	   the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan.	  	  Like	  everyone	  else	  in	  the	  USSR,	  citizens	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  were	  privy	   to	   central	   Soviet	  newspapers	   and	   television,	   both	  of	  which	  were	  filled	  with	  criticism	  of	  the	  Party	  and	  Soviet	  society.59	  	  Critical	  articles	  about	  life	  in	  Tajikistan	   from	   Izvestiia	   and	   Pravda	   were	   also	   increasingly	   reprinted	   in	   local	  newspapers.	   In	   June	   1987,	   for	   example,	   Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana	   reprinted	   a	  short	  article	  from	  Izvestiia	  about	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  some	  girls	  to	  finish	  school	  in	  Gissar	   in	   light	   of	   pressure	   to	   get	  married.60	  In	   January	  1988,	  moreover,	  Pravda’s	  Tajikistan	  correspondents	  harshly	  attacked	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	   the	  CPT	  for	  “imitating”	   the	   form	  of	   perestroika	  without	   “filling	   it	  with	   content	   in	   accordance	  with	  the	  spirit	  and	  demands	  of	  the	  time,”	  criticism	  that	  was	  also	  reprinted	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  149,	  d.	  234,	  l.	  1.	  Kurgan-­‐Tyube	  Oblast	  had	  only	  been	  formed	  in	  1977	  (GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  145,	  d.	  361,	  l.	  1)	  and	  would	  again	  be	  divided	  into	  its	  own	  oblast	  in	  January	  1990	  (TsGART	  f.	  1718,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  60,	  l.	  2).	  	  57	  For	  Pallaev’s	  comments,	  see	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  58.	   	  On	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  unification,	  see	  Mahkamov’s	   comments	   at	   an	   April	   29,	   1988	  meeting	   of	   the	   CPSU	   Politburo	   Commission	   on	   the	  “Perestroika”	  of	  State	  Agencies	  and	  Structures,	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  149,	  d.	  8,	  l.	  15.	  	  	  	  58	  Hasanov	   was	   accused	   in	   March	   1988	   of	   being	   “deeply	   corrupt”	   and	   taking	   bribes	   of	   350,000	  rubles	   (see	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	   and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	   243;	   also	  Protokol	  deviatogo	  plenuma	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  26.03.1988,	  RGASPI	   f.	   17,	   op.	   157,	   d.	   1912,	   ll.	   133-­‐136,	  157).	   After	   spending	   more	   than	   three	   years	   in	   jail,	   however,	   all	   charges	   against	   Hasanov	   were	  dropped	  in	  July	  1991	  (Ne''mat	  Bobodzhon,	  “Krakh	  'tadzhikskogo	  dela',”	  Biznes	  i	  politika,	  December	  25-­‐31,	  1993).	  	  Whether	  true	  or	  not,	  the	  accusations	  clearly	  seemed	  to	  be	  part	  of	  Moscow's	  attempt	  to	  “clean	  up”	  and	  “democratize”	  the	  Party	  in	  Central	  Asia.	  59	  Interview	  with	  residents	  of	  Dushanbe,	  February	  2015.	  60	  L.	  Mahkamov,	  “Ten’	  paradzhi,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  June	  9,	  1987.	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pages	   of	   Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana.61 	  This	   idea	   of	   “imitating”	   perestroika	   and	  glasnost	   highlighted	   the	   contradictory	   stance	   taken	   by	   the	   CPT	   leadership.	  	  Moscow	  had	  dictated	  that	  reform	  was	  necessary,	  and	  Dushanbe	  wished	  to	  remain	  loyal	  and	   follow	  this	  order.	   	  Yet	   there	  remained	   little	   local	  support	   for	  change	  or	  understanding	   as	   to	   why	   it	   was	   necessary:	   the	   CPT	   was	   left	   to	   go	   through	   the	  motions	  of	  being	  “critical”	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  being	  loyal.	  	  	  In	  January	  1988,	  however,	  the	  situation	  in	  Dushanbe	  began	  to	  change.	  	  It	  was	  then	  that	  glasnost	  finally	  found	  a	  truly	  local	  outlet	  in	  Tajikistan	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  article	  “To	  ba	  kai	  ob	  az	  tagi	  iakh	  meravad?”	  (Taj.	  “For	  how	  long	  will	  water	  flow	  under	   the	   ice?”)	   in	   the	   newspaper	  Komsomoli	  Tojikiston.62	  Written	   by	   the	   young	  philosopher	  Mirbobo	  Mirrahim,	  who	  had	  just	  a	  year	  before	  defended	  a	  dissertation	  in	  Moscow	  on	   religion	   and	   secular	   Soviet	   traditions,63	  “To	   ba	   kai	   ob	   az	   tagi	   iakh	  meravad?”	   brought	   together	   many	   of	   the	   issues	   that	   would	   come	   to	   dominate	  discourse	  in	  Tajikistan	  in	  the	  next	  few	  years.	  	  Built	  around	  a	  discussion	  about	  Tajik	  language	   and	   culture,	   Mirrahim’s	   article	   criticized	   the	   history	   of	   Tajikistan’s	  founding,	   the	   current	   state	   of	   the	   language,	   and	   the	   practices	   of	   regional	   Soviet	  development.	   	   As	   a	   result	   of	   Soviet	   “super-­‐internationalism”	   and	   “national	  nihilism,”	  Mirrahim	  argued,	  Tajikistan	  had	  lost	  its	  historical	  capitals	  of	  Samarkand	  and	  Bukhara	  to	  Uzbekistan	  in	  the	  1920s,	  was	  currently	  losing	  its	  national	  literary	  language,	  and	  in	  general	  was	  being	  held	  back	  in	  its	  development.	  	  	  	  Reactions	  to	  Mirrahim’s	  article	  were	  quick	  and	  emotional.	  	  This	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  its	   nominal	   topic	   –	   discussions	   about	   the	   state	   of	   the	   Tajik	   language	   were	   not	  entirely	  new	  –	  and	  much	  more	  to	  do	  with	  its	  framing.	  64	  	  In	  Mirrahim’s	  reading,	  the	  declining	   state	   of	   the	   Tajik	   language	   was	   just	   one	   representative	   aspect	   of	   the	  larger	  problem	  of	  Soviet	  development	  since	   the	  1920s.	   	   	  This	  brought	  out	  strong	  feelings	  among	   the	  Tajik	  elite.	  Karim	  Abdulov,	  who	   in	  1988	  was	  working	   for	   the	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  O.	  Latifi	  and	  V.	  Loginov,	  “Dushanbinskii	  urok,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  January	  05,	  1988.	  	  62	  Mirbobo	  Mirrahimov,	  “To	  ba	  kai	  ob	  az	  tagi	  iakh	  meravad?”	  Komsomoli	  Tojikiston,	  January	  6,	  1988.	  	  63	  M.	  Mirrahimov,	   “Rol’	   sovetskoi	   obriadnosti	   v	  preodolenii	   religioznykh	   traditsii	   (na	  materialakh	  respublik	  Srednei	  Azii)”	   (Dissertatsii	  na	  soiskanie	  stepeni	  kandidata	   filosofskikh	  nauk,	  Akademiia	  obshchestvennykh	  nauk	  pri	  TsK	  KPSS,	  Moscow,	  1987).	  64	  While	  Mirrahim	  has	  claimed	  that	  his	  argument	  was	  fundamentally	  new,	  the	  Tajik	  language	  issue	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  previously	  discussed.	   	  See:	  Salomiddin	  Mirzorakhmatov,	  Geroi	  –	  istinnye	  i	  
mnimye.	  Istoriia	  v	  litsakh	  (Astana:	  Self-­‐Published,	  2011),	  41;	  Davlat.	  “Mirbobo	  Mirrahim:	  peshtozi.”	  	  For	  Mirrahim’s	  position,	  see	  Mirboboi	  Mirrahim,	  Hamtabaqi	  Shodmon	  Yusupov	  va	  Khul’kar	  Yusupov	  
Pukid	  (Dushanbe:	  Bukhoro,	  2012),	  12-­‐13.	  
	  	   135	  
CPT	  Central	  Committee	   in	  Dushanbe,	   recalled	   intense	  discussions	  between	  Party	  workers	   after	   the	   article	   was	   published.	   	   For	   his	   own	   part,	   Abdulov	   “expressed	  personal	   feelings”	   in	   support	   for	   the	   article	   and	   its	   promotion	   of	   the	   Tajik	  language.	  65	  	  	  For	  many	  Tajik	  intellectuals	  and	  government	  employees	  like	  Abdulov,	  Mirrahim’s	   article	   struck	   a	   nerve,	   emphasizing	   issues	   of	   cultural	   and	   linguistic	  development	  that	  they	  felt	  ought	  to	  be	  discussed	  more	  openly.	  	  	  	  Official	   reactions	   were	   quite	   the	   opposite.	   	   The	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   CPT	  quickly	  condemned	  the	  article,	  as	  did	  the	  republican	  Komsomol,	  which	  published	  an	   article	   by	   its	   Ideological	   Division	   head,	   Zafar	   Saidov,	   who	   called	   Mirrahim	   a	  “dilatant”	  and	  his	  ideas	  dangerous.66	  	  In	  early	  February	  the	  newspaper	  Kommunist	  
Tadzhikistan	   also	   published	   a	   response	   to	   Mirrahim’s	   article	   by	   the	   journalist	  Khul’kar	  Yusupov,	   accusing	  Mirrahim	  of	   falsifications	   and	   “denouncing	  even	   that	  which	   doesn’t	   need	   to	   be	   denounced.”67 	  By	   February	   17,	   the	   Bureau	   of	   the	  republican	   Komsomol	   held	   a	   meeting	   to	   discuss	   Mirrahim’s	   article,	   which	   was	  officially	   declared	   to	   be	   “one-­‐sided”	   and	   “to	   be	   full	   of	   errors	   and	   irresponsible	  generalizations.”68	  	  The	  newspaper	  Komsomoli	  Tojikiston,	  which	  was	  overseen	  by	  the	   republican	   Komsomol,	   was	   reprimanded,	   and	   its	   editor,	   Ato	   Khojaev,	  summarily	   fired	   from	   his	   position.69	  	   Abdulov	   also	   lost	   his	   job	   in	   the	   Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT,	  a	  reprisal,	  he	  felt,	  for	  his	  support	  of	  the	  article.	  	  With	  its	  call	  for	   a	   reconsideration	   of	   Soviet	   history	   and	   republican	   territorial	   divisions,	  Mirrahim’s	   article	   opened	   up	   too	  many	   difficult	   questions	   that	   the	   leadership	   of	  the	   CPT	   was	   unprepared	   to	   answer.	   	   By	   discussing	   the	   status	   of	   Bukhara	   and	  Samarqand,	  it	  also	  threatened	  to	  ignite	  conflict	  with	  Uzbekistan,	  which	  Mahkamov	  was	  keen	  to	  avoid.70	  	  Altogether	  the	  republican	  leadership	  saw	  strong	  reason	  to	  try	  to	  stamp	  out	  Mirrahim’s	  ideas	  entirely.	  	  They	   were,	   however,	   too	   late.	   Over	   the	   next	   two	   years	   the	   ideas	   outlined	   by	  Mirrahim	  in	  his	  article	  would	  grow	  in	  scope	  and	  resonance	  in	  the	  Dushanbe	  press.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Abdulov,	  Rohi	  behbud,	  10-­‐13.	  	  66	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  “Mirbobo	  Mirrahim:	  Peshtozi	  harakati	  istiqlolkhohy,”	  Ozodagon,	  March	  29,	  2017.	  67	  Kh.	   Yusupov,	   “Tochka	   zreniia:	   a	   razve	   ledokhod	   ne	   nachalsya?”	   Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana,	  February	  03,	  1988.	  68	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  “Mirbobo	  Mirrahim:	  Peshtozi	  harakat	  istiqlolkhohy,”	  Ozodagon,	  April	  05,	  2017.	  	  	  69	  TadzhikTA,	  “V	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  March	  04,	  1988.	  70	  This	  did,	  in	  fact,	  lead	  to	  conflict,	  as	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Uzbek	  SSR	  reacted	  badly	  to	  Mirrahim’s	  and	  subsequent	  claims.	  	  See	  Nishanov,	  Derev’ia	  zeleneiut,	  254-­‐255.	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Critical	  articles	  and	  public	  discussions	  began	  to	  grow	  in	  number,	  on	  issues	  ranging	  from	   the	   role	   of	   Islam	   in	   perestroika-­‐era	   Tajikistan,71	  the	   state	   of	   the	   republic’s	  ecology,72	  the	   historical	   role	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   in	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,73	  and	   the	  slow	   pace	   of	   economic	   reform.74 	  	   More	   worrisome,	   this	   criticism	   frequently	  followed	  Mirrahim’s	  framing,	  and	  placed	  independent	  complaints	  within	  a	  broader	  disparagement	  of	  Soviet	  development	   in	  Tajikistan	  as	  a	  whole.	   	  The	  Roghun	  dam	  construction	   was	   critiqued	   for	   disregarding	   the	   local	   villagers	   whom	   it	   would	  displace,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  increased	  reliance	  on	  centralized	  funding	  it	  would	  require	  to	  complete.75	  The	  history	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  institutional	  establishment	  as	  a	  republic,	  “in	   serious	   need	   of	   historiographical	   analysis	   and	   generalization,”	   as	   the	   Tajik	  historian	  Rahim	  Masov	  wrote	   in	  1988,	   continued	   to	  be	   argued	  over.76	  And	  many	  writers	   questioned	   why	   Tajik	   villages	   were	   increasingly	   full	   of	   “sauntering	  mustachioed	   youth”	   without	   jobs	   when	   perestroika	   had	   seemed	   to	   offer	   the	  promise	  of	  increased	  economic	  development	  and	  employment.77	  	  There	   did	   seem	   something	   clearly	   wrong	   about	   Tajikistan’s	   trajectory.	   As	  perestroika	   picked	   up	   speed	   in	   1988	   and	   1989,	   many	   of	   the	   underlying	  contradictions	   in	   Tajikistan	   –	   in	   particular,	   the	   imbalance	   between	   demographic	  growth	  and	  available	   jobs	  and	   the	  republic’s	   reliance	  on	  other	  Soviet	   republics	  –	  began	  to	  grow	  both	  increasingly	  obvious	  and	  increasingly	  harsh.	  	  	  It	  was	  also	  clear	  that	   public	   interest,	   piqued	   as	   equally	   by	   growing	   economic	   hardship	   as	   by	  glasnost	  in	  Moscow	  and	  in	  the	  central	  press,	  was	  primed	  for	  greater	  participation	  in	   Gorbachev’s	   program	   of	   democratization.	   While	   all	   of	   the	   newspapers	   in	  Tajikistan	  remained	  government	  owned	  and	  operated	  throughout	  1988	  and	  1989,	  some	  quickly	  gained	  a	  reputation	  for	  their	  critical	  positions	  –	  and	  were	  rewarded	  by	   readers	  by	   sharp	   increases	   in	   circulation.	   	  The	  Tajik-­‐language	   literary	  weekly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  TadzhikTA,	   “Ateisticheskoe	   vospitanie:	   novye	   podkhody,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	   March	   18,	  1988;	  also	  Interview	  with	  Parviz	  Mullojanov,	  Dushanbe,	  January	  2017.	  72	  M.	  Georgiev,	  “Gde	  zhit’	  sazanu	  i	  fazanu?”	  Pamir	  39,	  no.	  6	  (1988).	  	  73	  I.	  Kalandarov,	  “Istina	  –	  bez	  prikras,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  October	  4,	  1988.	  74	  For	   example,	   see	   Kh.	   Kiyomiddinov,	   “Partkom	   i	   ekonomicheskaia	   reforma:	   ne	   kampaniia	   –	  programma	   na	   gody,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   October	   6,	   1988;	   Ivan	   Khlevniuk,	   “Nadeius’	   na	  podderzhku,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  January	  4,	  1989.	  75	  On	  the	  threat	  to	  local	  villages,	  see	  Otakhon	  Latifi,	  “Plotina,”	  Pravda,	  November	  11,	  1988.	  	  On	  the	  economic	   arguments	   made	   against	   Roghun	   by	   the	   reformist	   economists	   Tohir	   Abdujabbor	   and	  Hojimukhammad	   Umarov,	   see	   Gholib	   Ghoibov,	   Ta’’rikhi	   Khatlon	   as	   oghoz	   to	   imruz	   (Dushanbe:	  Donish,	  2006),	  637.	  76 	  R.M.	   Masov,	   Istoriia	   istoricheskoi	   nauki	   i	   istoriografiia	   sotsiolisticheskogo	   stroitel’stva	   v	  
Tadzhikistane	  (Dushanbe:	  Donish,	  1988),	  11.	  77	  Shodi	  Khanif,	  “Khoziaeva	  i	  nakhlebniki,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  January	  11,	  1987.	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Adabiyot	  va	  San’’at	  (“Literature	  and	  Culture”),	  the	  critical	  voice	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Union	  of	  Writers,	  more	   than	  doubled	   its	  circulation	  between	  1986	  and	  1989.78	  By	  early	  1989,	  moreover,	  frustration	  and	  criticism	  in	  Dushanbe	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  move	  beyond	   the	   restrictive	   pages	   of	   local	   newspapers	   and	   into	   the	   sphere	   of	   public	  activism,	  “informal”	  organizations,	  and	  even	  protest.	  	  
	  
IV.	  Democratization’s	  (Brief)	  Foray	  into	  the	  Dushanbe	  Streets	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  February	  24,	  1989	  a	  large	  group	  of	  predominantly	  young	  men	  gathered	   in	   front	  of	   the	  Tajik	   Supreme	  Soviet	   on	  Lenin	   Square	   in	  Dushanbe.	   	  By	  noon	   their	   number	   had	   reached	   around	   1,000,	   swelled	   by	   students	   from	   local	  universities.	   	   Organized	   in	   support	   of	   a	   law	   currently	   under	   discussion	   in	   the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  that	  would	  make	  Tajik	  the	  official	  state	  language	  of	  Tajikistan,	  the	  demonstration	   was	   alive	   with	   calls	   for	   change.	   	   “We	   are	   for	   perestroika!”	   the	  banners	   held	   by	   the	   students	   read;	   “We	   demand	   the	   resurrection	   of	   the	   ancient	  Tajik	   culture!” 79 	  	   While	   the	   demonstration	   remained	   calm	   throughout	   the	  afternoon,	  it	  was	  factually	  illegal:	  the	  organizers,	   including	  Mirrahim,	  had	  made	  a	  formal	   request	   to	   hold	   the	   demonstration	   only	   three	   days	   prior,	   while	   the	   law	  required	   all	   requests	   to	   be	  made	   ten	   days	   in	   advance.	   This	   left	   the	   Tajik	   state	   –	  both	   the	  police	   surrounding	   the	  demonstration	  and	   the	  parliamentarians	   insides	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  –	  unsure	  of	  how	  to	  react.	  	  Their	  confusion	  was	  only	  increased	  by	   their	   lack	   of	   experience	   with	   similar	   events.	   	   While	   other	   Soviet	   cities	   had	  experienced	   protests,	   demonstrations,	   and	   unrest	   in	   1988	   and	   1989,	   Tajikistan	  had	   retained	   its	   air	   of	   calm.	   	   In	   fact,	   the	   demonstration	   in	   front	   of	   the	   Supreme	  Soviet	  was	  the	  first	  in	  at	  least	  40	  years	  –	  since	  1945	  no	  comparable	  event	  had	  been	  recorded	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Adabiyot	  va	  San’’at’s	  circulation	  rose	  from	  37,200	  in	  1986	  to	  83,000	  in	  1989;	  see	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  155,	  d.	  2180,	  l.	  14;	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1706,	  l.	  40.	  	  79	  TadzhikTA,	  “Uchimsia	  demokratii:	  Miting	  na	  ploshchadi,”	  Kommunsit	  Tadzhikistana,	  February	  26,	  1989;	  A.	  Ganelin,	  “Skazhi	  mne	  po-­‐tadzhikski	  –	  brat,”	  Komsomolets	  Tadzhikistana,	  August	  25,	  1989.	  80	  According	  to	  data	  from	  the	  KGB,	  only	  one	  “disturbance”	  (besporiadok)	  was	  recorded	  in	  Tajikistan	  from	  1945-­‐1988:	  a	   large	  street	   fight	   in	  1985	  between	   local	  Tajiks	  and	  a	  group	  of	  Slavic	  outsiders	  (Spravka	   ot	   Predsedatelia	  KGB	  Chebrikova	  M.S.	   Gorbachevu	  ot	   04.03.1988.	   	   APRF	   f.3,	   op.	   108,	   d.	  523,	   ll.	   27-­‐34.	   	   Reprinted	   in	   Istochnik:	   vestnik	   arkhiva	   prezidenta	   Rossiskoi	   Federatsii	   19,	   no.	   6	  (1995):	  152).	   	   	  Mark	  Beissinger	  has	  identified	  one	  additional	  “protest”	  event	  in	  Tajikistan	  in	  1987	  (“Mass	   Demonstrations	   and	   Mass	   Violent	   Events	   in	   the	   Former	   USSR,	   1987-­‐1992,”	  http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/research1.htm#Data),	   but	   upon	   review,	   the	   event	   in	  question	  turns	  out	  to	  have	  been	  a	  group	  of	  students	  having	  an	  “agitated”	  discussion	  about	  the	  1985	  fight	  (“Tajikistan’s	  Russian-­‐Tajik	  Ethnic	  Conflict,”	  FBIS	  Daily	  Report	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  January	  24,	  1989	  (FBIS-­‐SOV-­‐89-­‐014)).	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Ultimately,	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   decided	   to	   overlook	   the	   “illegal”	   nature	   of	   the	  demonstration.81 	  	   After	   the	   gathered	   students	   had	   refused	   repeated	   calls	   to	  disperse,	  a	  delegation	  was	  sent	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  crowd.	  	  Led	  by	   Goibnazar	   Pallaev,	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet’s	   Presidium,	   the	  delegation	   assured	   those	   gathered	   that	   their	   concerns	   would	   be	   taken	   into	  consideration.	   	  A	  draft	  of	  the	  Law	  on	  Language	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  had	  already	  been	  written,	  they	  said	  –	  and	  would	  soon	  be	  published	  for	  public	  consideration.82	  	  Both	  government	   representatives	   and	   leading	   intellectuals,	   including	   the	   philosopher	  Akbar	  Tursun	  and	  poet	  Mumin	  Kanoat	  spoke	  about	  the	  need	  to	  promote	  the	  study	  of	   the	   Tajik	   language,	   and	   after	   a	   few	   hours	   the	   crowd	   dispersed	   on	   its	   own.	  Shocked	  by	  the	  unexpected	  turn	  of	  events,	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  deputies	  went	  back	  to	  their	  work	  on	  the	  language	  law.	  	  Arguably,	   however,	   they	   should	  not	  have	  been	  quite	   so	   surprised.	   	  While	   free	  of	  protests	  or	  demonstrations,	   the	  six	  months	  prior	   to	  February	  1989	  had	  seen	   the	  development	   of	   the	   first	   “informal”	   (neformal’nye)	   organizations	   in	   Tajikistan.	  	  While	   limited	   in	   scope	   and	   activity	   during	   1988,	   these	   organizations	   did	   bring	  together	   leading	   intellectuals	   in	   Tajik	   cities,	  who	   began	   to	   discuss	   the	   course	   of	  perestroika	   reforms	   and	   voice	   their	   frustrations.	   	   In	   Dushanbe,	   the	   poets	   Bozor	  Sobir	   and	   Loik	   Sherali,	   together	   with	   the	   editor	   Askar	   Hakim,	   informally	   began	  meeting	   with	   other	   reform-­‐minded	   intellectuals,	   referring	   to	   themselves	   as	   the	  “Yovoroni	  Bossozi”	  (Taj.	  “Supporters	  of	  Perestroika”).83	  	  In	  Kulyab	  in	  the	  south	  of	  Tajikistan,	   the	   poet	   Safarmuhammad	   Aiubi	   and	   actor	   Rustami	   Abdurahim	   went	  further,	  forming	  the	  organization	  “Oshkoro”	  (Taj.	  “Glasnost”)	  with	  the	  express	  goal	  of	   returning	   to	   Kulyab	   its	   status	   as	   an	   oblast	   and	   promoting	   its	   local	   economic	  development.	  	  By	  late	  1988,	  moreover,	  Oshkoro	  had	  managed	  to	  organize	  at	  least	  one	  meeting	  with	  Mahkamov	   and	   Pallaev,	  where	   its	  members	   berated	   the	   Tajik	  leadership	  for	  the	  state	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  attention	  paid	  to	  provincial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  The	  organizers	  were	   “warned”	  by	   the	  Prosecutor’s	  Office	  not	   to	   repeat	   their	  mistake,	  but	  were	  not	   prosecuted.	   	   See	   S.	   Krylov,	   “Ob’’iavleno	   predosterozhenie	   organizatoram	  nesanktsionnirovannogo	  mitinga,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  March	  7,	  1989.	  82	  In	  fact,	  a	  Commission	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  had	  been	  working	  on	  the	  law	  since	  early	  January	  1989.	  	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  335,	  l.	  35.	  83	  While	   it	   was	   reported	   that	   Yovoroni	   Bossozi	   published	   an	   official	   program	   and	   organized	  demonstrations,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   to	   support	   this.	   	   Instead,	   the	   “organization”	   seems	   to	   have	  existed	  for	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time	  and	  held	  very	  informal	  meetings.	  For	  varying	  accounts,	  see	  Annett	  Bohr,	  “Formation	  of	  a	  People’s	  Front	   in	  Tajikistan,”	  Radio	  Liberty	  Research	  Bulletin,	  November	  16,	  1988	  (498/88);	  Suzanne	  Crow,	  “Informal	  Groups	  in	  Tajikistan	  –	  Will	  They	  Have	  a	  Role?”	  FBIS	  Daily	  
Report	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  February	  23,	  1990.	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areas	   outside	   of	   Dushanbe.84	  	   Together	   with	   the	   growing	   pugnaciousness	   of	   the	  Tajik	  press,	  this	  certainly	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  sufficient	  warning	  about	  the	  societal	  frustration	  brewing	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  	  Yet	  just	  as	  this	  wave	  of	  glasnost-­‐driven	  criticism	  and	  democratic	  social	  activism	  –	  as	  not	  incidentally	  promoted	  by	  Gorbachev,	  Yakovlev,	  and	  others	  in	  CPSU	  Central	  Committee	  –	  crested	  in	  February	  1989,	  it	  just	  as	  quickly	  began	  to	  ebb,	  dissipating	  back	   into	   the	   normally	   calm	   waters	   of	   Dushanbe	   politics.	   	   	   No	   further	  demonstrations	   followed	   on	   the	   heels	   of	   the	   first	   one	   on	   February	   24,	   and	  additional	   “informal”	   organizations	   failed	   to	   crop	   up	   in	   the	   subsequent	  months.	  	  The	  ideas	  around	  which	  earlier	  criticism	  had	  been	  organized,	  moreover,	  began	  to	  wane	  in	  social	  importance.	  	  While	  ecological	  concerns	  had	  become	  a	  major	  concern	  in	  other	  Soviet	  republics,	  in	  Tajikistan	  they	  failed	  to	  mobilize	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  population,	  and	  by	  late	  1988	  and	  early	  1989	  even	  the	  number	  of	  local	  newspaper	  articles	  touching	  upon	  ecology	  began	  to	  drop.85	  	  	  The	   Roghun	   dam,	   which	   had	   been	   partially	   criticized	   on	   ecological	   grounds,	  retained	   high	   levels	   of	   support,	   with	   only	   a	   small	   minority,	   led	   by	   the	   poet	  Gulrukhsor	  Safieva	  –	  who	  had	  been	  born	  in	  one	  of	  the	  villages	  slated	  for	  flooding	  –	  continuing	   to	   question	   its	   construction.86	  	   Questions	   about	   history,	   culture	   and	  religion	  had	  seemed	  to	  lose	  their	  edge,	  with	  the	  darkest	  corners	  of	  Soviet	  history	  remaining	   untouched	   and	   the	   Soviet	   state’s	   increased	   tolerance	   for	   religious	  institutions	   opening	   up	   space	   for	   dialogue	   with	   Tajikistan’s	   mullahs.87 	  	   “We	  consider	   it	   the	   duty	   of	   all	  Muslims	   and	   citizens	   of	   the	   USSR	   to	   help	   perestroika	  however	  we	  can,”	  the	  imam-­‐hatib	  of	  the	  Central	  Leninabad	  Mosque	  had	  said	  in	  late	  1988	   –	   here,	   too,	   there	   seemed	   little	   cause	   for	   democratic	  mobilization.88	  	   Even	  language,	  which	  had	  nominally	  driven	  both	  Mirrahim’s	  1988	  article	  and	  the	  1989	  demonstration,	  was	  not	  the	  guaranteed	  motivating	  factor	  it	  may	  have	  seemed.	  	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  On	  Oshkoro,	  see	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  57-­‐58.	  85	  Shoira	   Muzafarovna	   Toirova,	   “Osobennosti	   razvitiia	   sovremennoi	   tadzhikskoi	   ekologicheskoi	  zhurnalistiki	   v	   svete	   problem	   vodnykh	   resursov,	   stroitel’stva	   Rogunskoi	   GES	   i	   chrezvychainykh	  situatsii”	   (Dissertatsiia	   na	   soiskanie	   uchenoi	   stepeni	   kandidata	   filologicheskikh	   nauk,	   Slavianskii	  Universitet,	  Dushanbe,	  2015),	  40-­‐42.	  86	  Interview	  with	  Parviz	  Mullojanov,	  Dushanbe,	   January	   2017;	   cf.	   Sodiqov,	   “From	   resettlement	   to	  conflict.”	   	  Sodiqov	  has	  argued	   that	  opposition	   to	  Roghun	  was	  widespread	  during	  perestroika,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  contemporary	  evidence	  for	  this.	  87	  The	  first	  local	  work	  on	  Stalin-­‐era	  repressions	  of	  Tajik	  politicians,	  for	  example,	  was	  only	  published	  in	  2012.	  	  See:	  Qurboni	  Alamshoh,	  Pomir,	  1937	  (Dushanbe:	  Irfon,	  2012).	  88	  M.	  Saifiddinov,	  “Tseli	  perestroiki	  poniatny	  nam,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  October	  9,	  1988.	  
	  	   140	  
contrast	   to	   claims	   made	   by	   Mirrahim	   and	   others	   about	   the	   threat	   to	   the	   Tajik	  language,	  sociological	  surveys	  showed	  the	  opposite:	   in	  fact,	  only	  30%	  of	  Tajiks	  in	  Tajikistan	  were	  fluent	  in	  Russian,	  while	  the	  vast	  majority	  (88%)	  reported	  fluency	  in	   Tajik.89	  	   On	   the	   local	   level,	   moreover,	   Tajik	   citizens	   often	   had	   a	   hard	   time	  understanding	  what	  the	  fuss	  was	  about.	  In	  Panj	  district	  in	  the	  south	  of	  Tajikistan,	  for	   example,	   one	   activist	   promoting	   the	   Law	   on	   Language	   reported	   that	   “people	  looked	  at	  us	  funny”	  when	  they	  heard	  about	  the	  law.	  	  “‘Why	  do	  we	  need	  this	  law?’	  –	  they	  asked,	  “we	  already	  speak	  in	  Tajik	  anyways.”90	  	  	  Giving	  the	  lie	  to	  both	  Western	  expectations	  of	  nationalist	  uprisings	  in	  Central	  Asia	  and	   broader	   narratives	   of	   “post-­‐colonial”	   stirrings	   on	   the	   back	   of	   ecological	   and	  developmental	   concerns,	   the	   population	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   was	   simply	   failing	   to	  mobilize.	  Part	  of	  the	  problem,	  as	  a	  Komsomol	  committee	  concluded	  in	  1989,	  was	  that	   it	  was	   “difficult	   to	   orient	   in	   the	  political	   situation”	   –	   in	   other	  words,	   people	  were	  increasingly	  frustrated,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  clear	  organizing	  principle	  for	  their	  anger.	  91	  	   To	   an	   even	   greater	   degree,	   however,	   mobilization	   failed	   to	   take	   hold	  because	   glasnost	   continued	   to	   follow	   a	   mold	   dictated	   from	   outside.	   	   The	  increasingly	  critical	  tone	  of	  Dushanbe’s	  literary	  journals	  and	  newspapers	  followed	  a	   pattern	   set	   by	   Moscow	   a	   few	   years	   prior,	   as	   did	   the	   initial	   spikes	   of	   street	  demonstrations.	   	   	   Glasnost	   and	   democratization	   remained	   phenomena	   dictated	  from	  Moscow.	  	  Yet	  Mahkamov	  and	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  had	  little	  choice	  but	   to	   push	   for	   its	   acceptance:	  Moscow	   continued	   to	   complain	   about	   the	   lack	   of	  glasnost	   and	   intra-­‐party	   democracy	   in	   the	   republic.	   	   Reacting	   to	   this	   ongoing	  pressure,	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1989	  the	  CPT	  began	  to	  double	  its	  efforts.	  	  Over	  the	  next	  six	  months	  the	  coordinated	  efforts	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT,	  the	  Tajik	  Komsomol,	  and	  politicians	   in	  Moscow	  would	   lead	  to	  both	  the	  founding	  of	  several	  new	   “informal”	   organizations	   in	   Tajikistan,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   surprisingly	   open	   and	  public	  debate	  over	  the	  Law	  on	  the	  Tajik	  Language.	  	  
	  
V.	  Promoting	  Glasnost	  from	  Above	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  On	   knowledge	   of	  Russian:	   E.M.	   Ermolaeva,	   “Iazyk	   respondenta,	   iazyk	   ankety,”	  Sotsiologicheskie	  
issledovaniia	  13,	  no.	  1	  (1987):	  98-­‐99;	  on	  knowledge	  of	  Tajik:	  R.	  Alimov	  and	  M.	  Saidov,	  Natsional’nyi	  
vopros:	  raschety	  i	  proschety	  (Dushanbe:	  Irfon,	  1991),	  37.	  90	  Interview	  with	  Hikmatullo	  Saifullozoda,	  Dushanbe,	  February	  2015.	  91	  “Molodezh’.	  Mitingovaia	  demokratiia:	  ‘za’	  i	  ‘protiv’,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  August	  16,	  1989.	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In	   accordance	   with	   Soviet	   practice,	   the	   task	   of	   directing	   the	   energies	   of	  discouraged	   young	   people	   in	   Dushanbe	   was	   delegated	   to	   the	   republican	  Komsomol.	   	   Already	   frustrated	   with	   the	   lack	   of	   informal	   political	   groups	   in	   the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  the	  Komsomol	  leadership	  quickly	  took	  to	  the	  task	  of	  negotiating	  with	  the	  organizers	  of	  the	  February	  24	  demonstration.92	  	  By	  early	  April	  1989	  an	  agreement	  had	   been	   struck:	   the	   political	   club	   “Ru	   ba	   Ru”	   (Taj.	   “face-­‐to-­‐face”)	   was	   founded	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Komsomol.93	  Intended	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  political	  dialogue,	  Ru	  ba	  Ru	  organized	  meetings	  between	  Tajik	  citizens	  and	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   republic,	   during	   which	   constructive	   criticism	   could	   be	  leveled	   against	   the	   latter.	   	   Taking	   place	   at	   the	   House	   of	   Political	   Enlightenment	  (Dom	   politicheskogo	   prosvesheniia)	   in	   Dushanbe,	   the	   Ru	   ba	   Ru	   meetings	   were	  envisioned	  by	   the	   republican	   leadership	   as	   a	   controlled	   solution	   to	   the	  dissipate	  frustration	   on	   display	   in	   the	   republic.94	  	   Citizens	   would	   now	   be	   able	   to	   express	  their	  concerns	  directly	  to	  their	  state	  representatives	  –	  and	  those	  representatives,	  in	  turn,	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  respond	  in	  a	  productive	  and	  democratic	  manner.	  	  Ru	   ba	   Ru	   held	   its	   first	  meetings	   in	  May	   1989.	   Each	  meeting	   took	   the	   form	   of	   a	  public	  debate,	  with	   a	  political	   leader	   speaking	   to	   a	   crowd	  made	  up	  of	   university	  students,	  professors,	  and	  political	  activists.	  	  Early	  participants	  included	  Mirrahim,	  the	   reform-­‐minded	   economists	   Tohir	  Abdujabbor	   and	  Hojimukhammad	  Umarov,	  an	  organizer	  of	  the	  February	  24	  demonstration,	  B.	  Makhsudov,	  and	  the	  Komsomol	  secretary	   Jumakhon	   Isoev.95	  	   These	   activists,	  writers,	   and	   economists,	  moreover,	  quickly	  began	  to	  dominate	  the	  proceedings,	  laying	  into	  the	  invited	  politicians	  over	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Tajik	  economy,	  growing	  unemployment,	  and	  the	  apparent	  inaction	  of	   the	   republican	   government.	   	   Leading	   Tajik	   communists,	   including	   Kahhor	  Mahkamov,	   Izatullo	   Khayoev	   and	   Jamshed	   Karimov,	   the	   first	   secretary	   of	   the	  Dushanbe	   City	   Committee,	  were	   all	   heavily	   criticized,	  with	   participants	   “proving	  that	   the	   invited	   leader	   had	  made	   only	  mistakes	   and	   blunders	   in	   his	   work.”96	  	   It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Alimov	  and	  Saidov,	  Natsional’nyi	  vopros,	  84-­‐85.	  93	  “Polozhenie	  o	  politcheskom	  klube	  ‘Ru	  ba	  Ru’,”	  Komsomolets	  Tadzhikistana,	  October	  11,	  1989.	  94	  Nurali	   Davlat,	   “‘Ru	   ba	   ru’:	   Az	   taloshi	   ehyoi	   zaboni	   Tojiki	   to	   qasdi	   tarki	   komsomol,”	  Ozodagon,	  October	  9,	  2015.	  95	  Ruikhati	  mahdomi	  siyosyi	  “Ru	  ba	  ru,”	  dated	  19.05.1989;	  document	  held	  in	  the	  personal	  collection	  of	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  Dushanbe;	  Mirrahim,	  Hamtabaqi,	  34-­‐35.	  96	  Alimov	  and	  Saidov,	  Natsional’nyi	  vopros,	  85.	  	  On	  Ru	  ba	  Ru,	  see	  Kamoli	  Kurbonien,	  “Litsom	  k	  litsu	  litso	   uvidet’	   mozhno,”	   Komsomolets	   Tadzhikistana,	   October	   11,	   1989;	   Abashin	   and.	   Bushkov,	  
Tadzhikistan:	  nekotorye	  posledstviia,	  29;	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  “‘Ru	  ba	  ru’:	   	  Az	  oghoz	  to	  anjom,”	  Ozodagon,	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quickly	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   “constructive”	   dialogue	   desired	   by	   the	   Tajik	  leadership	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  Ru	  ba	  Ru	  participants’	  plan.	  	  Quite	  on	  the	  contrary:	  for	  those	  like	  Mirrahim,	  the	  idea	  was	  to	  prove	  the	  incompetence	  of	  those	  running	  the	  republic.	   	   “Tajikistan’s	  ministers	  and	  bureaucrats	  came	  to	  the	  club	   ‘Ru	  ba	  Ru’	  with	  fat	  and	  full	  stomachs,”	  he	  later	  wrote,	  “but	  left	  with	  sweaty	  faces,	  bowed	  with	  shame	  and	  disgrace.”97	  	  	  While	  hardly	  the	  productive	  atmosphere	  the	  Tajik	  leadership	  had	  hoped	  for,	  Ru	  ba	  Ru	   proved	   inarguably	   successful,	   drawing	   in	   crowds	   of	   hundreds	   and	   quickly	  becoming	   the	   leading	   platform	   for	   political	   dialogue	   in	   the	   Tajik	   SSR.98	  	   It	   also	  spawned	  numerous	   local	   imitations,	  as	   regional	  branches	  of	   the	  Tajik	  Komsomol	  also	   began	   to	   encourage	   the	   formation	   of	   informal	   organizations	   and	   “political	  clubs.”	   	   	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   1989	   similar	   organizations	   were	   founded	   with	  Komsomol	   support	   in	   Leninabad	   (“Ekh’’yoi	   Khujand”),	   Ura-­‐Tyube	   (“Vakhdat”),	  Vakhsh	  District	  (“Tajdid”),	  and	  Nurek	  (“Dirafshi	  	  Koviyon”).99	  	  In	  some	  cities,	  these	  organizations	   took	   on	   localized	   goals	   -­‐	   Ekh’’yoi	  Khujand,	   for	   example,	   advocated	  for	   Leninabad’s	   name	   to	   be	   changed	   back	   to	   the	   historical	   “Khujand”	   –	   but	   in	  general	  they	  followed	  the	  model	  of	  Ru	  ba	  Ru,	  providing	  a	  space	  for	  increasing	  loud	  and	  critical	  debate.	  	  	  	  One	  prominent	  topic	  in	  these	  debates,	  moreover,	  was	  the	  Law	  on	  Language	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  At	  first,	  the	  push	  to	  make	  Tajik	  the	  official	  language	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  had	  seemed	   to	   fade	  after	  February	  1989,	  with	   limited	  public	   support	  and	  Mahkamov	  and	  other	  leaders	  of	  the	  republic	  expressing	  skepticism	  about	  the	  need	  for	  the	  law.	  	  After	  a	   few	  months,	  however,	  Moscow	  got	   involved,	  which	  changed	   the	  situation	  entirely.	  	  In	  early	  April	  1989,	  the	  draft	  Law	  on	  Language	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  sent	  to	   the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   CPSU	   for	   comment.	   	   As	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  Pallaev	  received	  a	  series	  of	  minor	  changes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  October	   2,	   2015;	   Nurali	   Davlat,	   “‘Ru	   ba	   ru’:	   Az	   peshnihodi	   Turajonzoda	   to	   khashmi	   Vahhobov,”	  
Ozodagon,	  October	  15,	  2015.	  	  97	  Mirboboi	  Mirrahim.	  To	  ba	  kai	  ob	  az	  tagi	  iakh	  meravad?	  (Tehran:	  Atlas,	  1998),	  78.	  Also	  see:	  Isaac	  Scarborough,	  “From	  February	  to	  February	  and	  From	  Ru	  ba	  Ru	  to	  Rastokhez:	  Political	  Mobilisation	  in	  Late	  Soviet	  Tajikistan,”	  Cahiers	  d’Asie	  centrale	  26	  (2016).	  98	  Interview	  with	   former	   Ru	   ba	   Ru	   participants,	   Dushanbe,	   February	   2015;	   I.	   Usmonov,	  Ta’’rikhi	  
siyosyi	  Tojikistoni	  sohibistiqlol	  (Khujand:	  Nuri	  Ma’’rifat,	  2003),	  19-­‐22.	  99 	  Prilozhenie	   k.	   p.	   1	   “g”,	   prot.	   St.	   no.	   68,	   Programma	   raboty	   respublikanskogo	   seminara-­‐soveshchaniia	   ideologicheskikh	   kadrov	   po	   rabote	   s	   samodeiatel’nymi	   obshchestvennymi	  organizatsiiami,	  02.02.1990,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op	  159,	  d.	  1709,	  l.	  10.	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to	  the	   law,	  as	  well	  as	  advice	  from	  Yakovlev	  to	  “go	  ahead	  and	  pass	  the	   law,”	  since	  “Russian	   [language]	   doesn’t	   need	   any	   sort	   of	   protection	   in	   Tajikistan.”100	  	   Tajik	  lawmakers	  also	  received	  copies	  of	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia’s	  recent	  Laws	  on	  Language	  as	   examples	   of	   similar	   successful	   legislation.101	  	   Given	   the	   Central	   Committee’s	  clear	   support	   for	   the	   law,	  Pallaev,	  Mahkamov,	   and	   the	  other	   leaders	   of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  had	   little	  choice	  but	   to	  set	   their	  concerns	  and	  skepticism	  aside.	   	  As	   they	  had	  initially	   promised,	   they	   opened	   the	   law	   up	   to	   public	   debate,	   hoping	   to	   both	  appease	  Yakovlev	  and	  his	  (as	  they	  understood	  it)	  ascendant	  faction	  in	  the	  Moscow	  Politburo	  and	  deflate	  social	  tension	  in	  Dushanbe.102	  	  Far	  from	  receding,	  however,	  tensions	  only	  became	  inflamed.	  	  From	  May	  1989	  the	  Tajik	   language	   became	   a	   central	   topic	   of	   debate	   at	   Ru	   ba	   Ru	  meetings,	   amongst	  intellectuals	  in	  Dushanbe,	  and	  in	  the	  press.	  	  Thousands	  of	  letters	  were	  also	  sent	  to	  the	   Supreme	  Soviet	   both	   supporting	   and	  opposing	   the	   law.103	  	   	   Activists	   on	  both	  sides	  mobilized	   support,	  with	  most	  of	   the	   appeals	   sent	   clearly	   copied	   from	   form	  letters:	   Russian-­‐language	   letters	   overwhelmingly	   opposed	   the	   law	   and	   worried	  over	   “inter-­‐ethnic	   conflict,”	   while	   Tajik-­‐language	   writers	   supporting	   the	   law	  proclaimed	   the	   “happiness	   of	   the	   republic’s	   people”	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   law’s	  passage.104	  	  While	   language	   had	   been	   at	   best	   a	   minor	   concern	   before	   1989,	   the	  linguistically	   organized	   mobilization	   and	   debate	   drew	   sharp	   lines	   of	   division	   in	  society.	   	   	   Low-­‐level	   economic	   and	   social	   frustrations	   gained	   an	   organizing	  principle,	  with	  the	  Tajik	  language	  becoming	  a	  stand-­‐in	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  republic	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Tajik	  speakers	  began	  to	  see	  Russian’s	  dominance	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  growing	  contradictions	  in	  the	  Tajik	  economy	  –	  between	  the	  relative	  wealth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  See	  the	  marked	  draft	  Pallaev	  received	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPSU,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	   41,	   d.	   335,	   l.	   34.	   	   For	  Yakovlev’s	   comments,	   see	  Nurali	  Davlat,	   “Qahhor	  Mahkamov:	  Oghoz	   va	  farjomi	  ‘prezidenti	  javon’,”	  Ozodagon,	  August	  10,	  2016.	  101	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  344,	  ll.	  89-­‐101.	  102 	  For	   an	   early	   public	   push	   for	   debate	   on	   the	   Law	   on	   Language,	   see	   TadzhikTA,	   “Satus	  gosudarstvennogo	   –	   tadzhikskomu	   iazyku.	   	   S	   rasshirennogo	   zasedaniia	   biuro	   TsK	   Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  April	  7,	  1989.	   	  The	  draft	  law	  was	  published	  on	  April	  14	  (“Proekt:	   Zakon	   Tadzhikskoi	   sovetskoi	   sotsialisticheskoi	   respubliki	   o	   iazyke,”	   Kommunist	  
Tadzhikistana,	  April	  14,	  1989).	  103	  In	  May	  and	  June	  1989	  thousands	  of	  letters	  were	  sent	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  related	  to	  the	  Law	  on	  Language	  (TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  dd.	  338-­‐341).	   	  Some	  reports	  listed	  up	  to	  “74,000	  written	  and	  spoken	  suggestions”	  (TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  341,	  l.	  69).	  	  	  104	  For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  Russian-­‐language	  appeal,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  341,	  l.	  15;	  for	  the	  standard	  Tajik	  formula,	  see	  d.	  339,	  l.	  123.	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of	   Russian-­‐speaking	   Dushanbe	   and	   the	   decreasing	   opportunities	   in	   the	   Tajik-­‐speaking	  rural	  areas.105	  	  	  With	   debate	   and	   emotions	   rising,	   Mahkamov	   and	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   CPT	  retained	   their	   initial	   skepticism.	  Mahkamov	   finally	  approved	   the	   law	  only	  after	  a	  telephone	  conversation	  with	  Gorbachev,	  in	  which	  the	  latter	  expressed	  his	  support	  for	  the	  law	  and	  encouraged	  Mahkamov	  to	  avoid	  falling	  behind	  other	  republics	  that	  had	  already	  passed	  similar	  legislation.	  106	  	  Following	  Gorbachev’s	  express	  support,	  the	   Law	   on	   Language	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   was	   given	   the	   green	   light	   in	   the	   Tajik	  Supreme	   Soviet,	   and	  was	   passed	   into	   law	   on	   July	   22,	   1989.	   	   	   Although	   softened	  from	   its	   original	   draft	   and	   giving	   Russian	   the	   status	   of	   “language	   of	   interethnic	  communication,”	   the	   law	  did	  make	  Tajik	   the	   sole	   state	   language	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  and	  dictate	  the	  long-­‐term	  replacement	  of	  Russian	  by	  Tajik	  in	  all	  state	  activities.107	  	  The	  law	  was	  also	  quickly	  claimed	  as	  a	  political	  victory	  for	  those	  who	  had	  promoted	  it,	  including	  the	  increasingly	  vocal	  participants	  of	  Ru	  ba	  Ru	  in	  Dushanbe.	  	  	  The	  Law	  on	  Language	  would	  not	  be	  Moscow’s	   final	   incursion	   into	   the	  politics	  of	  glasnost	   in	  Dushanbe.	   	   	  Having	  been	  elected	  to	  the	  Congress	  of	  People’s	  Deputies	  and	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  USSR	  in	  April	  1989,	  the	  poetess	  Gulrukhsor	  Safieva	  had	  used	   her	   new	   political	   status	   to	   continue	   advocating	   against	   the	   Roghun	  hydroelectric	   dam.108	  	   Her	   arguments	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   flooding	   of	   local	  villages,	  including	  her	  family’s,	  and	  by	  late	  summer	  1989	  she	  had	  helped	  mobilize	  a	  group	  of	  local	  elders	  (aksakaly)	  from	  these	  villages,	  who	  visited	  Moscow	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  dam.	  	  In	  Moscow,	  the	  elders	  failed	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  meet	  with	  Boris	  Yeltsin,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  Construction	  Committee	  and	  a	  symbol	  of	  Soviet	  opposition	  following	  his	  famous	  removal	  from	  the	  Politburo	  in	  late	  1987	  and	  triumphant	  election	  to	  the	  Congress	  of	  People’s	  Deputies	   in	  the	   face	  of	  overt	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Interview	  with	  Parviz	  Mullojanov,	  Dushanbe,	  January	  2017.	  106	  Asliddin	  Sohibnazar,	  Subhi	  sitorakush	  (Dushanbe:	  Donish,	  1997),	  v.	  1,	  14-­‐15.	  	  107	  See	  the	  “final	  version”	  of	  the	  law	  as	  approved	  by	  the	  CC	  CPT	  on	  30.06.1989	  (TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	   d.	   335,	   ll.	   103-­‐149)	   and	   the	   nearly	   identical	   version	   passed	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   on	  22.07.1989	   (“Zakon	   Tadzhikskoi	   Sovetskoi	   Sotsialisticheskoi	   Respubliki	   o	   iazyke,”	   Komsomolets	  
Tadzhikistana,	  August	  2,	  1989).	  	  More	  radical	  provisions,	  such	  as	  the	  teaching	  of	  the	  Arabic	  script	  in	  Tajik	  schools,	  had	  also	  been	  removed.	  	  108 	  See	   Aziia-­‐Plius,	   “Gulrukhsor:	   Prorokov	   posylaet	   Bog,	   poetov	   vybiraet	   narod…”	   Asia-­‐Plus,	  December	   23,	   2013;	   “Gulrukhsor:	   Man	   hargiz	   ziddi	   sokhtmoni	   Roghun	   nabudam,”	   Radoi	   Ozody,	  May	  1,	  2010;	  online	  http://www.ozodi.org/a/2029458.html.	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resistance	  from	  the	  CPSU.109	  	  	  They	  did,	  however,	  manage	  to	  meet	  with	  Sogdiana,	  a	  “public	   organization”	   founded	   and	   registered	   in	   Moscow	   by	   a	   group	   of	  postgraduate	  students	   from	  Tajikistan.	   	  Sogdiana	  had	  been	  searching	   for	  ways	  to	  affect	   change	   in	  Tajikistan,	  and	  quickly	   took	  up	   the	  elders’	   cause.	   	  Together	  with	  Pavel	   Florenskii,	   a	   geologist	  who	   had	   questioned	   the	   safety	   of	   the	   Roghun	   dam,	  they	  secured	  a	  meeting	  with	  Yeltsin	  and	  convinced	  him	  to	  visit	  the	  dam.110	  	  In	  August	  1989	  Yeltsin	  visited	  Tajikistan,	  spending	  most	  of	  a	  week	  in	  and	  around	  the	   Roghun	   construction	   site.	   Although	   he	   had	   initially	   promised	   Sogdiana	  immediate	  action,	  the	  results	  of	  his	  visit	  were	  inconclusive.	  	  	  Publically,	  he	  limited	  himself	   to	   mild	   criticism,	   noting	   that	   “the	   project	   is	   a	   bit	   raw,”	   while	   privately	  assuring	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	   that	   the	  dam	  had	  Moscow’s	   full	   support.111	  	  This	   waffling	   left	   everyone	   disappointed,	   with	   Safieva	   and	   Sogdiana	   left	   to	  continue	   their	   lobbying	   and	   Mahkamov	   and	   others	   wondering	   what	   Moscow’s	  position	   on	   the	   dam	   might	   actually	   be.	   	   	   Worried	   that	   financial	   and	   political	  support	   could	  dry	  up,	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	  buckled	  under	  pressure.	   	   The	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  issued	  a	  joint	  order,	   indicating	  that	  the	  Roghun	  Dam’s	  height	  would	  be	  decreased	  by	  from	  325	  to	  275	  meters.	  	  This	  would	  “allow	  a	  60%	  reduction	  in	  the	  number	  of	  people	  to	  be	  relocated	  from	  the	  flooding	  area,”	   leaving	  only	  around	  9,000	  individuals	  to	  be	  resettled.112	  	   On	   both	   Roghun	   and	   the	   Law	   on	   Language	   Moscow’s	   hand	   had	  proven	  critical:	  rather	  than	  relying	  on	  an	  upwelling	  of	  local	  support,	  Tajik	  activists	  had	   been	   able	   to	   appeal	   and	   depend	   upon	   members	   of	   the	   CPSU	   elite	   to	   push	  through	  their	  chosen	  causes.	  	  	  
	  
VI.	  Conclusion:	  Rastokhez	  and	  Political	  Mobilization	  in	  Dushanbe	  By	   the	   fall	   of	   1989	   the	   efforts	   of	   politicians	   in	   Dushanbe	   and	  Moscow	   had	   born	  fruit:	  glasnost	  and	  democratization	  had	  finally	  arrived	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  	  In	  addition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  On	   Yeltsin’s	   removal	   from	   the	   Politburo	   in	   1987,	   see	   Cherniaev,	   Veber,	   and	   Medvedev,	   V	  
Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  258-­‐263;	  on	  his	  election	  to	  the	  Congress	  in	  1989,	  see	  Boris	  El’tsin,	  Ispoved’	  na	  
zadannuiu	  temu	  (Riga:	  Rukitis,	  1990),	  3-­‐12;	  174-­‐179.	  110	  Interview	  with	  Parviz	  Mullojanov,	  founding	  member	  of	  Sogdiana,	  Dushanbe,	  January	  2017.	  111	  For	   Yeltsin’s	   comments,	   see	   Ekaterina	  Kozhevnikova	   and	   Liliia	   Gaisina,	   “Georgii	   Koshlakov	   za	  kulisami	   Sovetskoi	   vlasti,”	   Asia-­‐Plus,	   November	   19,	   2008;	   on	   his	   trip	   to	   Tajikistan,	   see	   “Menia	  porazili	   liudi.	   	   Semnadtsat’	   voprosov	   Borisu	   El’tsinu,”	   Komsomolets	   Tadzhikistana,	   September	   8,	  1989;	  interview	  with	  Parviz	  Mullojanov,	  Dushanbe,	  January	  2017.	  112	  TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3659,	  l.	  25.	  	  Initially,	  22,500	  people	  had	  been	  scheduled	  for	  relocation;	  see	  Pis'mo	  Makhkamova	  i	  Koshlakova	  Pred.	  SM	  SSSR	  Ryzhkovu	  ot	  05.03.1988,	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  149,	  d.	  290,	  l.	  51.	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to	   a	   combative	   local	   press,	   “informal”	   (if	   state-­‐sponsored)	   organizations	   had	  appeared	  around	  the	  republic,	  and	  political	  lobbying	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  corners	  had	  become	   part	   of	   the	   otherwise	   closed	   political	   process	   in	   Dushanbe.	   	   In	   political	  clubs	  and	  public	  meetings,	   frustrations	  and	  social	  dissatisfaction	  were	   finding	  an	  increasingly	  organized	  –	  and	  increasingly	  strident	  –	  outlet.	  	  While	  demonstrations	  and	   other	   public	   signs	   of	   struggle	   remained	   unseen	   after	   February	   1989	   (in	  contrast	  to	  Moscow	  and	  many	  other	  corners	  of	  the	  USSR),	  life	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  clearly	   growing	  more	  politicized.	   	   It	  was	   this	  politicized	   environment,	  moreover,	  that	   gave	   birth	   to	   the	   first	   independent	   political	   movement	   in	   Tajikistan	   –	  “Rastokhez”	  (Taj.	  “rebirth”).	  	  Founded	   by	   some	   of	   the	   most	   active	   members	   of	   Ru	   ba	   Ru,	   including	   Tohir	  Abdujabbor,	   Mirbobo	   Mirrahim,	   and	   the	   professors	   Hamidullo	   Habibullo	   and	  Sharofiddin	   Imomov,	   Rastokhez	   was	   meant	   to	   provide	   a	   more	   independent	  platform	  to	  advocate	  for	  political	  and	  economic	  change.113	  	  Holding	  its	  first	  official	  meeting	  on	  September	  14,	  1989,	  Rastokhez	  elected	  the	  economist	  Abdujabbor	  its	  chairman	  and	  called	  on	  the	  Tajik	  Party	  and	  government	  to	  help	  revive	  both	  Tajik	  culture	  and	  traditions	  and	  the	  state	  of	  the	  local	  economy.	  	  Achieving	  both	  of	  these	  goals,	  Rastokhez	  argued,	  would	  mean	  furthering	  the	  work	  of	  perestroika	  to	  rebuild	  the	  Soviet	  economy.114	  	   It	  would	  also	  mean	  giving	  Tajikistan	  greater	  control	  over	  its	   own	   resources	   and	   development:	   from	   Abdujabbor’s	   perspective,	   one	   of	  Tajikistan’s	   fundamental	  problems	  was	  economic	  mismanagement	   from	  Moscow.	  Given	  full	  control	  over	  local	  resources	  and	  revenues,	  he	  and	  Rastokhez	  argued,	  the	  republic	   would	   be	   able	   to	   resolve	   its	   underlying	   contradictions	   by	   selling	   raw	  goods	   on	   the	   world	   market	   and	   investing	   in	   infrastructure.115	  	   “The	   Tajik	   SSR	  should	   be	   a	   sovereign	   state,”	   Rastokhez	   summarized	   in	   its	   Charter,	   “and	   should	  independently	   resolve	   issues	   related	   to	   the	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social	  development	  of	  the	  republic.”116	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  Rastokhez	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  kept	  membership	  records,	  and	  its	  organization	  was	  always	  somewhat	  ad-­‐hoc.	   	  Other	  members	   included	  Askar	  Hakim,	  Ahmadshoh	  Komilzoda,	  and	  Abdunady	  Sattorzoda.	   See	   Nurali	   Davlat,	   “Tohiri	   Abdujabbor:	   ‘Padar”-­‐i	   e’’lomiiai	   istiqlol,”	   Ozodagon,	  September	  21,	  2016;	  Mirrahim,	  Hamtabaqi,	  34.	  114	  “Programma	  organizatsii	  ‘Rastokhez’,”	  reprinted	  in	  N.G.	  Chicherina	  (ed.),	  Grazhdanskie	  dvizeniia	  
v	  Tadzhikistane	  (Moscow:	  TsIMO,	  1990),	  115-­‐123.	  115	  On	  Abdujabbor’s	  economic	  reasoning,	  see	  Kalinovsky,	  Laboratory	  of	  Socialist	  Development;	  also	  Davlat,	  “Tohiri	  Abdujabbor.”	  116	  “Ustav	   organizatsii	   ‘Rastokhez’,”	   reprinted	   in	   N.G.	   Chicherina	   (ed.),	   Grazhdanskie	   dvizeniia	   v	  
Tadzhikistane	  (Moscow:	  TsIMO,	  1990),	  133.	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  Although	  Rastokhez’s	   calls	   for	   increased	  perestroika	   and	   economic	   liberalization	  were	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   Party	   line,	   its	   more	   radical	   calls	   for	   full	   economic	  sovereignty	  and	  local	  political	  control	  set	  it	  at	  odds	  against	  the	  CPT	  and	  Dushanbe	  politicians.	   	   From	   the	  very	  beginning,	  moreover,	   it	  began	   to	  act	   as	  an	  opposition	  movement,	  emphasizing	  popular	   issues	   like	   the	  recent	  Law	  on	  Language	  and	   the	  need	   to	   protect	   Tajik	   cultural	   values.117	  	   Building	   on	   the	   increasingly	   politicized	  atmosphere	   in	   Dushanbe,	   the	   movement	   rallied	   support	   for	   its	   political	   and	  economic	   program,	   organizing	   dissipate	   and	   disparate	   frustrations	   into	   a	   single	  platform.	   	   	   Its	  success	  quickly	  outshone	  the	  other	  “informal”	  groups	  in	  Tajikistan,	  with	   organizations	   such	   as	   Ekh’’yoi	   Khujand,	   Vakhdat,	   and	   Oshkoro	   joining	   its	  platform	   in	   late	  1989.118	  	  As	  Rastokhez	  waxed	   in	  popularity,	  moreover,	  Ru	  ba	  Ru	  waned,	   with	   an	   increasing	   number	   of	   well-­‐known	   intellectuals,	   including	   Bozor	  Sobir,	   joining	   the	   former	  movement.119	  	   By	   the	   final	  months	   of	   1989,	  moreover,	  Rastokhez	  was	  openly	  acting	  as	  a	  political	  party,	  supporting	  50	  candidates	  for	  the	  upcoming	  February	  1990	  elections	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.120	  	  	  The	  Tajik	  state	  tried	  to	  hamper	  its	  efforts	  by	  refusing	  to	  register	  the	  organization	  and	  accusing	  its	  members	  of	  “extremism,”	  but	  to	  little	  immediate	  effect.121	  	  	  	  Building	  upon	  the	  burgeoning	  politicization	  in	  Dushanbe	  and	  the	  broad	  framework	  of	  criticism	  established	  by	  Oshkoro,	  Ru	  ba	  Ru,	  and	  other	  organizations,	  Rastokhez	  was	   able	   to	   outline	   a	   unified	   political	   platform	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	   CPT.	   By	  criticizing	   the	   whole	   of	   Soviet	   development	   in	   Tajikistan,	   moreover	   –	   from	   the	  imbalances	  created	  by	  “turnover	  taxes”	  and	  the	   limited	  revenues	  provided	  to	  the	  Tajik	   SSR	   to	   the	   historical	   promotion	   of	   the	   Russian	   language	   –	   Rastokhez	  harnessed	  the	  frustrations	  of	  many	  different	  social	  groups.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  were	   the	   intellectuals	   (teachers,	   professors,	   and	   most	   prominently,	   writers)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  On	  Rastokhez’s	   activities	   in	   late	  1989,	   see	  Oleg	  Panfilov,	   “Rasprostraneno	   zaiavlenie	  dvizeniia	  ‘Rastokheza’.	   	   Rukovodstvo	   dvizheniia	   udivleno	   ocherednoi	   provokatsiiei	   vlastei,”	   Nezavisimaia	  
gazeta,	  January	  11,	  1996;	  Scarborough,	  “From	  February	  to	  February.”	  118	  Sh.M.	   Sultanov,	   Demontazh	   SSSR:	   Velikaia	   katastrofa	   XX-­‐ogo	   stoletiia.	   Tadzhikistan	   na	   poroge	  
grazhdanskoi	  voini	  (1990-­‐1991	  gg.)	  (Khujand:	  Khoroson,	  2014),	  117.	  119	  Ru	  ba	  Ru	  held	  meetings	  at	   least	  until	   January	  1990,	  but	  seems	  to	  have	  had	  limited	  importance	  after	   the	   founding	   of	   Rastokhez;	   see	   Qironshohi	   Sharifzoda,	   “‘Rubaru’	   va	   intikhobot,”	   Javononi	  
Tojikiston,	   January	  24,	  1990;	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  “Ru	  ba	  ru:	  Shohidi,	  peshnihod,	  va	  padrudi	  noma’’lum,”	  
Ozodagon,	  November	  30,	  2015.	  120	  Davlat,	  “Tohiri	  Abdujabbor.”	  	  On	  Rastokhez’s	  campaigning,	  see	  Mirbobo	  Mirrahim	  and	  Kholnazar	  Muhabbat,	  “Buzurgy	  ba	  aql	  ast,	  na	  ba	  sol,”	  Javononi	  Tojikiston,	  January	  24,	  1990.	  121	  Press	  Gruppa	  KGB	  TSSR,	  “Kto	  est’	  kto,”	  Komsomolets	  Tadzhikistana,	  October	  17,	  1989.	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concerned	   about	   the	   state	   of	   the	   Tajik	   language	   and	   culture.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  there	   were	   the	   masses	   of	   recent	   graduates,	   workers,	   and	   young	   people	  increasingly	   frustrated	   about	   the	   state	   of	   the	   economy,	   growing	   deficits,	   and	  decreasing	  economic	  opportunities.122	  	  Together,	  these	  concerns	  were	  molded	  into	  a	  wider	  critique	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  Tajikistan	  had	  developed,	  in	  Rastokhez’s	  reading,	  often	  for	  the	  greater	  benefit	  of	  the	  urban	  few	  or	  Moscow	  bureaucrats	  than	  for	  the	  average	  citizen	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  	  	  	  Even	   as	   “national	   rebirth”	   and	   development	  were	   often	   couched	   in	   linguistic	   or	  cultural	  terms,	  however,	  there	  was	  little	  doubt	  about	  the	  underlying	  cause	  of	  social	  frustration:	   the	   worsening	   state	   of	   the	   economy	   was	   on	   everyone’s	   mind.	   	   The	  Tajik	   SSR	   had	   moved	   into	   official	   recession	   in	   1989,	   and	   both	   deficits	   of	   basic	  goods	  and	  unemployment	  were	  growing.	   	  Day	  to	  day	  life	  was	  getting	  increasingly	  difficult	   for	   the	   citizens	   of	   Tajikistan,	   a	   fact	   reflected	   in	   Rastokhez’s	   frequent	  reference	  to	  the	  need	  for	  economic	  reform.	  	  Its	  first	  major	  foray	  into	  policymaking,	  in	   fact,	   was	   a	   long	   proposal	   for	   increased	   market	   liberalization,	   published	   in	  January	   1990.123	  	   The	   state-­‐promoted	   campaign	   of	   glasnost	   and	   democratization	  had	  brought	  many	  new	   issues	   to	   the	   fore	  of	   the	  public	  consciousness	  –	   the	  Tajik	  language,	  Soviet	  development	  practices,	   the	  divide	  between	  city	  and	  village	  –	  but	  for	  most	  people	  the	  most	  immediate	  concern	  remained	  the	  shrinking	  economy.	  	  A	  contemporary	  survey	  amongst	  young	  people	  in	  Dushanbe,	  for	  example,	  found	  that	  the	  most	  common	  frustration	  voiced	  about	  perestroika	  was	  the	  growth	  of	  deficits	  and	   the	   “goods	   mafia”	   (torgovaia	   mafia). 124 	  Given	   the	   opportunity	   to	   voice	  criticism,	   the	   residents	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  were	   just	   as	   likely	   to	   criticize	   the	   state’s	  own	  reforms	  as	  anything	  else.	  	  With	  economic	  reform	  directed	  from	  Moscow,	  however,	  there	  was	  little	  either	  the	  leaders	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   or	   the	   new	   class	   of	   politicians	   could	   factually	   do	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122 	  On	   the	   different	   groups	   supporting	   Rastokhez,	   see	   Iu.G.	   Kul’chik,	   S.I.	   Rumiantsev,	   N.G.	  Chicherina,	   “Analyticheskii	   obzor	   –	   grazhdanskie	   dvizhenie	   v	   Tadzhikistane,”	   in	   Grazhdanskie	  
dvizhenie	   v	   Tadzhikistane,	   ed.	   N.G.	   Chicherina	   (Moscow:	   TsIMO	   1990),	   35;	   Alimov	   and	   Saidov,	  
Natsional'nyi	  vopros,	  75.	  123	  Tohiri	  Abdujabbor,	  Kh.	  Azimov,	  Kh.	  Muhabbatov,	  J.	  Mahmadshoev,	  A.	  Murodov,	  Kh.	  Homidov,	  H.	  Habibulloev,	   B.	   Maqsudov,	   A.	   Kholiqzoda,	   M.	   Saidov,	   Sh.	   Yusupov,	   and	   M.	   Mirrahimov,	   “Loihai	  al’ternativy:	  Kontseptsiiai	  mustaqiliiati	   iqtisodii	   Jumhurii	  Shuravii	  Sotsialistii	  Tojikiston,”	   Javononi	  
Tojikiston,	  January	  31,	  1990.	  124	  Alimov	  and	  Saidov,	  Natsional'nyi	  vopros,	   87.	   	  The	   “goods	  mafia”	  most	   likely	   refers	   the	   corrupt	  practice	   whereby	   goods	   were	   unofficially	   sold	   on	   the	   side,	   rather	   than	   through	   official	   stores.	  	  These	  practices	  skyrocketed	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  cooperatives	  in	  1988.	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improve	  the	  situation.	  	  Instead,	  they	  watched	  helplessly	  as	  the	  economy	  collapsed.	  The	  most	  worrying	   issue	  was	   unemployment,	  which	  was	   always	   growing.125	  	   As	  Alimamad	  Niyozmamadov,	  the	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Panj	  District	  Party	  Committee,	  complained	  in	  late	  1989,	  “there	  is	  a	  great	  surplus	  of	  labor	  power	  (rabochaia	  sila):	  healthy	   young	   men	   are	   literally	   wandering	   around	   unemployed.”	   	   Nobody,	  Niyozmamadov	   worried,	   seemed	   to	   be	   able	   to	   find	   them	   jobs,	   even	   in	   the	  cooperative	   sector.	  126	  	   The	   idea	   that	   unemployment	   was	   central	   to	   the	   growing	  social	   frustration	   seen	   in	   the	   Tajik	   press	   and	   amongst	   informal	   groups	   was	  accepted	  by	  most	  everyone	  in	  Dushanbe:	   it	  was	  publically	  acknowledged	  by	  both	  Mahkamov	  and	  the	  Rastokhez	  associate	  Abdunaby	  Sattorov	  during	  the	  later	  half	  of	  1989.127	  	  	  	  Unable	   to	   improve	   the	   underlying	   economic	   situation,	   Mahkamov	   and	   the	  leadership	   of	   the	   CPT	   were	   also	   hamstrung	   in	   their	   ability	   to	   stop	   others	   from	  using	   the	   economic	   collapse	   against	   them.	   	   Gorbachev,	   Yakovlev,	   Yelstin,	   and	  others	   in	   the	   Central	   Committee	   in	   Moscow	   had	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   glasnost,	  democratization,	   and	   new	   “national	   movements”	   needed	   to	   be	   promoted	   –	   and	  should	  not	  be	  undermined.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1989	  an	  entirely	  new	  class	  of	  politicians,	   such	   as	   Mirrahim	   and	   Abdujabbor,	   had	   emerged	   in	   Dushanbe,	  promoted	  by	  Moscow	  benefactors	  and	  protected	  by	  the	  aura	  of	  “glasnost.”	   	  These	  politicians	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	   economic	   collapse	   and	   growing	   discontent	   to	  mobilize	   supporters	   for	   their	   vision	   of	   “national	   rebirth”	   and	   economic	  sovereignty.	   	   Paralleling	   contemporary	   events	   in	   many	   other	   republics	   and	  repeating	  the	  same	  pattern	  observed	  in	  Moscow	  over	  the	  previous	  two	  years,	  the	  growth	  of	  glasnost,	  “democracy,”	  and	  multi-­‐party	  politics	  in	  Dushanbe	  had,	  all	  the	  same,	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  anything	  but	  popularly	  driven.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  By	  late	  1989,	  unemployment	  in	  Tajikistan	  had	  reached	  at	  least	  28%,	  if	  not	  more;	  it	  would	  reach	  30%	  by	  late	  1990.	  	  See	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  160,	  d.	  1672,	  l.	  3.	  126	  Tiuchkalov,	  “Glubinka	  –	  poniatie	  sotsial’noe,”	  101.	  127 	  For	   Mahkamov’s	   comments,	   see	   “O	   zadachakh	   partiinykh	   i	   komsomol’skikh	   organizatsii	  respubliki	  po	  povysheniiu	   roli	  molodezhi	   v	  perestroike	   i	   demokratizatsii	   obshchestvennoi	   zhizni.	  Doklad	   K.M.	   Makhkamova,”	   Komsomolets	   Tadzhikistana,	   September	   27,	   1989;	   for	   Sattorov's	   –	  “Molodezhnaia	  politika.	  Kakoi	  ei	  byt’?”	  Komsomolets	  Tadzhikistana,	  July	  07,	  1989.	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Chapter	  Six	  	  
The	  Harsh	  Reckoning	  of	  February	  1990	  	  On	   March	   1,	   1990	   the	   poetess	   and	   member	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   of	   the	   USSR	  Gulrukhsor	  Safieva	  handed	  an	  emotional	  handwritten	  note	   to	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev.	  She	   begged	   him	   to	   investigate	   the	   riots	   that	   had	   shaken	   her	   home	   earlier	   that	  month:	  
“I	  ask	   for	  a	  word!	  …	  The	  cause	  of	   the	  events	   in	  Dushanbe	  has	  not	  been	  
investigated!!!	   	   I	   ask,	   as	   I	   promised	   the	   20,000	   gathered	   at	   a	  
demonstration	   in	   Dushanbe,	   promised	   to	   bring	   to	   your	   attention	   the	  
state	  of	  our	  people	  –	  poverty,	  destitution,	  social	  injustice,	  unemployment	  
–	  and	  to	  ask:	  what	  led	  people	  to	  such	  extremes?”1	  
	  Safieva	   went	   on	   to	   request	   that	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   establish	   an	   independent	  commission	   to	   investigate	   the	   riots,	   reminding	  Gorbachev	   that	   “the	   people	   await	  your	  decision	  and	  a	  political	  appraisal	  of	  what	  has	  happened	  in	  Dushanbe.”	  	  Shortly	  before	  giving	  her	  note	  to	  Gorbachev,	  Safieva	  herself	  had	  heard	  these	  same	  demands	  on	  February	  18,	  when	  a	   crowd	  of	   tens	  of	   thousands	  gathered	  outside	  of	   a	  movie	  theater	   a	   few	   kilometers	   from	   the	   center	   of	   Dushanbe	   and	   called	   for	   an	  investigation	  into	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  ongoing	  demonstrations.2	  	  Strangely,	  the	  people	  in	  the	  crowd	  seemed	  to	  be	  demanding	  from	  Moscow	  an	  answer	  as	  to	  why	  they	  had	  been	  gathering	  on	   the	  streets	  of	  Dushanbe	  all	  week.	  Neither	   the	  crowd	   itself,	  nor	  those	  addressing	  it	  on	  February	  18,	  including	  Safieva	  and	  other	  representatives	  of	  the	   central	   and	   republican	   Soviet	   governments,	   had	   been	   able	   to	   provide	   a	   clear	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	   	  In	  fact,	   from	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  riots	  on	  February	  11	  there	  had	  been	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  confusion	  amongst	  all	  involved	  about	  exactly	  why	  tens	  of	   thousands	  of	  primarily	  young	  men	  were	   flooding	   the	   streets	  of	  Dushanbe	  and	   demanding	   political	   change.	   That	   unexpected	   and	   bloody	   riots	   had	   engulfed	  the	   previously	   calm	   capital	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	  was	   undeniable,	   but	   no	   one	   seemed	  able	  to	  explain	  just	  how	  and	  why	  this	  might	  have	  occurred.	  	  	  
I.	  Riots	  in	  Need	  of	  An	  Explanation	  The	   “events”	   that	   Safieva	   referred	   to	  were	   a	  week	  of	   demonstrations	   and	   rioting	  that	  rocked	  the	  Tajik	  capital	  from	  February	  11	  to	  18,	  1990.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Safieva	   to	   Gorbachev,	   undated,	   GARF,	   f.	   9654,	   op.	   6,	   d.	   176,	   l.	   30;	   read	   by	   Gorbachev	  March	   2	  following	  a	  meeting	  with	  Safieva	  on	  March	  1.	  	  On	  the	  meeting,	  see	  Sh.	  Shabdolov,	  ed.,	  Rasshirennyi	  
XVIII	   plenum	   TsK	   Kompartii	   Tadzhikistana.	   03	   Marta	   1990	   g.	   Stenograficheskii	   ochet	   (Dushanbe:	  Irfon,	  1990),	  74.	  2	  See:	  N.	  Sautin,	  “Snova	  mitingi,”	  Pravda,	  February	  20,	  1990;	  Buri	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’:	  pravda	  i	  
lozh’	  (Moscow:	  Intransdornauka,	  2015),	  312-­‐329.	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week	  at	  least	  25	  people	  were	  killed,	  shops	  were	  looted,	  citizens	  assaulted,	  and	  tens	  of	  millions	  of	  rubles	  in	  damages	  incurred.	  	  Nominally	  started	  over	  rumors	  about	  the	  provision	  of	  scarce	  housing	  to	  Armenian	  refugees	  from	  Baku,	  Azerbaijan	  (the	  site	  of	  bloody	   ethnic	   riots	   the	   month	   before),	   the	   demonstrations	   quickly	   grew	   out	   of	  hand,	  nearly	  overthrowing	  the	  government	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  and	  requiring	  martial	  law	  to	  restore	  order.	   	  For	  a	  republic	  that	  had	  barely	  embraced	  the	  new	  politics	  of	  perestroika	  and	  glasnost,	  this	  was	  a	  violent	  awakening.	  It	  also	  challenged	  all	  sorts	  of	   conceptions	   about	   Tajikistan	   as	   a	   peaceful	   and	   reliable	   outpost	   of	   Soviet	   calm	  away	   from	   the	   travails	   of	   Moscow	   politicking.	   It	   seemed	   almost	   impossible	   for	  violence	   to	   have	   erupted	   quite	   so	   quickly	   and	   unexpectedly	   in	   Dushanbe,	   a	  confusion	   that	   was	   only	   strengthened	   by	   the	   rioters’	   apparent	   perplexity	   about	  their	  own	  motivations.	  	  This	   lack	   of	   clarity	   quickly	   gave	   rise	   to	   a	   number	   of	   varied	   and	   contradictory	  explanations	  and	  narratives.	  	  In	  Tajikistan,	  where	  the	  February	  1990	  events	  remain	  to	  this	  day	  extremely	  controversial,	  arguments	  have	  from	  the	  beginning	  tended	  to	  cluster	   around	   two	  mutually	   exclusive	   accounts.	   	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   national	  movement	   Rastokhez	   is	   accused	   of	   organizing	   the	   riots	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  wrench	  power	  from	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  3	  	  Those	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  Rastokhez,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  have	  blamed	  either	   the	  political	   leaders	  of	   the	  republic	  or	   the	  republican	  KGB	  for	  organizing	  the	  riots	  to	  discredit	  Rastokhez	  prior	  to	  elections	  to	  the	   Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet	   on	   February	   25,	   1990.4	  Both	   narratives	   stress	   the	   idea	  that	   the	   riots	   were	   “organized”	   by	   someone	   from	   the	   outside:	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  events	   could	   have	   been	   spontaneous	   or	   uncontrolled	   is	   frequently	   dismissed	  outright.	  	  	  Western	   accounts	   of	   the	   February	   events	   have	   also	   clustered	   around	   these	   two	  narratives,	   with	   some	  writers	   accusing	   the	   republican	   authorities	   or	   the	   KGB	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 	  Viktor	   Ponomarov,	   “Kolokola	   nadezhdy,”	   Pravda,	   May	   10-­‐11,	   1990;	   E.	   Saidov,	   “Neskol’ko	  shtrikhov	   k	   fevral’iu,”	  Komsomolets	  Tadzhikistana,	   July	   15,	   1990;	   “Voqeahoi	   fevral:	   tahqiq	   idoma	  dorad,”	   Tojikistoni	   Shuravy,	   January	   15,	   1991;	   Sulkhiya	   Kobilova,	   Fevral’skie	   sobytiia	   1990	   g.	   v	  
Tadzhikistane	   (Khudjand:	  Tadzhikskii	  gosudarstvennii	  universitet	  prava,	  biznesa,	   i	  politiki,	  2007);	  Sultanov.	  Demontazh	  SSSR.	  4	  Sh.	  Shabdolov,	  ed.,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana,	  15-­‐16	  fevralya	  1990	  g	  
(stenograficheskii	   otchet)	   (Dushanbe:	   Irfon,	   1990),	   48;	   K.	   Myalo	   and	   P.	   Goncharov,	   “Vspyshka	   v	  gorakh,”	   Novoe	   vremia	   9	   (1990);	   A.	   Ganelin,	   “Esli	   pozhary	   zazhigayut,”	   Komsomol’skaia	   pravda,	  March	  28,	  1990;	  Dustov,	  Zakhm	  bar,	  29-­‐30;	  Nurali	  Davlatov,	  “Krovavii	  fevral’	  1990	  goda,”	  Asia-­‐Plus,	  February	  19,	  2015.	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organizing	   the	   riots	   for	   their	   own	   benefit.5	  While	   Western	   authors	   tend	   not	   to	  directly	  accuse	  Rastokhez	  of	  controlling	  the	  riots,	  an	  alternative	  body	  of	  work	  has	  stressed	  the	  growth	  of	  “national	  sentiment”	  in	  Tajikistan	  prior	  to	  1990,	  pointing	  to	  the	   long-­‐held	   frustrations	  of	   the	   titular	  national	  majority	  as	   the	  ultimate	  cause	  of	  the	  riots.	  	  In	  this	  reading	  of	  events,	  the	  February	  1990	  riots	  were	  a	  minor	  episode	  in	   the	  broader	   “rise”	  of	  nationalism	  engendered	  by	  glasnost	   and	  democratization	  during	   perestroika.	  6	  Here,	   Rastokhez	   is	   seen	   as	   symptomatic,	   rather	   than	   causal:	  its	  visibility	  during	   the	  riots	  was	  simply	  a	  demonstration	  of	  nationalism’s	  growth	  and	  ultimate	  cause	  of	  the	  February	  riots.	  7	  	  	  Throughout	   all	   of	   these	   accounts,	   however,	   the	   actual	  mobilized	   are	   often	   lost	   in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  mobilizers	  and	  mobilizing	  factors.	  	  The	  motivations	  that	  drove	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  Tajik	  Soviet	  citizens	  into	  the	  streets	  in	  February	  1990	  –	  as	  well	  as	   those	   motivations’	   potential	   legitimacy	   –	   are	   rarely,	   if	   ever,	   discussed.	  	  Demonstrators	  are	   infrequently	  quoted	  or	  cited,	  and	  instead	  reference	   is	  made	  to	  political	   conspiracies,	   backdoor	   deals,	   or	   background	   processes	   of	   nationalist	  growth	  occurring	  across	  the	  USSR	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  dominant	  narratives	  avoid	   extended	   discussion	   of	   either	   the	   rioters’	   motivations	   or	   the	   immediate	  background	   to	   the	   riots:	   the	  period	  of	   economic	  downturn	  and	   collapse	  of	  1988-­‐1989.	  As	  this	  dissertation	  has	  argued,	  however,	  the	  growth	  of	  new	  political	  parties	  and	  movements	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  economic	  downturn	  of	  the	   perestroika	   era,	   with	   unemployment	   leading	   the	   way	   in	   driving	   social	   and	  political	  frustrations.	  By	  turning	  to	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  February	  1990	  events,	  as	   well	   as	   the	   motivations	   and	   frustrations	   felt	   by	   its	   participants,	   this	   chapter	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  riots	  in	  Dushanbe	  were	  also	  driven,	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  by	  the	  slow	  crumbling	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economic	  and	  social	  order	  experienced	  during	  perestroika.	   	  While	  Rastokhez	  was	  visible	  and	  present	  during	  the	  riots,	  and	  some	  Tajik	  politicians	  tried	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  chaos	  for	  their	  own	  benefit,	  neither	  group	   had	   been	   in	   any	   position	   to	   organize	   or	   coordinate	   the	   riots.	   	   Instead,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Ro’i,	   “Central	  Asian	  Riots”;	   Juraeva,	   “Ethnic	  Conflict”;	  Stephane	  Dudoignon,	   “Political	  Parties	  and	  Forces	   in	   Tajikistan,	   1989-­‐1993,”	   in	  Tajikistan:	  The	  Trials	  of	   Independence,	   eds.	  Mohammad-­‐Reza	  Djalili,	  Frederic	  Grare,	  and	  Shirin	  Akiner	  (London:	  Curzon,	  1998),	  57-­‐58;	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  
Tajikistan,	   188;	   Parviz	   Mullojanov,	   “February	   1990	   Riots	   in	   Tajikistan:	   Who	   Was	   Behind	   the	  Scenes?	  Review	  of	  the	  Main	  Existing	  Versions,”	  Cahiers	  d’Asie	  centrale	  26	  (2016):	  249.	  6	  Akbarzadeh,	   “Why	   did	   nationalism	   fail”;	   Akiner,	   “Melting	   Pot,	   Salad	   Bowl”;	   Glenn,	   The	   Soviet	  
Legacy;	  Collins,	  Clan	  Politics;	  Markowitz,	  “How	  Master	  Frames.”	  7	  See	  Nassim	  Javad	  and	  Shahrbanou	  Tadjbaksh,	  Tajikistan:	  A	  Forgotten	  Civil	  War	  (London:	  Minority	  Rights	  Group,	  1995),	  11;	  Atkin,	  “Tajikistan:	  reform,	  reaction.”	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February	   1990	   events	   in	   Dushanbe	   are	   best	   understood	   as	   an	   uncontrolled	  expression	   of	   public	   frustration	   that	   quickly	   got	   out	   of	   hand:	   a	   cry	   of	   rage	   and	  violence	  against	  an	  order	  that	  was	  failing	  to	  live	  up	  to	  its	  many	  promises.	  	  
II.	  The	  Unfolding	  Unrest	  The	   first	   week	   of	   February	   1990	   gave	   little	   indication	   of	   the	   violence	   to	   come.	  	  Dushanbe	   was	   shrouded	   in	   winter	   rains	   and	   overhung	   clouds,	   a	   dour	   but	   calm	  backdrop	  to	  the	  growing	  but	  unrealized	  frustrations	  of	  perestroika-­‐era	  Tajikistan.	  	  In	   the	  Tajik	   capital	   and	   regions,	   campaigning	  was	   in	   full	   swing	   for	   the	  upcoming	  elections	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  Meetings	  were	  frequently	  held	  in	  Dushanbe,	  where	  opposition	  politicians,	  such	  as	  Rastokhez’s	  Tohir	  Abdujabbor,	  up	  for	  election	   in	  Asht	  District	   in	   the	  Tajik	  north,	  would	  declaim	   the	   republic’s	  poor	  management.	   	   On	   Friday,	   January	   26,	   for	   example,	   Abdujabbor	   promoted	   his	  campaign	  by	  demonstrating	  in	  front	  of	  the	  headquarters	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	  (CPT),	  a	  sprawling	  neocolonial	  building	  of	  red	  brick	   at	   Dushanbe’s	   then	   central	   intersection.	   Abdujabbor	   called	   for	   “the	  government	   of	   Tajikistan	   to	   be	   cleaned	   of	   swindlers,	   wreckers,	   traitors,	   and	  mafiosos,”8	  and	   he	   and	   his	   supporters	   held	   signs	   with	   the	   words	   of	   the	   famous	  Pakistani	   poet	   Muhammad	   Iqbal:	   “Awake	   from	   your	   deep	   sleep!” 9 	  	   Yet	   this	  demonstration,	  like	  those	  before	  it,	  ended	  quietly	  and	  without	  apparent	  impact	  on	  either	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT	  or	  Tajik	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  By	   February	   8,	   however,	   something	   had	   begun	   to	   change.	   	   That	   evening	  Maqsud	  Ikromov,	   the	   mayor	   of	   Dushanbe,	   spoke	   on	   Tajik	   republican	   television	   about	   a	  group	  of	  Armenian	  refugees	  who	  had	  recently	  arrived	  in	  Tajikistan	  from	  the	  ethnic	  violence	   in	  Baku.	  10	  	   Ikromov	  was	   light	  on	   the	  particulars,	   and	  perhaps	   it	  was	   the	  modesty	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  actions	   that	   led	  him	   to	  avoid	  detail:	   a	   total	  of	  only	  47	  refugees,	  including	  29	  Armenians,	  had	  arrived	  in	  Dushanbe	  during	  the	  last	  week	  of	  January,	   most	   of	   whom	   ended	   up	   staying	   with	   friends	   or	   relatives.11	  	   The	   Tajik	  government,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  Soviet	  program	  of	  support	  for	  refugees	  from	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Nasreddinov,	   Tarkish,	   95,	   108;	   also	   D.	   Nazriev	   and	   I.	   Sattorov,	   eds.,	   Respublika	   Tadzhikistan:	  
istoriia	  nezavisimosti.	  	  God	  1991-­‐i	  (khronika	  sobytii)	  (Dushanbe:	  AK-­‐94,	  2002),	  206.	  9	  Pers.	  “Az	  khobi	  garon	  khez!”	  See:	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  78-­‐79.	  10	  Mirrahim,	  Khamtabaqi	  Shodmon	  Iusupov,	  44.	  	  11	  Protokol	   shestnadtsatogo	  plenuma	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  14.02.1990	  goda,	  RGASPI	   f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1695,	  l.	  3;	  Spravka	  “O	  rabote	  komissii	  prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	   po	   rassledovaniiu	   obstoiatel’stv,	   sviazannykh	   s	   sobytiiami	   v	   gor.	   Dushanbe	   12-­‐14	   fevralia,”	  August	  1990,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  279,	  l.	  149.	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conflict	   in	   Baku,	   had	   distributed	   on	   average	   30	   rubles	   to	   each	   of	   the	   arriving	  Armenians,	  spending	  a	  grand	  total	  of	  930	  rubles	  on	  the	  whole	  operation.12	  	  There	  was	  probably	  little	  reason	  for	  further	  comment.	  	  For	  many	  of	  those	  watching,	  however,	  this	  news	  apparently	  came	  as	  a	  shock	  –	  and	  one	   that	   would	   grow	   enormously	   through	   rumor	   and	   misinformation.	   	   By	   the	  afternoon	  of	  Friday,	  February	  9,	  the	  information	  had	  spread	  throughout	  Dushanbe	  and	   its	   surrounding	   suburbs,	   quickly	   growing	   in	   size	   and	   importance.	  13	  In	   the	  public	   imagination,	   the	  29	  Armenians	  became	  thousands;	   the	  unstated	  amount	  of	  support	  became	  state-­‐provided	  apartments.	   	  At	  Friday	  prayers	  across	   the	  capital,	  where	  many	  people	  had	  gathered	  at	  noon,	  groups	  of	   local	  men	  became	   incensed:	  the	  idea	  that	  outsiders	  would	  be	  provided	  with	  apartments	  when	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  Dushanbe	  residents	  had	  been	  on	  waiting	   lists	   for	  years	  was	  galling.	   	  Given	   the	  constantly	   worsening	   economic	   conditions,	   increasing	   unemployment,	   and	  shrinking	  opportunities	  for	  Soviet	  Tajik	  citizens,	  government	  support	  for	  outsiders	  was	  all	  the	  more	  infuriating.	  	  	  	  Angry	   talk	   led	   to	   action,	   and	   on	   Friday	   afternoon	   a	   large	   crowd	   had	   gathered	   in	  front	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building.	  	  	  Amongst	  others,	  Abdujabbor	  again	  railed	  against	   the	  government	  of	  Tajikistan	   for	   their	   lack	  of	  support	   to	   the	  Tajik	  people,	  once	   more	   reading	   the	   poetry	   of	   Iqbal	   while	   others	   “gave	   voice	   to	   their	   own	  protests.”14	  	  	  As	  during	  previous	  demonstrations,	  however,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  paid	  little	  attention,	  and	  they	  continued	  to	  ignore	  the	  angry	  voices	  on	  the	  street	  on	  February	  10,	  even	  as	  demands	  were	  made	   to	  meet	  with	   the	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  CPT,	  Kahhor	  Mahkamov.15	  	   In	   contrast	   to	   earlier	   events,	   however,	   the	   lack	   of	  any	  official	  response	  only	  made	  things	  worse:	  rumors	  continued	  to	  swirl	  and	  push	  people	  into	  the	  streets.	   	  Matters	  came	  to	  a	  head	  on	  the	  rainy	  afternoon	  of	  Sunday,	  February	  11,	  when	  a	  group	  of	  about	  150	  men	  gathered	  on	  Lenin	  Square	  in	  front	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	   refugees	   that	   arrived	   in	   Dushanbe	   represented	   a	   tiny	   portion	   of	   the	   tens	   of	   thousands	   of	  Armenians	  from	  Baku	  for	  whom	  the	  USSR	  was	  attempting	  to	  find	  housing	  and	  support;	  the	  majority	  was	   in	   Moscow	   and	   the	   RSFSR.	   In	   late	   January	   1990	   a	   federal	   program	   was	   developed	   to	  redistribute	   the	   refugees	   and	  29	   arrived	   in	  Dushanbe.	   	   See	   Zapiska	  Ryzhkova	  Doguzhievu,	   V.Kh.,	  Shcherbakovu,	  V.I.,	  Kriuchkovu,	  V.A.,	  Vlasovu,	  A.V.,	  Bakatinu,	  V.V.	  ot	  26.01.1990,	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  180,	  ll.	  52-­‐56.	  13 	  “Voqeahoi	   fevral:	   tahqiq	   idoma	   dorad”;	   also	   Karimov,	   Krovavii	   fevral’,	   92;	   Shabdolov,	  
Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  49.	  14	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  67;	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  94.	  15	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  68.	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the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Soviet	   Socialist	   Republic.	   	   Those	   gathered	  continued	  to	  express	  anger	  about	  the	  “thousands”	  of	  Armenian	  refugees	  who	  were	  supposedly	  receiving	  apartments	  from	  the	  republican	  government.	  	  Finding	  no	  one	  at	   work	   in	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   building	   on	   the	   chilly	   Sunday,	   the	   crowd	  moved	  north	  along	  Lenin	  Avenue	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building.	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐afternoon	  the	  crowd	  had	  grown	  into	  massive	  protest	  of	  more	  than	  2,500	  people,	  who	  made	  loud	  and	  repeated	  demands	  to	  remove	  the	  refugees	  from	  the	  republic.16	  	  The	   shouting	   eventually	   reached	   its	  mark,	   and	   a	   delegation	   from	   the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan,	  including	  Mahkamov	  and	  the	  CPT’s	  second	  secretary,	  Gennady	  Veselkov,	  emerged	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building	  to	  speak	  with	  the	  crowd.	  As	  Veselkov	  later	  reported,	  “for	  the	  next	  three	  and	  a	  half	  hours,	  during	  which	  time	  the	  demonstration	  continued	  near	  the	  main	  entrance	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  we	  conducted	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  hundreds	  and	  hundreds	  of	  people”	  gathered	  there.17	  	  Mahkamov	   and	   Veselkov	   assured	   the	   crowd	   that	   the	   rumors	   circulating	   in	  Dushanbe	   since	   February	   8	   about	   thousands	   of	   Armenian	   refugees	   were	  completely	  baseless.	  	   As	   they	   told	   the	   crowd,	   an	   internal	   government	   review	  had	  already	  verified	  that	  all	  of	  47	  of	  the	  refugees	  from	  Baku	  were	  staying	  with	  relatives	  and	  not	  a	  single	  apartment	  had	  been	  provided	  to	  them.	  18	  	  	  	  Mahkamov	  also	  assured	  the	  crowd	  that	  the	  Central	  Committee	  was	  very	  aware	  of	  the	  concerns	  expressed	  about	   the	   lack	  of	  housing	   in	  Dushanbe	  and	   the	  perceived	  injustice	  of	  its	  provision	  to	  outsiders.	   	  He	  further	  promised	  an	  “investigation”	  into	  the	   rumours	   about	   refugees	   to	  be	   conducted	   together	  with	   the	  Chief	  Mufti	   (Qazy	  
Kalon)	   of	   Tajik	   Muslims,	   Hoji	   Akbar	   Turajonzoda,	   meant	   to	   play	   the	   role	   of	   an	  impartial	   authority	   figure.	   	   Accounts	   differ	   about	   when	   the	   results	   of	   this	  investigation	   would	   be	   made	   public:	   some	   later	   argued	   that	   Mahkamov	   had	  promised	  to	  speak	  with	  the	  crowd	  again	  in	  24	  hours,	  while	  Mahkamov	  insisted	  that	  he	  had	  made	  no	  such	  promise,	  and	  that	  the	  crowd	  itself	  decided	  on	  this	  deadline.19	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Soobshchenie	  Komissii	  prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  po	  proverke	  sobytii	  12-­‐14	  
fevralia	  1990	  g.	  v	  g.	  Dushanbe,	  Personal	  Archive	  of	  Buri	  Karimov,	  Moscow,	  Russian	  Federation.	  	  17	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1695,	  l.	  3.	  18	  Soobshchenie	  Komissii	  prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Tadzhikskoi.	  19	  For	   the	   claim	   that	  Mahkamov	   failed	   to	   follow	   through	   on	   his	   promise,	   see	  Davlatov,	   “Krovavii	  fevral’.”	  For	  Mahkamov’s	  version	  of	  events,	  see	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1695,	  l.	  11.	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One	  way	  or	  another,	  the	  promise	  of	  an	  investigation	  calmed	  the	  crowd,	  and	  by	  the	  early	  evening	  the	  demonstration	  was	  over.	  	  During	  the	  evening	  of	  February	  11,	  efforts	  were	  made	  to	  identify	  refugees	  who	  had	  recently	   arrived	   from	   the	   Caucasus	   and	   verify	   that	   no	   one	   had	   received	   support	  inappropriately.	   	   In	   the	   process,	   numerous	   Armenian	   families	   that	   had	   lived	   in	  Dushanbe	  for	  decades	  were	  inadvertently	  scared	  into	  leaving:	  by	  the	  early	  morning	  hours	  of	  February	  12	  all	  of	  the	  47	  individuals	  that	  had	  recently	  arrived	  in	  Dushanbe	  had	  rushed	   to	   the	  airport	  and	  departed	   the	  republic,	   together	  with	  many	  of	   their	  relatives	   from	   the	   city.	   Turajonzoda	   accompanied	   the	   fleeing	   refugees	   and	   their	  relatives	  to	  the	  airport,	  and	  later	  reported	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee	  that	  a	  total	  of	  223	   individuals	   had	   left	   the	   republic	   in	   this	  way	   overnight.20	  	   Over	   the	   next	   few	  days,	  Dushanbe’s	  Armenian	  residents	  would	  continue	  to	  flee	  the	  perceived	  threat:	  by	  February	  15,	   a	   total	  of	  1390	  had	   left	   the	   republic.21	  With	   tensions	  on	   the	   rise,	  Mahkamov	  and	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT	  also	  took	  no	  chances.	  	  An	  appeal	  was	   made	   that	   evening	   to	   the	   Ministry	   of	   the	   Interior	   of	   the	   USSR	   for	   military	  support,	  and	  by	  the	  morning	  of	  February	  12th	  both	  a	  battalion	  of	  150	  internal	  force	  troops	   (vnutrennie	   voiska)	   and	   a	   small	   group	   of	   commandoes	   from	   the	   KGB’s	  “Alpha”	  unit	  had	  arrived	  and	  been	  deployed	  around	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building	  in	  Dushanbe.22	  	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  The	   morning	   of	   February	   12	   initially	   returned	   Dushanbe	   to	   its	   normal	   routine:	  there	  were	  no	  protesters	  on	  the	  streets,	  and	  government	  workers	  went	  about	  their	  normal	   business.	   	   “After	   lunch	   I	  went	   to	   the	   [Council	   of	  Ministers]	  meeting,”	   the	  then	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Tajik	  Gosplan,	  Buri	  Karimov,	   later	  wrote,	   “which	   started	   at	  about	  two	  thirty.”	  	  Just	  a	  few	  minutes	  after	  the	  meeting	  began,	  though,	  Karimov	  and	  the	  other	  ministers	  were	  startled	  by	  a	  call	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building.	  23	  	  They	  were	  shocked	  by	  what	  they	  heard.	  	  As	  if	  one	  cue	  at	  14:45,	  hundreds	  and	  then	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1695,	  l.	  4.	  	  21	  This	  included	  at	  least	  614	  permanent	  residents.	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  279,	  l.	  149.	  22	  RGASPI	   f.	   17,	   op.	   159,	   d.	   1695,	   l.	   11.	   As	   of	   February	   11th	   all	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   own	   internal	   force	  (vnutrennie	  voiska)	  units	  had	  been	  sent	  to	  keep	  order	  in	  Baku.	  	  The	  150	  internal	  force	  soldiers	  and	  unclear	  number	  of	  KGB	  commandoes	  that	  arrived	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  the	  12th	  would	  have	  been	  the	  main	  force,	  together	  with	  the	  Dushanbe	  police	  (militsiia),	  guarding	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building.	  	  On	  the	  Alpha	  commandoes,	  see:	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  135.	  	  23	  Buri	  Karimov,	  Kurbonii	  duzakhma	  (Dushanbe:	  Oriyonob,	  1992),	  24.	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thousands	  of	  young	  men	  had	  begun	  to	  arrive	  on	  the	  square	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building.	   	  They	  immediately	  demanded	  to	  speak	  with	  Mahkamov,	  who	  had	  also	  been	  at	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  meeting	  and	  only	  learned	  of	  the	  events	  from	   the	   frantic	   phone	   call.	   	  While	  Mahkamov	   sought	   a	   path	   from	   the	  Council	   of	  Ministers	  building	   to	   the	  Central	   Committee	  headquarters,	   other	  members	  of	   the	  Central	   Committee	   tirelessly	   explained	   to	   those	   gathered	   that	   all	   of	   the	   very	   few	  refugees	  had	  already	  left	  the	  republic	  and	  that	  their	  concerns	  had	  been	  taken	  into	  consideration.	   	  This	  seemed	  to	  have	   little	  effect	  on	  the	  crowd,	  which	   immediately	  changed	  its	  demands	  to	  Mahkamov’s	  resignation,	  refused	  to	  leave	  the	  square,	  and	  began	   to	   burn	   buses	   and	   loot	   the	   surrounding	   stores.	  24	  Even	   Mahkamov’s	   own	  arrival	   on	   the	   square	  had	   little	   effect,	   and	  attempts	   continued	   to	  be	  made	  by	   the	  crowd	   to	  storm	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building	  and	  surrounding	  ministries.	   	  The	  authorities	  called	  in	  the	  police	  and	  internal	   force	  troops	  and	  in	  the	  ensuing	  chaos	  shots	   were	   fired,	   leading	   to	   the	   deaths	   of	   both	   demonstrators	   and	   witnesses	   in	  nearby	   buildings.25	  The	   use	   of	   lethal	   force	   further	   enraged	   the	   crowd,	   which	  continued	  to	  riot	  on	  the	  central	  square	  and	  combat	  the	  internal	  ministry	  forces	  who	  had	   now	   been	   restricted	   to	   using	   non-­‐lethal	   means	   of	   crowd	   control,	   including	  truncheons,	   blank	   ammunition,	   and	   tear	   gas.	   	   Only	   by	   nine	   that	   evening	  was	   the	  crowd	  finally	  dispersed.26	  	  By	  the	  time	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  curfew	  were	  declared	  at	  ten	  p.m.,	  nine	  people	  had	  died,	  more	  than	  70	  had	  been	  wounded	  (46	  with	  bullet	  wounds)	  and	  46	  shops	  and	  restaurants,	   two	  movie	   theaters,	  and	  a	  bank	  had	  all	  been	   looted	  or	  damaged.	  	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Land	  Reclamation	  and	  Water	  Management,	  which	  was	  located	  next	  to	   the	  Central	  Committee	  building,	  had	  also	  been	  set	  on	   fire.27	  	   	  The	  night	  passed	  without	   incident,	   but	   it	   was	   anyone’s	   guess	   as	   to	   what	   would	   happen	   the	   next	  morning.	  28	  	  Initially,	   February	   13	   appeared	   to	   repeat	   the	   events	   of	   the	   previous	   day.	   	   The	  morning	   was	   quiet,	   and	   the	   Tajik	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   took	   the	   opportunity	   to	  discuss	   what	   had	   happened.	   	   Unfortunately,	   the	   discussions	   went	   nowhere:	   “In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  95.	  25	  “Voqeahoi	  fevral:	  tahqiq	  idoma	  dorad.”	  26	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1695,	  l.	  4.	  	  27	  Ibid.;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  279,	  ll.	  150-­‐152;	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  137.	  	  28	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  159,	  l.	  5.	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truth	   no	   one	   could	   provide	   an	   explanation	   as	   to	   the	   conditions	   and	   cause	   of	   the	  events.”29	  	  By	  midday,	  moreover,	  large	  groups	  of	  young	  men	  began	  to	  again	  gather	  on	  the	  streets	  around	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  clash	  with	   the	   internal	   force	   troops	  stationed	  there,	  and	  loot	  surrounding	  stores	  and	  restaurants.	  Violence	  also	  spread	  outwards	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  with	  deaths,	  wounds,	  and	  looting	  reported	  in	   multiple	   outlying	   areas	   of	   Dushanbe	   (in	   fact,	   all	   of	   the	   deaths	   reported	   on	  February	   13	   occurred	   far	   away	   from	   the	   center	   of	   the	   riots).30	  The	   number	   of	  demonstrators	  in	  front	  the	  of	  Central	  Committee	  equivalently	  increased	  throughout	  the	   day,	   and	   by	   the	   late	   afternoon	   a	   crowd	   of	   tens	   of	   thousands	   had	   pushed	   the	  troops	  back	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building	  itself,	  having	  occupied	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  square	  in	  front	  of	  it.31	  	  (By	  some	  accounts,	  the	  crowd	  on	  February	  13	  numbered	  up	  to	  50,000.)32	  	  	  	  In	   contrast	   to	   previous	   days,	   the	   crowd	   also	   began	   to	   organize	   itself	   and	   its	  demands.	   	   At	   some	   point	   during	   the	   afternoon	   a	   group	   coalesced	   around	   the	  Rastokhez	  members	  A.	  Kholikov	  and	  Kh.	  Khabibuloev,	  who	  began	  to	  put	  together	  a	  list	  of	  initially	  17	  writers	  and	  intellectuals	  (including	  the	  leaders	  of	  Rastokhez)	  who	  would	   represent	   the	   demonstrators	   as	   a	   “People’s	   Committee.”	  33	  	   Many	   of	   these	  individuals,	   however,	   were	   not	   initially	   in	   the	   crowd:	   Mirbobo	   Mirrahim,	   for	  example,	   arrived	   on	   the	   square	   on	   the	   evening	   of	   the	   13th,	   and	   the	   Rastokhez	  chairman	  Abdujabbor	  and	  poet	  Bozor	  Sobir	  only	  showed	  up	  to	  join	  the	  committee	  on	   the	   14th. 34 	  	   Those	   present,	   however,	   wrote	   up	   a	   list	   of	   their	   chosen	  representatives	   and	   then	   decided	   that	   the	   committee	   should	   be	   led	   by	   Buri	  Karimov,	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Gosplan,	   who	   was	   also	   not	   present	   in	   the	  crowd.	   	  Egged	  on	  by	  the	  nascent	  People’s	  Committee,	  the	  demonstrators	  crafted	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Karimov,	  Kurbonii	  duzakhma,	  29.	  30	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  279,	  ll.	  153-­‐154.	  31	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  159,	  l.	  5.	  32	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  119.	  	  33	  “Voqeahoi	  fevral:	  tahqiq	  idoma	  dorad”;	  also	  Nazriev	  and	  Sattorov,	  Respublika	  Tadzhikistan,	  209;	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  100.	  	  The	  committee	  elected	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  republican	  leadership	  was	  referred	   to	   in	   Russian	   as	   the	   “People’s	   Committee”	   (narodnii	   komitet),	   “Provisional	   Committee”	  (vremennii	  komitet),	  and	  “Committee	  of	  17”	  (komitet-­‐17).	  	  The	  term	  “People’s	  Committee”	  has	  been	  chosen	   here,	   as	   it	   most	   accurately	   portrays	   the	   original	   Tajik	   title	   (shuravy	   mardumy).	   	   For	   a	  comparison	   of	   the	   titles	   in	   Russian	   and	   Tajik	   and	   a	   list	   of	   members,	   see	   Protokol	   sovmestnogo	  
zasedaniia	   rukovodstva	   respubliki	   s	   narodnym	  komitetom,	   izbrannym	  mitinguiushchim	  narodom	  ot	  
14	  fevralia	  1990	  g.	  and	  Protokoli	  masvaratii	  bainitarafaini	  rohbariyati	  jumkhuri	  va	  sozmoni	  mardumi	  
az	  14.02.1990,	  Personal	  Archive	  of	  Buri	  Karimov,	  Moscow,	  Russian	  Federation.	  34	  For	  Mirrahim’s	  whereabouts	  on	  February	  13-­‐14,	  see	  Mirrahim,	  Hamtabaqi	  Shodmon	  Yusupov,	  45-­‐47;	  for	  Abdujabbor's,	  see	  Shabdolov,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  30-­‐31;	  for	  Sobir’s,	  see	  Bozor	  Sobir,	  Chashmi	  safedor	  (Dushanbe:	  Adolat,	  1991),	  103.	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series	   of	   large	   posters	   and	   began	   to	   shout	   “We	   trust	   Karimov!”	   and	   “We	   want	  Karimov	  as	  First	  Secretary!”	  35	  	  Having	   learned	   of	   the	   crowd's	   demands,	   Karimov	   travelled	   to	   the	   Central	  Committee	  building,	  where	  Mahkamov	  and	  Izotullo	  Khayoev,	   the	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Tajik	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  asked	  him	  to	  try	  to	  calm	  down	  those	  present.36	  	  Exiting	  the	  main	  entrance	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building	  directly	  onto	  a	  crowd	  of	  tens	  of	  thousands,	  Karimov	  reported	  feeling	  an	  overwhelming	  sense	  of	  fear.	  	  “But	  then	  I	  pulled	  myself	  together,”	  he	  recalled,	  “and	  began	  to	  speak,”	  exhorting	  the	  crowd	  to	  remain	  calm	  through	  poetry:	  	  
	   The	  mockery	  of	  youth	  may	  be	  strong,	  
	   Yet	  in	  pride	  the	  eyes	  of	  arrogance	  are	  blind.	  
With	  bravado	  a	  nail	  is	  hammered	  in	  today,	  
	   Tomorrow	  it	  will	  be	  taken	  up	  by	  plyers.	  37	  	  Once	   the	   crowd	  had	  begun	   to	   calm	  down,	  Karimov	  was	   handed	   a	   piece	   of	   paper	  with	   the	   “People’s	   Committee”	   and	   his	   name	   added	   on	   top.	  38	  While	   accusations	  would	   later	   be	   made	   that	   Karimov	   insisted	   on	   leading	   the	   committee	   himself,39	  what	  is	  clear	  no	  matter	  the	  case,	  and	  what	  Karimov	  has	  also	  explicitly	  admitted,	  is	  that	   from	   this	   moment	   on	   he	   too	   began	   to	   act	   in	   “political	   opposition”	   to	   the	  leadership	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR.	   	   Just	   like	   the	   members	   of	   the	   crowd	   he	   now	  represented,	  he	  also	  began	  to	  demand	  their	  resignation.40	  	  Negotiations	  between	   the	  committee	  and	   the	  government	  began	   that	  evening.	   	   In	  addition	   to	   demanding	  Mahkamov’s	   resignation	   from	   his	   post	   as	   First	   Secretary,	  Karimov	   and	   the	   “People’s	   Committee”	   also	   insisted	   on	   Khayoev’s	   resignation	   as	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  and	  Ghoibnazar	  Pallaev’s	  from	  his	  post	  as	  the	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Presidium	  of	   the	  republic’s	  Supreme	  Soviet.41	  	  Although	   they	  did	   not	   give	   in	   to	   these	   demands,	  Mahkamov,	   Khayoev,	   and	   Pallaev	   did	   agree	   to	  release	   a	   number	   of	   detainees	   who	   had	   been	   arrested	   the	   day	   before.42	  	   It	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  115-­‐116;	  118.	  36	  Karimov,	  Kurbonii	  duzakhma,	  37-­‐38;	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  72-­‐73.	  37	  Karimov,	  Kurbonii	  duzakhma,	  38-­‐39.	  38	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  122-­‐123;	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  74.	  39	  Shabdolov,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  126-­‐127.	  40	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  122.	  41	  Shabdolov,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  41.	  42	  Ibid.,	  66.	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hoped	   that	   this	   would	   help	   to	   calm	   the	   crowd	   that	   continued	   to	   riot	   and	   loot	  throughout	  that	  evening,	  but	  the	  attempt	  proved	  fruitless.	  	  Disturbances	  continued	  on	   the	   central	   square	   until	   eight	   p.m.	   that	   evening,	   and	   once	   the	   demonstrators	  were	  pushed	  back	  they	  simply	  began	  to	  commit	  violence	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  city.43	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  somehow	  stave	  off	  the	  ongoing	  rioting,	  Mahkamov,	  Khayoev,	  Pallaev,	  together	   with	   the	   deputy	   chairman	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers,	   Otakhon	   Latifi,	  appealed	   to	   the	   citizens	   of	   Dushanbe	   on	   republican	   television,	   calling	   for	   the	  formation	   of	   self-­‐defense	   committees	   to	   patrol	   and	   protect	   the	   capital’s	   outlying	  neighborhoods.	  44	  	  	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  Mahkamov	  also	  took	  the	  opportunity	  to	  appeal	  to	  Moscow	  for	  additional	  help,	  and	  by	  the	  morning	  of	  February	  14	  a	  delegation	  headed	  by	  Boris	  Pugo,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	   Party	   Control	   Committee	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   the	  USSR	   and	   candidate	  member	   of	   the	   CPSU	   Politburo,	   had	   arrived	   in	   Dushanbe.45	  Not	   insignificantly,	  another	   contingent	  of	  1068	   internal	   force	   troops	  also	  arrived	   that	   same	  morning	  from	  the	  Turkestan	  Military	  Command.46	  	  Pugo	  and	  his	  team	  helped	  to	  organize	  a	  special	  plenary	  meeting	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT	  at	  which	  any	  idea	  of	  resignation	   was	   rejected.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   plenary	   meeting	   showed	   clear	  division	   in	   the	   ranks	  of	   the	  Central	  Committee,	   as	  political	   camps	   formed	  around	  Mahkamov	  and	  Karimov.	  	  The	  meeting	  also	  failed	  to	  lower	  tensions	  in	  the	  city:	  by	  the	  afternoon	  on	  the	  14th	  another	  enormous	  crowd	  of	  approximately	  30,000	  people	  had	  gathered	  at	   the	  Central	  Committee	  building	   to	  demand	  Mahkamov,	  Khayoev,	  and	   Pallaev’s	   resignations	   and	   the	   right	   to	   conduct	   a	   religious	   funeral	   service	  (janoza)	  on	  the	  square	  for	  those	  who	  had	  died	  on	  the	  12th	  and	  13th	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  riots.	  	  Neither	  demand	  was	  acceded	  to,	  and	  the	  demonstrators	  continued	  their	  pattern	  of	  rioting,	  lighting	  buildings	  on	  fire,	  and	  combatting	  the	  government	  forces	  on	  the	  street.47	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1695,	  l.	  5;	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  131.	  	  44	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1695,	  l.	  5.	  45	  Ibid.,	  l.	  26.	  46	  Soobshchenie	  Komissii	  prezidiuma,	  29.	  47	  Shabdolov,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  11-­‐12.	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At	  the	  same	  time,	  negotiations	  continued	  between	  the	  People’s	  Committee	  and	  the	  republican	  leadership,	  now	  with	  Pugo’s	  additional	  participation.	   	  Beginning	  in	  the	  mid-­‐afternoon,	  these	  negotiations	  continued	  for	  six	  tense	  hours,	  during	  which	  time	  the	   committee	   continually	   demanded	   the	   resignation	   of	   the	   leadership	   and	  unidentified	   individuals	   ran	   into	   the	  meeting	   room	  and	  made	   threats	  about	  what	  would	  happen	   in	  case	  they	  didn’t	  resign:	  blood	  would	  be	  spilled;	  buildings	  would	  be	  burned;	  the	  republic	  would	  collapse.	  48	  	  	  At	  around	  nine	  PM,	  the	  three	  leaders	  of	  the	  republic	  finally	  agreed	  to	  quit	  their	  posts	  and	  a	  memorandum	  of	  agreement	  was	  signed	  between	   them	  and	   the	  People’s	  Committee	   in	  which	  Mahkamov,	  Khayoev,	  and	  Pallaev	  all	  agreed	  to	  resign	  in	  “accordance	  with	  existent	  legislation.”49	  	  Acting	  as	  Moscow’s	   representative,	  Pugo	  gave	  his	   consent	   to	   the	  agreement,	  after	  which	  point	  the	  three	  leaders	  left	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building.50	  	  Bozor	  Sobir	  was	  sent	  by	   the	   People’s	   Committee	   to	   the	   republican	   television	   station	   to	   record	   an	  announcement	   about	   the	   resignation,	   which	   was	   supposed	   to	   run	   immediately	  after	   the	   news	   show	   “The	   Times”	   (Vaqt)	   at	   around	   ten	   p.m.	  51	  	   As	   a	   result	   of	  bureaucratic	   intransigence	   at	   the	   station,	   however,	   the	   announcement	   was	   only	  run	  after	  midnight.52	  	  	  	  Yet	  the	  resignation	  of	  the	  Tajik	  leadership	  did	  not	  bring	  about	  the	  immediate	  calm	  that	  had	  been	  promised	  by	  the	  People’s	  Committee.	  Demonstrations	  on	  the	  central	  square	   continued	   throughout	   and	   after	   the	   negotiations,	   and	   even	   after	   the	  announcement	  of	  the	  leadership’s	  resignation	  was	  played	  late	  at	  night	  on	  television	  disorder	  and	  rioting	  continued	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  Dushanbe.	  	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  February	  14th,	  a	  further	  five	  people	  had	  died,	  including	  at	  least	  three	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  internal	  force	  soldiers	  responding	  to	  reports	  of	  unrest.	  53	  	  	  Immediately	   after	   the	   negotiations	   ended,	   moreover,	   the	   two	   sides	   had	   begun	  positioning	  themselves	  for	  further	  conflict.	  	  	  Karimov	  returned	  to	  his	  Gosplan	  office	  with	  a	  group	  of	  his	   supporters,	   including	   the	  Minister	  of	  Higher	  Education	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  Nur	  Tabarov,	  the	  editor	  of	  the	  newspaper	  Tojikistoni	  sovety,	  Mazhabsho	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Ibid,	  41.	  49	  Ibid,	  12;	  Protokol	  sovmestnogo	  zasedaniia.	  50	  Karimov,	  Kurbonii	  duzakhma,	  55.	  51	  Karimov,	  Kurbonii	   duzakhma,	   60;	   Nasreddinov,	   Tarkish,	   117-­‐118;	   Sobir,	   Chashmi	   safedor,	   105;	  “Voqeahoi	  fevral:	  tahqiq	  idoma	  dorad.”	  52	  Karimov,	  Kurbonii	  duzakhma,	  60.	  53	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  279,	  ll.	  38-­‐39;	  153-­‐154.	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Muhabbatshoev,	   and	   the	   Central	   Committee	   secretary	   Nurullo	   Khuvaidullaev	   to	  discuss	  how	  to	  proceed.	  Tabarov	  also	  began	  to	  call	  in	  others.	  Maqsud	  Ikromov,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  city	  council	  of	  Dushanbe,	  was	  invited,	  apparently	  to	  win	  him	  over	  to	   Karimov’s	   side,	   but	   he	   left	   quickly	   thereafter.	   Those	   remaining	   agreed	   that	  Karimov	  should	  become	  acting	  chairman	  of	   the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	   in	  Khayoev’s	  stead,	   and	   Usman	   Usmanov,	   deputy	   chairman	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   Presidium,	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  which	  such	  decisions	  were	  officially	  made,	  was	  called	  in	  for	  additional	   discussions.54	  	   After	   Usmanov	   left,	   A.	   Khabibov,	   the	   director	   of	   the	  political	   section	   of	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Internal	   Affairs	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   was	   sent	   to	  deliver	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  resignation	  agreement	  and	  information	  about	  Karimov’s	  plans	  to	  Pugo	  and	  Mamadayoz	  Navjuvonov,	   the	  Minister	  of	   Internal	  Affairs	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  55	  	  Given	  Pugo’s	  (and	  thus	  Moscow’s)	  earlier	  approval	  of	  Karimov’s	  accession	  to	  a	  leadership	  post,	  it	  seemed	  as	  though	  everything	  was	  settled.56	  “We	  have	  won,”	  the	   Rastokhez	   members	   and	   Karimov	   backers	   Olim	   Zafarbekov	   and	   Muhammad	  Haitov	  were	  heard	  to	  have	  cheered	  late	  at	  night	  in	  the	  Central	  Committee	  building	  –	  “We	  have	  made	  a	  revolution.	  	  Now	  we	  will	  start	  cleaning	  out	  this	  Committee.”57	  	  Unbeknownst	   to	  Karimov	  and	  his	   supporters,	   though,	  political	   gears	  were	   still	   in	  motion	   –	   and	   would	   soon	   be	   turned	   against	   them.	   	   As	   soon	   as	   Usmanov	   and	  Ikromov	  had	  left	  Karimov’s	  office,	  they	  had	  made	  phone	  calls	  to	  the	  republican	  and	  party	  leadership,	  setting	  in	  motion	  a	  series	  of	  countermoves.	  	  Ikromov	  spoke	  with	  Jamshed	   Karimov,	   the	   chairman	   of	   the	   Dushanbe	   Party	   Committee,	   who	   called	  together	  a	  late	  night	  meeting	  of	  his	  Committee	  that	  condemned	  the	  resignation	  and	  demanded	  another	  Special	  Party	  Plenary	  Meeting	  the	  next	  day.58	  	  Usmanov,	  for	  his	  part,	   called	  Pallaev,	  who	   categorically	   refused	   to	   initiate	   proceedings	   designating	  Karimov	   as	   acting	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Council	   of	  Ministers.	   	   Pallaev	   also	   appears	   to	  have	  spoken	  late	  into	  the	  night	  with	  Mahkamov,	  Khayoev,	  and	  others,	  insofar	  as	  by	  the	  morning	  of	   the	  15th	   the	   supporters	  of	   the	   republican	   leadership	  were	  able	   to	  destroy	   a	   good	   portion	   of	   that	   day’s	   Tojikistoni	   sovety,	   the	   newspaper	   that	   had	  carried	   the	  resignation	  announcement,	  and	  hold	  an	  extended	  closed-­‐door	  session	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Shabdolov,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  100,	  119;	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  157-­‐158.	  	  55	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1711,	  l.	  18.	  	  56	  On	  Pugo’s	  acceptance	  of	  Karimov’s	  candidacy,	  see	  Sobir,	  Chashmi	  safedor,	  104-­‐105.	  57	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  118.	  58	  TadzhikTA,	  “Sobranie	  aktiva,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  February	  16,	  1990.	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of	  the	  CPT	  Bureau.59	  	  A	  sizeable	  further	  contingent	  of	  internal	  force	  troops	  had	  also	  arrived	  in	  the	  city	  overnight,	  leaving	  the	  center	  of	  Dushanbe	  looking	  like	  a	  strictly	  controlled	  war	  zone	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  February	  15th.60	  	  	  Over	   the	   next	   two	   days,	   an	   emotional	   Special	   Plenary	   Session	   of	   the	   Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Communist	  Party	  was	  held	  together	  with	  the	  Dushanbe	  City	  Committee	   and	   the	   People’s	   Committee.	   	   The	   CPT	   accused	   Karimov	   and	   the	  People’s	  Committee	  of	  attempting	  a	  coup	  d’état,	  while	   the	   latter	   continued	   to	   call	  for	   the	   republican	   leadership’s	   resignation,	   accuse	   Mahkamov	   and	   the	   local	  security	  services	  of	  instigating	  the	  riots,	  and	  threaten	  further	  instability	  in	  the	  case	  that	   the	   leadership	   would	   renege	   on	   its	   promise	   to	   resign.	   	   After	   two	   days	   of	  arguments,	   however,	   the	   Central	   Committee	   rejected	   Mahkamov,	   Pallaev,	   and	  Khayoev’s	  resignations,	  expressed	  faith	  in	  Mahkamov’s	  leadership,	  and	  initiated	  an	  investigation	   into	  Karimov	  and	  his	  supporters’	  attempts	   to	  wrest	  power	   from	  the	  leadership	  on	  February	  13-­‐14.61	  	  Outside	  on	  the	  street	  demonstrations	  continued,	  but	  on	  a	  much	  more	  limited	  basis:	  on	  February	  15	  only	  one	  large	  meeting	  was	  held	  on	   Lenin	   Square,	   and	   on	   the	   16th	   none	   were	   registered.62 	  	   The	   self-­‐defense	  committees	   controlled	   the	   outer	   neighborhoods,	   the	   Internal	   Ministry	   troops	  continued	   to	   patrol	   the	   center,	   and	   the	   republican	   KGB	   and	   police	   force	  worked	  overtime	  to	  detain	  the	  criminal	  elements	  that	  had	  emerged	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  chaotic	  situation.63	  	  	  	  	  Yet	   two	  days	  remained	  before	   the	  end	  of	   the	  demonstrations.	  Saturday,	  February	  17th	   passed	   quietly	   and	   without	   event;	   Pugo	   and	   the	   republican	   leadership	   met	  with	  groups	  of	   citizens	  and	  religious	   leaders	  and	  worked	   to	  convince	  people	   that	  the	   chaos	   was	   over.64	  On	   Sunday	   the	   18th,	   however,	   a	   massive	   crowd	   began	   to	  gather	  on	  Lenin	  Square	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet.	  	  While	  the	  people	  gathering	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  For	   the	   published	   announcement,	   see:	   Sh.	   Masriddin	   and	   I.	   Kholnazar,	   “Dar	   borai	   iste’’foi	  rohbariyat,”	  Tojikistoni	  sovety,	  February	  15,	  1990.	  60	  Soobshchenie	  Komissii	  prezidiuma,	  29.	  61	  Shabdolov,	   Vneocherednoi	   17-­‐ii	   plenum	   TsK,	   130-­‐132.	   Since	   the	   memorandum	   of	   agreement	  between	   the	   People’s	   Committee	   and	   Mahkamov,	   Pallaev,	   and	   Khayoev	   indicated	   that	   the	   three	  would	   “resign	   in	   accordance	   with	   existent	   legislation,”	   their	   resignations	   would	   have	   had	   to	   be	  confirmed	  by	   the	  Communist	  Party	  and/or	  Supreme	  Soviet.	   	   Since	   the	  Communist	  Party	   rejected	  the	  resignations,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  would	  also	  do	  so;	  the	  resignations	  were	  thus	  considered	  void.	  	  	  62	  Shabdolov,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  12.	  63	  Petkel’,	  Zhiznennie	  ukhaby,	  145-­‐147.	  64	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  228.	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seemed	  not	  to	  have	  any	  one	  leader	  or	  clear	  direction,	  their	  arrival	  on	  Lenin	  Square	  was	   anything	   but	   accidental:	   during	   the	   Special	   Plenary	   Session	   of	   the	   Central	  Committee	  on	  February	  15,	  committee	  member	  A.	  Ochilov	  had	  threatened	  a	  repeat	  demonstration	   on	   the	   18th	   if	   the	   republican	   leadership	   were	   to	   renege	   on	   their	  resignations.65	  	  Since	  the	  center	  of	  Dushanbe	  was	  now	  under	  strict	  military	  control,	  however,	  the	  demonstrators	  were	  quickly	  pushed	  off	  of	  Lenin	  Avenue	  and	  moved	  west	  along	  Putovskii	  Avenue,	  coming	  to	  a	  halt	  near	  the	  recently	  built	  movie	  theater	  “Kohi	  Borbad.”	  	  The	  crowd	  of	  tens	  of	  thousands	  (estimates	  varied	  between	  15	  and	  50	  thousand66)	  then	   spent	   the	   afternoon	   loudly	   protesting	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   republican	  leadership	  during	  the	  week’s	  riots	  and	  demanding	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  cause	  of	   the	   unrest.	   Politicians,	   including	   Buri	   Karimov,	   Davlat	   Khudonazarov	   and	  Gulrukhsor	  Safieva,	  as	  well	   as	   the	  deputy	  chairman	  of	   the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  Georgii	  Koshlakov,	  all	  assured	  the	  crowd	  that	  an	  investigation	  would	  be	  held	  on	  the	  highest	  levels.67	  	  The	  idea	  that	  an	  investigation	  would	  be	  conducted	  by	   an	   independent	   commission	   on	   the	   Union	   level	   seemed	   to	   calm	   the	   crowd,	  which	  began	  to	  break	  up	  at	  around	  five	  p.m.	  that	  evening.68	  	  	  This	  proved	  the	  end	  of	  the	  riots	  and	  demonstrations,	  as	  after	  February	  18th	  no	  further	  crowds	  gathered	  in	  the	  city	  and	  Dushanbe’s	   citizens	  began	   to	   take	  stock	  of	   the	  damage	  done	   to	   their	  home.	   	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   week	   25	   people	   had	   been	   killed,	   more	   than	   700	  wounded	  (including	  106	  with	  bullet	  wounds),	  and	  more	  than	  32	  million	  rubles	  in	  damage	  done	  to	  shops,	  restaurants,	  and	  city	  infrastructure.69	  	  
III.	  Unfinished	  Investigations	  and	  Unclear	  Explanations	  Safieva	  kept	  her	  word	   to	   the	  crowd	  on	  February	  18.	   	  She	  and	  Khudonazarov	  met	  with	   Gorbachev	   on	   March	   1,	   and	   they	   exhorted	   him	   to	   initiate	   a	   Union-­‐level	  investigation	  into	  the	  February	  riots	  in	  Dushanbe.	  	  Gorbachev	  promised	  to	  “closely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Shabdolov,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  32-­‐33.	  66	  Buri	   Karimov	   has	   claimed	   50,000	   at	   this	   meeting	   (Karimov,	   Krovavii	   fevral’,	   313),	   whereas	  Safieva	   said	   20,000	   (GARF	   f.	   9654,	   op.	   6,	   d.	   176,	   l.	   30).	   	   Official	   sources	   estimated	   15,000	  (“Sostoial’sia	  miting,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  February	  19,	  1990).	  67	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  314-­‐322;	  	  68	  Jum’’a	  Davlat,	  “Girdihamoi,”	  Javononi	  Tojikiston,	  February	  20,	  1990.	  69	  “Press-­‐tsentr:	  ofitsial’noe	  soobshchenie,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  February	  21,	  1990;	  “Ruikhati	  kurboniyoni	  fojia,”	  Sukhan,	  February	  15,	  1991;	  Shabdolov,	  Rasshirennyi	  XVIII	  plenum,	  29;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  279,	  l.	  152.	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follow	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  republic,”	  but	  quickly	  seemed	  to	  lose	  interest.70	  	  During	  the	  third	  Congress	  of	  Peoples’	  Deputies,	  held	  just	  two	  weeks	  later	  on	  March	  12-­‐15,	  1990,	   the	   February	   events	   were	   mentioned	   only	   once,	   and	   only	   by	   Kahhor	  Mahkamov.71	  	   No	   further	   comment	   was	   given,	   and	   no	   calls	   were	   made	   for	   an	  independent	  Supreme	  Soviet	  commission,	  such	  had	  investigated	  violence	  in	  Tblisi,	  Georgia	   the	   year	   before.	  72	  	   Instead,	   nearly	   all	   of	   Gorbachev’s	   and	   the	   Congress’s	  attention	   was	   given	   over	   to	   establishing	   the	   post	   of	   “President	   of	   the	   USSR,”	   a	  position	  to	  which	  Gorbachev	  was	  quickly	  elected	  in	  an	  uncontested	  election.	  	  	  While	   the	   desired	   Supreme	   Soviet	   commission	   was	   never	   created,	   three	   other	  investigations	  into	  the	  February	  events	  were	  conducted.	  	  	  Respectively	  overseen	  by	  the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   CPT	   in	   Dushanbe,	   the	   General	   Prosecutor’s	   Office	  (Genprokuratura)	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   and	   the	   Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet,	   all	   three	  investigations	   failed	   to	   issue	   conclusive	   reports.	   	   Instead,	   all	   three	   made	  contradictory	   and	   suggestive	   statements	   about	   the	   causes	   and	   instigators	   of	   the	  riots	  while	   leaving	  many	  questions	  unanswered	  and	  uninvestigated.	   	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   all	   of	   the	   investigations	   ended	  up	   suggesting	   a	   similar	  nationalistic	   framing	  for	  the	  February	  events,	  which	  was	  both	  politically	  advantageous	  and	  unsupported	  by	  much	  available	  evidence.	  	  	  	  The	  tone	  was	  set	  by	  the	  “Party	  investigation”	  initiated	  by	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT	  immediately	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  riots.	  The	  February	  riots,	  the	  CPT	  argued,	  had	  been	  a	  “planned	  action	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  destabilizing	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  capital	  and	   republic”	   and	   ultimately	   “stopping	   the	   elections”	   scheduled	   for	   later	   in	   the	  month.73	  	   The	   Party	   investigation	   also	   established	   that	   Buri	   Karimov	   and	   his	  supporters	  had	  taken	  advantage	  of	  the	  chaos	  to	  attempt	  an	  illegal	  coup	  d’etat.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Karimov	  and	  Nur	  Tabarov	  were	  removed	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT,	   kicked	   out	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   entirely,	   and	   fired	   from	   their	   respective	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Shabdolov,	  Rasshirennyi	  XVIII	  plenum,	  74.	  71	  Vneocherednoi	   tretii	   S’’ezd	   narodnykh	   deputatov	   SSSR,	   12-­‐15	   marta	   1990	   g.:	   Stenograficheskii	  
otchet	  (Moscow:	  Izdanie	  Verkhognogo	  Soveta	  SSSR,	  1990),	  v.1,	  129-­‐133.	  72	  A	   committee	   sent	   by	   the	   Council	   of	   Nationalities’	   Commission	   for	   the	   Social	   and	   Economic	  Development	   of	   Union	   and	   Autonomous	   Republics,	   National	   Districts,	   and	   Oblasts	   that	   visited	  Tajikistan	   in	   August	   1990	   included	   Khudonazarov	   and	   Z.S	   Gulova,	   two	   Congress	   of	   People’s	  Deputies	   members	   from	   Tajikistan.	   	   In	   the	   committee’s	   report,	   these	   two	   deputies	   took	   the	  opportunity	   to	   discuss	   the	   February	   riots.	   	   Neither	   the	   committee,	   nor	   its	   trip	   to	   Tajikistan,	  however,	  was	  connected	  to	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  riots.	  	  See:	  GARF	  f.5446,	  op.	  163,	  d.	  180,	  ll.	  6-­‐9.	  73	  Shabdolov,	  Rasshirennyi	  XVIII	  plenum,	  74;	  38.	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positions	  as	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Gosplan	  and	  Minister	  of	  Education	  for	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	   Others	   who	   had	   appeared	   to	   support	   Karimov,	   including	   the	   editor	   of	  
Tojikistoni	   sovety,	   Mazhabsho	   Muhabbatshoev,	   and	   the	   head	   of	   the	   legal	  department	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPT,	  Nurullo	  Khuvaidulloev,	  were	  also	  removed	   from	   the	   Central	   Committee.74	  	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   the	   Party	  investigation	  remained	  vague	  about	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  the	  riots.	   	   Instead	  of	  pointing	   to	   particular	   social	   or	   economic	   causes	   or	   actual	   organizers,	   it	   instead	  hinted	   at	   “destructive	   forces”	   and	   “provocateurs,”	   which	   had	   “manipulated”	   the	  people	   into	   taking	   to	   the	   streets. 75 	  	   The	   CPT	   also	   emphasized	   that	   these	  “destructive	  forces”	  had	  used	  growing	  economic	  and	  social	  frustration	  to	  fan	  anti-­‐Armenian	  and	  nationalistic	  feelings	  in	  Dushanbe.76	  	  	  	  The	   next	   two	   investigations	   followed	   similar,	   if	   contradictory,	   trajectories.	   The	  enquiry	   conducted	   by	   the	   Tajik	   General	   Prosecutor’s	   Office,	   led	   by	   the	   young	  prosecutor	  Solidzhon	  Juraev,	  issued	  a	  single	  preliminary	  statement	  a	  year	  after	  the	  riots.	   	  While	  this	  report	  confirmed	  the	  CPT’s	  earlier	  assessment	  that	  the	  riots	  had	  not	  been	  entirely	  spontaneous,	   Juraev	  and	  the	  General	  Prosecutor’s	  Office	  did	  not	  blame	  Karimov	  for	  the	  violence,	  going	  as	  far	  as	  to	  drop	  all	  charges	  against	  him	  in	  February	   1991.	  77	  	   Instead,	   as	   they	   highlighted	   in	   their	   report,	   the	   prosecutors	  believed	   that	   “the	   leaders	   of	   the	   organization	   “Rastokhez”	   and	   reactionary	  elements	   of	   the	   Islamic	   clergy”	   had	   “built	   up	   tension	   in	   interethnic	   relations	  and…brought	   about	   the	  massive	   disorder.”	  78	  Finally,	   the	   investigation	   conducted	  by	  a	   commission	  answering	   to	   the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	   also	  managed	   to	  muddy	  the	   waters.	   	   Officially	   chaired	   by	   the	   metalworker	   Siroj	   Mikhtodzhev,	   the	  Commission	  was	   factually	   dominated	   by	   its	   deputy	   chairman,	   Safarali	   Kenjaev,	   a	  well-­‐known	  lawyer	  who	  had	  been	  elected	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  in	  February	   1990.	   In	   its	   one	   report	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   in	  September	  1990,	  this	  commission	  largely	  focused	  on	  the	  known	  facts	  of	  the	  events	  –	  how	  many	  killed,	  how	  much	  damage	  done	  –	  and	  made	  vague	  speculation	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1706,	  ll.	  2-­‐3;	  27-­‐28.	  75	  Shabdolov,	  Rasshirennyi	  XVIII	  plenum,	  9;	  15-­‐16	  76	  Ibid.,	  86-­‐87.	  77	  Nurali	   Davlatov	   and	   Marat	   Mamadshoev,	   “Kto	   stoial	   za	   fevral’skimi	   sobytiiami?”	   Asia-­‐Plus,	  February	  10,	  2012;	  Letter	  No.	  18/100	  ud-­‐90	  from	  26.02.1991,	  sent	  from	  the	  General	  Prosecutor's	  Office	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  to	  Buri	  Bachabekovich	  Karimov,	  Personal	  Archive	  of	  Buri	  Karimov,	  Moscow,	  Russian	  Federation.	  78	  “Voqeahoi	  fevral:	  tahqiq	  idoma	  dorad.”	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the	   causes	   of	   the	   events	   instead	   of	   providing	   clear	   explanation.	  79	  	   	  Arguing	   that	  Rastokhez’s	   fault	   for	   the	   violence	   remained	   “unproven,”	   the	   commission	   instead	  pointed	  figures	  at	  supposed	  “Azerbaijani	  emissaries”	  who	  had	  arrived	  in	  Dushanbe	  to	  stir	  up	  nationalism	  and	  the	  KGB	  that	  had	  failed	  to	  stop	  them.	  80	  	  	  	  Even	  as	  the	  three	  investigations	  disagreed	  on	  most	  points,	  they	  had	  found	  common	  ground	   on	   two	   central	   arguments:	   first,	   that	   the	   February	   riots	   were	   not	  spontaneous,	  but	  rather	  premeditated;	  and	  second,	  that	  they	  were	  meant	  to	  fan	  the	  flames	  of	  nationalism.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  assumptions	  carried	  clear	  political	  advantage.	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  ongoing	  confusion	  over	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  riots,	  it	  was	  valuable	  to	  have	  someone	  to	  blame,	  rather	  than	  consider	  difficult	  questions	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  degradation.	   	  By	   framing	   the	  debate	   in	  nationalist	   terms,	  moreover,	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  –	  those	  accusing	  Rastokhez	  and	  those	  accusing	  state	  structures	  –	  were	  able	   to	   paint	   the	   February	   events	   in	   an	   appropriately	   negative	   shade	   of	   political	  paint	  understandable	  to	  everyone	   in	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	   	  Throughout	   the	  history	  of	  the	  USSR,	  excess	  nationalist	  sentiment	  had	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  multiethnic	  and	  multinational	  state,	  a	  discourse	  that	  had	  only	  grown	  during	  the	  unrest	  of	   the	  Gorbachev	   years.	   At	   a	   Politburo	   meeting	   about	   the	   ongoing	   conflict	   in	   the	  Nargorno-­‐Karabakh	  region	  of	  Azerbaijan	   in	  February	  1988,	  moreover,	  Gorbachev	  took	  the	  story	  further,	  arguing	  that	  these	  conflicts	  were	  latent	  to	  the	  very	  structure	  of	   the	   national-­‐republican	   divisions	   in	   the	  USSR.	   Built	   into	   the	   framework	   of	   the	  state	  designed	  by	  Stalin,	  Gorbachev	  said,	  they	  could	  pop	  up	  anywhere.81	  In	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	   for	  example,	  a	   conflict	  over	  water	  use	  during	   the	  summer	  of	  1989	  along	   the	  Tajik-­‐Kyrgyz	  border	  had	  also	  been	  overwhelmingly	  interpreted	  in	  the	  Soviet	  press	  as	  an	  example	  of	  growing	  “nationalist	  sentiment”	  along	  republican	  borders.82	  It	  was	  thus	   doubly	   advantageous	   to	   place	   the	   February	   events	   squarely	   into	   this	  interpretation:	   their	   nationalist	   organizers,	   whoever	   they	   were,	   were	   clearly	  unacceptable	   politically,	   and	   the	   explosion	   of	   violence	   could	   be	   at	   the	   same	   time	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  “Zakliuchenie	  komissii	  Prezidiuma	  VS	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  po	  proverke	  sobytii	  12-­‐14	  fevralia	  1990	  goda	   v	   gorode	   Dushanbe,”	   Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana,	   September	   2,	   1990;	   Soobshchenie	   Komissii	  
prezidiuma.	  80	  Ibid.	  81	  Stenogramma	   zasedaniia	   Politbiuro	   ot	   29	   fevralia	   1988	   g.	   The	   Russian	   Archives	   Project,	   State	  Archive	  Service	  of	  Russia	  /	  Hoover	  Institution,	  f.	  89,	  r.	  1003,	  89/42/18.	  	  82	  Madeleine	  Reeves,	   “‘And	  Our	  Words	  Must	  be	  Constructive!’	  On	  the	  Discordances	  of	  Glasnost’	   in	  the	  Central	  Asian	  Press	  at	  a	  Time	  of	  Conflict,”	  Cahiers	  d’Asie	  centrale	  26	  (2016).	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conveniently	   attributed	   to	   actions	   taken	   in	   the	   late	   1920s,	   rather	   than	   any	  immediate	  effects	  from	  perestroika.	  	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  clear	  explanation	  provided	  by	  the	  investigations,	  it	  may	  be	  of	  little	  surprise	   that	   no	   consensus	   emerged	   after	   the	   February	   1990	   riots.	   	   Instead,	   two	  alternative	  but	  parallel	  narratives	  about	  the	  riots	  emerged:	  either	  that	  the	  events	  of	  February	  1990	  had	  been	  organized	  and	   led	  by	  Rastokhez	  on	   the	  back	  of	  growing	  nationalist	  and	  religious	  fervor,	  or,	  alternatively,	  that	  the	  February	  riots	  had	  been	  intentionally	  orchestrated	  by	  the	  security	  services	  to	  discredit	  Rastokhez	  and	  other	  “nationalists.”	   	   Hints	   of	   both	   of	   these	   views	   were	   present	   from	   the	   first	   week	  following	  the	  events,	  and	  have	  remained	  the	  dominant	  versions	  in	  Tajikistan	  ever	  since.83	  These	   narratives	   also	   tended	   to	   align	   well	   with	   the	   Western	   discourse	  about	   “nationalism’s	   rise”	   in	   peripheral	   Soviet	   republics,	   a	   narrative	   that	   would	  only	   gain	   in	   scope	   after	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   USSR	   in	   1991,	   coming	   to	   play	   an	  important	  role	  as	  one	  of	  the	  presumed	  causes	  of	  the	  collapse.84	  	  Yet	  on	  all	  counts	  –	  from	  the	  role	  of	  nationalism	  to	  the	  “organization”	  of	  the	  riots	  by	  either	  Rastokhez	  or	  the	  KGB	  –	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  good	  cause	  to	  doubt	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  that	  has	  developed	  since	  1990.	  	  	  	  First	  of	  all,	  there	  was	  simply	  little	  nationalism	  to	  fan	  in	  Dushanbe	  in	  February	  1990.	  	  Sociological	   research	  had	   for	  years	  established	  relatively	   low	   levels	  of	  nationalist	  sentiment	  in	  the	  city	  and	  Tajik	  SSR	  as	  a	  whole:	  according	  one	  survey	  of	  university	  students	  conducted	  in	  early	  1989,	  for	  example,	  Tajik	  students	  were	  less	  likely	  than	  their	  peers	  in	  other	  republics	  to	  view	  the	  local	  “interethnic	  situation”	  as	  a	  source	  of	  strife.	  	  	  The	  same	  study	  also	  found	  that	  only	  34%	  of	  Tajik	  students	  were	  in	  favor	  of	  “republican	   citizenship,”	   a	   key	   marker	   at	   the	   time	   for	   nominally	   nationalist	  ambitions. 85 	  	   Having	   analyzed	   the	   development	   of	   national	   movements	   in	  Tajikistan,	  a	  group	  of	  researchers	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Academy	  of	  Sciences’	  Institute	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  On	  March	   3,	   1990,	   for	   example,	  Mahkamov	   hinted	   at	   national	   sentiment	   as	   one	   of	   the	   factors	  underlying	  the	  riots	  (Shabdolov,	  Rasshirennyi	  18-­‐ii	  Plenum	  TsK,	  12).	   	  Numerous	  publications	   from	  1990	  and	  1991	  made	  much	  stronger	  claims	  against	  Rastokhez	  and	  “nationalists.”	  	  See:	  Ponomarov,	  “Kolokola	  nadezhdy”;	  Saidov,	   “Neckol’ko	  shtrikhov;”	  also	  RGASPI	   f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1710,	   ll.	  16-­‐17;	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  260,	   l.	  57.	   	  Accusations	  against	  the	  KGB	  or	  other	  unseen	  organizers	  also	  started	  in	  1990:	  Shabdolov,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  48;	  Myalo	  and	  Goncharov,	  “Vspyshka	  v	  gorakh”;	  Ganelin,	  “Esli	  pozhary.”	  84	  On	  nationalism	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  see:	  Beissinger,	  Nationalist	  Mobilization;	  Suny,	  The	  
Revenge	  of	  the	  Past;	  Walker,	  Dissolution.	  	  	  85	  L.G.	   Novikov	   and	   A.A.	   Rotman,	   “Stereotipy	   istoricheskogo	   samosoznaniia,”	   Sotsiologicheskie	  
issledovaniia	  15,	  no.	  5	  (1989):	  5,	  11.	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Ethnology	  and	  Anthropology	  concluded	  in	  1990	  that	  “in	  Tajikistan	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘national	  idea’	  has	  not	  taken	  on	  particular	  political	  importance.”86	  	  Nor	  did	  the	  riots	  themselves	   demonstrate	   a	   particularly	   nationalistic	   character.	   	   Early	   frustrations	  over	  the	  apartments	  supposedly	  provided	  to	  outsider	  Armenians	  quickly	  bled	  into	  broader	  complaints	  about	  the	  state	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  Tajik	  society.87	  There	  was	  also	  no	  evidence	  that	   the	  participants	   in	   the	  February	  1990	  violence	  targeted	  the	  non-­‐Tajik	   population	   of	   Dushanbe	   in	   any	   organized	   fashion.	   	   Violence	   was	  indiscriminate	   and	   spread	   amongst	   the	   city’s	   many	   nationalities.	   	   Rumors	  circulated	   about	   Russians	   being	   targeted	   during	   the	   riots,	   but	   no	   witnesses	   or	  evidence	  could	  ever	  be	  produced.	  88	  	  As	   far	   as	   the	   supposed	   instigators	   of	   the	   February	   riots	   are	   concerned,	   it	   is	  exceedingly	   doubtful	   that	   Rastokhez	   could	   have	   organized	   the	   initial	  demonstrations	   or	   mobilized	   the	   rioters	   to	   the	   streets.	   	   First	   of	   all,	   although	  Rastokhez	  inarguably	  tried	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  riots	  once	  they	  started,	  nearly	  all	  of	  its	  leaders	  were	  out	  of	  Dushanbe	  during	  the	  first	  days	  of	  violence	  and	  looting.	  In	   addition,	   accusations	  made	   against	   Rastokhez	   generally	   failed	   to	   consider	   the	  actual	  level	  of	  support	  –	  or	  even	  name	  recognition	  –	  the	  organization	  had	  prior	  to	  the	  February	  events.	  Available	  survey	  data	  show	  that	  only	  after	  February	  1990	  had	  the	  majority	   of	   Dushanbe	   residents	   even	   heard	   of	   Rastokhez	   –	   and	   that	  most	   of	  those	   surveyed	   knew	   nothing	   more	   about	   the	   movement	   other	   than	   its	  participation	   in	   the	   riots.89	  	  While	  Rastokhez	  had	  developed	   a	  notable	   reputation	  amongst	  segments	  of	  the	  national	  elite	  in	  Dushanbe,	  its	  mass	  support	  amongst	  the	  populace	   was	   as	   of	   February	   1990	   at	   best	   limited.90	  	   Even	   after	   the	   riots	   mass	  support	  for	  the	  movement	  was	  limited,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  its	  poor	  showing	  in	  the	  late	  February	  1990	  elections	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  The	  movement	  had	  fielded	   50	   candidates,	   and	   predicted	   that	   it	   would	   win	   20-­‐30%	   of	   the	   Soviet’s	  seats.91	  	  In	  reality,	  though,	  only	  two	  of	  their	  members	  –	  Abdujabborov	  and	  Sobir	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Kul’chik,	  Rumyanstev,	  and	  Chicherina,	  “Analiticheskii	  obzor,”	  33.	  	  87	  For	  a	  more	  thorough	  treatment	  of	  nationalism’s	  supposed	  “rise”	  in	  perestroika-­‐era	  Tajikistan,	  see	  Scarborough,	  “(Over)determining	  social	  disorder.”	  88	  In	  fact,	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  killed	  and	  wounded	  during	  the	  riots	  were	  Tajik	  in	  what	  was	  a	  then	  majority	  non-­‐Tajik	  city.	  	  See:	  “Ruikhati	  kurboniyoni	  fojia”;	  Soobshchenie	  Komissii	  prezidiuma.	  89	  Alimov	  and	  Saidov,	  Natsional’nii	  vopros,	  64-­‐65.	  90	  S.	  Olimova	  and	  M.	  Olimov,	  “Obrazovannyi	  klass	  v	  perepetiiakh	  XX	  v.,”	  Vostok	  5	  (1991):	  101.	  	  91	  Mullojanov,	  “February	  1990	  Riots	  in	  Tajikistan,”	  248.	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managed	   to	   be	   elected.	   The	   Supreme	   Soviet	   remained	   dominated	   by	   established	  members	  of	  the	  CPT.	  	  Ultimately,	   Rastokhez	   simply	   did	   it	   not	   have	   the	   organizational	   wherewithal	  necessary	   to	   draft,	   organize,	   and	   mobilize	   thousands	   of	   people	   to	   the	   streets	   of	  Dushanbe.	  Its	  organizational	  structure	  was	  ad-­‐hoc	  and	  informal,	  and	  later	  claims	  to	  contrary,	  it	  was	  not	  yet	  in	  contact	  with	  more	  established	  political	  parties	  that	  could	  have	  assisted	  it.92	  	  As	  the	  Tajik	  historian	  Gholib	  Ghoibov	  has	  summarized:	  	  	  
“In	   truth,	   Rastokhez	   at	   that	   time	   was	   not	   a	   powerful	  
organization…Rastokhez	  fell	  into	  the	  ready	  porridge	  (oshi	  taiyor)	  of	  the	  
February	   events,	   for	   the	   preparation	   of	   which	   it	   simply	   did	   not	   have	  
sufficient	  resources.”	  93	  	  Given	  Rastokhez’s	   limited	  social	  clout,	   there	  was	  also	  accordingly	   little	  reason	  for	  the	   Tajik	   authorities	   to	   be	   concerned	   with	   its	   supposed	   “threat”	   to	   their	   power	  before	  the	  riots.	  Much	  like	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole,	  leading	  members	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	   government	   have	   reported	   only	   learning	   about	   Rastokhez	   following	   the	  February	   riots.94	  	   In	   addition,	  during	  a	  Republican-­‐wide	   seminar	  held	  by	   the	  CPT	  for	   “ideological	   workers	   on	   coordination	   with	   independent	   social	   organizations”	  only	   a	  week	   before	   the	   riots	   on	   February	   2,	   no	  mention	  was	  made	   of	   Rastokhez	  whatsoever.95	  	  There	  was	  also	  good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  movement’s	  claims	  about	  the	  number	  of	  parliament	  seats	  they	  were	   likely	  to	  win	  in	  the	  February	  elections.	  	  Having	  only	  fielded	  50	  candidates	  in	  elections	  for	  the	  230-­‐member	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  reaching	   20%	   of	   parliamentary	   deputies	   would	   have	   required	   winning	   all	   50	   of	  these	  seats	  –	  a	  very	  unlikely	   feat.	   	  Reaching	  30%	  would	  have	  been	  arithmetically	  impossible.	   	   There	   seemed	   little	   reason	   for	   the	   republican	   authorities	   to	   be	  concerned	  –	  and	  certainly	  no	  cause	  for	  anyone	  to	  organize	  riots	  simply	  to	  blacken	  the	   name	   of	   a	   political	   organization	  without	  mass	   support	   outside	   of	   Dushanbe.	  Most	  importantly,	  moreover,	  there	  is	  absolutely	  no	  actual	  evidence	  linking	  the	  KGB	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  (cf.	  Kobilova,	  Fevral’skie	  sobytiia;	  Atkin,	   “Tajikistan:	   reform,	  reaction,	  and	  civil	  war”)	  that	  Rastokhez	  received	  organizational	  support	  from	  the	  Sajudis	  movement	  of	  Lithuania,	  which	   in	  1990	  was	  much	  more	  established.	  However,	  Rastokhez	  had	  no	   contact	  with	   the	  Sajudis	  until	  August	  1990,	  when	  its	  deputy	  chairman,	  Mirbobo	  Mirrahim,	  was	  introduced	  to	  the	  movement	  by	  the	  student	  organization	  Sogdiana	  in	  Moscow	  (Interview	  with	  Parviz	  Mullojanov,	  January	  2017).	  93	  Ghoibov,	  Ta’’rikhi	  Khatlon,	  669.	  94	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  67.	  95	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1709,	  l.	  10.	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or	  any	  state	  structure	  to	  the	  riots’	  planning	  or	  organization	  –	  only	  increasingly	  self-­‐referential	  and	  unverifiable	  rumors.96	  	  
IV.	  Reconsidering	  the	  Results	  of	  February	  1990	  It	  may	  be	  tempting	  to	  search	  for	  “plots”	  and	  organizers	  behind	  the	  February	  events	  –	   and	   it	   certainly	  was	   tempting	   for	   those	   surveying	   the	  wreckage,	  who	   began	   to	  blame	   all	   sorts	   of	   “instigators,”	   KGB	   agents,	   “Azerbaijani	   emissaries,”	   and	  Rastokhez	  members.	   	  While	   a	   continuing	   source	   of	   debate,	   especially	   in	  modern	  Tajikistan,	  where	  “conspiracies”	  are	  said	  to	  lurk	  behind	  most	  political	  events,	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  almost	  no	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  claims	  made	  against	  either	  Rastokhez	  or	   the	   KGB.	   Both	   the	   republican	   government	   and	   the	   new	   “national	   movement”	  were	  equally	   surprised	  by	   the	   riots	  when	   they	  came,	  and	  both	   tried	   in	   their	  own	  ways	   to	   take	  political	   advantage	  of	   them.	   	  That	   all	   involved	  began	   to	  blame	  each	  other	   for	   the	   “rising	  nationalism”	   in	   the	  republic,	  however,	  does	  not	  a	  convincing	  explanation	  make	   for	  one	  or	  another	   side’s	   culpability.	   	   It	   is	  also	  only	  part	  of	   the	  story.	  	  There	  were	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  men	  (and	  women)	  on	  the	  streets	  during	  the	  February	   riots.	   	  While	   these	   individuals	   were	  mobilized	   and	   directed	   in	   part	   by	  politicians,	   they	   were	   also	   reacting	   to	   immediate	   socio-­‐political	   forces	   and	  protesting	  against	   the	  established	   leaders	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR.	   	  Given	  the	  state	  of	   the	  economy	  in	  February	  1990,	  moreover,	  they	  in	  fact	  had	  good	  cause	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  As	   this	   dissertation	   has	   established,	   by	   February	   1990	   Tajik	   Soviet	   citizens	   had	  numerous	  reasons	  to	  protest.	   	  Unemployment	  had	  continued	  to	  grow	  in	  1989	  and	  1990,	   much	   as	   it	   had	   in	   years	   past;	   the	   economic	   reforms	   of	   perestroika	   had	  increasingly	   led	   to	  delivery	  and	  product	   shortages	   in	   the	  Tajik	  SSR,	   consequently	  lowering	   production	   figures	   and	   overall	   economic	   growth;	   average	   wages	   were	  dropping	   for	   those	  who	   retained	   their	   jobs,	   even	   as	   inflation	   grew.	   	   In	   the	   social	  sphere,	  housing	  construction,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  issues	  facing	  both	  Dushanbe	  and	   the	   republic	   as	   a	  whole,	   had	  by	   the	   late	  1980s	   fallen	   far	   behind	   its	   planning	  schedule.	   	   Facts	  and	   rumors	  of	   corruption	  were	  also	   spreading	   together	  with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Most	  versions	  suggest	  that	  one	  or	  another	  state	  official	  (usually	  Mahkamov,	  Khayoev,	  Pallaev,	  or	  the	  Tajik	  KGB	  Chairman,	  Petkel)	  met	  with	  the	  leaders	  of	  Dushanbe’s	  organized	  crime	  syndicates	  at	  the	   “Penguin”	   restaurant	   on	   February	   9.	   	   The	   only	   evidence	   for	   this	   rumor,	   however,	   had	   been	  provided	   by	   a	   waitress	   from	   the	   restaurant	   who	   later	   admitted	   to	   making	   up	   the	   testimony	  (Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  477).	   	  This	  admission	  is	   then	  often	  confusingly	   interpreted	  as	  evidence	  that	   the	  KGB	  organized	  everything	  (i.e.,	  Davlatov,	   “Krovavii	   fevral’”).	   	  This	  confusion	  has	   led	  even	  some	   proponents	   of	   this	   argument	   to	   admit	   that	   “there	   just	   isn’t	   evidence	   to	   support	   it.”	   See	  Interview	  with	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  Dushanbe,	  February	  2015.	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growth	   of	   cooperatives	   and	   private	   business	   activity,	   as	   certain	   state	   and	   party	  figures	  seemed	  to	  gain	  in	  wealth	  while	  the	  average	  Tajik	  citizen	  only	  saw	  the	  cost	  of	  living	   go	   up	   month	   after	   month.	   Perestroika	   had	   brought	   about	   the	   general	  deterioration	   of	   the	   Tajik	   economy	   and	   the	   provision	   of	  many	   of	   the	   goods	   and	  services	  that	  Tajik	  Soviet	  citizens	  had	  grown	  accustomed	  to	  take	  for	  granted.	  	  	  	  By	   early	   1990,	   moreover,	   the	   political	   winds	   of	   glasnost	   had	   finally	   reached	  Dushanbe,	  with	  Rastokhez	  and	  other	  new	  political	  organizations	  creating	  an	  outlet	  for	  many	  individuals’	  frustrations	  with	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  (see	  Chapter	  Five).	  	  	  Newspapers	  had	  begun	  to	  expand	  their	  critical	  coverage	  of	  events	  in	  Tajikistan,	  and	  the	   republican	   leadership	   was	   increasingly	   challenged	   on	   many	   questions	   of	  economic,	   cultural,	   and	   linguistic	   development.	   	   Finally,	   the	   election	   campaign	  leading	  up	   to	   the	  February	  1990	  elections	   to	   the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	   Supreme	  Soviet	  had	  instigated	   a	   new	   era	   of	   open	   political	   struggle	   in	   the	   republic,	   with	   public	  declamations	  of	  corruption	  made	  on	  the	  street	  with	  no	  obvious	  consequences.	  Thus	  the	   citizens	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   would	   have	   found	   themselves	   in	   a	   situation	   where	  their	   livelihoods	   were	   degrading	   just	   at	   the	   very	   moment	   when	   they	   were	  encouraged	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  the	  state.	   	   It	  was	  in	  this	  social	  tinderbox	  that	  the	  riots	  of	  February	  1990	  occurred	  in	  Dushanbe,	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that,	  nationalism	   aside,	   these	   factors	   would	   have	   most	   immediately	   motivated	   the	  protestors	   demanding	   the	   resignation	   of	  Mahkamov	   and	   the	   other	   leaders	   of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  	  	  	  Rather	  than	  nationalist	  uprising	  orchestrated	  by	  the	  KGB,	  Rastokhez,	  or	  others,	  the	  February	   riots	   are	   much	   better	   understood	   as	   a	   largely	   undirected	   explosion	   of	  frustration	  against	  political	   leaders	  who	  were	  seen	  as	  no	   longer	  guaranteeing	   the	  basic	  social	  functions	  the	  Soviet	  system	  had	  long	  provided.	   	  Those	  who	  joined	  the	  demonstrations	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  drawn	  from	  the	  groups	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  economic	   collapse	   of	   perestroika.	   	   This	   included	   those	  whose	   standards	   of	   living	  had	  dropped	  most	  notably	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  of	  perestroika:	  students	  living	  in	  Dushanbe	   without	   adequate	   housing,	   newly	   unemployed	   workers,	   kolkhoz	  members	  without	  clear	  employment,	  and	  many	  others.	  97	  Perestroika	  and	  glasnost	  had	  upturned	  many	  of	  Soviet	  citizens’	  basic	  assumptions,	  not	  least	  of	  all	  about	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  On	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  the	  protesters,	  see:	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1710,	  ll.	  16-­‐17.	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guarantee	  of	  employment.	   	  Amongst	  the	  most	  primary	  rights,	  the	  Soviet	  state	  had	  long	  held	  in	  theory	  and	  practice,	  was	  the	  right	  to	  a	  job,	  and	  in	  the	  full	  employment	  system	  of	  the	  USSR	  the	  idea	  of	  becoming	  unemployed	  was	  almost	  nonsense.98	  	  By	  1990,	  however,	   it	  was	  eminently	  possible:	  workers	  were	  losing	  their	  jobs	  and	  not	  being	  rehired.	   	  Many	  of	   those	  on	  Dushanbe’s	  streets	   in	  February	  1990	  had	   found	  themselves	   in	   this	   shocking	  position,	  newly	  and	   inexplicably	  unable	   to	   find	  work	  and	  to	  support	  their	  families.	  99	  	  With	  no	  jobs	  and	  the	  previous	  assumption	  of	  slow	  but	  steady	  economic	  improvement	  turned	  on	  its	  head,	  there	  may	  have	  seemed	  no	  alternative	  but	  to	  try	  to	  affect	  change	  through	  street	  protest.	  	  Behind	   closed	  doors,	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	  were	  also	  willing	   to	   admit	   that	  unemployment	  and	  other	  unresolved	  economic	  issues	  may	  have	  lain	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	   February	   events.	   	   During	   the	   CPT	   plenum	   held	   on	   February	   16,	   the	   second	  secretary	   Veselkov,	   for	   example,	   quietly	   noted	   that	   “the	  main	   problems	   are	  well	  known,”	  pointing	  out	  that	  “the	  impossibility	  of	  getting	  a	  job	  was	  the	  deciding	  factor	  for	  many	  young	  people.”	  100	  	  Kenjaev	  also	  repeated	  the	  sentiment	  at	  a	  late	  February	  Supreme	  Soviet	  session.	  101	  	   In	  many	  ways,	  moreover,	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  should	   not	   have	   been	   surprised	   by	   the	   links	   between	   unemployment	   and	   social	  disorder.	   	   As	   Mahkamov	   and	   Pallaev	   had	   been	   warned	   at	   a	   meeting	   with	   the	  organization	  “Oshkoro”	  in	  Kulyab	  in	  mid-­‐1989:	  “Young	  men	  and	  women	  have	  been	  left	  entirely	  without	  work,	  and	  because	  of	  their	  unemployment	  they	  have	  begun	  to	  head	  down	  the	  wrong	  path.”	  	  This	  could	  only	  lead	  to	  violence,	  the	  Oshkoro	  activist	  Qurbon	  Zardakov	   said,	   “and	  we	  are	  heading	   for	   a	  harsh	   reckoning.”	  102	  	   	  Nor	  was	  this	  a	  pattern	  unique	  to	  Tajikistan.	  	  Over	  the	  previous	  two	  years	  unemployed	  young	  men	  in	  Kyrgyzstan,	  Uzbekistan,	  Armenia,	  and	  Azerbaijan	  had	  all	  begun	  to	  commit	  chaotic	  and	  semi-­‐organized	  violence;	  over	  the	  next	  two	  years	  the	  same	  reckoning	  would	   be	   felt	   in	   Georgia,	   the	   North	   Caucasus,	   and	   elsewhere.	   	   	   Pointing	   to	  perestroika’s	   economic	  downturn	   could	  not	  win	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	   any	  political	   points	   in	  ways	   that	   an	   “orchestrated”	   nationalist	   uprising	  might.	   	   But	   it	  remained	   the	  most	   salient	   explanation	   for	   the	   explosion	   of	   violence	   in	   February	  1990.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  On	  the	  Soviet	  State’s	  dedication	  to	  full	  employment,	  see	  Granick,	  Job	  Rights.	  99	  Sautin,	  “Snova	  mitingi.”	  100	  Shabdolov,	  Vneocherednoi	  17-­‐ii	  plenum	  TsK,	  58.	  101	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  77.	  102	  Quoted	  in	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  58.	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  None	  of	  this	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  nationalist	  ideas,	  Rastokhez,	  or	  the	  KGB	  had	  no	  role	  at	   all	   in	   the	   development	   and	   course	   of	   the	   February	   riots.	   Notwithstanding	   its	  claims	   to	   the	   contrary,103	  Rastokhez	  was	   clearly	   involved	   in	   the	  early	  protests	  on	  February	   9	   that	   grew	   out	   of	   hand	   in	   later	   days,	   and	   its	  members	   played	   central	  roles	  in	  the	  People’s	  Committee	  that	  came	  to	  represent	  the	  crowd	  during	  the	  riots.	  Moreover,	  the	  sense	  of	  economic	  frustration	  expressed	  by	  those	  participating	  in	  the	  riots,	   many	   of	   whom	   lived	   and	   worked	   in	   Dushanbe’s	   Tajik-­‐majority	   suburbs,	  would	  have	  been	  directed	  towards	  the	  better	  living	  standards	  in	  the	  “Russified”	  city	  of	  Dushanbe.104	  	  As	  a	  result,	  economic	  concerns	  may	  have	  easily	  blended	  into	  ethnic	  ones,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  seeming	  nationalist	  lines	  of	  the	  conflict	  may	  be	  visible	  here	  as	   well.	   	   Finally,	   the	   republican	   KGB	   and	   the	   reinforcements	   sent	   from	  Moscow	  showed	  clear	  incompetence	  on	  February	  12	  when	  they	  fired	  on	  the	  demonstrators,	  undoubtedly	   leading	   to	   greater	   violence	   and	   damage	   than	  would	   have	   otherwise	  been	  the	  case.	  	  Yet	  none	  of	  these	  factors	  were	  on	  their	  own	  sufficient	  to	  fully	  initiate	  the	  February	  events	  or	  mobilize	  the	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  protestors	  into	  the	  streets.	  	  Underlying	   the	   explosion	   of	   mass	   protest	   and	   violence	   was	   the	   fundamental	  downturn	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  from	  1987-­‐1990,	  a	  downturn	  that	  caught	  everyone	  unaware	  and	  contradicted	  basic	  assumptions	  about	  where	  life	  was	  going.	  	  	  When	  a	  small	  demonstration	  grew	  out	  of	  hand,	  it	  gave	  Tajik	  citizens	  an	  opportunity	  to	  voice	  their	  growing	  anger	  and	  desperation	  at	  politicians	  who	  seemed	  unable	  to	  return	   the	   republic	   to	   its	  previous	  prosperity.	   	  As	   tensions	   rose,	   shots	  were	   fired	  and	  demonstrators	  killed;	   and	  everyone,	   from	   looters	   and	   criminals	   to	   ambitious	  opposition	   figures	   and	   government	   politicians,	   began	   to	   try	   to	   use	   the	   chaos	   to	  their	  own	  personal	  advantage.	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  From	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   riots	  members	   of	   Rastokhez	   attempted	   to	   disassociate	   themselves	  from	   the	   events	   in	   which	   were	   taking	   part.	   	   On	   February	   12	   they	   sent	   a	   letter	   to	   Mahkamov	  backdated	  to	  February	  9	  denying	  all	  responsibility	  for	  events	  that	  they	  could	  not	  have	  known	  about	  on	  the	  9th,	  such	  as	  the	  demonstrations	  of	  February	  11	  and	  12	  (RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1695,	  l.	  8).	  A	  letter	  was	  also	  sent	  sometime	  between	  February	  13	  and	  19	  by	  Rastokhez-­‐associated	  members	  of	  the	   People’s	   Committee	   to	   the	   Congress	   of	   People’s	   Deputies	   in	  Moscow	   claiming	   that	   the	   Tajik	  intelligentsia	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  riots	  (GARF	  f.	  9654,	  op.	  6,	  d.	  176,	  ll.	  21-­‐22).	  104	  On	  Dushanbe	  as	  a	  “Russified”	  city,	  see:	  Kalinovsky,	  Laboratory	  of	  Socialist	  Development;	  Alimov	  and	  Saidov,	  Natsional’nii	  vopros,	  39.	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As	  the	  dust	  settled	  on	  February	  events	  and	  their	  investigations,	  Dushanbe	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Tajikistan	  seemed	  to	  return	  to	  its	  prior	  state	  of	  normalcy.	  Karimov	  and	  his	  supporters’	  attempt	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  riots	  and	  apparent	  political	  vacuum	  to	  pursue	   their	   own	   political	   ambitions	   had	   failed,	   and	   they	   had	   all	   been	   removed	  from	  positions	  of	  authority.	  Minor	  bickering	  could	  be	  heard	  in	  closed	  CPT	  meetings	  –	   as	   late	   as	   April	   1990	   some	   CPT	   members	   groused	   that	   “Karimov	   had	   been	  right”105	  –	  but	  from	  the	  outside	  there	  were	  few	  signs	  of	  strife.	  	  Mahkamov,	  Khayoev	  and	   Pallaev	   had	   retained	   their	   posts	   at	   the	   head	   of	   the	   CPT	   and	   Tajik	   SSR;	   a	  compliant	   and	   Communist-­‐dominated	   Supreme	   Soviet	   had	   been	   elected;	   and	  Moscow,	   through	  Pugo’s	   intervention,	   had	   seemed	   to	   reaffirm	   its	   support	   for	   the	  current	  leadership	  of	  the	  republic.	  	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  however,	  this	  sense	  of	  calm	  was	  misleading.	  	  As	  Chapter	  Seven	  will	  show,	   power	   struggles	   remained	   inside	   the	   CPT,	   with	   Mahkamov	   challenging	  Pallaev	  and	  others	  for	  increasing	  political	  power	  over	  the	  course	  of	  1990.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  social	  unrest,	  moreover,	  was	  held	   in	  place	  by	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  curfew	  that,	  having	  been	  declared	  on	  February	  14,	  were	  kept	  in	  place	  until	  June	  27,	  1991.	  And	  the	  state	  of	  the	  economy,	  the	  most	  important	  arbiter	  in	  keeping	  the	  population	  calm	   and	   happy,	   was	   only	   collapsing	   even	   further.	   	   As	   the	   final	   chapters	   of	   this	  thesis	  will	  demonstrate,	  the	  Tajik	  state’s	  capacity	  to	  provide	  for	  its	  citizens	  in	  terms	  of	  jobs,	  social	  guarantees	  and	  even	  basic	  goods	  would	  only	  decrease	  over	  the	  next	  two	  years.	  Unfortunately,	  these	  were	  issues	  that	  were	  basically	  unresolvable	  on	  the	  republican	   level	   –	   based	   on	   Union-­‐wide	   economics	   changes,	   they	   would	   have	  required	   investment	   and	   support	   from	   the	   Soviet	   center	   for	   any	   chance	   of	  successful	  resolution.	  	  	  	  Even	  Moscow’s	  support,	  moreover,	  was	  now	  suspect.	  	  Although	  Gorbachev	  and	  the	  Central	   Committee	   in	   Moscow	   remained	   the	   final	   instantiation	   of	   authority	   for	  everyone	   in	   Tajikistan,	   for	   its	   part	   Moscow	   appeared	   at	   best	   ambivalent	   about	  events	   in	   Dushanbe.	   February	   1990	  made	   it	   clear	   that	   Gorbachev	   and	   the	   other	  members	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  were	  essentially	  willing	  to	  accept	  anyone	  in	  the	  position	  of	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  CPT	  or	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  as	  long	  as	  that	  individual	  were	  to	  keep	  order	  in	  the	  republic.	  	  When	  the	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  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1710,	  l.	  66.	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scales	   had	   seemed	   tipped	   towards	   Buri	   Karimov	   and	   his	   supporters,	   Moscow’s	  envoy,	  Boris	  Pugo,	  was	  inclined	  to	  support	  him	  –	  and	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  tipped	  back	  to	  Mahkamov	   and	   Khayoev,	   so	   too	   did	   Pugo’s	   (and	   Moscow’s)	   loyalties.	  106	  Nor	   did	  Gorbachev,	  Nikolai	  Ryzhkov,	  or	  any	  other	  leading	  figure	  in	  Moscow	  ever	  respond	  to	  the	  appeals	  made	  by	  Safieva,	  Khudonazarov,	  or	  other	  Tajik	  politicians	   for	   further	  investigations	  into	  the	  riots.	  	  When	  he	  was	  interviewed	  about	  the	  February	  events	  a	  few	   years	   later	   in	   1993,	  moreover,	   Gorbachev	   demonstrated	   only	   the	   vaguest	   of	  recollections	   about	   the	   riots,	   suggesting	   only	   that	   they	   had	  been	   caused	  by	   “clan	  conflicts”	   and	   arguing	   that	   such	   matters	   were	   the	   “internal	   affairs	   of	   the	   Tajik	  people.”107	  While	   Tajik	   politicians	   clearly	   could	   not	   imagine	   a	   political	   system	  without	   Moscow	   as	   the	   final	   and	   sacrosanct	   arbiter	   of	   political	   power,	   Moscow	  seemed	  to	  be	  paying	  less	  and	  less	  attention	  to	  the	  fate	  of	  its	  southern	  republic.	  	  	  	  More	   than	   anything	   else,	   the	  February	   events	  brought	   to	   the	   fore	   the	  underlying	  struggles	   in	   late	   Soviet	   Tajik	   society,	   both	   between	   rival	   politicians	   and	   between	  those	  who	  had	  benefitted	   from	  perestroika	   and	   those	  who	  had	   lost.	   	   This	   “harsh	  reckoning”	  opened	  up	  space	   for	  a	  public	  political	  contest	   that	  had	   long	  been	  held	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  	  Open	  debate	  split	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  with	  deputies	  criticizing	  both	  each	  other	  and	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Soviet	  government.	  	  Citizens’	   complaints	   about	   the	   state	   of	   the	   economy,	   Tajik	   society,	   or	   their	  interactions	  with	   state	   bodies,	  moreover,	   were	   increasingly	   voiced	   in	   public	   and	  were	   increasingly	   jumped	   upon	   by	   ambitious	   political	   figures.	   Buri	   Karimov	  was	  simply	  the	  first	  Tajik	  politician	  to	  publically	  stake	  his	  career	  on	  a	  wave	  of	  populist	  anger;	   he	   would	   hardly	   be	   the	   last	   of	   the	   local	   demagogues	   and	   populists	   to	  contribute	   to	   the	   disintegration	   of	   the	   Soviet	   state.	   In	   the	   years	   following	   the	  February	   events,	   political	   parties	   began	   to	   be	   founded,	   further	   elections	   were	  challenged,	  and	  political	  struggle	  over	  time	  became	  an	  entrenched	  part	  of	  life	  in	  the	  Tajik	  capital.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Karimov,	  Krovavii	  fevral’,	  208-­‐209.	  107	  Interview	  with	  Mikhail	  S.	  Gorbachev,	  Charoghi	  Ruz	  no.	  2	  (71),	  1993.	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Chapter	  Seven	  
The	  “Calm”	  Before	  the	  Storm:	  March	  1990-­‐July	  1991	  	  A	  modernist	  façade	  of	  round	  green	  windows	  behind	  a	  screen	  of	  high	  trees	  on	  Lenin	  Avenue,	   the	   hotel	   “Oktiabrskaia”	   had	   long	   represented	   the	   height	   of	   comfort	   for	  Dushanbe’s	   elites.	   	   Belonging	   to	   the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Communist	  Party	   (CPT),	   this	   hotel	   was	   where	   visiting	   politicians,	   party	   workers,	   and	  government	  functionaries	  stayed	  when	  in	  town	  from	  Moscow	  or	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  USSR.	   	   In	   February	   1991,	   however,	   it	   was	   quietly	   sold	   to	   the	   cooperative	   firm	  “EKOMPT.”	   	   Only	   founded	   a	   few	  weeks	   earlier,	   EKOMPT	   had	   in	   fact	   just	   bought	  from	   the	   Central	   Committee	   this	   hotel,	   the	   next-­‐door	   House	   of	   Political	  Enlightenment,	   the	   Institute	   of	   Political	   Studies	   further	  down	  Lenin	  Avenue,	   and	  36	   automobiles.	   	   	   As	   a	   government	   investigation	   would	   later	   reveal,	   EKOMPT’s	  source	  of	  revenue	  was	  the	  very	  same	  Central	  Committee:	  immediately	  prior	  to	  its	  purchases,	   the	  CPT	  had	   transferred	   the	   cooperative	   firm	  21.9	  million	   rubles.	   	   Of	  these,	  12.4	  million	  were	  use	  to	  fund	  EKOMPT’s	  buying	  spree	  in	  Dushanbe.	  	  The	  rest	  went	  towards	  founding	  a	  network	  of	  local	  representative	  offices	  across	  Tajikistan	  that	  were	  involved	  in	  purchasing	  and	  reselling	  consumer	  goods	  at	  high	  markups.	  1	  	  In	  many	  ways	  this	  backroom	  deal	  represented	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  in	  both	  Dushanbe	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  USSR	  by	  early	  1991.	  	  Just	  like	  the	  majority	  of	  other	  cooperatives,	  EKOMPT	  had	  been	   founded	  “under”	   (pri)	  a	  Soviet	   institution,	  in	   this	   case	   the	  Central	   Committee	  of	   the	  CPT.	  As	   in	  many	  other	   cases,	   EKOMPT	  received	   expensive	   capital	   goods	   not	   only	   effectively	   for	   free,	   but	   in	   a	   way	   that	  allowed	  it	  to	  convert	  funds	  into	  cash	  and	  pay	  back	  its	  founding	  institution	  in	  hard	  currency.	   	   Like	   many	   other	   cooperatives,	   moreover,	   EKOMPT	   quickly	   declared	  itself	   independent	  of	   its	  founders	  and	  justified	  its	  actions	  on	  the	  new	  rules	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  In	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  after	  all,	  these	  buildings	  “had	  not	  provided	  income.”2	  	  The	  new	  dictates	  of	  the	  market	  required	  that	  capital	  be	  put	  to	  use	  to	  make	  a	  profit.	  	  	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  “Oktiabrskaia”	  Hotel	  to	  EKOMPT,	  involving	  the	  Central	  Committee	   and	   millions	   of	   rubles	   of	   Party	   income,	   was	   demonstrative	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  160,	  d.	  1672,	  ll.	  6-­‐7;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1274,	  l.	  43,	  48,	  277-­‐283.	  	  2	  Stenogramma	   Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan,	   21.12.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1274,	  l.	  46.	  	  
	  	   178	  
changed	  political	  environment	  of	  1991.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  showed	  the	  complicity	  of	  the	  CPT	  in	  the	  economic	  burgling	  of	  the	  Soviet	  state,	  much	  as	  the	  Party	  across	  the	   USSR	   was	   beginning	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   its	   position	   economically.3	  	   In	  Dushanbe,	   as	   much	   as	   anywhere	   in	   the	   USSR,	   politicians	   were	   inimically	   and	  immediately	  involved	  in	  the	  founding	  of	  cooperatives	  and	  the	  corrupt	  shuffling	  of	  assets,	   a	   process	   that	   locally	   became	   known	   in	   Tajik	   as	   shu’’badabozi	   or	  “bamboozlement.”4	  	  Yet	  the	  attempt	  was	  still	  made	  to	  avoid	  publicity,	  even	  as	  the	  activities	  of	  many	  cooperatives	  and	   the	  general	  economic	  downturn	  had	  become	  well	  known.	  	  The	  sale	  of	  the	  hotel	  and	  other	  objects	  to	  EKOMPT	  was	  only	  revealed	  after	  August	  1991;	  it	  required	  an	  extensive	  government	  investigation	  to	  reveal	  the	  Central	   Committee’s	   true	   role	   in	   the	   process.	   	   Even	   as	   the	   Party	  was	   effectively	  admitting	   that	   the	   old	   order	   was	   collapsing	   by	   selling	   off	   assets	   it	   was	   just	   the	  same	   attempting	   to	   keep	   up	   appearances.	   	  Whatever	   else	  was	   happening	   in	   the	  economy	   and	   Soviet	   society,	   the	   CPT	   repeated	   throughout	   1990	   and	   1991,	   the	  Party	  remained	  in	  control.	  	  Politics	  was	  continuing	  like	  normal.	  	  	  	  This	  basic	  contradiction	  between	  the	  reality	  of	  disintegrating	  economic	  and	  social	  order	   and	   the	  placid	   image	  of	  Tajik	   society	  presented	  by	   the	  Kahhor	  Mahkamov	  and	  the	  other	  leaders	  of	  the	  CPT	  would	  come	  to	  define	  much	  of	  the	  period	  between	  February	  1990	  and	  August	  1991.	   	   	  To	  some	  degree,	  of	  course,	  life	  in	  Dushanbe	  in	  February	   1991	  was	  much	  more	   stable	   than	   a	   year	   prior.	   The	   city’s	   streets	  were	  free	   of	   political	   demonstrations,	   and	   no	  major	   violent	   events	   had	   been	   reported	  throughout	  the	  republic	  over	  the	  year	  following	  the	  1990	  riots.	  	  There	  seemed	  an	  attempt	  to	  return	  to	  life	  as	  it	  was	  before.	  Football	  games	  were	  held	  as	  scheduled;	  new	  holidays,	   including	   the	  Tajik	  Language	  Day	   set	   for	   July	  22,	  were	   celebrated;	  and	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  went	  about	  their	  lives	  as	  best	  they	  could.	  A	  façade	  of	  normalcy	  had	  returned.	  	  	  Yet	   this	  was	  at	  best	  a	   thin	   façade	  –	  and	  one	  ultimately	  held	   in	  place	   through	   the	  demonstration	  of	   force	  and	   threat	  of	   renewed	  violence.	  Although	   the	  majority	  of	  residents	  of	  Dushanbe	  and	  other	  cities	  in	  Tajikistan	  continued	  to	  go	  to	  work,	  many	  of	   them	   were	   being	   laid	   off,	   while	   others	   began	   to	   see	   large	   pay	   discrepancies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  On	  this	  process	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  USSR,	  see	  Solnick,	  Stealing	  the	  State;	  Hough,	  Democratization	  and	  
Revolution;	  Handelman,	  Comrade	  Criminal.	  4	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  “Maqsud	  Ikromov:	  Gharqshudai	  girdobi	  bozihoi	  siyosy,”	  Ozodagon,	  April	  26,	  2017.	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appear	  between	  workers	  and	  managers.	  The	  new	  rules	  of	  Soviet	  “free	  enterprise”	  meant	   that	   resources	   were	   increasingly	   siphoned	   out	   of	   enterprises,	   given	   to	  cooperatives,	  and	  exported	  abroad	  for	  hard	  currency.	  The	  cost	  of	  living	  was	  rising,	  as	  was	  inflation,	  and	  basic	  standards	  of	   living	  were	  being	  ground	  away.	  Although	  political	  parties	  were	  not	  openly	  protesting	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Dushanbe,	  moreover,	  they	  were	  being	  founded	  and	  meeting	  behind	  closed	  doors.	   	  All	  of	  these	  potential	  sources	   of	   strife	   were	   only	   kept	   at	   bay	   by	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	   and	   10	   p.m.	  curfew	   that	   had	   been	   declared	   during	   the	   February	   1990	   riots	   –	  measures	   that	  remained	   in	   force	   in	   Dushanbe	   until	   July	   1991.5	  	   Even	   football	   games	   had	   to	  receive	   special	   permission	   from	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Internal	   Affairs	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	  before	  they	  could	  be	  held.6	  	  All	  other	  large	  gatherings	  were	  by	  default	  banned.	  	  	  While	   Mahkamov	   and	   the	   Party	   leadership	   presented	   a	   façade	   of	   normalcy,	   the	  floor	   was	   falling	   out	   from	   underneath	   them.	   	   The	   economy	   was	   now	   openly	  collapsing,	   and	   multi-­‐party	   politics	   was	   out	   in	   the	   open,	   with	   a	   number	   of	  important	  parties	  founded	  and	  beginning	  to	  operate	  between	  February	  1990	  and	  July	   1991.	   	   These	   developments	   occurred	   largely	   behind	   closed	   doors,	   off	   of	   the	  streets,	  and	  away	  from	  the	  public	  gaze,	  but	  this	  hardly	  limited	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  structure	   and	   form	  of	   events	   to	   come	   in	   the	   fall	   of	   1991	  and	   thereafter.	   	   In	   fact,	  although	  the	  eighteen	  months	  before	  the	  August	  1991	  Putsch	  tend	  to	  be	  treated	  (if	  at	   all)	   as	   a	   historical	   dead-­‐zone	   –	   a	   period	   in	   which	   little	   of	   note	   occurred	   in	  Dushanbe	  –	  this	  period	  in	  fact	  defined	  the	  very	  shape	  of	  the	  political	  order	  to	  come.	  	  From	   the	   parties	   that	   burst	   into	   the	   political	   arena	   in	   late	   August	   1991	   to	   the	  demonstrators	   filling	   Dushanbe’s	   squares	   on	   these	   parties’	   call	   –	   everyone	   was	  reacting	   to	   the	   overall	   deteriorating	   economic	   and	   political	   situation	   that	   had	  developed	  over	  the	  past	  year	  and	  half.	  	  
I.	  Political	  Struggles	  in	  Moscow	  and	  Dushanbe	  	  Winters	  in	  Tajikistan’s	  valleys	  tend	  to	  be	  relatively	  short	  and	  mild;	  they	  are	  quickly	  and	  summarily	  overturned	  each	  March	  by	  spring’s	  gentle	  but	  insistent	  arrival.	  	  For	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  the	  sunlight	  of	  March	  1990	  was	  a	  welcome	  break	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  On	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  curfew	  in	  Dushanbe,	  see	  GARF	  f.	  9654,	  op.	  10,	  d.	  59,	  l.102;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1231,	  l.	  31;	  d.	  1239,	  ll.	  340,345.	  On	  its	  final	  removal	  in	  July	  1991,	  see	  Postanovlenie	  Prezidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   No.	   443	   “Ob	   otmene	   chrezvychainogo	  polozheniia	  na	  territorii	  gor.	  Dushanbe,”	  27.06.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1248,	  l.	  22.	  	  6	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  278,	  ll,	  78-­‐79.	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the	  cold	  drizzles	  of	  February,	  which	  had	  followed	  the	  riots	  from	  start	  to	  finish.	  	  The	  elections	  of	  late	  February	  1990,	  shadowed	  by	  the	  riots,	  had	  also	  seemed	  dampened	  by	  the	  time	  they	  occurred.	   	  They	  did,	  however,	  return	  a	  sense	  of	  Party-­‐controlled	  order,	   insofar	  as	  representatives	  of	  the	  CPT	  managed	  to	  secure	  an	  overwhelming	  majority	  (216	  out	  of	  230	  representatives)	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet.	   	  Even	  increased	  emphasis	   on	   “democratization,”	   and	   the	   encouraging	   of	   multiple	   candidates	   in	  most	   districts	   had	   not	   cost	   the	   CPT	   its	   support.7	  	   The	   majority	   of	   the	   Supreme	  Soviet	  were	  those	  who	  already	  “had	  drunk	  from	  the	  cup	  of	  high	  office,”	  one	  of	  the	  few	  oppositional	  candidates,	  Asliddin	  Sohibnazar,	  groused;	  the	  old	  guard	  retained	  and	   was	   strengthening	   its	   position	   of	   power.8	  	   Yet	   just	   as	   the	   political	   elite	   of	  Dushanbe	   was	   catching	   its	   breath,	   events	   were	   already	   apace	   in	   Moscow	   that	  would	  come	  to	  shake	  up	  the	  already	  fragile	  order	  reestablished	  in	  Dushanbe	  after	  February.	  	  On	   March	   12,	   1990,	   the	   Extraordinary	   Third	   Congress	   of	   People’s	   Deputies	  gathered	  in	  the	  Kremlin,	  called	  by	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  This	  extraordinary	  congress	  was	  called	  not,	  as	  many	  would	  have	  expected	  and	  hoped,	  to	  discuss	  the	  ongoing	  wave	  of	  violence	  in	  many	  corners	  of	   the	  USSR,	  or	  even	  Lithuania’s	  declaration	  of	   independence	   from	  the	  USSR	  on	  March	  11.	   	   In	   fact,	  deputies	  were	  actively	  discouraged	  from	  “getting	  agitated”	   over	   such	   issues,	   with	   some	   Soviet	   leaders	   withholding	   telegrams,	   for	  example,	  about	  ongoing	  violence	  between	  Armenia	  and	  Azerbaijan.9	  	   Instead,	   the	  purpose	  of	  the	  congress	  was	  twofold:	  to	  remove	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Constitution	  its	  6th	  Article,	   which	   guaranteed	   a	   “leading	   role”	   for	   the	   Communist	   Party,	   and	   to	  establish	   the	   position	   of	   the	   President	   of	   the	   USSR.10 	  	   Gorbachev	   remained	  convinced	   that	   the	  Party	  was	   the	   largest	   impediment	   to	  perestroika,	   and	   that	   its	  conservative	  wing	  was	  continuing	  to	  sabotage	  his	  reforms.	  He	  therefore	  sought	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  “Spisok	   narodnykh	   deputatov	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR,	   izbrannykh	   25	   fevralia	   1990	   goda,”	  Kommunist	  
Tadzhikistana,	   March	   4,	   1990;	   “Spisok	   narodnykh	   deputatov	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR,	   izbrannykh	   4	   i	   9	  marta	   1990	   goda,”	   Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana,	   March	   22,	   1990;	   Statisticheskii	   otchet	   o	   sostave	  Verkhovnogo	   Soveta,	   Prezidiuma,	   komitetov,	   i	   postoiannykh	   komissii	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	  Tadzhikskoi	   SSR.	   	   GARF	   f.	   9654,	   op.	   10,	   d.	   100,	   l.	   227.	   Some	   districts	  were	   contested	   by	   up	   to	   5	  candidates;	  see	  PA	  IPI	  KPT	  f.	  3,	  op.	  384,	  d.	  195,	  ll.	  35-­‐36,	  cited	  in	  Sultanov,	  Demontazh	  SSSR,	  192.	  	  8	  Sohibnazar,	  Subhi	  sitorakush,	  v.	  1,	  18.	  9	  GARF	  f.	  9654,	  op.	  2,	  d.	  134,	  l.	  12.	  	  10	  For	   the	   planning	   behind	   the	   Congress,	   see	   Cherniaev,	   Veber,	   and	   Medvedev,	   V	   Politbiuro	   TsK	  
KPSS,	  592-­‐593;	  605-­‐606.	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even	  further	  undermine	  its	  authority,	  while	  establishing	  a	  more	  secure	  position	  for	  himself	  atop	  a	  political	  pyramid	  built	  parallel	  to	  the	  Party.11	  	  	  Notwithstanding	  both	  grumbling	  over	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  amendments	  were	  being	  made	  to	  the	  Soviet	  constitution	  and	  unexpectedly	  strong	  opposition	  to	  Gorbachev’s	  candidacy,	   the	   Congress	   of	   People’s	   Deputies	   fulfilled	   both	   requests.12	  	   The	   6th	  article	   was	   removed	   from	   the	   constitution,	   and	   Gorbachev	   was	   duly	   elected	   on	  March	   15th	   to	   the	   newly	   created	   post	   of	   President	   of	   the	   USSR.	   	   For	   Kahhor	  Mahkamov,	  the	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan,	  the	  lesson	  to	  be	   taken	   away	   from	   this	   3rd	   Congress	  was	   twofold.	   	   First,	  Moscow	   showed	   little	  interest	   in	   investigating	   or	   otherwise	   involving	   itself	   in	   peripheral	   affairs,	   and	  Mahkamov’s	   attempt	   to	   discuss	   the	   February	   events	   fell	   on	   deaf	   ears,	   just	   as	  previous	   appeals	   to	   Gorbachev	   had	   failed.13	  In	   general,	   moreover,	   the	   level	   of	  attention	   and	   support	   that	   Mahkamov	   and	   the	   other	   leaders	   of	   the	   Communist	  Party	   of	   Tajikistan	   could	   count	   on	   from	   the	   center	   was	   fading.	   	   With	   the	  Communist	   Party	   denied	   its	   previously	   official	   “leading”	   role	   in	   society	   and	  Moscow	   increasingly	   disengaged	   from	   Tajikistan’s	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   political	   affairs,	  Mahkamov	   found	   himself	   in	   need	   of	   new	   institutional	   pillars	   of	   support.	  	  Gorbachev	  had	  made	  it	  clear	  at	  the	  Congress	  that	  the	  political	  axis	  had	  shifted:	   it	  was	  now	  necessary	  to	  supplement	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  once	  omnipotent	  Party.	  	  Returning	   to	   Dushanbe	   after	   the	   3rd	   Congress	   of	   People’s	   Deputies,	   Mahkamov	  acted	  quickly	  to	  secure	  himself	  a	  non-­‐Party	  leadership	  position.	  Rather	  than	  move	  to	  modify	   the	  constitution	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  –	  which	  would	  have	  been	  required	  to	  establish	  a	  presidential	  post	  –	  he	  instead	  targeted	  what	  was	  already	  officially	  the	  most	  powerful	  position	  in	  the	  republic,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet.	  	  While	  on	  paper	   this	   represented	   the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  head	  of	   state,	   in	  practice	   it	  had	  been	  a	  largely	   ceremonial	   role,	   if	   one	   that	   retained	   political	   clout.	   	   From	   Mahkamov’s	  perspective,	   however,	   it	   could	   be	   turned	   into	   a	   position	   of	   real	   power	   –	   and	  provide	   the	   political	   legitimacy	   the	   Party	  was	   quickly	   losing.	   In	   the	   first	   days	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  On	  Gorbachev’s	   reasoning	  and	   the	  background	   to	  his	  decision	   to	  run	   for	  president	   through	   the	  Congress,	   see	   Brown,	  Gorbachev	  Factor,	   185-­‐205;	   George	  W.	   Breslauer,	  Gorbachev	  and	  Yeltsin	  as	  
Leaders	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  89.	  12	  On	  the	  grumblings	  of	  some	  deputies	  to	  the	  Congress,	  see	  Vneocherednoi	  tretii	  s’’ezd,	  v.	  1,	  355;	  on	  opposition	  to	  Gorbachev	  as	  the	  only	  candidate,	  see	  Brown,	  Gorbachev	  Factor,	  205.	  13	  For	  Mahkamov’s	  speech	  to	  the	  3rd	  Congress,	  see	  Vneocherednoi	  tretii	  s’’ezd,	  v.	  1,	  129-­‐133.	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April	  1990	  a	  Plenum	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  was	  called	  at	   Mahkamov’s	   behest,	   and	   the	   current	   Supreme	   Soviet	   Chairman,	   Ghoibnazar	  Pallaev,	  was	  summarily	  convinced	  to	  “request	  to	  retire”	  from	  his	  post.14	  	  When	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  convened	  on	  April	  10,	  Pallaev	  followed	  orders	  and	  submitted	   his	   resignation.15	  	   This	   easy	   success	   led	  Mahkamov	   to	   believe	   that	   he	  would	   be	   running	   unopposed	   for	   the	   position	   of	   Chairman,	   and	   his	   faction	   of	  supporters	   in	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  confidently	  put	   forward	  his	  candidacy	  on	  April	  12.16	  	   Left	   without	   any	   position	   in	   the	   government	   and	   angry	   at	   Mahkamov’s	  aggressive	  move	  on	  his	  job,	  however,	  Pallaev	  also	  quite	  unexpectedly	  put	  forward	  his	   own	   candidacy.17	  	   	   When	   a	   vote	   was	   called	   following	   a	   short	   but	   unusually	  sharp	   debate,	   Mahkamov	   was	   left	   the	   victor,	   receiving	   162	   votes	   to	   62	   for	  Pallaev.18	  	  	  	  	  Mahkamov	  had	  won	  –	   but	   at	   a	   higher	  political	   cost	   than	   expected.	   	   The	  political	  struggles	   that	   had	   long	   remained	   hidden	   behind	   the	   closed	   doors	   of	   the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	  were	  thrown	  into	  the	  public	  view.	  	  This	  exposed	  not	  only	   underlying	   disagreements	   between	   Communist	   Party	   members,	   but	   also	   a	  growing	  schism	  in	  the	  republic’s	  leaders	  over	  the	  recent	  February	  events.	  	  During	  the	   short	   debate	   that	   preceded	   his	   election,	   Mahkamov	   was	   exposed	   to	  unprecedented	  and	  harsh	  criticism.	  Sohibnazar,	   the	  opposition	  deputy	  elected	   to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  in	  February,	  led	  the	  charge.	  	  He	  accused	  Mahkamov	  of	  extreme	  incompetence:	  	  
“Is	  a	  man	  who	  failed	  to	  calm	  a	  crowd	  of	  2-­‐3	  thousand	  with	  a	  bullhorn,	  who	  
met	  his	  own	  people	  with	  bullets,	  and	  who	  has	  committed	  many	  other	  sins	  –	  
is	   he	   really	   today	   called	   upon	   to	   be	   the	   leader	   of	   a	   5-­‐million	   strong	  
nation?”19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  123.	  15	  Technically,	   the	   full	   “Session”	   of	   the	   12th	   Convocation	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	  opened	  on	  April	  12,	  but	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Presidium	  began	  on	  April	  10.	  	  See	  “Ukazi	  Prezidiumi	  Shuroi	  Olii	   ChShS	   Tojikiston	   “Dar	   borai	   dav’’at	   kardani	   Shuroi	   Olii	   ChShS	   Tojikiston,”	   Tojikistoni	   sovety,	  March	  13,	  1990;	  TadzhikTA,	  “Dar	  Prezidiumi	  Shuroi	  Olii	  ChShS	  Tojikiston,”	  Tojikistoni	  sovety,	  April	  11,	  1990.	  	  16	  Technically,	  Pallaev	  had	  previously	  been	  the	  “Chairman	  of	  the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet.”	  The	  April	  1990	  Session	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  also	  quietly	  disbanded	  this	  post,	  combining	   it	  with	  the	  previously	  distinct	  “Chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet.”	  17	  See	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  123;	  Sohibnazar,	  Subhi	  sitorakush,	  v.	  1,	  96-­‐98;	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  “Asliddin	  Sohibnazarov:	  Sohibnazar	  yo	  ‘folbini	  jumhury’,”	  Ozodagon,	  August	  2,	  2017.	  18	  TadzhikTA,	  “Khabari	  mukhtasar	  dar	  borai	  majlisi	  Olii	  RSS	  Tojikiston,”	  Tojikistoni	  sovety,	  April	  13,	  1990.	  19	  Sohibnazar,	  Subhi	  sitorakush,	  107.	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Other	  deputies	  followed	  suit.	  	  Although	  Mahkamov	  and	  his	  supporters	  were	  able	  to	  end	   the	   debate	   before	   it	   grew	   out	   of	   hand,	   this	   level	   of	   criticism	   clearly	  demonstrated	  the	  willingness	  of	  many	  deputies	  –	  including	  many	  members	  of	  the	  Communist	   Party	   –	   to	   buck	   the	   Party	   line	   and	   challenge	   the	   republic’s	   leaders.	  Even	   beyond	   the	   few	   non-­‐Party	   opposition	   members	   in	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	  (primarily	   Sohibnazar,	   Tohir	   Abdujabbor	   and	   Bozor	   Sobir),	   it	   was	   growing	  increasingly	  obvious	   that	   there	  was	  greater	  and	  greater	  support	   in	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  for	  alternative	  political	  positions	  and	  parties.	  	  	  	  This	  also	  did	  not	  go	  unnoticed	  outside	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet.	   	   	  Shodmon	  Yusuf,	  a	  university	   lecturer	   and	   expert	   in	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   philosophy	   (he	   was	   also	   the	  head	  of	  the	  local	  Party	  cell	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  Department	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Academy	  of	  Sciences),	  also	  made	  an	  entrance	  into	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  April	  1990.	  That	  month	  he	   published	   a	   controversial	   article	   entitled	   “The	   Wounds	   of	   History.”	   	   In	   this,	  Yusuf	  argued	  that	   the	  “totalitarian”	  system	  developed	  under	  Stalin	  and	  Brezhnev	  had	   undermined	   Lenin’s	   original	   ideas	   of	   a	   Soviet	   federation,	   leading	   to	   the	  underdevelopment	   of	   republics	   like	   Tajikistan.	   	   	   For	   Tajikistan	   to	   survive,	   he	  argued	  forcefully,	  it	  would	  need	  both	  political	  independence	  from	  Moscow	  and	  an	  open	   market	   economy.	   Yusuf	   began	   to	   meet	   with	   like-­‐minded	   thinkers	   and	  supporters	   in	   April	   and	   May	   of	   1990,	   publically	   demanding	   action	   on	   political	  issues,	  and	  even	  going	  as	   far	  as	  declaring	  a	  hunger	  strike.	  By	   June,	  Yusuf	  and	  his	  supporters	   had	   decided	   to	   found	   the	   Democratic	   Party	   of	   Tajikistan	   (DPT)	   to	  advocate	   change,	   and	  began	   lobbying	   the	  Tajik	   SSR	   for	   registration	  as	   a	  political	  party.20	  	  Together	  with	  the	  violence	  of	  February	  1990,	  Yusuf	  would	   later	  write,	   it	  had	  been	  the	  increasingly	  open	  political	  struggle	  on	  display	  in	  Dushanbe	  that	  had	  led	  him	  into	  party	  politics.	  	  More	  socially	  conservative	  forces	  also	  began	  to	  coagulate	  following	  the	  April	  1990	  session	   of	   the	   Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet.	   	   	   The	   summer	   of	   1990	   saw	   the	   formal	  development	   of	   the	   Islamic	   Revival	   Party	   of	   Tajikistan	   (IRPT),	   which	   brought	  together	   a	   new	   class	   of	   radical	   politicians,	   like	  Davlat	   Usmon,	   one	   of	   the	   party’s	  main	   organizers,	   with	   representatives	   of	   informal	   but	   influential	   religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  On	  the	  development	  of	  the	  DPT,	  see	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  “Shodmon	  Yusuf:	  ‘Padari	  demokratiiai	  tojiki’,”	  
Ozodagon,	  May	  31	  and	  June	  7,	  2017.	  
	  	   184	  
traditions,	   including	  Abdullo	   Said	  Nuri	   and	  Muhammadsharif	  Himmatzoda.21	  The	  latter	   two	   had	   been	   the	   students	   of	  Muhammadjon	  Hindustoni,	   one	   of	   the	  most	  important	  figures	  in	  Central	  Asian	  Islam	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  adding	  religious	  clout	  to	  the	  party’s	  platform.22	  	  	  	  Previous	   attempts	   at	   religiously	   inflected	   political	   activism	   had	   been	   dealt	   with	  quickly	  and	  harshly,	  with	  Nuri	  having	  been	  arrested	  in	  1986	  and	  sentenced	  to	  two	  years	   in	  a	  prison	  camp	  for	  distributing	  anti-­‐Soviet	   literature.23	  In	  1990,	  however,	  the	  situation	  was	  clearly	  different.	  	  Mahkamov’s	  hands	  were	  bound	  by	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  6th	  article	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Constitution:	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	  could	  no	   longer	   claim	  a	   legal	  monopoly	  on	   the	  political	   sphere.	   	  While	  Mahkamov	  was	  unable	  to	  stop	  the	   IRPT	  or	  DPT	  from	  gathering,	  however,	  he	  did	  manage	  to	  keep	  the	   parties	   from	   holding	   founding	   conventions:	   with	   the	   ongoing	   state	   of	  emergency	   in	   the	   republic,	   it	   was	   a	   simple	   matter	   to	   simply	   refuse	   any	   and	   all	  political	  events	  the	  special	  state	  permission	  they	  required	  to	  be	  held.	   	  Frustrated	  with	  the	  intransigence	  he	  faced,	  Yusuf	  called	  and	  complained	  to	  the	  USSR’s	  “head	  democrat,”	  Boris	  Yeltsin,	   in	   July	  1990.	   	  Having	  been	  elected	   the	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Supreme	   Soviet	   of	   the	   Russian	   SFSR	   in	   May	   1990	   and	   overseen	   the	   passage	   of	  Russia’s	   Declaration	   of	   Sovereignty	   in	   June,	   Yeltsin	   increasingly	   represented	   a	  challenge	   to	   Gorbachev’s	   authority	   in	  Moscow.	   Yeltsin	   promptly	   brought	   Yusuf’s	  case	  to	  Gorbachev,	  who	  in	  turn	  called	  Mahkamov	  pressured	  him	  into	  allowing	  the	  DPT	  to	  register	  24	  Still	  unquestioningly	  loyal	  to	  Moscow	  and	  Gorbachev,	  Mahkamov	  gave	   in	   and	   provided	   permission	   for	   the	   DPT	   to	   hold	   a	   founding	   congress	   on	  August	   10,	   1990.25	  	  While	   the	   IRPT	  was	   still	   denied	   registration,	   the	   Tajik	   state	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  According	  to	  internal	  party	  histories,	  the	  IRPT	  was	  founded	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  by	  Nuri	  and	  other	  followers	   of	   Hindustoni;	   this	   is	   unverifiable.	   	   Actual	   political	   activity	   can	   be	   tracked	   to	   the	   late	  1980s,	  and	  as	  a	  party	  the	  group	  came	  together	  only	  after	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Union-­‐wide	  Party	  of	  Islamic	  Revival,	  which	  held	  its	  own	  conference	  in	  Astrakhan	  in	  June	  1990.	  	  One	  of	  the	  organizers	  of	  the	   Dushanbe	   conference,	   Davlat	   Usmon,	   was	   also	   present	   in	   Astrakhan,	   and	   the	   two	   parties	  remained	  linked	  until	  late	  1991.	  	  See	  Dudoignon,	  “Political	  Parties	  and	  Forces	  in	  Tajikistan,”	  64.	  	  22	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  Hindustoni’s	  theology	  and	  his	  influence	  on	  the	  IRPT,	  see	  Epkenhans,	  Origins	  of	  
the	  Civil	  War,	  185-­‐187;	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  253-­‐254.	  23	  V.	  Rabiev,	   “Idushchie	  v	  nikuda,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  February	  12,	  1987;	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	   Tajikistan,	   249;	   Monica	   Whitlock,	   Beyond	   the	   Oxus:	   The	   Central	   Asians	   (London:	   John	  Murray,	  2002),	  142.	  24	  Nurali	   Davlat,	   “Mnogopartiinost’	   po-­‐tadzhikski,”	   Asia-­‐Plus,	   March	   31,	   2015;	   Davlat,	   “Shodmon	  Yusuf.”	  25	  Bushkov	  and	  Mikul’skii,	  “Tadzhikskaia	  revoliutsiia,”,	  16.	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simply	   chose	   not	   to	   pay	   attention	   when	   the	   new	   party	   went	   ahead	   and	   held	   a	  conference	  in	  the	  village	  of	  Chortut	  outside	  of	  Dushanbe	  on	  October	  6,	  1990.26	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  For	  Mahkamov	  and	  the	  other	  leaders	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  political	  parties	  was	  both	  distasteful	  and	  disturbing:	  it	  was	  a	  challenge	  to	  their	  very	  sense	  of	  how	  society	  and	  politics	  should	  function.	  Yet	  there	  was	  little	  they	  could	  do.	  	  The	  independent	  Democratic	  and	  Islamic	  Revival	  Parties	  were	  founded,	  elected	  leaders	  –	   Shodmon	   Yusuf	   and	   Muhammadsharif	   Himmatzoda,	   respectively	   –	   and	   went	  about	   their	   political	   business	   of	   lobbying,	   building	   up	   membership,	   and	   even	  printing	   newspapers.	   Loyalty	   to	   Moscow	   and	   the	   continuing	   need	   for	   economic	  support	   from	   the	   center	   meant	   that	   Mahakamov	   and	   his	   supporters	   were	  essentially	  unable	   to	   reject	   the	   course	   set	   in	   the	  Soviet	   capital.	   	   That	   this	   course	  was	   increasingly	  contradictory	  and	  set	  by	  both	  Gorbachev	  and	  Yelstin,	  who	  were	  locked	   in	   a	   growing	   power	   struggle,	   did	   not	   undermine	   its	   importance	   for	  Tajikistan.	   	   In	  practice	   it	  meant	   that	   the	   republic	   still	  bound	   to	  do	  exactly	  as	   the	  Soviet	  authorities	  in	  Moscow	  asked	  –	  even	  if	  this	  was	  to	  undermine	  the	  power	  of	  Soviet	  governance.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  paradoxical	  cost	  of	  remaining	  a	  constituent	  element	  of	  the	  Soviet	  system,	  so	  it	  seemed,	  was	  to	  further	  undermine	  the	  political	  structures	  that	  had	  supported	  this	  system	  for	  decades.	  	  Nor	   was	   the	   paradox	   of	   remaining	   loyal	   to	   the	   Soviet	   state	   by	   undermining	   its	  institutions	   restricted	   to	   the	   founding	   of	   new,	   non-­‐Communist	   political	   parties.	  Quite	   the	   opposite:	   over	   the	   course	   of	   1990	   and	   1991,	   Mahkamov’s	   unflinching	  loyalty	  to	  Moscow	  would	  frequently	  lead	  him	  and	  the	  government	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  to	   take	   action	   that	   ultimately	   challenged	   Moscow’s	   leadership.	   	   This	   was	  particularly	  obvious	  during	  the	  XXVIII	  Congress	  of	  the	  KPSS,	  held	  in	  Moscow	  in	  July	  1990,	   which	   had	   the	   ultimate	   consequence	   of	   undermining	   the	   authority	   and	  governing	  capacity	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  	  	  Even	  before	  the	  XXVIII	  Congress	  the	  leading	   institutions	   of	   the	   Party,	   the	   Secretariat	   and	   the	   Politburo,	   had	   been	  reduced	   in	   size	   and	   function	  –	  but	   following	   the	  Congress	   their	   role	  was	   limited	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  263;	  Vera	  Tolz,	  “The	  USSR	  this	  Week,”	  Radio	  Liberty	  Report	  on	  
the	  USSR,	  October	  19,	  1990.	  	  The	  organizers	  of	  this	  conference	  were	  fined	  in	  December	  1990.	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even	  further.27	  	  The	  newly	  expanded	  Politburo,	  which	  now	  included	  all	  of	  the	  first	  secretaries	  of	  republican	  parties,	  essentially	  copied	  the	  already	  established	  Council	  of	  the	  Federation,	  which,	  together	  with	  the	  Presidential	  Council,	  had	  been	  created	  by	   the	  Congress	   of	   Peoples’	  Deputies	   in	  March.28	  	   This	  made	   the	  Politburo	   as	   an	  institution	  in	  many	  ways	  redundant,	  and	  it	  met	  infrequently,	  if	  at	  all.	   	   	  In	  contrast	  to	   many	   other	   delegates	   to	   the	   Congress,	   who	   loudly	   protested	   this	   and	   other	  attacks	   on	   Party	   power	   before	   ultimately	   acceding	   to	   Gorbachev’s	   proposed	  reforms	  (“he	  hypnotizes	  every	  last	  one	  of	  us,”	  one	  delegate	  later	  complained),29	  the	  Tajik	  delegation	  quietly	  voted	   in	   favor	  of	   reform	  without	  voicing	  any	  opposition.	  Reporting	  on	   the	  Congress	  a	  month	   later	   to	  a	  plenum	  of	   the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan,	  Mahkamov	  was	   even	   strangely	   sanguine	   about	   the	   Party’s	   future:	   the	  Congress,	   he	   reassured	   party	   members	   “has	   created	   a	   solid	   foundation	   for	   the	  ongoing	   renewal	   of	   the	   Party…and	   the	   strengthening	   of	   its	   leading	   role	   in	  society.”30	  	  	  As	  power	  continued	  to	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  Party,	   the	   leadership	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  also	   found	   itself	   under	   pressure	   from	   Moscow	   to	   express	   its	   political	  independence.	   Starting	   in	   late	   1988	   with	   Estonia	   and	   continuing	   through	   1989	  with	   Lithuania,	   Latvia,	   Azerbaijan	   and	  Georgia,	   Soviet	   republics	   had	   increasingly	  begun	   to	   declare	   their	   “sovereignty”	   over	   their	   constituent	   territories.	  What	   this	  meant	  in	  practice	  varied	  from	  republic	  to	  republic,	  but	  at	  a	  minimum	  it	  indicated	  that	  in	  case	  of	  contradiction,	   local	   legislation	  took	  precedence	  over	  central	  Soviet	  laws.	   	  This	   clearly	  undermined	  Moscow’s	  power,	   and	  Gorbachev	   initially	   reacted	  by	   brow-­‐beating,	   threatening,	   and	   even	   declaring	   an	   economic	   embargo	   against	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  Stephen	  White,	  “Background	  to	  the	  XXVIII	  Congress,”	  in	  The	  Soviet	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Disarray:	  
The	  XXVIII	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  ed.	  E.A.	  Rees	   (London:	  Macmillan,	  1992),	  11.	  	  For	  earlier	  cuts	  to	  Party	  authority,	  see	  Chapters	  Four	  and	  Five.	  28	  For	  the	  makeup	  of	  the	  new	  Politburo,	  see	  “Politbiuro	  i	  sekretariat	  tsentral’nogo	  komiteta	  KPSS,”	  
Izvestiia	  TsK	  KPSS	  8,	  no.	  307	  (August	  1990):	  7.	  29	  Stephen	  White,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  the	  XXVIII	  Congress,”	   in	  The	  Soviet	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Disarray:	  
The	  XXVIII	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  ed.	  E.A.	  Rees	   (London:	  Macmillan,	  1992),	   49.	   	   Georgii	   Koshlakov,	   deputy	   chairman	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR’s	   Council	   of	  Ministers,	   has	   also	  argued	   that	  Gorbachev	  was	   an	   effective	   “hypnotizer,”	   able	   to	   get	   delegates	   to	   change	   their	   votes	  through	  sheer	  will	  power.	  	  See:	  Interview	  with	  Georgii	  Koshlakov,	  Dushanbe,	  July	  2016.	  30 	  “Ob	   itogakh	   XXVIII	   s’’ezda	   KPSS	   i	   osnovnykh	   napravleniiakh	   deiatel’nosti	   Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana.	   	   Doklad	   chlena	   Politbiuro	   TsK	   KPSS,	   pervogo	   sekretaria	   TsK	   Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  K.M.	  Makhkamova	  na	  III	  plenume	  TsK	  Kompartii	  respubliki	  20	  avgusta	  1990	  goda,”	  
Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  August	  22,	  1990.	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Lithuania.31	  	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  1990,	  however,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  republics	  (most	  especially	   Russia)	   having	   followed	   the	   Baltics’	   example	   and	   now	   nominally	  “sovereign,”	   Gorbachev	   changed	   tactics.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   he	   and	   his	   advisors	  continued	   to	   insist	   on	   “the	   supremacy	   of	   union	   legislation	   over	   republican	  [legislation],”	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   encouraging	   lagging	   republics	   to	   catch	   up	  with	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   Union	   in	   order	   to	   “usurp	   the	   local	   nationalists’	   agenda.”32	  	  Gorbachev’s	  exact	  motivations	  remain	  unclear:	  he	  may	  have	  been	  convinced	  that	  if	  all	  of	  the	  republics	  reached	  a	  position	  of	  “sovereignty”	  their	  individual	  nationalist	  movements	  could	  be	  cancelled	  out	  in	  a	  new	  Union.	  	  One	  way	  or	  another,	  though,	  he	  was	  pushing	  the	  situation	  dangerously	  close	  to	  the	  edge.	  	  For	  its	  part,	  however,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  in	  little	  hurry	  to	  declare	  its	  “sovereignty.”	  As	  discussions	   in	   the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	   in	   June	  1990	   indicated,	   for	  Dushanbe	  the	  benefits	  of	  such	  a	  declaration	  seemed	  limited:	  	  
Comrade	   Nasreddinov:	   And	   we	   should	   discuss	   the	   Declaration	   [on	  
Sovereignty].	  
Comrade	  Aslonov:	  Union	  republics	  are	  already	  discussing	  and	  passing	  them.	  
Comrade	   Gafarov:	   The	   Constitution	   already	   says	   “The	   Sovereign	   Tajik	  
Soviet	  Socialist	  Republic.”	  
Comrade	  Mahkamov:	  Why	  must	  we	  pass	  a	  separate	  Law	  on	  Sovereignty?	  
Comrade	  Nasreddinov:	  On	  political	  and	  economic	  sovereignty.	  	  The	  Uzbeks	  
already	  have	  one.	  	  That	  is	  why	  it	  is	  necessary.	  
Comrade	  Mahkamov:	  We	  believe	  that	  the	  [Union]	  Agreement	  is	  needed	  first	  
of	  all.	   	  These	  questions	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  agreement.	   	  Those	  who	  
pass	  Declarations	  are	  making	  particularistic	   claims.	   	  That	   is	   just	  one	   step	  
from	  secession	  from	  the	  Union.33	  	  	  In	   contrast	   to	   other	   republics,	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   saw	   little	  economic	   benefit	   to	   “sovereignty.”	   	   Instead,	   the	   strongest	   argument	   in	   favor	   that	  could	  be	   found	  was	  that	  “the	  Uzbeks	  already	  have	  one”	  –	  Moscow’s	  arguments	  to	  catch	   up	  with	   other	   republics	   were	  working.	   	   However,	   the	   risks	   were	   great,	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Gregory	   Gleason,	   “The	   Federal	   Formula	   and	   the	   Collapse	   of	   the	   USSR,”	   Publius:	   The	   Journal	   of	  
Federalism	   22,	   no.	   3	   (1992):	   149-­‐150;	   for	   Gorbachev’s	   earlier	   (and	   calmer)	   approach,	   see	  Cherniaev,	   Shest’	   let,	   295;	   for	   an	   extended	   later	   exchange	   between	   Gorbachev	   and	   Algirdas	  Brazauskas,	   the	   First	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Lithuanian	   Communist	   Party,	   see	   “Vneocherednoi	   plenum	  TsK	  KPSS	  –	  25-­‐26	  dekabria	  1989	  goda.	  Stenograficheskii	  otchet,”	  Izvestiia	  TsK	  KPSS	  6,	  no.	  305	  (June	  1990):	  40-­‐50.	  32	  See	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  627-­‐634;	  first	  quote	  on	  634	  by	  Rafik	  Nishanov	  on	  July	  20,	  1990;	  Martha	  Brill	  Olcott,	  “The	  Soviet	  (Dis)Union,”	  Foreign	  Policy	  82	  (1991):	  126-­‐127,	  latter	  quote	  on	  127.	  33	  Stenogramma	   Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   ot	   28	   iiunia	   1990,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  279,	  l.	  31.	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Mahkamov	   highlighted.	   	   There	   was	   little	   stomach	   in	   Tajikistan	   for	   the	   idea	   of	  actually	  leaving	  the	  USSR.	  
	  Gorbachev,	  however,	  continued	  to	  encourage	  the	  passage	  of	  a	  declaration.	  Feeling	  “forced”	  by	  the	  wave	  of	  declarations	  and	  worried	  how	  Moscow	  would	  react	  to	  the	  lack	   of	   any	   local	   declaration,	   Mahkamov	   and	   the	   Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet	   finally	  passed	  an	  official	  Declaration	  “On	  the	  State	  Sovereignty	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republic”	  on	  August	  24,	  1990.	  34	  	  The	  opposition	  politicians	   in	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet,	   including	   Rastokhez’s	   Abdujabbor,	   who	   had	   helped	   to	   draft	   the	   final	  Declaration,	  welcomed	  the	  move	  towards	  economic	  and	  political	  self-­‐control.35	  For	  Mahkamov	   and	   the	   established	   leadership,	   however,	   this	   brought	   up	   “sensitive	  issues”	   –	   not	   only	   about	   the	   Tajik	   SSR’s	   status	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Moscow,	   but	   about	   the	  long-­‐term	   stability	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   as	   a	   whole.36	  Worse,	   it	   was	   the	   most	  influential	  leaders	  of	  the	  USSR	  –	  Gorbachev,	  Yelstin,	  and	  others	  in	  Moscow	  –	  who	  were	  pushing	   for	   these	  “sensitive	   issues”	   to	  be	  brought	  out	   into	  the	  open.	   	   	  They	  continued	  to	  assert	  their	  authority	  over	  Mahkamov	  and	  the	  CPT,	  but	  just	  as	  equally	  continued	   the	   paradox	   of	   pushing	   for	   decreased	   state	   and	   party	   authority,	  including	  in	  the	  long	  run	  their	  own.	  	  	  This	  was	  also	  the	  case	  with	  ongoing	  discussions	  related	  to	  the	  new	  “Union	  Treaty.”	  Debates	   over	   both	   Tajikistan’s	   “sovereignty”	   within	   the	   Soviet	   system	   and	   the	  status	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   had	   taken	   place	   against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   broader	  confusion	  about	  this	  treaty.	  Called	  upon	  to	  secure	  and	  renew	  the	  USSR,	  the	  “Union	  Treaty”	  had	  been	  initially	  floated	  by	  Gorbachev	  in	  January	  1990	  in	  response	  to	  the	  first	   declarations	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   independence	   in	   1988	   and	   1989.37	  	   After	  Russia	   declared	   its	   sovereignty	   in	   June	   1990,	   moreover,	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	  advisors	  repackaged	  the	  concept	  as	  a	  “Union	  of	  Sovereign	  Socialist	  Republics,”	   in	  recognition	  and	  acceptance	  of	  the	  new	  status	  quo	  of	  “sovereign”	  republics.38	  	  With	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Nurali	   Davlat,	   “Tohiri	   Abdujabbor:	   ‘Padar’-­‐i	   e’’lomiiai	   istiqlol,”	  Ozodagon,	   September	   28,	   2016;	  Bushkov	  i	  Mikul’skii,	  “Tadzhikskaia	  revoliutsiia,”	  17.	  The	  main	  provision	  of	  this	  Declaration	  was	  to	  give	   legal	   supremacy	   to	   republican	   legislation;	   see	   “Proekt:	   Deklaratsiia	   O	   gosudarstvennom	  suverinitete	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  August	  15,	  1990.	  35	  Davlat,	  “Tohiri	  Abdujabbor.”	  36	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  297,	  l.	  31.	  	  37Cherniaev,	  Shest’	  let,	  323-­‐326;	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  589-­‐590.	  38	  On	  the	  first	  meeting	  “to	  discuss	  the	  Treaty	  concept,”	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  278,	  l.	  26;	  also	  Nishanov,	  Derev’ia	  zeleneiut,	   324.	   	   On	  Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors’	   position	   prior,	   see	   Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  627,	  635.	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Yeltsin’s	  political	  star	  rising	  in	  Moscow	  and	  Gorbachev	  having	  backed	  himself	  into	  a	  corner	  through	  his	  promotion	  of	  republican	  sovereignty,	  it	  was	  growing	  unclear	  what	   role	   would	   be	   left	   for	   either	   the	   central	   Soviet	   government	   or	   Gorbachev	  himself.	  	  By	  promoting	  the	  Union	  Treaty	  and	  asking	  all	  fifteen	  republics	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  new	  structure	  for	  the	  Union,	  Gorbachev	  hoped	  to	  secure	  at	  least	  the	  latter.	  	  	  Very	  quickly,	  however,	  Gorbachev	  ran	  into	  difficulty.	  	  First,	  not	  all	  of	  the	  republics	  would	  attend	  meetings,	  with	  Estonia	  and	  Lithuania	  boycotting	  the	  proceedings.	  It	  also	   emerged	   that	   the	   leadership	   of	   different	   republics	   had	   strikingly	   different	  views	   on	   what	   the	   new	   Union	   should	   look	   like.	   	   Some,	   like	   Ukraine’s	   Leonid	  Kravchuk39	  advocated	  a	  loose	  “confederation”	  of	  republics,	  while	  others	  advocated	  for	  essentially	  cosmetic	  changes	   that	  would	   leave	   the	  strong	  Union	  center	   intact.	  	  Tajikistan,	   for	   example,	   was	   in	   favor	   of	   a	   strong	   “federation,”	   and	   asked	   for	  guarantees	  that	  its	  economy	  “would	  continue	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  Union	  resources”	  for	   at	   least	   another	   5	   years.40	  This	   conflict	   over	   the	   economic	   role	   of	   the	   Soviet	  center	  in	  the	  new	  Union	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  economic	  and	  financial	  assets	  was	  further	   complicated	   by	   the	   development	   of	   two	   competing	   Market	   Transition	  Programs	   (programmy	  perekhoda	  k	  rynku)	   in	  August	  1990.	  Developed	  by	  Leonid	  Abalkin	  and	  a	  team	  from	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  USSR,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  Stanislav	   Shatalin	   and	  others	   from	   the	  Council	   of	  Ministers	   of	   the	  RSFSR,	   on	   the	  other,	   the	   two	   programs	   contained	   markedly	   different	   visions	   of	   the	   role	   and	  functions	   to	   be	   held	   by	   the	   central	   Soviet	   government.41	  	   Abalkin’s	   program	  retained	   a	   clearly	  defined	   central	   federal	   government;	   Shatalin’s	   did	  not,	   leaving	  space	   only	   for	   a	   weakened	   “coordinative	   center.”	   	   Since	   the	   Market	   Transition	  Program	  had	  been	  meant	  as	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  proposed	  Union	  Treaty,	  the	  clear	  contradiction	  between	  the	  central	  Soviet	  government’s	  proposal	  and	  that	  made	  by	  the	  largest	  Soviet	  republic	  was	  particularly	  troublesome.42	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Plokhy,	  The	  Last	  Empire,	  56-­‐57;	  also	  Michael	  Mandelbaum,	  “Coup	  de	  Grace:	  The	  End	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  71,	  no.	  1	  	  (1991/1992):	  168.	  40 	  Stenogramma	   Zasedaniia	   Presidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   ot	   18.06.1990,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  278,	  l.	  14.	  	  41	  The	  Shatalin	  plan,	  on	  which	  Grigorii	  Yavlinsky	  also	  worked,	  would	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  “500	  Days	  Plan,”	  insofar	  as	  it	  proposed	  a	  500-­‐day	  transition	  to	  a	  full	  market.	  	  This	  plan	  was	  later	  adopted	  by	   the	   Russian	   Supreme	   Soviet.	   	   See	   Cherniaev,	   Shest’	   let,	   370-­‐371;	   Nikolai	   Ryzhkov,	   Glavnyi	  
svidetel’	  (Moscow:Eksmo,	  2009),	  117-­‐122;	  139.	  42	  Abalkin,	  Neispol’zovannyi	  shans,	   195-­‐214;	  Pavlov,	  Upushchen	  li,	   254-­‐255;	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	   and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  TsK	  KPSS,	  637.	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Gorbachev	  assigned	  a	  commission	  headed	  by	  the	  economist	  Abel	  Aganbegian	  the	  task	  of	  “combining”	  the	  two	  programs,	  but	  two	  months	  of	  work	  was	  inconclusive.	  	  Ultimately,	   a	   shortened	   and	   somewhat	   truncated	   version	   of	   Shatalin’s	   program	  was	   proposed	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   and	   passed	   in	   October	   1990.43	  	  While	   this	  obligated	  the	  USSR	  to	  finalize	  its	  ongoing	  transition	  to	  a	  market	  system	  in	  1991,	  it	  left	  the	  status	  of	  the	  central	  Soviet	  government	  undefined	  and	  markedly	  unclear.44	  The	  Supreme	  Soviet	  did	  clarify	  matters	  somewhat	  on	  December	  3,	  when	  it	  passed	  a	  resolution	  “On	  the	  General	  Conception	  of	  the	  New	  Union	  Treaty	  and	  the	  order	  of	  its	  Signing,”	  which	  defined	  the	  new	  form	  of	   the	  USSR	  as	  a	   federal	  union	  between	  sovereign	   states.	   	   The	   4th	   Congress	   of	   People’s	   Deputies	   confirmed	   this	  interpretation	   on	   December	   24th,	   but	   passed	   ultimate	   legal	   authority	   (and	  responsibility)	   to	   the	   Soviet	   people. 45 	  	   It	   was	   decided	   that	   a	   Union-­‐wide	  referendum	   should	   be	   held	   on	   the	   status	   of	   the	   USSR	   in	   March	   1991.	   	   This	  referendum,	  with	   some	   republican	  variation,	   asked	   citizens	   to	   vote	   yes	   or	  no	  on	  the	   “necessity	   of	   saving	   the	   Union	   of	   Soviet	   Socialist	   Republics	   as	   an	   updated	  federation	  of	  equal	  sovereign	  republics.”	  	  	  When	   the	   citizens	   of	   9	   Soviet	   republics	   (6	   republics	   boycotted	   the	   referendum)	  dutifully	  went	  to	  the	  polls	  on	  March	  17,	  1991	  they	  overwhelming	  voted	  yes.	  	  With	  a	  mandate	  of	  more	  than	  76%	  of	  voters	  behind	  them,	  Gorbachev’s	  team	  returned	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table	  with	  reinvigorated	  strength:	  the	  Soviet	  people,	  so	  it	  seemed,	  were	  firmly	  in	  favor	  of	  their	  vision	  of	  a	  Soviet	  “federation.”	  	  Yet	  the	  new	  round	  of	  talks,	  held	  at	  Novo-­‐Ogaryovo,	  Gorbachev’s	  dacha	  outside	  of	  Moscow,	  ran	  into	  many	  of	   the	   same	   problems	   as	   the	   year	   before.	  46	  	   First,	   the	   six	   republics	   that	   had	  boycotted	   the	   referendum	   refused	   to	   participate,	   leaving	   the	   Union	   treaty	   to	   be	  discussed	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  “9+1”	  group	  –	  nine	  republics	  and	  the	  Union	  government.	  	  The	  talks	  ground	  on	  through	  the	  summer	  of	  1991,	  with	  Gorbachev	  and	  his	  advisors	  continuously	   giving	   ground	   to	  Yeltsin	   and	  other	   republican	   leaders	  who	   insisted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Abalkin,	  Neispol’zovannyi	  shans,	  216,	  236-­‐240;	  Cherniaev,	  Shest’	  let,	  373-­‐376.	  44	  M.F.	  Polynov,	  E.A.	  Tarasov,	  “Perekhod	  k	  rynochnoi	  ekonomike	  v	  SSSR	  v	  gody	  perestroiki:	  bor’ba	  za	  sozdanie	  kontseptsii.	  1989-­‐1991,”	  Noveishaia	  istoriia	  Rossii	  18,	  no.	  1	  (2017):	  118-­‐121.	  45	  The	  4th	  Congress	  of	  People’s	  Deputies	  involved	  many	  scandalous	  declarations,	  including	  Eduard	  Shevardnadze’s	  claim	  of	  a	  “coming	  dictatorship”	  and	  associated	  resignation	  and	  Sazhi	  Umalatova’s	  call	   for	   Gorbachev’s	   removal.	   	   This,	   however,	   had	   little	   practical	   effect:	   Gorbachev	   was	   able	   to	  successfully	   coordinate	   the	  passage	  of	   resolutions	   in	   favor	   a	  new	  Union	  Treaty	   and	  a	   supporting	  referendum.	   	   See	   Chetvertyi	   s’’ezd	   narodnykh	   deputatov	   SSSR,	   17-­‐27	   dekabria	   1990	   g.	  
Stenograficheskii	  otchet	  (Moscow:	  Izdania	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  SSSR,	  1991),	  esp.	  v.	  1,	  10,	  552-­‐559;	  v.	  2,	  206-­‐232.	  46	  Cherniaev,	  Shest’	  let,	  440-­‐441.	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on	   increasing	  authority	  within	   the	  new	  Union	   structure.47	  For	   its	  part,	  Tajikistan	  continued	  to	  favor	  a	  powerful	  central	  government:	  96%	  of	  Tajik	  citizens	  had	  voted	  in	   favor	   of	   the	   new	   Union,	   and	   its	   leaders	   voiced	   a	   preference	   for	   a	   “gradual”	  transition	   to	   republican	   autonomy.	  48	  	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   was	   unclear	   how	  Tajikistan	  would	  be	  able	  to	  implement	  its	  preferred	  vision	  of	  a	  newly	  strengthened	  Union.	   	   “We	   conducted	   the	   referendum,”	   the	   Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet	   deputy	  Tukhtaboi	  Gafarov	  mused	   in	  April	  1991,	   “and	  the	  result	   is	  well	  known.	   	  But	  how	  can	  we	  realize	  the	  results	  of	  the	  referendum?”49	  There	  was	  no	  obvious	  answer,	  and	  Mahkamov	  seemed	  boxed	  in	  by	  the	  paradoxical	  framework	  presented	  by	  Moscow,	  whereby	   loyalty	  was	   could	   only	   be	  demonstrated	  by	  undermining	   central	   Soviet	  authority.	   	   Desperate	   to	   retain	   some	  Union	   framework,	  Mahkamov	   continued	   to	  follow	  Gorbachev’s	  lead	  in	  ceding	  authority	  to	  the	  republics.	  	  From	  his	  perspective,	  there	  was	  simply	  no	  other	  option.	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  Watching	  the	  calm	  streets	  of	  Dushanbe	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1991,	  Mahkamov	  and	  his	  supporters	   in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  government	  remained	  worried.	   	  And	  they	  had	  good	  reason	  to	  be:	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  seemed	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  collapse,	  a	  new	  Union	  treaty	  remained	  unsigned,	   and	   republics	  were	   interpreting	   “sovereignty”	   however	   they	  saw	  fit.	  	  Internally,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  riven	  with	  political	  division,	  with	  opposition	  political	   parties	   growing	   in	   number	   and	   strength.	   In	  March	   1991	  Rastokhez,	   the	  DPT	  and	  the	  IRPT	  were	  joined	  on	  the	  political	  stage	  by	  the	  Pamiri-­‐dominated	  “La’’li	  Badakhson,”	   an	   organization	   founded	   in	   Dushanbe	   by	   the	   math	   teacher	   Atobek	  Amirbek	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   promoting	   Pamiri	   culture.50	  	   And	   then	   there	   was	   the	  problem	  of	  Islam,	  which	  by	  1991	  was	  growing	  increasingly	  prominent.	  	  	  Although	  frequently	  highlighted	  in	  most	  histories	  of	  Tajikistan,	  Islam	  had	  played	  a	  limited	  political	  role	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  before	  1990	  and	  1991.	  While	  most	  residents	  of	   Tajikistan	   considered	   themselves	   Muslims,	   Islam	   was	   a	   primarily	   personal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Brown,	  Gorbachev	  Factor,	  288-­‐289.	  48	  See	  Mahkamov’s	  comments	  in	  November	  1990	  in	  Cherniaev,	  Veber,	  and	  Medvedev,	  V	  Politbiuro	  
TsK	  KPSS,	  653;	  on	  the	  results	  of	  the	  referendum	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1239,	  ll.	  2-­‐3.	  	  49	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1239,	  l.	  15.	  	  50	  S.	  Olimova	   and	  M.	  Olimov,	  Tadzhikistan	  na	  poroge	  peremen	   (Moscow:	  Tsentr	   strategicheskikh	   i	  politicheskikh	  issledovanii,	  1999),	  111.	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matter:	  it	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  daily	  life	  and	  life	  events	  (weddings,	   holidays,	   and	   the	   like),	   and	   Tajikistani	   Soviet	   citizens	   continued	   to	  adhere	   by	   Islamic	   cultural	   norms,	   such	   as	   circumcision	   and	   avoiding	   pork.	   	   The	  organized	  celebration	  of	  Muslim	  holidays,	  however,	  was	  kept	   to	  a	  minimum,	  and	  Islam	   was	   explicitly	   kept	   out	   of	   the	   public	   and	   political	   sphere.	  51	  	   This	   balance	  remained	  true	  in	  the	  first	  years	  of	  perestroika,	  as	  evidenced	  both	  by	  the	  arrest	  of	  Nuri	  in	  1986	  and	  the	  broader	  campaign	  against	  organized	  Islam	  conducted	  by	  both	  Moscow	   and	   Dushanbe	   from	   1985-­‐1987.	   	   In	   December	   1985,	   for	   example,	   the	  Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   CPSU	   passed	   a	   resolution	   “On	   Additional	   Measures	  Connected	   with	   the	   Activation	   in	   Asia	   and	   Africa	   of	   so-­‐called	   ‘Militant	   Islam’,”	  which	   in	   part	   required	   Tajikistan	   to	   increase	   its	   local	   atheist	   propaganda	  campaigns.52	  	  This	  was	  followed	  up	  in	  1986	  by	  further	  CC	  CPSU	  resolutions	  –	  and	  a	  general	   sense	   amongst	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   republic	   that	   expressions	   of	   Islam	  needed	  to	  be	  kept	  to	  a	  minimum.	  53	  	  Noting	  the	  relatively	  low	  levels	  of	  religiosity	  in	  the	   south	   compared	   to	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   republic,	   for	   example,	   an	   organized	  campaign	  was	  started	  in	  1986	  to	  dispatch	  experienced	  party	  activists	  from	  Kulyab	  to	  more	  religious	  northern	  regions.	  54	  	  Even	  through	  1990,	  as	  Asliddin	  Sohibnazar	  later	   remarked,	   “Communist	   ideology	   kept	   the	   upper	   hand	   in	   its	   battle	   against	  religion.”	  55	  	  The	   situation	   was	   cardinally	   different	   in	   1991.	   	   The	   Islamic	   Revival	   Party	   of	  Tajikistan,	   moreover,	   was	   only	   part	   of	   a	   much	   larger	   picture.	   	   With	   Moscow’s	  approach	   to	   organized	   religion	   slowly	   (if	   somewhat	   disorderly)	   softening,	  Mahkamov	   and	   the	   Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet	   found	   themselves	   under	   increasing	  pressure	   to	   provide	   space	   for	   Islam	   in	   the	   public	   sphere.56	  	   In	   part,	   this	   meant	  expanding	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Qoziyot	  (muftiate),	  which,	  under	  its	  young	  and	  active	   leader,	  Hoji	  Akbar	  Turajonzoda,	  quickly	   grasped	   the	   initiative,	   broadening	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Atkin,	  The	  Subtlest	  Battle;	  Sartori,	  “The	  Secular	  that	  Never	  Was.”	  52 	  Protokol	   No.	   47	   zasedaniia	   biuro	   Leninabadskogo	   obkoma	   Kompartii	   Tadzhikistana	   ot	  17.12.1985,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  154,	  d.	  2431,	  ll.	  150-­‐154.	  	  53	  S.M.	  Iskhakov,	  “Perestroika”	  i	  sovetskie	  musul’mane,”	  in	  Tragediia	  velikoi	  derzhavoi:	  natsional’noi	  
vopros	   i	   raspad	   Sovetskogo	   soiuza,	   ed.	   G.N.	   Sevost’ianov	   (Moscow:	   Izdatel’stvo	   “Sotsial’no-­‐politicheskaia	   mysl’”),	   2005,	   487-­‐488;	   Interview	   with	   a	   former	   member	   of	   the	   CPT	   Bureau,	  Dushanbe,	  July	  2016.	  54	  Protokol	  no.	  74	  zasedaniia	   sekretariata	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  19.11.1985.	  RGASPI,	  F.	  17,	  Op.	  154,	  D.	  2385,	  L.	  6.	  55	  Sohibnazar,	  Subhi	  sitorakush,	  v.	  1,	  25-­‐26.	  	  56	  See	   Tett,	   “Ambiguous	   Alliances,”	   37;	   also	   Andrei	   Mel’nikov,	   “Perestroika	   nadelila	   Tserkov’	  pravami,	  a	  obiazannostiami	  ne	  uspela,”	  Nezavisimaia	  Gazeta,	  June	  03,	  2015.	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its	  educational	  activities	  and	  printing	  a	  newspaper,	  the	  Minbari-­‐i	  Islom.	   	  This	  was	  further	   strengthened	   by	   the	   separation	   of	   the	   Tajik	  Qoziyot	   from	   the	   Tashkent-­‐based	   Religious	   Administration	   of	   Muslims	   of	   Central	   Asia	   and	   Kazakhstan	  (SADUM)	   in	   late	  1989,	  which	  gave	  Turajonzoda	  and	  his	  office	  much	  greater	   local	  authority.57	  	   Space	   for	   religion,	   moreover,	   also	   required	   legislative	   initiative.	   In	  December	  1990,	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	  passed	  a	  Law	  “On	  Freedom	  of	  Religion	  and	   Religious	   Organizations,”	   which	   lifted	   most	   restrictions	   on	   mosque	  registration	   and	   the	   open	   practice	   of	   Islam.	  58 	  Almost	   immediately,	   the	   total	  number	  of	  mosques	  in	  the	  republic	  jumped	  from	  44	  to	  nearly	  3,000,	  including	  130	  larger	   “Friday”	   mosques.59	  	   In	   practice,	   of	   course,	   the	   majority	   of	   these	   smaller	  mosques	   had	   previously	   existed	   as	   informal	   or	   unofficial	   places	   of	   worship;	   the	  new	   law	   simply	   legalized	   existing	   local	   organizations,	   while	   also	   providing	   new	  impetus	   for	   their	   social	   influence.60	  Whether	   strictly	   new	   or	   not,	   however,	   the	  legalization	   of	   mosques	   allowed	   them	   to	   become	   unregulated	   places	   of	   social	  organization	   as	  well	   as	   religion.	   	   As	   the	   ethnographer	   Gillian	   Tett	  was	   told	   at	   a	  newly	  opened	  mosque	  in	  1990:	  “Before,	  in	  the	  time	  of	  Stalin	  and	  Brezhnev	  we	  had	  no	   mosque,	   so	   we	   (the	   men)	   could	   not	   meet.	   	  But	   now	   -­‐	   a	   thousand	   thanks	   to	  Gorbachev!	  [taj.	  hazor	  rakhmat	  ba	  Gorbachev!]	   -­‐	  we	  have	  a	  mosque.”61	  	   Islam	  was	  moving	  into	  the	  political	  realm.	  	  	  To	   the	   avowed	   atheist	  Mahkamov,	   the	   rise	   of	   organized	   religion	  was	   essentially	  incomprehensible:	   for	   him	   and	  many	   of	   the	   more	   conservative	   members	   of	   the	  CPT,	   Islam	   simply	   had	   no	   place	   in	   the	   political	   sphere.	   Between	   the	   collapsing	  Soviet	  superstructure,	  the	  rise	  of	  local	  parties,	  and	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  Islam,	  however,	   the	   political	   order	   in	   Dushanbe	   was	   becoming	   almost	   unrecognizable.	  	  Mahkamov	   responded,	   in	   large	   part,	   by	   fighting	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   power	   however	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Born	   Akbar	   Turaevich	   Qahhorov,	   Turajonzoda	   was	   appointed	   Qazi	   Kalon	   (Chief	   Mufti)	   of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  at	  the	  relatively	  young	  age	  of	  34	  in	  1988.	  	  For	  his	  biography	  and	  career,	  see	  Epkenhans,	  
Origins	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  203-­‐211;	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  271-­‐272.	  	  58	  Bushkov	  and	  Mikul’skii,	  “Tadzhikskaia	  revoliutsiia,”	  18;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1236,	  ll.	  12-­‐13.	  	  59	  In	  1989,	  there	  were	  only	  17	  mosques	  in	  the	  republic,	  including	  5	  in	  Dushanbe,	  a	  figure	  that	  rose	  to	   44	   by	   October	   1990.	   	   On	   1989,	   see	   M.	   Mirrahimov,	   “Strogo	   uchityvat’	   vse	   faktory	  mezhnatsional’nykh	   otnoshenii,”	   Voprosy	   istorii	   5	   (1989):	   85;	   Atkin,	   The	   Subtlest	   Battle,	   17.	   	   On	  1990,	  see	  Protokol	  No.	  6	  zasedaniia	  biuro	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  24.10.1990,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  159,	  d.	  1708,	  l.	  2.	  On	  1991,	  see	  Niyazi,	  “Islam	  and	  Tajikistan’s,”	  184-­‐185.	  60	  Qadi	  Akbar	  Turajonzoda,	  “Religion:	  The	  Pillar	  of	  Society,”	  in	  Central	  Asia:	  Conflict	  Resolution,	  and	  
Change,	  eds.	  Roald	  Z.	  Sagdeev	  and	  Susan	  Eisenhower	  (Chevy	  Chase,	  Maryland:	  CPSS	  Press,	  1995),	  268.	  61	  Tett,	  “Ambiguous	  Alliances,”	  94.	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possible.	   	   After	   waffling	   for	   months,	   in	   November	   1990	   he	   finally	   initiated	  discussions	   in	   the	  Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet	   about	   the	   post	   of	   President	   of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR,	   to	  which	  he	  was	   summarily	  nominated	  by	   the	  CPT.62	  Opposition	  politicians,	  however,	  both	  objected	   to	   the	   form	  of	  elections	  –	  much	   like	  Gorbachev	   in	  March	  1990,	   the	  Tajik	  President	  was	   to	  be	  elected	  not	  by	  popular	  vote,	  but	  only	  by	   the	  Supreme	   Soviet	   –	   and	   collectively	   backed	   Rahmon	   Nabiev	   as	   an	   alternative	  candidate.63	  	   	  Returning	  to	  politics	  in	  February	  1990	  after	  his	  1985	  removal	  from	  the	  position	  of	  CPT	  1st	  Secretary,	  Nabiev	  had	  initially	  failed	  to	  secure	  a	  seat	  in	  the	  Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet.	   	   With	   the	   help	   of	   Sohibnazar	   and	   other	   opposition	  politicians,	   however,	   he	  was	   elected	   in	   a	   special	   election	   in	   April	   1990,	   and	   had	  since	  become	  the	  public	  face	  of	  those	  opposed	  to	  Mahkamov	  in	  the	  parliament.	  64	  	  Although	   this	   challenge	   to	   Mahkamov	   once	   again	   failed,	   with	   Nabiev	   losing	   the	  presidential	  vote	  on	  November	  29,	  89	  to	  131,65	  the	  latter’s	  return	  to	  politics	  could	  hardly	  calm	  the	  newly	  minted	  President	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  nerves.	  	  As	  1990	  turned	  to	  1991	  and	  the	  spring	  thawed	  into	  summer,	  Mahkamov	  faced	  a	  political	  situation	  that	  was	  clearly	  and	  inexorably	  slipping	  out	  of	  his	  grasp.	  	  	  
II.	  From	  Bad	  to	  Worse:	  Economic	  Collapse	  	  Unfortunately,	  much	  of	  the	  instability	  Mahkamov	  faced	  was	  driven	  by	  factors	  over	  which	   he	   had	   little	   factual	   control.	   	   The	   economic	   downturn	   that	   had	   struck	  Tajikistan	  in	  1989	  had	  worsened	  throughout	  1990	  and	  grown	  into	  an	  open	  crisis	  by	   1991.	   	   “In	   1990,”	   as	   the	   Presidium	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	  reported	   in	   early	   1991,	   “it	   was	   not	   possible	   to	   halt	   the	   growth	   of	   negative	  economic	   tendencies….	  The	   ruble	   continues	   to	  devalue	  and	   inflation	   is	   growing.”	  	  The	  production	  of	  consumer	  goods	  remained	  outpaced	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  salaries,	  and	  even	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  widespread	  price	  increases	  seen	  since	  1989	  (see	  Chapter	  Four),	  Tajikistan’s	  entire	  economy	  contracted	  by	  more	  than	  1.2%	  in	  1990.66	  	   Unemployment	   also	   failed	   to	   halt	   its	   ongoing	   rise,	   reaching	   more	   than	  30%	   in	   many	   parts	   of	   Tajikistan.	   	   Just	   as	   they	   were	   losing	   jobs,	   moreover,	  Tajikistan’s	   citizens	   also	   found	  goods	  disappearing	   from	  stores	   –	   and	   the	   cost	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  “Otkrovennyi,	   delovoi	   razgovor,”	   Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana,	   November	   16,	   1990;	   TadzhikTA,	  “Vydvinut	  kandidat	  v	  prezidenty	  respubliki,”	  Kommunist	  Tadzhikistana,	  November	  18,	  1990.	  	  63	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  124;	  128.	  64	  Nurali	   Davlat,	   “Kahhor	  Mahkamov:	   Oghoz	   va	   farjomi	   ‘prezidenti	   javon’,”	  Ozodagon,	   August	   31,	  2016.	  65 	  TadzhikTA,	   “Informatsionnoe	   soobshchenie,”	   Kommunist	   Tadzhikistana,	   November	   30	   and	  December	  1,	  1990.	  	  66	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1230,	  ll.	  162-­‐163.	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those	  that	  remained	  skyrocketing.	   	  There	  was	  little	  doubt	  that	  these	  factors	  were	  feeding	   the	   growth	   of	   new	   political	   parties	   and	  movements,	   and	   the	   Tajik	   state	  scrambled	   to	   find	   ways	   to	   alleviate	   the	   economic	   situation.	   	   Yet	   their	   efforts	  inevitably	   came	   up	   short,	   blocked	   most	   frequently	   by	   the	   centralized	   nature	   of	  Soviet	  economic	  reforms	  and	  their	  own	  limited	  control	  over	  the	  Tajik	  economy.	  	  The	   structural	   limitations	   faced	   by	   Mahkamov	   and	   his	   advisors	   on	   economic	  questions	  were	  evident	  throughout	  the	  republic,	  but	  they	  were	  particularly	  clear	  in	  relation	  to	   the	  State	  Citrus	  Farm	  named	  for	  N.	  Qarabaev	   in	  Kolkhozobad	  District.	  	  Founded	   in	   the	   late	   1960s,	   this	   state	   farm	   had	   for	   decades	   been	   an	   exemplar	  agricultural	   enterprise,	   producing	   high	   yields	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   uniquely	   sweet	   and	  juicy	  lemons	  and	  always	  turning	  a	  profit.67	  	  Even	  in	  1990	  the	  state	  farm	  continued	  to	  be	  profitable,	  and	  its	  lemons	  were	  in	  high	  demand	  across	  the	  USSR.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   by	   early	   1991	   it	   was	   going	   bankrupt	   and	   its	   lemons	   were	   nowhere	   to	   be	  found	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  stores	  and	  markets.68	  	  	  This	   contradictory	   state	   of	   affairs	   was	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   perestroika’s	   many	  convoluted	  layers	  of	  economic	  reform.	  	  Early	  on	  in	  his	  tenure	  as	  First	  Secretary	  in	  late	   1985,	   Gorbachev	   had	   proposed	   an	   agricultural	   program	   that	   was	   meant	   to	  recentralize	  and	  boost	  food	  production	  across	  the	  USSR.	  	  Ultimately	  passed	  in	  the	  spring	   of	   1986,	   this	   program	   in	   part	   combined	   the	   previously	   existing	   six	  agricultural	   ministries	   into	   a	   giant	   State	   Agricultural-­‐Industrial	   Committee	  (Gosagroprom).	  	  In	  order	  to	  increase	  agricultural	  productivity,	  moreover,	  it	  created	  a	   series	   of	   “Scientific-­‐Productive	   Associations”	   (nauchno-­‐proizvodstevennye	  
ob’’edineniia	  or	  NPO),	  which	  were	  given	  authority	  over	  a	  series	  of	  related	  state	  and	  collective	   farms.	   	   In	   Kolkhozabad	   District,	   control	   over	   the	   State	   Citrus	   Farm	  named	   for	   N.	   Qarabaev	  was	   given	   to	   the	   newly	   founded	  NPO	   “Boghparvar”	   (taj.	  “Orchard	  Management”).	  	  Amongst	  other	  things,	  Boghparvar	  was	  given	  the	  right	  to	  distribute	  the	  farms’	  profits,	  nominally	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  higher	  productivity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Lemons	  began	  to	  be	  grown	  in	  Tajikistan	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s,	  when	  they	  were	  brought	  to	  the	  newly	  irrigated	  Vakhsh	  valley	  by	  the	  Georgian	  agriculturalist	  Vladimir	  Tsulaia.	  	  A	  selection	  process	  of	   14	   years	   was	   needed	   to	   cultivate	   the	   necessary	   sort,	   but	   once	   established	   in	   1949,	   the	   Tajik	  lemon	  became	  an	  important	  part	  of	   local	  economies	  and	  diets.	   	  See	  I.	  Meskhi,	  “Po	  Tadzhikistanu,”	  
Ogonyok,	   October	   10	   1954,	   27;	   Salomiddin	  Mirzorakhmatov,	   “Triumf	   vakhshstroia:	   80	   let	   nazad	  nachalos’	  osvoenie	  Vakhshskoi	  doliny,”	  Asia-­‐Plus,	  April	  04,	  2013.	  	  68	  M.	  Urbanovichus,	  “Sponsory	  i	  nakhlebniki,”	  Komsomolets	  Tadzhikistana,	  January	  4,	  1991.	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At	  first,	  this	  new	  arrangement	  led	  to	  few	  practical	  changes.	  	  By	  1989,	  however,	  two	  reforms	  again	   initiated	   in	  Moscow	  managed	  to	  turn	  matters	  on	  their	  head.	   	  First,	  Gosagroprom	   was	   disbanded	   and	   agricultural	   ministries	   recreated	   in	   its	   wake,	  leaving	   Boghparvar	   and	   other	  NPOs	  without	   a	   clear	   chain	   of	   oversight.	   	   Second,	  moreover,	   cooperative	   businesses	   had	   both	   been	   legalized	   and	   allowed	   to	  move	  around	  profits	  without	  restriction,	  providing	  clear	  incentive	  for	  corrupt	  links	  with	  NPOs	   that	   had	   access	   to	  profitable	   farms.	   	   Boghparvar’s	  management	  wasted	  no	  time,	   withdrawing	   approximately	   500,000	   rubles	   a	   year	   from	   the	   Citrus	   State	  Farms’	  accounts	  and	  providing	  nothing	   in	  return.	   	  An	   investigation	   in	  early	  1991	  was	   unable	   to	   establish	   where	   these	   funds	   had	   gone:	   the	   best	   guess	   was	  somewhere	  in	  the	  cooperative	  sector,	  where	  they	  would	  have	  quickly	  been	  turned	  into	  cash.69	  	  	  The	  situation	  worsened	  even	  further	  in	  1991.	  	  The	  ongoing	  decentralization	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  meant	   that	  established	  connections	  between	  state	   farms	   like	   the	  one	  in	  Kolkhozabad	  and	  state	  enterprises	  were	  often	  sundered.	  	  Lemons	  were	  still	  sold,	   but	   were	   frequently	   bought	   up	   by	   cooperatives	   or	   the	   new	   semi-­‐private	  “Concerns”	   and	   exported	   abroad.	   	   Price	   liberalization,	   which	   had	   been	   pushed	  through	  in	  Moscow	  in	  January	  1991,	  meant	  prices	  on	  most	  foodstuffs	  rose	  during	  the	   first	  months	  of	   the	  year.	   	  Mahkamov’s	  government	  responded	  by	  subsidizing	  the	   cost	   of	   many	   basic	   goods,	   but	   this	   only	   led	   to	   the	   further	   disappearance	   of	  foodstuffs	   from	   Tajikistan:	   entrepreneurs	   would	   buy	   cheap	   flour,	   oil,	   or	   even	  lemons	  by	  the	  truck-­‐full	  in	  Tajikistan	  and	  sell	  them	  in	  Kazakhstan	  or	  Russia,	  where	  the	  market	  price	  was	  much	  higher.70	  By	  June	  1991	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  had	  already	  spent	  more	  than	  150	  million	  rubles	  on	  subsidies,71	  and	  yet	  food	  deficits	  had	  all	  the	  same	  reached	   “crisis”	   conditions	   and	   there	   seemed	   no	   end	   in	   sight	   to	   the	   downward	  tumble.72	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  In	  the	  peak	  years	  of	  lemon	  production	  in	  the	  Vakhsh	  valley,	  a	  local	  saying	  summed	  up	   their	   economic	   importance:	   “Limon	   nadori	   –	   imon	   nadori!”	   (taj.	   “If	   you	   don’t	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Ibid.	  70	  On	  the	  export	  of	  lemons	  in	  1991,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1271,	  l.	  40.	  	  71	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  163,	  d.	  181,	  ll.	  22;	  43.	  	  72	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1247,	  ll.	  88-­‐89.	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have	   lemons,	   you	   don’t	   have	   wealth.”)73	  Clearly,	   lemons	   were	   just	   a	   small	   if	  representative	  part	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  economic	  system,	  but	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  this	  saying	  rung	  especially	  true.	  	  The	  same	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  State	  Citrus	  Farm	  named	  for	  N.	  Qarabaev	  on	  the	   level	  of	  an	   individual	  enterprise	  were	   also	   visible	   on	   the	  macro-­‐level	   across	   Tajikistan.	   	  Much	   as	  Moscow-­‐driven	  reforms	  had	  led	  to	  the	  disappearance	  of	  lemons	  from	  store	  shelves,	  so	  too	  had	  they	  brought	  about	  the	  collapse	  evident	  throughout	  the	  Tajik	  economy	  by	  mid-­‐1991.	  	  	  First	   and	   foremost,	   the	   same	   structural	   conditions	   that	   had	   already	   led	   Soviet	  enterprises	  to	  lower	  production	  and	  raise	  prices	  in	  1988-­‐1990	  not	  only	  remained	  in	  place	  in	  1991	  –	  in	  some	  ways,	  they	  became	  even	  worse.	  	  In	  late	  1990	  and	  early	  1991	  legal	  changes	  were	  passed	  that	  were	  nominally	  intended	  to	  force	  enterprises	  to	  react	  to	  market	  signals:	  they	  lowered	  support	  payments	  from	  the	  state,	  allowed	  privatization	  through	  “the	  transfer	  of	  an	  enterprise	  to	  rental	  status,”	  and	  required	  proof	  of	  production	  gains	  in	  exchange	  for	  increased	  payments.74	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  they	  also	  lowered	  taxes	  on	  many	  types	  of	  enterprises,	  and	  innumerable	  others	  were	   able	   to	   receive	   individualized	   “exceptions”	   from	   the	   new	   rules.75	  In	  practice,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  new	  laws	  did	  little	  to	  stop	  enterprises	  from	  continuing	  to	   hoard	  profits,	   lower	  production,	   and	   focus	   on	  only	   the	  most	   profitable	   goods.	  	  The	  situation	  in	  Tajikistan	  thus	  reflected	  the	  USSR	  as	  a	  whole:	  as	  the	  investigative	  journalist	   Vasily	   Seliunin	   noted,	   changes	   to	   enterprise	   law	   had	   been	   “enough	   to	  destroy	   the	   consumer	   market	   and	   destroy	   the	   wholesale	   market.”76	  	   Nor	   was	  privatization	  a	  successful	  way	  out,	  as	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	   found	   in	  1991.	   	  Although	   the	  privatization	  of	  state	  property	  had	  been	  legalized	  in	  January	  1991	  and	  a	  list	  of	  551	  objects	  drawn	  up	  to	  be	  privatized,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  only	  29	  had	  actually	  been	  sold.77	  	  	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	   the	   ongoing	  program	  of	   decentralizing	   and	  marketizing	  relations	  between	  enterprises	  hampered	  Tajik	  factories’	  capacity	  to	  produce	  even	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Mirzorakhmatov,	  “Triumf	  vakhshstroia.”	  74	  See	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  USSR	  “On	  Enterprises	  in	  the	  USSR,”	  which	  came	  into	  effect	  on	  January	  1,	  1991	  (GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  163,	  d.	  1284);	  Law	  of	  the	  USSR	  “On	  the	  Union	  Budget	  for	  1991”	  (GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  13,	  d	  1742,	  l.	  109);	  and	  Decree	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  USSR	  “On	  Measures	  to	  Ensure	  the	  Normal	  Functioning	  of	  the	  Economy	  in	  1991”	  (GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  13,	  d.	  1742,	  l.	  14).	  75	  A	   frequent	   justification	   was	   that	   production	   losses	   occurred	   “not	   through	   the	   fault	   of	   the	  collective.”	  	  For	  such	  requests,	  see	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  13,	  d.	  1742,	  ll.	  1-­‐17,	  quote	  on	  17.	  76	  Interview	  with	  Vasily	  Seliunin,	  Moscow,	  June	  1990.	  2RR	  1/2/9	  44,	  p.	  4.	  77	  TsGART,	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1235,	  l.	  13;	  d.	  1286,	  ll.	  68-­‐69.	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the	  selection	  of	  expensive	  goods	  that	  remained	  profitable.78	  	  	  As	  the	  Tajik	  Finance	  Minister,	   Jonobiddin	   Lafizov,	   reported	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   in	   late	   1990,	  “Practically	   the	   republic’s	   entire	   economy	  has	   proven	  dependent	   upon	   imported	  and	   inter-­‐republican	   deliveries.”	   79 	  As	   the	   percentage	   of	   orders	   covered	   by	  
goszakaz	   (obligatory	   state	   orders)	   continued	   to	   drop,	   however,	   enterprises	  became	   less	   and	   less	   likely	   to	   agree	   to	   direct	   deals	   between	   one	   another.	  	  According	   to	   internal	   Gosplan	   calculations,	   by	   1991	   enterprises	   were	   agreeing	  across	  the	  USSR	  to	  only	  25%	  of	  the	  contracts	  needed	  to	  ensure	  full	  production.	  80	  	  As	   a	   result,	   Tajikistan	  was	   receiving	   less	   than	  20%	  of	   the	   lumber	   it	   needed,	   and	  completing	   failing	  to	  receive	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  glass	  bottles,	  airline	   fuel,	  steel,	  sugar,	  cotton	  and	  wool	  cloth,	  and	  many	  other	  products.81	  Essentially	  held	  hostage	  by	   larger	   enterprises	   in	   Russia,	   Kazakhstan	   and	   other	   republics	   that	   were	  demanding	  payment	  “in	  kind”	  for	  raw	  inputs,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  unable	  to	  produce	  enough	  goods	  either	  for	  its	  own	  citizens	  or	  for	  barter.82	  	  Much	  of	  its	  industry	  was	  at	  a	  standstill.	  	  
	  It	  was	  often	  suggested	  by	  politicians	   in	  Dushanbe	  and	  Moscow	  alike	   that	   foreign	  trade	  might	  help	  to	  solve	  Tajikistan’s	  economic	  woes,	  providing	  hard	  currency	  and	  both	   consumer	   goods	   and	   raw	   materials	   to	   fill	   store	   shelves	   and	   factory	  warehouses.	   	   In	  practice,	  however,	   the	  expansion	  of	   foreign	   trade	  only	   served	   to	  exacerbate	   matters.	   Although	   foreign	   trade	   had	   traditionally	   been	   strictly	  regulated	  in	  the	  USSR,	  passing	  almost	  exclusively	  through	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Economic	   Relations	   in	   Moscow,	   from	   1986	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   USSR	   under	  Gorbachev	  had	  started	  to	  ease	  restrictions.83	  	  Local	  organizations	  began	  receiving	  the	  right	  to	  either	   import	  or	  export	  goods	   in	  direct	  contract	  with	  foreign	  firms,	  a	  group	   that	   by	   1988	   included	   the	   state	   agency	   “Tadzhikvneshtorg”	   (rus.	   “Tajik	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  On	  the	  promotion	  of	  direct	  contracts,	  see	  Chapter	  Four.	   	  On	  April	  26,	  1990	  the	  USSR’s	  Supreme	  Soviet	  also	  passed	  the	  Law	  of	   the	  USSR	  “On	  Distributing	  Authority	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Federative	  Subjects,”	  which	  dictated	  that	  republics	  now	  held	  responsibility	   for	   the	  enterprises	  on	  their	  territory.	  	  See	  Article	  4	  of	  this	  law,	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  175,	  l.	  133.	  79	  Zakliuchenie	  po	  proektu	  Respublikanskogo	  biudzheta	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  na	  1991	  god,	  TsGART	   f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1230,	  ll.	  162-­‐163.	  	  80 	  Doklad	   Gosplana	   SSSR	   “O	   proekte	   obshchesoiuznogo	   prognoza	   Soveta	   Ministrov	   SSSR	   o	  funktsionirovanii	  ekonomiki	  strany	  v	  1991	  godu,”	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9341,	  l.	  26.	  81	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  163,	  d.	  180,	  l.	  41;	  d.	  181,	  ll.	  11-­‐12,	  25-­‐26,	  51-­‐52;	  TsGART	  f.	  355,	  op.	  16,	  d.	  22,	  l.	  34;	  d.	  182,	  l.	  22.	  	  	  82	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  163,	  d.	  181,	  ll.	  17-­‐18.	  	  83	  Ryzhkov,	  Perestroika,	  254-­‐255.	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Foreign	  Trade”).84	  	  Under	   the	   leadership	  of	   its	   energetic	  director,	  Yurii	  Gaitsgori,	  Tadzhikvneshtorg	   actively	   began	   to	   export	   foodstuffs	   and	   aluminum	   to	   China,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Pakistan,	   receiving	   in	  exchange	  expensive	  velvet	   cloth,	   silk,	   and	  other	   prestige	   goods.85	  	   	   In	   March	   1989	   Tadzhikvneshtorg	   received	   the	   right	   to	  license	   enterprises	   and	   cooperatives	   to	   conduct	   foreign	   trade	   independently;	   by	  the	   end	   of	   the	   year	   nearly	   50	   organizations	   in	   Dushanbe	   were	   already	   in	   the	  import-­‐export	  business.86	  	  Their	  number	  would	  continue	  to	   increase	   in	  1990	  and	  1991.	  	  	  Yet	  increasing	  imports	  and	  exports	  did	  little	  to	  alleviate	  either	  consumer	  deficits	  or	  the	  overall	  economic	  downturn.	  	  Instead,	  driven	  by	  low	  customs	  fees	  on	  export	  and	  high	   import	   fees,87	  Tajikistan’s	   organizations	   exported	   practically	   anything	   they	  could:	  raw	  materials	  (cotton,	  aluminum,	  foodstuffs),	  consumer	  goods	  (cotton	  cloth,	  shoes,	   kitchen	   dishes)	   and	   industrial	   inputs	   (fertilizer,	   cement,	  machine	   oil).	   	   In	  return,	   they	   overwhelmingly	   brought	   expensive	   prestige	   goods:	   computers,	  Japanese	  television	  sets,	  western	  cosmetics	  and	  perfume,	  and	  a	  very	  large	  amount	  of	  synthetic	  fabric.88	  	  These	  goods,	  along	  with	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  foreign	  currency	  also	  received,	  made	  a	  small	  number	  of	  newly	  minted	  Tajik	  businessmen	  very	  rich.	  	  Yet	  they	  “did	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  improving	  the	  provision	  of	  goods	  to	  the	  population.”	  89	  	   This	   was	   an	   understatement:	   they	   in	   fact	   made	   deficits	   much	  worse,	  as	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  rubles	  of	  needed	  goods	  were	  sent	  abroad.	  	  Hardly	  helping	   matters,	   multiple	   investigations	   kept	   disclosing	   facts	   of	   theft	   and	  embezzlement,	  and	  Tajik	  organizations	  patently	  ignored	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  the	  export	   of	   certain	   goods.90	  	   Illegality	  was	   a	   small	   price	   to	   pay	  when	   the	   rewards	  figured	  in	  the	  millions	  of	  dollars.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  TsGART	  f.	  2046,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  8	  ll.	  1-­‐2;	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3656,	  ll.	  180,	  302.	  85	  TsGART	  f.	  2046,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  8	  ll.	  3-­‐4.	  86	  This	  was	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Decree	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  USSR	  No.	  203	  of	  March	  7,	  1989	  “On	  Efforts	  of	  State	  Regulation	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  Activity.”	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  2046,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  8,	  l.	  10.	  	  87	  On	  customs	  fees	  established	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  USSR	  in	  1991,	  see	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  163,	  d.	  48,	  ll.	  4-­‐7.	  	  88	  For	  the	  content	  and	  value	  of	  import	  and	  export	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  in	  1991,	  for	  example,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1280,	  ll.	  95-­‐115.	  	  89	  E.	  Sh.	  Kashaeva,	  “Problemy	  i	  perspektivy	  sozdaniia	  i	  razmeshcheniia	  sovmestnykh	  predpriatii	  na	  territorii	   sredneaziatskogo	   regiona	   (na	   primere	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR),”	   in	   Sovetologi	   o	   problemakh	  
sotsial’no-­‐ekonomicheskogo	   razvitiia	   SSSR	   i	   soiuznykh	   respublik	   (Moscow:	   Institut	   ekonomiki	   AN	  SSSR,	  1991),	  80.	  	  90	  In	  1989,	  for	  example,	  the	  state	  agency	  “Tadzhikpotrebsoiuz”	  contracted	  with	  an	  Austrian	  firm	  to	  exchange	  fertilizer	  for	  seed	  potatoes.	  	  It	  received	  a	  loan	  from	  a	  state	  bank	  to	  purchase	  the	  fertilizer	  from	  local	  producers	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  and	  failed	  to	  either	  send	  the	  fertilizer	  or	  acquire	  potatoes.	  	  Its	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  As	  the	  example	  of	  export	  demonstrated,	  as	  space	  for	  unregulated	  economic	  activity	  opened	  up	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  so	  did	  the	  incentive	  for	  ethically	  questionable	  and	  even	  openly	   illegal	   pursuits.	   	   Partly	   this	   was	   related	   to	   the	   cooperative	   sector,	   the	  influence	   of	   which	   from	   the	   beginning	   had	   been	   at	   best	   ambiguous.	   By	   1991,	  moreover,	  the	  sector	  had	  almost	  fully	  merged	  with	  the	  republic’s	  “grey”	  economy.	  	  Reports	   showed	   that	  more	   and	  more	   “criminal	   elements”	   and	   “former	   convicts”	  were	   involved	   in	   the	   cooperative	   sector,	   and	   that	   “unhealthy	   tendencies”	   were	  dominating	  its	  activities.91	  	  This	  included	  millions	  of	  rubles	  in	  theft,	  tens	  of	  millions	  of	   unpaid	   taxes,	   and	   the	   frequent	   failure	   to	   fulfill	   contracts.92	  	   In	   addition,	   these	  cooperatives	  were	  less	  and	  less	  frequently	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  and	  sale	  of	  consumer	   goods.	   	   Instead,	   the	   number	   of	   cooperatives	   “founded	   on	   the	   base	   of	  state	   enterprises”	   actually	   grew	   by	   nearly	   10%	   in	   1991.93	  	   These	   businesses	  claimed	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  “production,”	  but	  in	  practice	  tended	  to	  buy	  up	  equipment	  and	  raw	  materials,	  which	  was	  then	  either	  exported	  or	  sold	  at	  market	  prices	  to	  the	  local	   population.	   	   Notwithstanding	   its	   questionable	   social	   value	   and	   negative	  impact	   on	   the	   economy,	   however,	   the	   sector	   continued	   to	   grow,	  with	  more	   than	  70,000	  Tajik	  Soviet	   citizens	  working	   in	  more	   than	  3,400	  cooperatives	   in	  1991.	  94	  For	  the	  individual	  worker,	  cooperatives	  could	  offer	  a	   lot	  –	  and	  first	  and	  foremost	  salaries	  of	  more	  than	  300	  rubles	  a	  month,	  at	  least	  50%	  higher	  than	  average.	  95	  	  Cooperatives	   were	   also	   just	   one	   piece	   of	   the	   larger	   puzzle	   of	   new	   business-­‐like	  organizations	   that	   started	   to	   flourish	   in	   1990	   and	   1991.	   	   In	   1990,	   a	   number	   of	  Tajikistan’s	   ministries	   were	   practically	   rented	   out:	   they	   were	   turned	   into	  “concerns”	  (kontserny)	  and	  their	  ministers	  transferred	  to	  the	  position	  of	  “director.”	  While	   this	   was	   meant	   to	   increase	   the	   ministries’	   activities	   through	   market	  incentives,	   in	   practice	   it	   led	   to	   directors	   assigning	   themselves	   salaries	   of	   nearly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  export	   license	  was	   suspended,	   but	   by	   1991	  was	   again	   sending	   raw	   goods	   abroad	   in	   violation	   of	  republican	  restrictions.	  	  On	  the	  1989	  case,	  see	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  260,	  ll.	  60-­‐65;	  on	  1991,	  see	  I.	   Sarychev,	   “KGB	   protiv	   sabotazha,”	   Komsomolets	   Tadzhikistana,	   April	   12,	   1991;	   on	   legal	  restrictions	  on	  export	  –	  TsGART	  f.	  2046,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  5,	  ll.	  139-­‐142.	  91	  Programma	   bor’by	   s	   prestupnost’iu	   i	   ukrepleniia	   pravoporiadka	   v	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   na	   1991-­‐1995	  gg.,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1252,	  l.	  52;	  Protokol	  No.	  75	  Zasedaniia	  Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,	  06.12.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1271,	  ll.	  5-­‐6.	  	  92	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1235,	  l.	  80;	  d.	  1271,	  ll.	  5-­‐6.	  	  93	  Gazibekov,	  “Rezervy	  razvitiia	  proizvodstvennykh,”	  43-­‐44.	  94	  Ibid.,	  3,	  40;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1271,	  l.	  18.	  95	  Gazibekov,	  “Rezervy	  razvitiia	  proizvodstvennykh,”	  45.	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2,000	  rubles	  a	  month	  and	  avoiding	  payments	  to	  the	  state	  budget.96	  Since	  January	  1991	   a	   new	   flat	   tax	   rate	   of	   5%	   on	   all	   business	   income	  meant	   that	   the	   concerns	  could	   legally	   hold	   onto	   the	   majority	   of	   their	   income.97	  	   In	   this	   environment,	  corruption,	  bribery,	  and	  embezzlement	  skyrocketed.	  	  By	  1991,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   was	   reporting	   that	   claims	   of	   bribery	   and	   financial	  mismanagement	   had	   increased	   by	   1,000%	   since	   1988,	   and	   “if	   citizens	   used	   to	  arrive	   with	   claims	   about	   bribery	   in	   the	   amount	   of	   200	   rubles,	   now	   we	   are	  investigating	  different	  cases	  –	  those	  of	  businesses	  where	  damages	  are	  greater	  than	  1	   million	   rubles.”	  98	  	   Perhaps	   emboldened	   by	   the	   actions	   of	   this	   new	   class	   of	  businessmen,	   the	   Tajik	   SSR’s	   leaders	   also	   doubled	   and	   tripled	   their	   salaries	   in	  1991	   in	   order	   to	   receive	   between	   1,000	   and	   2,000	   rubles	   a	   month.99 	  	   The	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	  went	   further,	   founding	   the	  business	   “EKOMPT”	   in	  February	   1991	   and	   loaning	   it	   millions	   of	   rubles	   to	   purchase	   cars	   and	   central	  Dushanbe	  buildings	  from	  the	  Party	  itself.100	  	  	  
III.	  State	  and	  Social	  Paralysis	  Economic	  recession,	  decreased	  production,	  the	  siphoning	  off	  and	  export	  of	  much-­‐needed	   consumer	   goods	   and	   increasing	   corruption	   all	   had	   the	   consequence	   of	  starving	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  of	  tax	  revenue.	  	  This	  was	  especially	  damaging	  in	  1991,	  when	  efforts	  to	  implement	  “principles	  of	  autonomy	  and	  self-­‐financing”	  on	  the	  republican	  level	   finally	  came	   into	  effect.	   	   Initially	  promoted	  during	  perestroika	  by	   the	  Baltic	  republics	  and	  other	  more	  industrially	  developed	  parts	  of	  the	  USSR,	  republican	  self-­‐financing	  (samofinansirovanie	  or	  khozraschet)	  essentially	  meant	  that	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  would	   need	   to	   “more	   fully	   provide	   for	   its	   internal	   needs	   based	   on	   its	   own	  production,”	   as	   one	   early	   policy	   analysis	   argued.101	  Long	   a	   matter	   of	   debate,	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  The	  Ministry	   of	   Social	   Provision	   (Ministerstvo	   sotsial’nogo	  obespecheniia),	   for	   example,	   became	  the	  Concern	  “Hizmat”	  (taj.	  “Service”);	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  306,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  1383,	  l.	  1.	  On	  concerns	  in	  general,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1237,	  l.	  10.	  	  97	  TsGART	  f.	  306,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  1403,	  ll.	  124-­‐127.	  98	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1271,	  l.	  38.	  	  99	  In	  1991,	  Aslonov	  received	  2,000	  rubles	  a	  month	  as	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	  	  Most	  other	  leading	  government	  figures	  received	  1,000	  rubles	  a	  month.	  	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1249,	  ll.	  3;	  14-­‐16.	  This	  was	  an	  increase	  of	  more	  than	  300%	  from	  1989	  (TsGART	  f.	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3660,	  l.	  182).	  	  100	  On	   EKOMPT	   and	   its	   activities	   in	   1991,	   see	   Protokol	   No.	   11	   zasedaniia	   sekretariata	   TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana	  ot	  22.07.1991,	  RGASPI	  f.	  17,	  op.	  160,	  d.	  1672,	  ll.	  6-­‐7;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1274,	  ll.	  43;	  48;	  277-­‐283.	  	  101	  Kompleksnaia	   programma	   razvitiia	   proizvodstvennykh	   sil	   soiuznykh	   respublik	   Srednei	   Azii	   i	  Kazakhskoi	  SSR	  na	  period	  do	  2010	  goda,	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  7785,	  l.	  48.	  On	  early	  discussions	  in	  Tajikistan,	  see	  Rasporiazhenie	  Soveta	  Ministrov	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  No.	  238	  ot	  10.08.1989,	  TsGART	  f.	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1991	   this	   meant	   that	   Tajikistan	   was	   required	   to	   cover	   the	   costs	   of	   subsidizing	  foodstuffs	   and	  making	  pension	  and	   social	   support	  payments	   to	   its	   citizens,	   all	   of	  which	  had	  traditionally	  been	  covered	  by	  the	  Union	  budget	  in	  Moscow.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  still	  required	  to	  sell	  cotton	  to	  the	  Soviet	  center	  at	  under-­‐market	  rates,	   for	  which	  it	  continued	  to	  receive	  none	  of	  the	  attendant	  taxes.102	  	   In	  short,	  for	  Tajikistan	  republican	  self-­‐financing	  was	  a	  terrible	  bargain:	  it	  lost	  much	  of	  the	  Union	  support	  it	  had	  enjoyed,	  while	  receiving	  literally	  nothing	  in	  return.	  	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   Tajik	  Minister	   of	   Finance	   Lafizov	   reported	   as	   early	   as	   February	  1991,	   “there	   was	   no	   real	   money	   in	   the	   state	   coffers.”	   	   The	   Tajik	   SSR’s	   budget	  obligations	  were	  doubling	   to	  more	   than	  4	  billion	   rubles	   in	  1991,	  while	   expected	  income	   was	   down	   from	   1990	   to	   around	   2.4	   billion	   rubles.	   	   Lafizov	   suggested	  “filling	   the	   [deficit]	   of	   1.8	   billion	   rubles	   from	   subsidies	   provided	   from	   the	  newly	  recreated	   all-­‐Union	   extraordinary	   fund	   for	   economic	   stabilization,”	   as	   well	   as	  through	  “new	  and	  various	  additional	  taxes.”103	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  1991,	  new	  taxes	  were	  raised,	  as	  were	  fines	  for	  traffic	  violations	  and	  fees	  for	   international	  travel	  –	  all	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  raise	  revenue.104	  	  In	  practice,	  however,	  these	  measures	  came	  up	  extremely	  short,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  rampant	  inflation	  and	  price	  liberalization.105	  	  Afraid	   of	   the	   social	   impact	   of	   price	   increases	   –	   “the	   people	   are	   embittered	  (ozlobleny),”	   one	   Supreme	   Soviet	   deputy	   reported,	   “and	   it’s	   frightening	   to	   meet	  with	  them”	  106	  –	  Mahkamov	  and	  his	  government	  spent	  even	  more	  subsidizing	  the	  cost	   of	   bread	   and	   other	   basic	   foodstuffs.	   	   Yet	   this	   had	   little	   impact	   other	   than	  increasing	   deficits	   as	   goods	  were	   hauled	   out	   of	   the	   republic	   by	   the	   truckload	   to	  further	  enrich	  a	   small	  number	  of	  new	  entrepreneurs.	   	   	  Nor	  was	   the	   stabilization	  fund	  cited	  by	  Lafizov,	  linked	  to	  the	  unsigned	  Union	  Treaty	  and	  requiring	  payments	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18,	  op.	  8,	  d.	  3659,	   l.	  57.	  For	  the	  Baltic	   influence,	  see	  Interview	  with	  Georgii	  Koshlakov,	  Dushanbe,	  July	   2016;	   also	   A.N.	   Grinberg,	   “Ekonomicheskii	   mekhanizm	   mezhrespublikanskikh	   i	  mezhregional'nykh	   otnoshenii,”	  Ekonomika	   i	   organizatsiia	  promyshlennogo	  proizvodstva	   (EKO),	   9,	  1989,	  38.	  	  102	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  9351,	  l.	  31.	  	  103	  TsGART	  f.	  306,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  1403,	  ll.	  124-­‐127.	  	  104	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1247,	  ll.	  18-­‐20.	  	  105	  Technically,	   the	  prices	  of	  basic	  goods	  were	  only	  “increased”	  by	  the	  Soviet	  government	   in	  April	  1991.	   	   In	  practice,	  however,	  many	  retail	  enterprises	  acted	  as	  though	  all	   limits	  on	  prices	  had	  been	  removed.	  	  See	  E.	  Gonzalez,	  “Chto	  delat’	  s	  partiei	  tovara?”	  Izvestiia,	  April	  2,	  1991.	  106	  Stenogramma	   Zasedaniia	   Presidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   ot	   08.04.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1237,	  l.	  25.	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from	  other	   increasingly	   skeptical	   republics,	   able	   to	   shore	  up	   the	  Tajik	  budget.107	  	  	  By	  the	  summer	  of	  1991	  the	  Tajik	  government	  found	  itself	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  rubles	  in	  debt,	  factually	  bankrupt,	  and	  hurtling	  into	  an	  apparent	  abyss.108	  	  Nor	  did	  the	  government	  have	  much	  of	  a	  plan	  to	  dig	  itself	  out.	  “There	  is	  absolutely	  no	  sense	  of	  any	  work	  being	  done,”	  the	  deputy	  Ashurov	  complained	  in	  April	  1991,	  “…where	  exactly	  are	  we	  heading?	  	  Where	  is	  our	  republic	  going?”	  109	  	  	  Mahkamov	   was	   silent	   in	   response;	   this	   would	   have	   in	   any	   case	   been	   a	   difficult	  question	   for	  him	  to	  answer.	   	  As	   the	  economy	  nosedived	  and	  deficits	   increased	   in	  1991,	  so	  too	  was	  society	  roughening	  around	  the	  edges.	  	  Crime	  in	  the	  republic	  had	  increased	   by	   nearly	   10%	   over	   the	   first	   half	   of	   1991,	   with	   organized	   crime,	  narcotics	  use,	  and	  economic	  crime	  related	  to	  bribery	  and	  embezzlement	  growing	  at	  particularly	  notable	  rates.110	  	   	  Government	  officials	  were	   increasingly	   involved	  in	   the	   “bamboozlement”	   (shubadabozy)	   hiding	   and	   selling	   of	   state	   property,	   and	  “seeing	  theft	  and	  pillaging	  by	  the	  republic’s	  representatives,	  so	  too	  did	  the	  people	  take	  to	  theft	  and	  petty	  crime	  (avboshy).”111	  With	  unemployment	  continuing	  to	  rise	  along	   with	   consumer	   deficits,	   thousands	   of	   desperately	   needed	   specialists	   were	  moving	   out	   of	   Dushanbe,	   leaving	   the	   local	   airport,	   for	   example,	   barely	   able	   to	  function.	  112	  Outside	   of	   Dushanbe,	   moreover,	   people	   were	   growing	   increasingly	  angry.	   	  As	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  deputy	  from	  the	  southern	  district	  of	  Kobodiyon,	  E.	  Kurbanov,	  told	  his	  colleagues	  in	  mid-­‐1991:	  	  
“My	   constituents	   asked	  me	   to	   pass	   their	  words	   to	   you,	   and	   said	   that	   if	   I	  
didn’t	   pass	   their	  words,	   that	   I	  would	   answer	   to	   them	   in	   the	   afterlife.	   	   It	  
should	  be	  said	  that	  they	  angrily	  spoke	  about	  being	  lied	  to	  by	  the	  President	  
of	  the	  republic…this	  is	  a	  barrel	  of	  gunpowder:	  just	  bring	  a	  spark	  and	  it	  will	  
explode	   into	   I	   don’t	   know	   what.	   	   That	   is	   the	   fevered	   state	   of	   my	  
constituents.”113	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  By	   the	  end	  of	  1991,	   inflation	  and	   the	   collapse	  of	   the	   central	   Soviet	  government	  had	   increased	  Tajik	  budget	  obligations	  to	  almost	  5.2	  billion	  rubles,	  while	  payments	   from	  central	   funds	  had	  only	  amounted	  to	  1.3	  billion.	  	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  306,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  1422,	  ll.	  8-­‐12;	  	  108	  GARF	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  163,	  d.	  181,	  l.	  62;	  also	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  139.	  	  109	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1237,	  l.	  13.	  110	  On	   rising	   crime	   rates,	   see	   Programma	   bor’by	   s	   prestupnost’iu	   i	   ukrepleniia	   pravoporiadka	   v	  Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   na	   1991-­‐1995	   gg.,	   TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1252,	   ll.	   51-­‐54;	   “Zakonu	   net	  al’ternativy,”	  Komsomolets	  Tadzhikistana,	  May	  17,	  1991.	  	  111	  Nasreddinov,	  Tarkish,	  136.	  	  	  On	  the	  “bamboozlement”	  sale	  of	  state	  property,	  see	  Davlat,	  “Maqsud	  Ikromov.”	  112	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  279,	  ll.	  32-­‐33.	  	  113	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1237,	  l.	  11.	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As	   President	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   however,	   Mahkamov	   either	   could	   not	   or	   simply	  failed	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  Rather	  than	  demand	  an	  increased	  portion	  of	  tax	  revenue	   in	  exchange	   for	  budget	  obligations	  he	  stayed	  silent	   in	  order	  to	  avoid	  any	   “backlash	   from	   the	   Union	   and	   other	   union	   republics.” 114 	  	   Instead	   of	  aggressively	  tackling	  the	  growing	  crime	  rates	  and	  low-­‐level	  criminality,	  he	  allowed	  the	  position	  of	  General	  Prosecutor	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  to	  go	  unfilled	  from	  December	  1990	   to	   May	   1991	   as	   he	   waited	   for	   legal	   disagreements	   to	   be	   sorted	   out	   in	  Moscow.	  115	  	  Once	   elections	  were	   finally	   held	   for	   the	   post,	  moreover,	   his	   favored	  candidate,	   Safarali	   Kenjaev,	   lost	   to	   the	   opposition-­‐supported	   Nurullo	  Khuvaidulloev.	  	  	  	  Increasingly,	   Mahkamov’s	   hold	   on	   power	   appeared	   to	   be	   slipping:	   the	   ongoing	  state	   of	   emergency	   kept	   people	   off	   of	   the	   streets,	   but	   behind	   closed	   doors	  frustration	   was	   growing.	   	   Newspapers,	   too,	   were	   increasing	   in	   number	   and	  censure,	  as	  independent	  publications	  such	  as	  Charoghi	  Ruz	  joined	  the	  critical	  state	  and	  party	  papers.116	  	  	  With	  opposition	  parties	  and	  politicians	  clamoring	  for	  a	  fight	  in	  the	  face	  of	  economic	  collapse	  and	  government	  weakness,	  it	  was	  anyone’s	  guess	  how	  long	  the	  status	  quo	  could	  last.	  Unemployment	  and	  the	  degradation	  of	  people’s	  standard	   of	   living	   remained	   the	   most	   salient,	   and	   unresolvable,	   issue,	   with	  increasingly	  large	  numbers	  of	  workers	  left	  idle	  and	  angry	  with	  the	  politicians	  they	  blamed	   for	   their	   plight.	   	   	   As	   frustration	   grew,	   so	   did	   the	   efforts	   of	   opposition	  politicians	  to	  build	  on	  and	  exploit	  social	  tensions.	  	  And	  the	  next	  few	  months	  would	  in	   fact	  prove	  Kurbanov	  right:	   in	   the	  end	  all	   it	   took	  was	  a	  spark	   to	   tip	   the	  system	  into	  utter	  dysfunction.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  TsGART	  f.	  306,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  1403,	  l.	  127.	  	  115	  Nasrullo	  Asadullo,	   “Qonunhoi	  nomukammal,”	  Adabiyot	  va	  sa’’nat,	  April	  25,	  1991.	  The	  previous	  General	  Prosecutor	  of	  Tajikistan,	  Genadii	  Mikhailin,	  had	  retired	  in	  December	  1990,	  leaving	  the	  post	  in	   the	   hands	   of	   his	   deputy,	   Tukhta	   Pochomulloev.	   Since	   December	   1990,	   however,	   the	   Supreme	  Soviet	  of	   the	  USSR	  was	  debating	   the	  order	   in	  which	  General	  Prosecutors	  were	   to	  be	  elected	   (see	  
Chetvertyi	   s’’ezd	  narodnykh	  deputatov,	  v.	   1,	   571).	   	   Until	   this	   question	  was	   resolved	   in	   late	   spring	  1991,	  no	  elections	  were	  held	  for	  the	  position	  in	  Tajikistan.	  	  	  116	  Oleg	  Panfilov,	  Tadzhikistan:	  zhurnalisty	  na	  grazhdanskoi	  voine	  (Moscow:	  Prava	  cheloveka,	  2003),	  15-­‐16.	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Chapter	  Eight	  
Slouching	  Towards	  Independence	  	  On	   the	   morning	   of	   Monday,	   August	   19,	   1991,	   a	   strange	   coded	   telegram	   was	  delivered	   to	   the	   Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   Tajikistan	   (CPT).	  	  Sent	  by	  the	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  CPSU	  Central	  Committee	  in	  Moscow,	  it	  referenced	  a	  “State	   Committee	   for	   the	   State	   of	   Emergency”	   and	   the	   need	   to	   support	   this	  committee’s	  actions	  in	  the	  coming	  days.	  Shortly	  thereafter	  another	  coded	  telegram	  arrived,	  this	  time	  from	  the	  office	  of	  Genadii	  Yanaev,	  the	  Vice-­‐President	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  In	  this	  telegram,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  CPT	  were	  ordered	  to	  distribute	  the	  Committee’s	  request	   for	   support	   to	   local	   government	   offices	   throughout	   the	   republic.	   	   No	  further	  explanation	  was	  provided.	  1	  	  	  Unbeknownst	   to	   Kahhor	  Mahkamov	   and	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   CPT,	   the	   night	   of	  August	   18th	   had	   been	   a	   busy	   one	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   USSR.	   	   A	   group	   of	  conspirators,	   including	   Yanaev,	   Prime	   Minister	   Valentin	   Pavlov,	   KGB	   Chairman	  Vladimir	  Kriuchkov,	  Defense	  Minister	  Dmitry	  Yazov,	  and	  Deputy	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Security	  Council	  Oleg	  Baklanov,	  had	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  Union	  Treaty	  meant	  to	  be	  signed	  on	  August	  20	  essentially	  represented	  the	  end	  of	   the	  USSR.2	  	  Unwilling	   to	  allow	   this,	   they	   instead	  chose	   to	   form	  an	   “Emergency	  Committee”	   and	   temporarily	   remove	   Gorbachev	   from	   power.3	  	   Together	   with	  Gorbachev’s	   close	   advisor	   and	   Committee	   sympathizer	   Valery	   Boldin,	   Baklanov	  was	   dispatched	   to	   “Object	   Zaria”	   near	   Foros,	   Crimea,	   the	   Soviet	   President’s	  summer	  resort.	  Boldin	  and	  Baklanov	  were	  instructed	  to	  negotiate	  with	  Gorbachev	  about	  the	  terms	  of	  his	  removal	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  oversee	  his	  house	  arrest.	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  Committee	  set	  about	  taking	  control	  of	  Moscow	  and	  the	  Soviet	  government.	  	  Troops	  were	  brought	  into	  the	  Soviet	  capital	  and	  took	  up	  positions	  on	  the	  streets,	  while	  supporters	  of	  the	  Committee	  already	  in	  control	  of	  state	  television	  and	  radio	  were	  bolstered	  by	  additional	  security	  forces	  at	  key	  transmission	  stations.4	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1633,	  l.	  247.	  	  2	  The	  Emergency	  Committee	  later	  came	  to	  include	  Interior	  Minister	  Boris	  Pugo,	  and	  the	  industrial	  and	  agricultural	  union	  leaders	  Vasily	  Starodubtsev	  and	  Aleksandr	  Tiziakov.	  3	  On	  the	  Emergency	  Committee’s	  motivations	  and	  plans,	  see	  Yanaev’s	  letter	  to	  US	  President	  Bush	  on	  August	   19,	   1991.	   	   George	   H.W.	   Bush	   Presidential	   Library,	   Gorbachev	   –	   Sensitive,	   July-­‐December	  1991.	  	  File	  No.	  OA-­‐ID	  91130-­‐004.	  4	  Brown,	  The	  Gorbachev	  Factor,	  294-­‐296;	  also:	  Boldin,	  Krushchenie	  pedastel’ia,	  8-­‐21.	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In	  Dushanbe,	  no	  one	  was	  quite	  sure	  how	  to	  respond.	  	  Many	  in	  the	  Tajik	  leadership	  –	   and	   certainly	   Mahkamov	   personally	   –	   were	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   Emergency	  Committee’s	  goals:	   they	   too	  had	  wished	   to	   stop	   the	   slow	  disintegration	  of	  Soviet	  statehood.	   	  While	   calmly	  accepting	   the	  news	   from	  Moscow,	  however,	  Mahkamov	  avoided	  openly	  supporting	  the	  Committee	  or	  even	  spreading	  their	  orders	  as	  far	  as	  requested.5	  	   	   Instead,	   given	   pause	   by	   plotters’	   seeming	   incompetence	   –	   even	   the	  telegrams	   sent	   to	   Dushanbe	   were	   improperly	   signed	   and	   stamped,	   and	   foreign	  radio	  stations	  were	  awash	  with	  reports	  of	  confusion	  in	  Moscow	  –	  Mahkamov	  chose	  to	  “take	  a	  wait	  and	  see	  approach.”6	  As	  the	  days	  passed,	  this	  began	  to	  seem	  a	  wise	  choice.	  Having	   failed	   to	  arrest	  Boris	  Yeltsin	  and	   the	  other	   leaders	  of	   the	  Russian	  republic	  in	  Moscow,	  the	  Emergency	  Committee	  faced	  increasingly	  large	  crowds	  of	  protestors	   in	   the	   streets,	   bolstered	   and	   led	   by	   Yeltsin’s	   speeches	   in	   front	   of	   the	  Russian	   “White	   House”	   (the	   seat	   of	   the	   Russian	   parliament).	   	   By	   August	   21,	   the	  Emergency	  Committee	  simply	  admitted	  its	  defeat:	  unwilling	  to	  order	  Soviet	  troops	  to	   fire	   on	   the	   crowds,	   it	   instead	   began	   to	   withdraw	   troops	   from	   Moscow	   and	  recalled	  Gorbachev	  to	  the	  capital,	  where	  he	  was	  met	  by	  a	  triumphant	  Yeltsin	  and	  an	  ascendant	  Russian	  parliament.	  	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  Emergency	  Committee	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  its	  putsch	  represented	  the	   final	   reversal	   of	   Soviet	   political	   fortunes.	   	   The	   Russian	   republic’s	   leadership	  had	   at	   last	   demonstrated	   its	   domination	   over	   the	   Soviet	   center:	   the	   plotters,	  representing	   the	   old	   (federal)	   political	   leaders,	   were	   arrested,	   and	   Gorbachev	  confirmed	  a	  new	  cabinet	  largely	  dictated	  by	  Yeltsin.	  	  The	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  Ivan	  Silaev,	  for	  example,	  was	  quickly	  made	  the	   new	   Soviet	   Premier,	   notwithstanding	   the	   opposition	   of	   both	   “all	   of	   the	  republics”	   and	   Gorbachev’s	   own	   circle.7 	  	   Facing	   a	   rapidly	   changing	   political	  landscape,	  Mahkamov	  continued	  his	  policy	  of	  inaction	  and	  indecision.	   	  On	  August	  22,	   he	   issued	   a	   briefly	   statement,	   in	  which	   he	   praised	   the	   Tajik	   people	   for	   their	  “wisdom”	   in	   waiting	   out	   the	   situation	   calmly	   and	   vaguely	   positioned	   himself	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  On	  the	  “calm”	  reaction	  to	  the	  putsch	  in	  Dushanbe,	  see	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  6;	  Shifrtelegramma	  No.	  210471,	  20.08.1991,	  GARF	  f.	  9654,	  op.	  7,	  d.	  1360,	  l.	  105.	  6	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1633,	  ll.	  247-­‐248;	  quote	  on	  248.	  	  Those	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  putsch	  in	  Moscow	  became	   famous	   for	   their	   incompetence	   upon	   taking	   power,	  whether	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   vague	   and	  rambling	  press	  conference	  on	  August	  19	  or	  their	  inability	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  Russian	  parliament.	  	  	  7 	  On	   the	   opposition	   to	   Silaev,	   see	   Stenogramma	   Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR,	  26.08.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1253,	  l.	  13.	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having	  been	  against	  the	  putsch.8	  	  	  He	  then	  also	  gave	  a	  speech	  on	  Tajik	  television	  on	  August	  25,	  in	  which	  he	  again	  called	  for	  “calm”	  and	  avoided	  any	  clearly	  statement	  of	  judgment	  about	  the	  Emergency	  Committee	  and	  its	  failed	  putsch.	  9	  	  By	  repeating	  the	  word	  “calm,”	  Mahkamov	  seemed	  to	  be	  attempting	  to	  will	   it	   into	  reality.	  	  At	  first,	  moreover,	  it	  appeared	  to	  work:	  much	  as	  there	  had	  been	  no	  public	  response	   to	   the	   putsch	   in	   Dushanbe,	   so	   was	   there	   little	   reaction	   to	   its	   collapse.	  While	   the	   superstructure	   of	   the	  USSR	  was	   disintegrating	   before	   his	   eyes,	   this	   at	  least	   allowed	   Mahkamov	   some	   breathing	   room	   –	   and	   space	   to	   approach	   the	  pressing	  questions	   of	   the	  day,	   such	   as	  Union	  Treaty,	  which	  he	   still	   felt	   deserved	  attention.10	  	  Yet	  Mahkamov’s	  respite	  would	  prove	  short-­‐lived.	   	  Within	  a	   few	  days	  Dushanbe	   would	   too	   feel	   the	   repercussions	   of	   the	   new	   political	   order	   that	   had	  arrived	  in	  the	  USSR	  on	  August	  22.	  	  	  Much	  as	  in	  Moscow,	  moreover,	  this	  new	  order	  would	  split	  society	  in	  two	  –	  those	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  new,	  if	  ill-­‐defined,	  post-­‐Soviet	  world,	  and	  those	  who	  remained	  loyal	  to	  the	  sinking	  ship	  of	  the	  Soviet	  state.	  	  	  	  In	  contrast	   to	  most	  Western	  and	  Soviet	  expectations,	  however,	   in	  Tajikistan	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  divide	  agreed	  on	  one	  point:	  Tajikistan’s	  future	  remained	  tied	  to	  Moscow.	  Instead	  of	  the	  final	  push	  for	  independence	  or	  a	  grasp	  at	  post-­‐colonial	  freedom,	  Tajikistan’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  putsch	  and	  Soviet	  disintegration	  in	  late	  1991	  was	  at	  best	  ambiguous.	  Even	  those	  advocating	  a	  break	  from	  the	  Soviet	  past	  made	  no	  attempt	  to	  break	  with	  Moscow	  or	  the	  economic	  ties	  that	  bound	  Dushanbe	  to	  the	  Russian	  economy.	  	  Nor	  did	  the	  opposition	  present	  a	  coherent	  plan	  for	  economic	  or	  political	  independence:	  much	  as	  the	  conservative	  leadership	  of	  Tajikistan,	  they	  too	  could	  little	  conceive	  of	  the	  practical	  realities	  of	  true	  independence.	  	  	  This	  remained	  true	   throughout	   the	   fall	   of	   1991,	   even	   as	   the	   Russian	   government	   under	   Boris	  Yeltsin	  made	   increasing	   efforts	   to	   divest	   itself	   of	   both	   the	   Soviet	   superstructure	  and	  many	  of	  the	  Union	  Republics	  that	  had	  once	  constituted	  it.	  	  	  Even	  as	  Yeltsin	  met	  with	  the	  leaders	  of	  Belorussia	  and	  Ukraine	  on	  December	  8,	  1991	  to	  plan	  the	  final	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  “Obrashchenie	  Prezidenta	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  K.M.	  Makhkamova	  k	  narodu	  Tadzhikistana,”	  Vechernii	  
Dushanbe,	  August	  23,	  1991.	  	  9	  “Vystuplenie	  Prezidenta	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  K.M.	  Mahkamova	  po	  televideniiu	  25	  avgusta,”	  Vechernii	  
Dushanbe,	  August	  27,	  1991.	  	  10	  The	  Union	  Treaty	   remained	  Mahkamov’s	   primary	   concern	   in	   late	  August	   1991.	   	   See	  TsGART	   f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1253,	  l.	  13.	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end	   of	   the	   USSR,	   Tajikistan’s	   president	   was	   trying	   to	   call	   Yeltsin	   to	   advocate	   a	  stronger	  Union.	  Dushanbe	  showed	  little	  stomach	  for	  independence.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  Tajikistan	  did	  finally	  find	  itself	  a	  factually	  independent	  nation	  in	  January	  1992,	   its	   leaders	  had	  little	  to	  no	  idea	  about	  how	  to	  proceed.	   	  There	  were	  no	   plans	   for	   independence,	   and	   no	   conception	   of	   how	   to	   rule	   an	   independent	  country.	   	   There	   was,	   however,	   a	   collapsed	   economy,	   an	   empty	   budget,	   and	   an	  increasingly	   unruly	   social	   order.	   Rather	   than	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   “political	   bargain”	  between	   opposed	   political	   factions,	   or	   the	   influence	   of	   radical	   ideas	   such	   as	  political	   Islam,	   as	   have	   been	   variously	   suggested,	   it	   was	   instead	   this	   impossible	  imbalance	   between	   a	   paralyzed	   government	   and	   a	   disintegrating	   economy	   that	  would	   ultimately	   lead	   to	   social	   breakdown	   and	   violence	   in	   March	   1992.11	  	   The	  preceding	  six	  months,	  moreover,	  from	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Putsch	  to	  the	  end	  of	  February	  1992,	  would	  define	  the	  lines	  of	  social	  cleavage	  that	  would	  later	  come	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  	  
I.	  The	  Struggle	  to	  Remain	  in	  Moscow’s	  Shadow	  	  It	  only	  took	  a	  few	  days	  after	  the	  putsch	  for	  the	  fault	  lines	  to	  show.	  	  With	  the	  earlier	  state	   of	   emergency	   having	   finally	   been	   repealed,	   Dushanbe’s	   opposition	   parties	  found	  that	   their	  hands	  were	  no	   longer	   tied.	   	  On	   the	  morning	  of	  Saturday,	  August	  24,	   the	   city’s	   residents	   awoke	   to	   the	   first	   of	   many	   political	   demonstrations:	  Shodmon	  Yusuf	  and	  his	  Democratic	  Party	  (DPT)	  had	  staged	  a	  large	  protest	  against	  the	  putsch	  in	  front	  of	  the	  central	  opera	  theater.	  12	  With	  the	  Emergency	  Committee	  having	   collapsed	   days	   before	   and	   its	   members	   already	   under	   arrest,	   this	  demonstration	  implied	  an	  ongoing	  struggle	  between	  those	  in	  favor	  of	  change	  and	  those	  who	  had,	  actively	  or	  passively,	  supported	  the	  putsch.	  This	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  the	  debates	   and	   political	   struggle	   of	   the	   next	   week.	   	   “The	   putsch	   did	   not	   fail	   –	   the	  putsch	   is	  ongoing!”	  declared	  Davlat	  Khudonazarov	  at	  an	  extraordinary	  session	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	   the	  USSR	  in	  Moscow	  on	  August	  27,	  accusing	  Mahkamov	  of	  not	   only	   sympathizing	  with,	   but	   also	   supporting	   the	   Emergency	   Committee.	   	   On	  August	  19,	  Khudonazarov	   told	   the	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  Mahkamov	  had	  met	  with	   the	  journalist	  (and	  former	  Deputy	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Council	  of	  Ministers)	  Otakhon	  Latifi.	  	  According	  to	  Latifi,	  Mahkamov	  had	  expressed	  his	  support	  “in	  principle”	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Cf.	   Driscoll,	  Warlords	   and	   Coalition;	   Markowitz,	   State	   Erosion;	   Tuncer-­‐Kilavuz,	   “Understanding	  Civil	  War.”	  12	  A.	   Liubimenko,	   “Otstoiat’	   demokratiiu.	   Reportazh	   s	   mitinga,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   August	   27,	  1991.	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the	  putsch.13	  	  After	  Latifi	  passed	  this	  information	  to	  Khudonazarov,	  the	  latter	  had	  tried	   to	   discuss	   it	   with	   Mahkamov	   a	   few	   days	   later	   on	   a	   plane	   to	   Moscow,	   but	  Mahkamov	   refused	   to	   speak	   at	   all	   –	   indicative,	   Khudonazarov	   argued,	   of	   the	  former’s	   conservatism	  and	   intransigence	   in	   the	   face	  of	   change.14	  Khudonazarov’s	  comments	   were	   met	   with	   support	   in	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   and	   Dushanbe	   alike,	  indicative	   not	   only	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   continued	   emphasis	   on	  Moscow	   as	   the	   seat	   of	  ultimate	  political	  power	  –	  but	  also	  the	  changing	  source	  of	  that	  power.	  	  With	   political	   clout	   rapidly	   shifting	   away	   from	  Gorbachev	   and	   the	   Soviet	   center,	  Mahkamov’s	   loyalty	   to	   the	   old	   system	   was	   quickly	   starting	   to	   look	   to	   many	   in	  Dushanbe	  like	  a	  liability.	  Mahkamov	  and	  his	  supporters	  in	  the	  CPT	  Bureau	  moved	  to	  disassociate	  themselves	  from	  the	  now	  tainted	  Party	  apparatus	  in	  Moscow:	  they	  cut	   ties	  with	   the	  CPSU	  and,	   copying	  a	  move	  made	  by	  Yeltsin	   in	   July,	   declared	  an	  official	   “departification”	   (departizatsiia)	   of	   all	   presidential	   and	   parliamentary	  offices.	  	  Yet	  this	  had	  little	  effect.15	  	  By	  the	  time	  a	  full	  session	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  gathered	  on	  August	  29,	   social	  pressure	  was	  reaching	  a	  breaking	  point.	   	   On	   the	   square	   outside	   the	   parliamentary	   building	   a	   loud	   political	  demonstration	   was	   underway,	   organized	   by	   a	   coalition	   of	   opposition	   forces,	  including	   the	  DPT,	  Rastokhez,	   and	   the	   Islamic	  Revival	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	   (IRPT).	  	  Pressuring	   the	   parliamentary	   deputies,	   the	   thousands	   of	   demonstrators	  “denounced	   the	  CPSU	  and	   the	   republican	   leadership”	   and	   called	   for	  Mahkamov’s	  resignation.	  16	  	   Encouraged	   by	   Latifi,	  who	   repeated	   his	   criticism	  of	  Mahkamov	   at	  the	   parliamentary	   session,	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   deputies	  met	  with	   the	   protestors	  and	  began	  discussing	  the	  possibility	  of	  removing	  the	  president.17	  	   In	  a	  few	  days	  a	  coalition	   had	   formed	   between	   the	   small	   minority	   of	   opposition	   deputies	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Verkhovnii	   Sovet	   SSSR.	   Vneocherednaia	   sessiia.	   Biulleten’	   No.	   4	   sovmestnogo	   zasedaniia	   Soveta	  
Soiuza	  i	  Soveta	  Natsional’nostei.	  27	  avgusta	  1991	  g.	  (Moscow:	  1991),	  35-­‐36.	  14 	  On	   Khudonazarov’s	   criticism	   of	   Mahkamov,	   see	   Mirzoi	   Salimpur,	   “GKChP	   dar	   Maskav	   va	  Tojikiston,”	   Radoi	   Ozody,	   August	   15,	   2011;	   interview	   with	   Davlat	   Khudonazarov,	   Moscow,	  December	  2016.	  15	  On	  the	  status	  of	  the	  CPT,	  see	  “Reshaetsia	  sud’ba	  partii,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  August	  28,	  1991.	  For	  the	  decision	   to	   “departify,”	   see	   “Ukaz	  Prezidenta	  Tadzhikskoi	   SSR	   “O	  prekrashchenii	  deiatel’nosti	  organizatsionnykh	   struktur	   politicheskikh	   partii	   i	   massovykh	   obshchestvennykh	   dvizhenii	   v	  pravookhranitel’nykh	   organakh	   i	   v	   apparate	   Prezidente	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	  August	  26,	  1991;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1254,	  l.	  4.	  	  On	  Yeltsin’s	  earlier	  move,	  see	  Kevin	  O’Connor,	  
Intellectuals	   and	   Apparatchiks:	   Russian	   Nationalism	   and	   the	   Gorbachev	   Revolution	   (Lanham:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2006),	  257-­‐258.	  16	  A.	   Khodzhaev,	   “Prizyv	   k	   ob’edineniiu	   demokraticheskikh	   sil,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   August	   30,	  1991.	  	  17	  On	   Latifi’s	   comments,	   see	  Nazriev	   and	   Sattarov,	  Respublika	  Tadzhikistan,	   21.	   On	   the	   actions	   of	  parliamentary	  deputies,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1260,	  l.	  18.	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parliament	   and	   a	   new	   class	   of	   ambitious	   politicians,	   spearheaded	   by	   Safarali	  Kenjaev,	  who	   sensed	   political	   blood	   in	   the	  water.	   	   A	   popular	   former	   prosecutor	  from	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Dushanbe,	  Kenjaev	  had	  a	  reputation	  for	  both	  eloquence	  –	  he	  wrote	  detective	  novels	  as	  a	  hobby	  –	  and	  personal	  ambition,	  both	  of	  which	  would	  become	   evident	   in	   the	   political	   struggles	   of	   1991	   and	   1992.18	  On	   August	   31	  Kenjaev	  initiated	  a	  successful	  vote	  of	  no	  confidence,	   leading	  to	  Mahkamov’s	  quiet	  resignation	  that	  afternoon.19	  	  	  Mahkamov’s	   resignation	   removed	   any	   final	   pretense	   of	   calm	   from	   the	   political	  arena	   in	  Dushanbe.	   	  With	  the	  post	  of	  president	  vacant,	   the	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  Qadriddin	  Aslonov,	   became	  acting	  president	  until	   new	  elections	  could	  be	  held,	  which	  were	  preliminarily	  set	  for	  October	  27.	  	  Much	  less	  experienced	  than	   Mahkamov,	   Aslonov	   was	   a	   handsome	   politician	   in	   his	   mid	   forties	   largely	  known	  as	  a	  former	  Party	  functionary	  and	  for	  his	  sympathies	  with	  some	  opposition	  figures.20	  	   Far	   from	   resting	   after	   their	   victory,	   moreover,	   the	   opposition	   parties	  banked	   on	   their	   newfound	   clout	   to	   demand	   even	   further	   change.	   	   Organizing	  ongoing	  demonstrations	   in	   front	  of	   the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet,	   the	  IRPT	  and	  other	  groups	   now	   demanded	   the	   banning	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   and	   the	   free	  registration	  of	  all	  other	  political	  organizations.21	  	  While	  avoiding	  any	  outright	  ban,	  Aslonov	  followed	  Moscow’s	  (and	  Yeltsin’s)	  earlier	  example,	  signing	  a	  presidential	  order	   on	   September	   1	   nationalizing	   all	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party’s	   property	   in	  Tajikistan.22	  	  With	  the	  Party’s	  authority	  (and	  wealth)	  dissipating,	  and	  sensing	  the	  hopelessness	   of	   his	   position,	  Mahkamov	   also	   retired	   from	   his	   final	   post	   as	   First	  Secretary	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   Tajikistan	   on	   September	   4.	   23 	  	   With	  Mahkamov	   and	   the	   Communist	   Party	   removed	   from	   the	   political	   arena,	   the	  inexperienced	  Aslonov	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  floundered	  without	  clear	  direction.	  	  Grasping	   for	   legislative	   initiative,	   they	   began	   to	   discuss	   a	   Declaration	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  On	  Kenjaev,	  see	  Epkenhans,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  169-­‐170.	  19	  On	  Mahkamov’s	  resignation,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1260,	  ll.	  15;	  25;	  Usmonov.	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  7;	  Epkenhans,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  144-­‐145.	  20	  On	   Aslonov,	   see	   Davlat,	   “Qadriddin	   Aslonov”;	   I.K.	   Usmonov,	   Mirostroitel’stvo	   v	   Tadzhikistane	  (Dushanbe:	  Devashtich,	  2006),	  10.	  21	  A.	   Khodzhaev,	   “S	   mesta	   sobytiia.	   Ploshchad’	   khochet	   byt’	   uslyshannoi,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	  September	  10,	  1991;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1256,	  l.	  16.	  	  22	  Stenogramma	  Soveshchaniia	  u	  Predsedatelia	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  tov.	  Aslonova	  K.A.,	   06-­‐07	   sentiabria	   1991	   g.,	   TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1256,	   l.	   17.	   	   Yeltsin	   nationalized	   CPSU	  property	  in	  the	  RSFSR	  on	  August	  25;	  see	  Atsushi	  Ogushi,	  The	  Demise	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Communist	  Party	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2008),	  147.	  23	  “Plenum	  TsK	  Kompartii	  Tadzhikistana,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  September	  5,	  1991.	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Independence	   for	   Tajikistan,	   justifying	   the	   idea	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   inevitability.	  	  Uzbekistan	  had	  passed	  a	   similar	  declaration,	   they	  argued,	   and	   “there	   is	  no	  other	  path”	   left.24	  	   “We	   no	   longer	   have	   a	   Union,”	   the	   deputy	   Hikmat	   Nasreddinov	  summed	   up	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   debate,	   “and	   it	   has	   all	   fallen	   into	   pieces.	   	   All	   that	  remains	  is	  us,	  Turkmenistan,	  and	  Gorbachev.”25	  	  The	  declaration	  was	  duly	  passed	  on	  September	  9,	  1991,	  making	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  an	  “independent”	  nation	  by	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Tajikistan.	  	  On	  paper,	  Tajikistan	  had	  become	  independent.	  	  The	  only	  problem	  was	  that	  no	  one	  in	  the	  Tajik	  government	  knew	  what	  this	  meant	  in	  practice.	  	  	  Although	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	   Soviet	   republics	   had	   now	   declared	   their	   independence	   from	   the	   USSR,	   the	  Union	   technically	   still	   existed.	   	   Gorbachev	   was	   still	   the	   president	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Union,	   and	   while	   the	   Congress	   of	   People’s	   Deputies	   had	   “voluntarily	   dissolved	  itself”	  (samoraspustil’sia)	  on	  September	  5,	  the	  Center	  continued	  to	  claim	  authority	  over	   the	   combined	   Soviet	   military	   forces	   and	   economic	   coordination.26	  Nor	   had	  either	   Moscow	   or	   any	   foreign	   government	   formally	   recognized	   Tajikistan’s	  independence.	   	   This	   allowed	   the	   Tajik	   leadership,	   which	   was,	   as	   the	   Rastokhez	  leader	   Tohir	   Abdujabbor	   complained,	   “not	   only	   disinclined	   towards	   the	  independence	  and	   the	   freedom	  of	   the	  Tajik	  people,	   but	   even	  actively	  working	   to	  contradict	  them,”	  to	  continue	  to	  tread	  water	  somewhere	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  loyalty	   to	   the	   center.27	  At	   the	   same	   time	   as	   the	   declaration	   of	   independence,	   the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	  was	  also	  debating	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Tajik	  economy	  and	  military	  forces	  –	  and	   in	  both	  cases	  managed	   to	  avoid	  any	  explicit	   rejection	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  place	  within	  a	  larger	  Soviet	  whole.	  	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  military,	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  passed	   a	   vague	   resolution	   dictating	   only	   the	   “development	   of	   a	   conception	   of	  defense	  and	  security	  for	  the	  Republic	  of	  Tajikistan.”	  28	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  moreover,	  Aslonov	   emphasized	   that	   Tajikistan	  presumed	   that	  within	   the	  USSR	   “the	   regular	  army	   would	   remain	   unified.”	  29	  During	   the	   parallel	   economic	   debate,	   the	   Prime	  Minister,	   Izatullo	  Khayoev	  was	   blunt	   –	   “The	  Union	  has	   stopped	   subsidizing	   us….	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  TsGART,	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1256,	  ll.	  9-­‐10.	  	  25	  Ibid,	  l.	  12.	  	  26	  See	  Vneocherednoi	  Piatyi	  S’’ezd	  narodnykh	  deputatov	  SSSR.	  Biulleten’	  No.	  6,	  05.09.1991,	  GARF	  f.	  9654,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  192;	  Dmitrii	   Lukashevich,	   Iuridicheskii	  mekhanizm	  razrusheniia	  SSSR	   (Moscow:	  TD	  Algoritm,	  2016),	  171-­‐172.	  27	  See	  Nurali	  Davlat,	  “Tohiri	  Abdujabbor:	  ‘Padar’-­‐i	  e’’lomiiai	  istiqlol,”	  Ozodagon,	  October	  12,	  2016.	  28	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1264,	  l.	  35.	  	  29	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1256,	  	  l.	  13.	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Nobody	  is	  going	  to	  give	  us	  any	  more	  money”30	  –	  and	  yet	   the	  result	  was	  anodyne.	  The	  Tajik	  parliament	   failed	   to	  pass	  any	  economic	  program,	  and	  Aslonov	  went	  on	  republican	   television	   to	   say	   that	   the	   key	   to	   recovery	   lay	   “in	   the	   speedy	  reestablishment	   of	   inter-­‐republican	   economic	   ties.” 31 	  	   For	   the	   leadership	   of	  Tajikistan,	   independence	   somehow	   meant	   a	   continuation	   of	   past	   practices.	   The	  USSR	  is	  collapsing,	  they	  told	  the	  Tajik	  population:	  long	  live	  the	  USSR.	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  Abdujabbor	   and	   other	   opposition	   leaders,	   however,	  were	   less	   satisfied	  with	   this	  state	   of	   affairs,	   although	   they	   found	   themselves	   in	   a	   tricky	  position.	   	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   having	   lobbied	   for	   Tajik	   independence	   and	   autonomy,	   they	   reasonably	  expected	  it	  to	  engender	  some	  legitimate	  change.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  too	  had	  little	   idea	   of	   what	   life	   outside	   of	   the	   USSR	   would	   mean,	   nor	   any	   clear	   plan	   for	  economic	   development.	   (Even	   the	   opposition	   economists	   Abdujabbor	   or	  Sohibnazar	  failed	  to	  present	  any	  economic	  program,	  instead	  simply	  repeating	  calls	  for	   increased	   liberalization	   and	   privatization.)	   	   To	   negotiate	   this	   conflict,	   the	  opposition	  parties	  chose	  to	  protest	  not	  the	  Soviet	  state	  and	  Tajikistan’s	  continued	  status	   as	   a	   Soviet	   republic	   –	   but	   instead	   the	   “conservative”	   forces	   nominally	  holding	  back	   reform	   in	   the	  USSR.	   	   First	   and	   foremost	   this	  meant	   the	  Communist	  Party,	   which	   continued	   to	   operate	   in	   Tajikistan,	   and	   throughout	   September	  representatives	  of	   the	  DPT,	   IRPT,	  Rastokhez	  and	  others	  held	  protests	  against	   the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	  (CPT).	  	  Holding	  portraits	  of	  Gorbachev	  and	  banners	  with	  democratic	  slogans,	  the	  protesters	  took	  up	  position	  on	  Lenin	  Square	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	  to	  demand	  a	  ban	  on	  the	  CPT.32	  	  Tensions	  finally	  came	  to	  a	  head	  on	  September	  21,	  1991,	  when	  the	  CPT	  met	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  Mahkamov’s	  resignation.	  	  Gathering	  in	  the	  EKOMPT	  building	  –	  the	  opulent	   former	   House	   of	   Political	   Education	   on	   Lenin	   Avenue	   that	   the	   CPT	   had	  recently	  privatized	  and	  sold	  –	   the	  Party	   took	  stock	  of	   its	  reduced	  position.	  Down	  the	  street	  on	  Martyrs’	  Square	  in	  front	  of	  the	  former	  Central	  Committee	  building,	  a	  crowd	  of	  thousands	  of	  protestors,	  enervated	  by	  the	  CPT’s	  temerity	  at	  calling	  a	  full	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Ibid,	  l.	  11.	  	  31	  Nazriev	  and	  Sattarov,	  Respublika	  Tajikistan,	  34.	  32	  See,	  for	  example,	  “Chehrai	  maidoni	  Ozody,”	  Adabiyot	  va	  sa’’nat,	  October	  7,	  1991.	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meeting,	  shook	  windows	  with	   their	  demands	  that	   the	  Party	  dissolve	   itself.33	  	  The	  CPT,	   however,	   decided	   to	   strike	   a	   middle	   ground,	   renaming	   itself	   the	   “Socialist	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan”	  and	  electing	  a	  relatively	  moderate	  figure,	  Shody	  Shabdolov,	  to	  be	  first	  secretary	  of	  the	  Party.	  	  Hearing	  this	  news,	  the	  protestors	  only	  became	  more	  enraged,	   decamping	   back	   to	   Lenin	   Square	   and	   collecting	   thousands	  more	   angry	  young	  men	  along	  the	  way.	  34	  	  	  By	   the	   early	   evening	   their	   number	   had	   reached	  nearly	   ten	   thousand,	   and	   led	   by	  Rastokhez	   deputy	   chairman	   Mirbobo	   Mirrahim	   and	   others,	   their	   chants	   were	  growing	   deafening.35	  	   In	   one	   of	   the	   more	   dramatic	   –	   and	   frequently	   repeated	   –	  episodes	   of	  modern	  Tajik	   history,	  Khayoev	   and	  Aslonov	  were	   forced	   to	   leave	   an	  ongoing	  Cabinet	  of	  Ministers	  meeting	  to	  address	  the	  crowd.	  	  They	  were	  joined	  on	  the	   roiling	   square	   by	  Maksud	   Ikromov,	   the	   then	  mayor	   of	   Dushanbe,	   as	  well	   as	  Abdujabbor	  and	  other	  opposition	  politicians.	   	   	  Trying	  to	  calm	  the	  crowd,	  Aslonov	  and	   Khayoev	  were	   shouted	   down	   until	   they	   declared	   that	   the	   Communist	   Party	  would	  be	  banned,	  waving	  an	  unsigned	  paper	  at	  the	  crowd	  to	  represent	  the	  as-­‐of-­‐yet	   unfinished	   resolution.36	  	   	   The	   crowd	   took	   Aslonov	   at	   his	   word,	   changing	   its	  shouts	  and	  boos	   to	  cheers	  of	  victory.	   	   	   	  Drunk	  with	  power,	   the	  now	  uncontrolled	  protestors	  also	  took	  it	  upon	  themselves	  to	  tear	  down	  the	  statue	  of	  Lenin	  that	  had	  given	  the	  square	  its	  name.	  	  Overseen	  and	  tacitly	  approved	  by	  Ikromov,	  this	  process	  ultimately	  required	  three	  cranes	  and	  led	  to	  the	  unseemly	  and	  disorganized	  sight	  of	  Lenin’s	  head	  and	  body	  rolling	  about	  before	  being	  summarily	  carted	  off.37	  	  	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  Sunday,	  September	  22,	  Aslonov	  met	  with	  his	  legal	  advisors	  and	  published	  the	   final	  resolution	   fully	  banning	   the	  CPT.	  Many	  other	  members	  of	   the	  Tajik	   elite	   were	   that	   morning	   glued	   to	   their	   televisions:	   it	   turned	   out	   that	  republican	  TV	  had	  filmed	  the	  destruction	  of	  Lenin’s	  statue,	  which	  it	  now	  included	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  10.	  34	  L.	  Nikulina,	  “Iz	  kommunistov	  v	  sotsialisty,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  September	  23,	  1991.	  	  35 	  Safarali	   Kendzhaev,	   Perevorot	   v	   Tadzhikistane	   (Dushanbe:	   Dushanbinskii	   poligrafkombinat,	  1996),	  18.	  36	  Sources	  differ	  on	  whether	  Aslonov	  had	  planned	  to	  declare	  a	  ban	  on	  the	  CPT	  before	  going	  out	  to	  the	  crowd	  or	   simply	   state	  his	   intention	   to	   temporarily	   “freeze”	   (priostanovit’)	   their	  activities,	  but	  once	   outside	   he	   declared	   it	   banned.	   	   It	   is	   also	   clear	   that	   the	   official	   resolution	   (postanovlenie)	  remained	   incomplete	  and	  partial	  until	  September	  22.	   	  For	  divergent	  accounts	  see	  TsGART	   f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1260,	  ll.	  18,	  26,	  31.	  	  37	  See	  Abdulov,	  Rohi	  behbud,	  31;	  Davlat,	  “Maqsud	  Ikromov.”	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in	  the	  morning	  news.38	  	  The	  sight	  of	  the	  uncontrolled	  crowd	  dictating	  politics	  and	  destroying	  symbols	  of	  the	  Soviet	  past	  split	  Tajik	  society.	  	  Those	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  crowd	   and	   critical	   of	   the	   now-­‐crumbling	   USSR,	   such	   as	   the	   radical	   poet	   and	  parliamentary	  deputy	  Bozor	  Sobir,	  saw	  Lenin’s	  fall	  as	  prophetic	  fulfillment	  of	  their	  past	  promises	  to	  “shred,	  shred,	  shred,	  and	  break	  that	  history.”39	  	  For	  the	  majority	  of	   Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet	   deputies	   and	   Dushanbe	   elites,	   however,	   the	   crowd	   had	  gone	  too	  far.	  Having	  grown	  up	  and	  come	  of	  age	  in	  the	  Party	  and	  Soviet	  society,	  they	  remained	   loyal	   to	   its	   symbols,	   especially	   Lenin.	   	   Watching	   the	   statue	   fall,	   as	  Kenjaev	  put	  it	  a	  few	  weeks	  later,	  for	  many	  it	  seemed	  as	  though	  “the	  whole	  nation	  was	  crying.”40	  	  By	   early	   that	   evening,	   this	   half	   of	   society’s	   aghast	   desperation	   had	   turned	   to	  organized	   revolt.	   	   Leading	   conservative	   members	   of	   the	   government	   and	   Party,	  including	   the	   Prosecutor	   General,	   Nurullo	   Khuvaidulloev,	   and	   Vakhob	   Vakhidov,	  secretary	   of	   the	   CPT,	   together	   with	   Kenjaev,	   began	   to	   gather	   Supreme	   Soviet	  deputies	  in	  the	  Agricultural	  Institute,	  a	  few	  kilometers	  north	  on	  Lenin	  Avenue.	  	  By	  five	   p.m.	   nearly	   90	   deputies	  were	   gathered;	   later	   their	   number	   grew	   to	   at	   least	  140,	   a	   clear	   majority	   of	   the	   225-­‐strong	   Supreme	   Soviet.41	  	   All	   present	   signed	   a	  protocol	  criticizing	  Aslonov’s	  actions	  on	  the	  21st	  and	  demanding	  a	  new	  session	  of	  the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   to	   evaluate	   the	   current	   political	   situation.42	  	   Arriving	   at	   the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  building	  early	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  Monday,	  September	  23,	  the	  newly	  organized	  deputies	  caught	  Aslonov	  off	  guard.	   	  Led	  again	  by	  the	  openly	  ambitious	  Kenjaev,	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   harshly	   criticized	   Aslonov	   and	   demanded	   his	  resignation.	   Outside	   on	   the	   street,	   a	   large	   crowd	   had	   also	   been	   gathered	   by	  Vakhidov	  and	  Nizoramoh	  Zarifova,	  the	  former	  deputy	  chairwoman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	   Presidium,	   who	   had	   remained	   a	   political	   force	   in	   the	   republic	   since	   her	  retirement	   in	  1989.43	  Battered	  by	   the	  deputies	   inside	   and	   the	   clamoring	  outside,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  This	  was,	   of	   course,	   politically	  motivated,	  which	   the	   opposition	   did	   not	  miss.	   See:	   Hoji	   Aqbari	  Turajonzoda,	  Miyoni	  obu	  otash	  (Dushanbe,	  1998),	  15.	  39	  From	  the	  poem	  “Dar	  bunyodi	  “Rastokhez,”	  published	  in	  mid-­‐1991.	  	  See	  Sobir,	  Chasmi	  Safedor,	  18.	  40	  TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1260,	   l.	   26.	   For	   similar	   perspectives,	   see	   Usmonov,	   Soli	   Nabiev,	   14;	  Abdulov,	  Rohi	  behbud,	  	  31-­‐32.	  41	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1260,	   ll.	  26-­‐27;	  Nurali	  Davlat,	   “Maqsud	  Ikromov:	  Gharqshudai	  girdobi	  bozihoi	  siyosy,”	  Ozodagon,	  May	  3,	  2017.	  42	  For	   the	   text	   of	   this	   protocol	   and	   its	   signatories,	   see	   “Ba	   Shuroi	   Olii	   Jumhuriiati	   Tojikiston	   az	  gurukhi	  deputathoi	  khalkii	  jumhuri,”	  22.09.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1257,	  ll.	  10-­‐18.	  	  43	  Usmonov,	   Soli	   Nabiev,	   13;	   Dustov,	   Zahm	   bar	   jismi,	   103-­‐105;	   Nazriev	   and	   Sattarov,	   Respublika	  
Tajikistan,	  42-­‐43;	  S.	  Ergashev,	  A.	  Yusupov,	  and	  A.	  Lukin,	   “Zharkii	  sentiabr’	  v	  Dushanbe,”	  Vechernii	  
Dushanbe,	  September	  24,	  1991.	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Aslonov	   gave	   in,	   admitting	   that	   “the	   mantle	   of	   leadership	   (shapka	  Monomakha)	  was	   too	   heavy	   for	   me,”	   and	   resigning	   from	   his	   position	   as	   Chairman	   of	   the	  Supreme	   Soviet.44	  	   The	   resurgent	   conservative	   majority	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	  quickly	   elected	  Rahmon	  Nabiev,	  who	   had	   emerged	   during	   the	   1990	   presidential	  elections	   as	   a	   palatable	   alternative	   to	   Mahkamov,	   as	   Chairman.	   	   They	   also	  overturned	  the	  ban	  on	  the	  CPT	  and	  for	  good	  measure	  began	  to	  discuss	  the	  arrest	  of	  Dushanbe’s	  mayor,	  Maqsud	   Ikromov,	   for	  his	  role	   in	  allowing	  Lenin’s	  statue	   to	  be	  destroyed.45	  	  	  By	   this	  point,	   it	  was	  growing	   increasingly	  clear	   that	  no	  one	  group	   in	  Tajikistan	  –	  neither	   the	   conservative	   majority	   of	   the	   government,	   nor	   the	   loose	   coalition	   of	  opposition	   parties	   –	  was	   in	   effective	   control	   of	   the	   republic.	   	   Instead,	   crowds	   of	  tens	   of	   thousands,	   organized	   by	   various	   and	   changing	   individuals	   and	   parties,	  dictated	  politics:	  demonstrating	  against	  Mahkamov	  had	  removed	  him	  from	  office;	  demonstrating	   against	   his	   replacement,	   Aslonov,	   had	   achieved	   the	   same	   result.	  	  Nabiev’s	  election	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Supreme	  Soviet	  Chairman	  (and	  de-­‐facto	  acting	  president)	   led	   to	   further	  crowds,	  meetings,	  and	  unending	  demonstrations,	  which	  also	  threatened	  to	  spiral	  out	  of	  control.	  	  Fascinatingly,	  the	  response	  chosen	  by	  both	  the	  government	  and	  the	  opposition	  to	  this	  vacuum	  of	  real	  power	  was	  identical	  –	  to	  appeal	   to	   Moscow	   for	   support.	   Immediately	   upon	   assuming	   authority	   as	   the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  on	  September	  23	  (and	  even	  before	  the	  opposition	  could	   organize	   meetings	   against	   him),	   Nabiev	   sent	   a	   request	   to	   General	   Ivan	  Fuzhenko,	   the	   Commander	   of	   the	   Turkestan	   Military	   District,	   which	   included	  Tajikistan,	  querying	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  sending	  Soviet	  troops	  to	  keep	  order	  in	  Dushanbe.46	  	   For	   its	   part,	   the	   opposition,	   whose	   ranks	   had	   been	   bolstered	   by	  Davlat	  Khudunazarov	  and	  Gulrukhsor	  Safieva,	  newly	   returned	   to	  Dushanbe	   from	  the	   now-­‐defunct	   Congress	   of	   People’s	   Deputies,	   organized	   new	   street	  demonstrations.47	  	  But	  they	  also	  appealed	  to	  Gorbachev	  and	  Yeltsin	  for	  support.	  	  In	  a	   letter	   published	   on	   September	   25,	   the	   opposition	   politicians	   publically	   called	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1260,	  l.	  27.	  	  45	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1257,	  l.	  9;	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1260,	  l.	  18.	  	  46	  Konstantin	   Voitsekhovich	   and	   Oleg	   Moskovskii,	   “Voiska	   ne	   budut	   vmeshivat’sia,”	   Vechernii	  
Dushanbe,	  September	  25,	  1991.	  47	  These	  meetings	  started	  on	  September	  24.	  	  See	  Usmonov,	  Mirostroitel’stvo	  v	  Tadzhikistane,	  11;	  A.	  Lukin,	   “Miting	   reshaet	   po-­‐svoemu,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   September	   25,	   1991;	   Dustov,	   Zahm	   bar	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  108.	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upon	   the	   Presidents	   of	   the	   USSR	   and	   Russia	   to	   “help	   reinstate	   democracy”	   in	  Tajikistan.48	  	  Nabiev’s	   request	   was	   categorically	   rejected	   by	   Fuzhenko	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Defense	  of	  the	  USSR,	  which	  banned	  its	  troops	  from	  “participation	  in	  the	  resolution	  of	   internal	   or	   interethnic	   conflicts	   in	   the	   sovereign	   republics.”	   The	   opposition’s	  plea,	   however,	   touched	   a	   nerve	   in	   Moscow,	   where	   Gorbachev	   was	   increasingly	  worried	  about	  Yeltsin’s	  growing	  clout	  in	  the	  peripheral	  republics.	   	  Responding	  to	  the	   Tajik	   opposition’s	   letter,	   Gorbachev’s	   advisor	   Georgii	   Shakhnazarov	  wrote	   a	  memo	  on	  October	  1.	   “As	  deleterious	  as	   it	   is	   to	   force	  one’s	  way	   into	  the	  sphere	  of	  republican	   activity,	   inaction	   is	   just	   as	   dangerous	   for	   the	   center	   in	   [these]	  questions,”	  he	  wrote,	  and	  ”the	  Russians	  are	  offering	  their	  own	  negotiating	  help	  to	  Tajikistan,	   emphasizing	   the	   Center’s	   torpor.	   	   	   With	   this	   in	   mind,	   I	   suggest	  immediately	   sending	   to	   Dushanbe…two	   members	   of	   the	   Political	   Consultative	  Council	   as	   personal	   representatives	   of	   the	   President	   of	   the	   USSR.”	  49	  Gorbachev	  took	   this	   advice,	   and	   quickly	   dispatched	   Anatoly	   Sobchak,	   the	   mayor	   of	   St.	  Petersburg,	   and	   Evgenii	   Velikhov,	   vice-­‐president	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Academy	   of	  Sciences,	  to	  “normalize	  the	  situation”	  in	  Dushanbe.	  	  Sobchak	  and	  Velikhov	  arrived	  in	  Dushanbe	  on	  October	  4,	  where	  they	  found	  a	  city	  paralyzed	  by	  nearly	  two	  weeks	  of	  demonstrations	  and	  a	  government	  paralyzed	  by	  a	   week	   of	   negotiations	   with	   the	   opposition.	   	   Nabiev,	   Khayoev,	   and	   Kenjaev	   had	  been	   arguing	  daily	  with	  Rastokhez’s	  Abdujabbor	   and	  Mirrahim,	   the	  DPT’s	  Yusuf,	  and	  the	  IRPT’s	  Himmatzoda	  and	  Usmon	  since	  September	  28	  with	  little	  result.	  	  The	  opposition	  kept	  demanding	  Nabiev’s	   resignation;	  Nabiev	  kept	   refusing	   to	   resign;	  no	   one	   could	   agree	   on	   anything	   else.50	  	   Through	   a	   combination	   of	   brow-­‐beating	  (“You,	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  republic,	  are	  doing	  nothing!”	  Sobchak	  once	  exclaimed51)	  and	   giving	   the	   opposition	   a	   platform	   to	   make	   threats	   (if	   Nabiev	   remained	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Signatories	   to	   this	   letter	   included	   Khudonazarov,	   Safieva,	   Sobir,	   Abdujabbor,	   Turajonzoda,	  Ikromov,	   and	   Sohibnazar.	   	   See	   “Prezidentu	   Soiuza	   SSR	   tovarishchu	   Gorbachevu	  M.S.,	   Prezidentu	  RSFSR	   tovarishchu	   El’stinu	   B.N.,	   Predsedateliu	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   RSFSR	   tovarishchu	  Khasbulatovu	  R.I.,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  September	  25,	  1991.	  49	  Dokladnaia	  zapiska	  G.	  Shakhnazarova	  M.S.	  Gorbachevu	  o	  zadachakh	  tsentra,	  01.10.1991.	  	  AGF,	  f.	  5,	  op.	  1,	  d.	  18149,	  ll,	  1-­‐2.	  	  50	  Protokol	   peregovorov	   rukovodstva	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan	   s	   predstaviteliami	   ob’’edinennykh	  demokraticheskikh	  sil,	  28-­‐29	  sentiabria	  1991	  g.,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1259,	  l.	  9.	  	  51	  Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan	   s	   uchastiem	   tt.	   Sobchaka	  A.A.,	  Velikohva,	  E.P.,	  Yanova,	  A.Ll,	  Putina,	  V.V.,	  04.10.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1261,	  l.	  7.	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president,	  Yusuf	  said,	  the	  crowd	  had	  promised	  to	  “stone	  you	  all	  to	  death	  and	  take	  power	   in	   its	   own	   hands.”52),	   Sobchak	   and	   Velikhov	   convinced	   Nabiev	   and	   his	  government	  to	  give	  in	  to	  most	  of	  the	  opposition’s	  demands.	  	  Nabiev	  resigned	  from	  his	   post	   as	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet,	   allowing	   his	   deputy,	   Akbarsho	  Iskandarov,	  to	  take	  over	  until	  the	  presidential	  elections,	  which	  were	  also	  moved	  to	  November	  24	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  fairer	  contest.	   	   In	  addition,	  all	  charges	  were	  dropped	  against	   Ikromov	   and	   other	   demonstration	   participants,	   and	   the	   IRPT	  was	   finally	  given	  a	  guarantee	  that	  it	  could	  now	  register.	  (This	  took	  a	  little	  while:	  although	  the	  party	   held	   an	   official	   Congress	   in	   Dushanbe	   on	   October	   26,	   it	   was	   only	   actually	  registered	  on	  December	  4.)53	  	  In	  exchange,	  the	  opposition	  agreed	  to	  stop	  its	  public	  protests	  and	  the	  CPT	  was	  allowed	  to	  remain	  operational.54	  	  This	   resolution	   created	   a	   very	   strange	   political	   backdrop	   for	   Tajikistan’s	   first	  presidential	   election	   as	   an	   “independent”	   republic.	   Having	   declared	   its	  independence	   from	   Moscow	   merely	   weeks	   before,	   Tajikistan’s	   government	   had	  subsequently	  requested	  a	  military	  intervention	  from	  the	  power	  from	  which	  it	  had	  just	  “freed”	  itself.	   	  This	  request,	  moreover,	  was	  rejected	  by	  a	  Soviet	  state	  that	  had	  not	  formally	  recognized	  Tajik	  independence	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  republic’s	  right	  to	  determine	   its	   “sovereign	   affairs.”	   Yet	   when	   the	   opposition	   asked	   for	   an	  intervention,	  the	  Center	  obliged,	  sending	  its	  representatives	  to	  assert	  control	  and	  find	   a	   solution	   to	   political	   gridlock.	   	   When	   these	   representatives	   (Sobchak	   and	  Velikhov)	  arrived,	  moreover,	  everyone	  in	  Dushanbe	  acceded	  to	  their	  authority	  and	  abided	  by	   the	   agreement	   they	  brokered.	   	   Thus	   at	   once	  Tajikistan	  was	  nominally	  independent	  and	  sovereign	  and	  yet	  de	  facto	  still	  part	  of	  the	  USSR,	  a	  middle	  ground	  that	  satisfied	  everyone	  while	  resolving	  nothing.	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52 	  Stenogramma	   soveshchaniia	   rukovodstva	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan,	  narodnykh	   deputatov	   SSSR	   ot	   Tadzhikistana,	   chlenov	   Verkhnovnogo	   Soveta	   ot	   razlichnykh	  politicheskikh	  partii	  i	  gruppirovok	  s	  uchastiem	  tt.	  Sobchaka	  A.A.,	  Velikhov	  E.P.,	  05.10.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1260,	  l.	  53.	  	  53	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  284;	  Nazriev	  and	  Sattorov,	  Respublika	  Tadzhikistan,	  142.	  54	  On	   the	   agreement	   reached	   between	   Nabiev,	   the	   DPT,	   Rastokhez,	   the	   IRPT,	   and	   Sobchak	   and	  Velikhov,	   see	   Protokol	   No.	   64	   Zasedaniia	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan	   ot	  05.10.1991,	   TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1260,	   ll.	   1-­‐2;Protokol	   No.	   65	   Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan	  ot	  06.01.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1261,	  ll.	  1-­‐4;	  also	  Usmonov,	  Mirostroitel’stvo	  v	  Tadzhikistane,	  11.	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Moscow's	  shadow	  remained	  evident	  even	  after	  Sobchak	  and	  Velikhov’s	  departure.	  In	  fact,	  it	  continued	  to	  animate	  political	  discussions	  and	  disagreements	  throughout	  the	  presidential	  campaign.	  Moved	  to	  late	  November,	  these	  elections	  pitted	  Nabiev	  as	  the	  establishment	  candidate	  against	  a	  variety	  of	  opposition	  figures.	  While	  there	  were	  a	  total	  of	  9	  candidates	  registered,55	  the	  majority	  of	  opposition	  parties	  threw	  their	  weight	  behind	  Khudonazarov,	  who	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  candidate	  most	  likely	  to	  effectively	   challenge	   Nabiev.	   Backed	   by	   Rastokhez,	   the	   DPT,	   and	   the	   IRPT,	  Khudonazarov	  all	  the	  same	  presented	  himself	  as	  an	  independent	  politician	  able	  to	  stand	   up	   for	   the	   average	   Tajik	   citizen,	   who	   at	   this	   point	   was	   sceptical	   of	   most	  parties,	  Communist	  or	  otherwise.	  	  Both	   Nabiev	   and	   Khudonazarov	   established	   extensive	   campaign	   networks	   and	  mobilised	   groups	   of	   volunteers	   across	   the	   republic.	  	   As	   they	   both	   worked	   to	  present	  themselves	  as	  candidates	  with	  strong	  links	  to	  Tajikistan,	  however,	  neither	  could	  avoid	  putting	  Moscow	  front	  and	  center.	  Nabiev	  emphasized	  his	  bona	  fides	  as	  a	   former	   first	   secretary	   in	   the	   Soviet	   system	   and	   his	   experience	   standing	   up	   for	  Tajik	  interests.	  	  He	  also	  pointed	  in	  official	  campaign	  literature	  to	  his	  endorsements	  from	  the	  Moscow	  newspaper	  Pravda	  and	  St.	  Petersburg’s	  Sobchak.56	  His	  campaign	  supporters,	   moreover,	   assured	   voters	   that	   given	   the	   precarious	   state	   of	   Tajik	  society	   and	   the	   economy	   the	   most	   important	   thing	   was	   “not	   to	   go	   against	   the	  leadership	   of	   great	  Moscow	  and	  bring	   in	   new	   faces	   to	  Dushanbe.”57	  	  Nabiev	  was	  Moscow’s	   man,	   the	   argument	   went	   –	   and	   having	   Moscow’s	   man	   in	   Dushanbe’s	  corner	  was	  the	  clearest	  route	  out	  of	  the	  current	  predicament	  of	  complete	  and	  utter	  economic	  collapse.	  	  According	   to	  Khudonazarov’s	   supporters,	  however,	  Nabiev	  was	   too	  bound	   to	   the	  old	   structures	   of	   power	   to	   effectively	   coordinate	  with	   the	   new	  political	   order	   in	  Moscow.	   	   In	   this	   light,	   Khudonazarov	   was	   the	   real	   candidate	   with	   backing	   in	  Moscow	  –	  backing	  not	  from	  Gorbachev	  or	  the	  now-­‐defunct	  Soviet	  center,	  but	  from	  Yeltsin	  and	  the	  democratic	  forces	  taking	  power	  there.	  	  And	  Khudonazarov	  did	  have	  strong	  links	  to	  many	  politicians	  in	  Moscow	  –	  links	  he	  did	  much	  to	  emphasize.	  	  His	  campaign	   distributed	   accolades	   from	   leading	   Russian	   democrats,	   such	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1268,	  l.	  10.	  	  56	  Nomzad	  ba	  Raisi	  Jumhirii	  Tojikiston,	  18-­‐20.	  57	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  16.	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Aleksandr	   Yakovlev,	   who	   praised	   him	   as	   “a	   man	   of	   freedom	   of	   the	   perestroika	  era.”58	  	  Developing	   links	  with	   the	  new	  market	  economy	   in	  Russia,	  Khudonazarov	  and	   his	   vice-­‐presidential	   candidate,	   the	   economist	   Asliddin	   Sohibnazar,	   argued,	  was	   the	   only	   way	   to	   save	   the	   Tajik	   economy.	   	   This	   would	   mean	   increased	  liberalization,	  marketization,	  and	  price	  increases	  –	  but	  it	  also	  relied	  upon	  ongoing	  and	  even	  growing	  support	  from	  the	  Soviet	  (or	  at	  least	  Russian)	  center.59	  	   	  When	  the	  elections	  were	  held	  on	  November	  24,	  Nabiev	  won	  a	  convincing	  victory,	  receiving	  58.5%	  percent	  of	   the	  vote	   in	   the	   first	  round.	  The	  election	  had	   inflamed	  passions,	   with	   turnout	   at	  more	   than	   86%	   of	   the	   electorate.	  60	  	   Partly	   voters	   had	  been	  excited	  by	  the	  novelty	  of	  a	  free	  and	  open	  campaign;	  partly	  they	  realized	  the	  stakes	  involved;	  and	  partly	  they	  had	  been	  mobilized	  through	  effective	  get-­‐out	  the	  vote	  campaigns.61	  	  Nabiev’s	  network	  was	  especially	  successful,	  drawing	  upon	  local	  authority	   figures	   –	   including	   those	   with	   questionable	   backgrounds,	   such	   as	   the	  soon-­‐to-­‐be	  infamous	  bartender	  and	  career	  criminal	  Sangak	  Safarov	  in	  Kulyab	  –	  to	  bring	  voters	  to	  the	  polling	  stations.62	  	  In	  some	  districts,	  this	  strategy	  provided	  with	  Nabiev	  with	  90-­‐100%	  of	  the	  local	  vote,	  leading	  to	  accusations	  of	  misconduct	  from	  Khudonazarov.63 	  With	   no	   foreign	   or	   independent	   election	   observers	   present,	  however,	   and	   with	   little	   real	   evidence	   of	   falsifications,	   Khudonazarov	   quickly	  dropped	  his	  complaints.64	  	  Later	  he	  admitted	  that	  the	  31%	  of	  the	  vote	  he	  received	  had	  likely	  been	  an	  honest	  reflection	  of	  voters’	  preferences.65	  Tajikistan,	  it	  seemed,	  had	  successfully	  passed	  the	  test	  of	  its	  first	  independent	  elections,	  honestly	  electing	  a	  former	  Communist	  Party	  leader	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  close	  cooperation	  with	  Moscow.	  Many	  in	  Tajikistan,	  moreover,	  believed	  that	  this	  closeness	  with	  the	  Russian	  center	  would	  finally	  turn	  their	  fortunes	  around.	  	  “Everyone	  was	  saying	  ‘Now	  Nabiev	  will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Quoted	  in	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  288.	  59	  Nurali	   Davlat,	   “Asliddin	   Sohibnazarov:	   Sohibnazar	   yo	   ‘folbini	   jumhury’,”	  Ozodagon,	   August	   30,	  2017.	  60	  Stenogramma	  Zasedaniia	  Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,	  28.11.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1269,	  l.	  5.	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  19.	  61	  On	  the	  excitement	  of	   the	  election,	  see	   Interviews	  with	   local	  residents,	  Dushanbe,	  May	  2016;	  on	  the	  mobilization	  of	  voters	  in	  general,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1268,	  ll.	  12-­‐18.	  	  62	  V.	  Medvedev,	   “Saga	   o	   bobo	   Sangake,	   voine,”	  Druzhba	  narodov	   6	   (1993):	   191;	   Safarali	   Kenjaev,	  
Tabadduloti	  Tojikiston	  (Dushanbe:	  Fondi	  Kenjaev,	  1993),	  v.	  1,	  27.	  63	  On	  localized	  results,	  see	  Dustov,	  Zakhm	  bar	  jismi,	  134;	  for	  Khudonazarov's	  protests	  –	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1269,	  l.	  5.	  	  64	  On	  the	  lack	  of	  observers,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1268,	  ll.	  8-­‐10,	  24.	  	  65	  Interview	  with	  Davlat	  Khudonazarov,	  Moscow,	  December	  2016;	  Interview	  with	  a	  Khudonazarov	  campaign	  volunteer,	  Moscow,	  December	  2016.	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take	  a	  hold	  of	  things,’”	  Ibrohim	  Usmonov	  wrote	  a	  few	  years	  later,	  “‘He	  will	  institute	  discipline	  and	  order,	  and	  we	  will	  aright	  the	  position	  of	  our	  people	  and	  state.”	  66	  	  	  
II.	  Accepting	  the	  Inevitable	  Just	  as	  Dushanbe	  was	  trying	  to	  once	  again	  bind	  its	  fortunes	  to	  Moscow,	  however,	  Moscow	  was	  again	  pulling	  away.	   	   Just	   two	  weeks	  after	  Nabiev’s	   election,	  Yelstin,	  Leonid	   Kravchuk,	   and	   Stanislav	   Shushkevich,	   the	   respective	   leaders	   of	   Russia,	  Ukraine,	   and	   Belorussia,	   met	   secretly	   on	   December	   8	   in	   Belovezhsk,	   Belorussia,	  where	   they	   agreed	   to	   dismantle	   the	   USSR	   and	   found	   a	   “Commonwealth	   of	  Independent	  States”	  (CIS)	  in	  its	  place.	  	  Ukraine	  had	  just	  overwhelmingly	  voted	  for	  independence	  in	  a	  referendum	  on	  December	  1,	  and	  across	  the	  USSR	  it	  was	  growing	  increasingly	   clear	   that	   the	   advantages	   of	   remaining	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   were	  exceedingly	   slim.	   	   Perhaps	   angry	   at	   not	   having	   been	   invited	   to	   Belovezhsk	   –	   or	  perhaps	   simply	   bluffing	   to	   give	   himself	   room	   to	   bargain	   –	   President	   Nursultan	  Nazarbaev	   of	   Kazakhstan	   gathered	   all	   of	   the	   Central	   Asian	   presidents,	   including	  Nabiev,	  in	  Ashkhabad	  on	  December	  12,	  where	  they	  began	  to	  discuss	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “Central	  Asian	  Union.”67	  	  Ultimately,	   this	  proposal	  was	  dropped,	  however,	  and	  on	  December	   21,	   11	   of	   the	   15	   now	   former	   Soviet	   republics	   met	   in	   Alma-­‐Ata,	  Kazakhstan	   to	   sign	   the	   formal	   agreement	   creating	   the	   CIS.	   Left	   with	   little	  alternative,	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev	  resigned	  from	  his	  position	  as	  President	  of	  the	  USSR	  on	  December	  25,	  bringing	  to	  an	  end	  both	  the	  last	  institute	  of	  Soviet	  statehood	  and	  the	  Soviet	  state	  itself.	  	  For	   the	   leadership	   of	   Tajikistan,	   this	   whirlwind	   of	   change	  was	   both	   unexpected	  and	  undesired.	  	  As	  late	  as	  December	  5,	  Nabiev	  was	  insisting	  that	  “although	  we	  are	  a	  sovereign	  republic,	  we	  are	  part	  of	  the	  Union.	  	  Right	  now	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  current	  position,	  which	  is	  why	  there	  must	  be	  a	  Union	  body,	  there	  must	  be	   a	   Center.”	   	   Even	   as	   Yeltsin	  was	   preparing	   that	   day	   to	   visit	   Belorussia	   for	   his	  fateful	  summit	  with	  Kravchuk	  and	  Shushkevich,	  Nabiev	  was	  trying	  to	  call	  him	  and	  argue	  for	  the	  continued	  necessity	  of	  retaining	  the	  Union	  Center.68	  	  Notwithstanding	  all	  of	  the	  warning	  signs,	  Nabiev	  was	  even	  taken	  unaware	  by	  the	  final	  collapse	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  20.	  67	  See	  Andrei	  S.	  Grachev,	  Final	  Days:	  The	  Inside	  Story	  of	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  trans.	  Margo	  Milne	   (Boulder:	  Westview,	   1995),	   147,	   161;	   Nazriev	   and	   Sattarov,	  Respublika	  Tadzhikistan,	   142-­‐143;	  Plokhy,	  The	  Last	  Empire,	  352-­‐356.	  68	  Nazriev	  and	  Sattarov,	  Respublika	  Tadzhikistan,	  34.	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USSR	  and	  Gorbachev’s	  resignation;	  he	  was	  completely	  “unprepared	  for	  work	  in	  the	  new	   conditions.”	  69	  Nor	   was	   Nabiev	   alone:	   for	   many	   of	   the	   political	   elites	   in	  Dushanbe,	   the	   idea	   of	   living	   in	   a	   truly	   independent	   country	   was	   difficult	   to	  conceive.	   	   Even	   the	   opposition	   parties	   had	   consistently	   failed	   over	   the	   past	   two	  years	  to	  present	  any	  vision	  of	  economic	  or	  social	  life	  that	  was	  completely	  divorced	  from	  Moscow.	  	  	  	  Yet	   as	   1991	   came	   to	   a	   close	  Nabiev	   and	   the	   other	   political	   leaders	   of	   Tajikistan	  found	   that	   they	   had	   no	   choice	   but	   to	   confront	   the	   prospect	   of	   economic	   and	  political	  independence.	  	  First	  and	  foremost,	  this	  meant	  taking	  stock	  of	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  Tajikistan,	  which	  was	  far	  from	  appealing.	  	  	  	  The	  economy,	  which	  had	  already	  been	  in	  bad	  shape,	  almost	  completely	  collapsed	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1991,	  and	  by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year	   had	   shrunk	   by	   as	   much	   as	   10%.70	  When	   he	   arrived	   in	  Dushanbe	   in	   early	   October,	   Sobchak	   was	   taken	   aback	   by	   the	   level	   of	   economic	  degradation:	  “For	  all	  of	  the	  economic	  difficulties	  faced	  across	  the	  country,	  you	  have	  it	   the	   worst,”	   he	   told	   Nabiev.	  71	  Matters	   had	   not	   improved	   in	   the	   subsequent	  months.	   In	   January	   1992	   the	   bread	   deficits	   that	   had	   begun	   in	   September	   1991	  worsened,	   notwithstanding	   attempts	   to	   control	   the	   situation	   through	   the	  implementation	   of	   a	   “voucher	   system”	   (talonnaia	   sistema).	  72	  	   Both	   gasoline	   and	  medicines	  were	  also	  heavily	  in	  deficit	  by	  January	  1992,	  causing	  disruptions	  to	  local	  deliveries,	  supply	  lines,	  and	  hospitals.73	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  unfortunately,	  the	  Tajik	  state’s	  access	  to	  financial	  resources	  had	  been	  sharply	  cut,	  giving	  state	  institutions	  limited	  ability	  to	  affect	  economic	  outcomes.	  	  	  Public	  transport	  provided	  an	  important	  example	  of	  the	  impossible	  quandary	  faced	  by	  most	  Ministries	   in	   the	   newly	   independent	   Tajik	   state.	   	   	   Dushanbe’s	   bus	   fleet	  included	  both	  a	  variety	  of	  Soviet-­‐made	  buses,	  as	  well	  as	  higher	  quality	  Hungarian	  “Ikaruses.”	   	   By	   the	   end	   of	   1991,	   however,	   the	   Tajik	   government	   was	   unable	   to	  purchase	   new	   buses,	   spare	   parts,	   tires,	   batteries,	   or	   even	   diesel	   gasoline.	   In	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  24.	  70	  Rough	  estimate	  based	  on	  sales	  volumes	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  NMP.	  	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1276,	  l.	  62;	  TsGART	  f.	  306,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  1422,	  ll.	  8-­‐12.	  71	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1260,	  l.	  9.	  72	  On	  bread	  deficits,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1262,	  ll.	  3-­‐4,	  8;	  Nazriev	  and	  Sattarov,	  Respublika	  
Tadzhikistan,	  131.	  On	  the	  voucher	  system,	  see	  Stenogramma	  Zasedaniia	  Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,	  19.11.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1268,	  l.	  20.	  	  73	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1279,	  ll.	  27-­‐29;	  d.	  1286,	  l.	  9.	  	  
	  	   222	  
past,	   the	   central	   Soviet	   government	   had	   delineated	   “hard”	   export	   currency	   to	  purchase	  around	  100	   Ikarus	  buses	  a	  year	   for	  Dushanbe,	   a	   funding	  pool	   that	  had	  now	  dried	  up	  entirely.	  74	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  even	   the	  Russian	   factories	   that	  produced	  spare	  parts	  were	  now	  demanding	  hard	  currency.	  	  Without	  any	  access	  to	  foreign	   currency,	   the	   only	   choice	   left	   was	   to	   barter:	   “Our	   people	   are	   sitting	   in	  Nizhnekamske,”	   the	   Ministry	   reported	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet,	   “and	   we’re	   even	  giving	   over	   our	   personal	   transport.	   	   We	   received	   permission	   to	   exchange	   one	  “Volga”	   automobile	   for	   500	   batteries.”75	  	   For	   the	   Hungarians,	   who	   were	   now	  demanding	   83,000	  US	   dollars	   for	   each	   bus	   (all	   foreign	   trade	   since	   January	   1992	  was	  conducted	  in	  dollars),	  the	  Tajik	  Cabinet	  of	  Ministers	  and	  the	  Tajik	  Aluminum	  Factory	   were	   coordinating	   on	   the	   possibility	   of	   bartering	   a	   thousand	   tons	   of	  aluminum.	  	  	  This,	  however,	  represented	  only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  the	  needed	  value	  –	  at	   1992	   market	   prices	   for	   raw	   aluminum,	   it	   would	   have	   represented	  approximately	  15	  Ikarus	  buses.76	  	  	  Yet	   there	  was	   little	  else	   that	   the	  Tajik	  government	  could	  do	  other	   than	  route	   the	  available	   thousand	   tons	  of	  aluminum	  “through	  an	  Austrian	   firm”	   to	  Hungary	  and	  receive	  a	  miserly	  number	  of	  buses	  and	  spare	  parts	  in	  return.	  	  Other	  than	  aluminum	  and	  cotton,	  Tajikistan	  had	  few	  other	  sources	  of	  hard	  currency	  –	  and	  cotton	  was	  no	  longer	  under	  state	  control,	  with	  state	  farms	  having	  received	  the	  right	  to	  freely	  sell	  their	   harvest	   in	   December	   1991.	   In	   practice,	   this	   meant	   that	   the	   entire	   cotton	  harvest	  had	  been	  bought	  up	  cheaply	  by	  private	  entrepreneurs	  and	  sold	  abroad	  in	  a	  way	   that	   brought	   little	   to	   the	   Tajik	   economy	   or	   budget.77	  	   Even	   aluminum	   sales	  never	   seemed	   to	  bring	   the	  expected	   returns.	   	  As	   the	  vice-­‐president	  of	  Tajikistan,	  Nazrullo	   Dustov,	   frustratedly	   exclaimed	   in	   January	   1992,	   “30	   million	   dollars	   of	  aluminum	   and	   cotton	   were	   sold,	   but	   the	   money	   just	   disappeared	   into	   thin	   air	  [pulro	  obu	  loi	  kard].”	  78	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1262,	  l.	  21;	  d.	  1271,	  l.	  50.	  	  75	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1262,	  l.	  21.	  	  76	  On	  the	  world	  market,	  raw	  aluminum	  cost	  approximately	  1200-­‐1250	  US	  dollars	  per	  metric	  ton	  in	  early	   1992	   (data	   from	   InfoMine.com).	   	   As	   the	   Tajik	   Supreme	   Soviet	   calculated,	   this	   would	   have	  provided	  only	  around	  1,400,000	  USD	  –	  far	  less	  than	  the	  12-­‐13	  million	  needed	  for	  buses	  and	  parts.	  	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1271,	  ll.	  49-­‐50.	  	  77	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1280,	  l.	  67.	  	  78	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev.	  33.	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Politicians	   were	   frustrated	   –	   this	   was	   not	   what	   they	   had	   had	   in	   mind	   when	  promoting	   “entrepreneurship”	   and	   individual	   business.	   They	   had	   assumed	   that	  “capitalism”	   would	   mean	   local	   production	   and	   the	   development	   of	   local	  enterprises.	   	   Yet	   this	   was	   not	   at	   all	   what	   they	   received.	   	   The	   cotton	   sector	  was	  highly	  representative	  of	  the	  broader	  situation	  in	  the	  Tajik	  economy	  in	  early	  1992,	  as	  market	  freedoms	  allowed	  businesses	  to	  increase	  their	  export	  of	  any	  and	  all	  raw	  materials	   in	  exchange	   for	  cash	  or	  prestige	  goods	   that	  could	  be	  sold	   for	  cash.	  The	  firm	   “Nuri	  Nav,”	   for	   example,	   exported	   onions,	   beans,	   cabbage,	   and	   other	   scarce	  foodstuffs	   to	   Russia	   and	   Afghanistan.	   	   In	   exchange	   they	   brought	   back	   a	   few	  imported	  washing	  machines,	  but	  largely	  pocketed	  the	  profits.	  	  This	  was	  harmful	  for	  the	  Tajik	  market,	  which	  needed	  imported	  electronics	  far	  less	  than	  it	  needed	  basic	  produce	   –	   but	   it	   was	   perfectly	   legal.	   	   As	   the	   director	   of	   Nuri	   Nav,	   Ruslan	  Abdurakhmanov,	  openly	  told	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	  at	  the	  end	  of	  January	  1992,	  “We	   sent	   80	   tons	   of	   cabbage	   and	   bought	   nothing…if	   deals	   are	   profitable,	  we	   do	  them,	  this	  is	  not	  violating	  the	  law.”79	  Many	  other	  firms	  engaged	  in	  similar	  business	  practices.	  Salt,	  bed	  sheets,	  nails,	  and	  electrical	  sockets	  were	  traded	  by	  the	  Kulyab-­‐based	   firm	  “Sorbon”	   to	  various	  Afghan	  partners	   in	  exchange	   for	  velour	  cloth	  and	  Japanese	  handkerchiefs,	  while	   the	  “Joint	  Soviet-­‐Dutch	  Enterprise	  Ramaks-­‐Nigina”	  exported	  143	  tons	  of	  apples,	  persimmons,	  grapes,	  and	  onions	  to	  Europe	  for	  cash.	  80	  	  Many	   of	   these	   new	   firms	   claimed	   they	   were	   benefitting	   Tajikistan	   by	   bringing	  significant	   tax	   revenue	   to	   the	   budget,	   but	   in	   practice	   they	   avoided	  paying	   either	  taxes	  on	  their	  profits	  or	  any	  sort	  of	  export	  tariffs.81	  	  	  	  	  Private	  businesses	  were	  starving	  the	  budget.	  They	  were	  also	  doing	  little	  to	  help	  the	  overall	  economy.	  	   	  By	  the	  end	  of	  January	  1992,	  production	  of	  all	  goods	  was	  down	  by	  18%	   from	  a	   year	   before,	   and	   the	  production	  of	   already	   scarce	   foodstuffs	   had	  decreased	  by	  224	  million	  rubles	  if	  compared	  to	  January	  1991.82	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  inflation	  was	  skyrocketing:	  having	  hit	  more	  than	  25%	  over	  the	  course	  of	  1991,	   it	  showed	   no	   sign	   of	   slowing	   its	   rise.	   Making	   the	   situation	   even	   worse,	   the	   Tajik	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Stenogrammai	  Majlisi	  Prezidiumii	  Shuroi	  Olii	  Jumhurii	  Tojikiston,	  30.01.1992,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1280,	  l.	  33.	  	  80	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1280,	  l.	  99.	  	  81	  See	   comments	   by	   the	   director	   of	   the	   export	   firm	   “Shark,”	   Nuriddin	   Khojaev,	   as	   quoted	   in	   M.	  Saifuddin	   and	   P.	   Saifuddin,	   “Esli	   sosed	   nuzhdaetsia,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   July	   17,	   1992.	   For	   the	  difficulties	  related	  to	  collecting	  tariffs	  and	  taxes,	  see	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1280,	  ll,	  94,	  99.	  	  82	  “O	   prognoze	   Gosudarstvennogo	   biudzheta	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistana	   na	   1992	   god,”	   TsGART	   f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1276,	  l.	  35.	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government	   had	   no	   levers	   over	   the	   monetary	   supply,	   which	   continued	   to	   be	  controlled	  by	  Moscow	  and,	  by	  January	  1992,	  by	  the	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Russia.	   	  With	  rubles	   bring	   printed	   in	  Moscow,	   Tajikistan	  was	   left	   to	   face	   the	   consequences	   of	  inflation	  without	  the	  benefits	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  capacity	  to	  print	  money	  to	  fulfill	  short-­‐term	  obligations.83	  	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  3:	  1991-­‐1992	  Republic	  of	  Tajikistan	  State	  Budget84	  	  Thus	   the	   Tajik	   government	  was	   under	   pressure	   to	   increase	   salaries,	   but	   had	   no	  money	  to	  do	  so;	  it	  was	  desperate	  to	  repair	  its	  public	  transport	  and	  provide	  services	  previously	   financed	  by	  Moscow,	  but	  equivalently	  had	  no	  source	  of	  revenue	  to	   fill	  this	  gap.	  	  It	  wasn’t	  even	  able	  to	  compile	  and	  pass	  a	  complete	  budget	  for	  the	  coming	  year.85	  	  With	  inflation	  projected	  by	  the	  Tajik	  Finance	  Ministry	  to	  hit	  100%	  in	  1992,	  the	   state	   found	   itself	   needing	   to	   somehow	   find	   more	   than	   12	   billion	   rubles	   in	  revenue	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.	  	  No	  one	  in	  the	  government	  had	  any	  idea	  how	  to	  do	  this,	   but	   extreme	   austerity,	   including	   the	   laying	   off	   of	   thousands	   of	   government	  workers,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  measures	  found.	  	  This	  was	  a	  painful	  idea,	  but	  the	  times	  were	  as	  desperate	  as	  anyone	  could	  remember.	  	  “Our	  situation	  is	  extreme,”	  Georgii	  Koshlakov,	  the	  former	  deputy	  chairman	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  told	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1991.	   	  “We	  have	  never	  before	  had	  this	  sort	  of	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situation.	   	   We	   stand	   before	   the	   inevitability	   of	   accepting	   extremes	   in	   order	   to	  survive.”	  86	  	  The	  Tajik	  state	  was	  now	  alone,	  independent,	  broke,	  and	  tottering.	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  With	  empty	  coffers	  and	  little	   idea	  of	  how	  to	  rule	  an	  independent	  country,	  Nabiev	  struggled	  to	  establish	  an	  effective	  government	  in	  the	  first	  months	  of	  1992.	  	  Many	  of	  his	   advisors	   later	   agreed,	   moreover,	   that	   his	   choices	   of	   political	   allies	   and	  appointees	  did	  not	  help	  matters.	   	  Akbar	  Mirzoev,	  whom	  Nabiev	  tapped	  to	  replace	  Izatullo	  Khayoev	  as	  Prime	  Minister	   in	   January	  1992	  was	   “an	  empty	   figure	   in	   the	  history	  of	  Tajik	  statehood,”	  and	  quickly	  gained	  a	  reputation	  for	  getting	  “sick”	  and	  disappearing	   whenever	   important	   decisions	   needed	   to	   be	   made.	   87 	  Nazrullo	  Dustov,	   picked	   by	   Nabiev	   as	   his	   vice-­‐presidential	   candidate	   in	   November	   1991	  because	  of	  his	  status	  as	  an	  industrial	  worker	  from	  the	  South	  of	  Tajikistan,	  proved	  a	  largely	   ineffectual	   political	   operative.	   Most	   problematic,	   however,	   was	   Safarali	  Kenjaev,	   the	  ambitious	   former	  prosecutor	  who	  had	   led	   the	  attacks	   that	   removed	  both	  Mahkamov	  and	  Aslonov	  from	  the	  Tajik	  presidency.	   	  Having	  helped	  organize	  Nabiev’s	   presidential	   campaign,	   Kenjaev	  was	   rewarded	   in	  December	   1991	  when	  he	  challenged	  Akbarsho	   Iskandarov	   for	   the	  Chairmanship	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Soviet.	  With	   Nabiev’s	   backing,	   he	   won	   handily	   on	   December	   2	   and	   quickly	   began	   to	  enforce	  his	  will	  on	  many	  political	  decisions.88	  	  With	  the	  effusive	  Kenjaev	  dominating	  internal	  politics	  and	  Mirzoev	  absent,	  Nabiev	  was	  largely	  left	  with	  the	  task	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Elected	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  closeness	  with	  Moscow,	  he	  ensured	  that	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	  quickly	  ratified	  the	  agreement	  creating	  the	  CIS	  and	  recognized	  the	  other	  CIS	  member	  states.89	  	  He	  also	  adhered	  closely	  in	  official	  statements	  to	  CIS	  policy	  announcements,	  and	  voiced	  faith	   in	   the	   CIS	   institutions	   that	   were	   supposed	   to	   take	   the	   place	   of	   Soviet	  coordinating	  bodies.	  Behind	  closed	  doors,	  however,	  he	  also	  sought	  out	  alternative	  regional	  partners,	  especially	  for	  industrial	  projects	  that	  Russia	  was	  no	  longer	  in	  a	  position	  to	  fund,	  such	  as	  the	  Rogun	  Hydroelectric	  Dam.	  	  With	  construction	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Stenogramma	  Zasedaniia	  Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,	  12.11.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1266,	  l.	  25.	  	  87	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  21;	  Kendzhaev,	  Perevorot,	  26,	  32,	  83.	  88	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1270,	  l.	  1.	  	  	  89	  Postanovlenie	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan	  No.	  25,	  25.12.1991,	  TsGART	   f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1633,	  ll.	  71,	  108.	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dam	  coming	  to	  a	  stop	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  funds,	  Nabiev	  met	  with	  a	  Pakistani	  delegation	  in	  December	   1991	   to	   discuss	   the	   possibility	   of	   outside	   financing.	   	   The	   Pakistanis	  expressed	  interest,	  but	  asked	  for	  guarantees	  of	  political	  stability.	  90	  	  	  Other	  powers	  were	  less	  finicky.	  	  Iran	  quickly	  established	  the	  first	  foreign	  embassy	  in	  Tajikistan	  in	  January	   1992	   and	   even	   before	   that	   had	   begun	   distributing	   aid	   in	   the	   country.91	  Nabiev’s	  government	  also	  moved	  to	  join	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  establish	  relations	  with	  a	  variety	  of	   foreign	  powers,	   including	   the	  United	  States,	  whose	  Secretary	  of	  State,	   James	   Baker,	   paid	   a	   cordial	   if	   inconclusive	   visit	   to	   Dushanbe	   in	   February	  1992.92	  	  For	   all	   of	   their	  willingness	   to	  meet	   and	   establish	   diplomatic	   relations,	   however,	  none	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  international	  partners	  backed	  up	  their	  words	  with	  pledges	  of	  financial	   support.	   	   Much	   as	   in	   Russia,	   international	   advisors,	   including	   from	   the	  IMF	   and	   World	   Bank,	   suggested	   cutting	   costs	   and	   promoting	   market	   relations,	  either	   unaware	   or	   unconcerned	   that	   these	   processes	   were	   already	   underway.93	  	  Foreign	  policy	  was	  unable	  to	  solve	  Tajikistan’s	   internal	   issues,	  and	  these	   internal	  issues	   continued	   to	   worsen.	   	   The	   state	   was	   largely	   paralyzed,	   with	   Russian	  specialists	  and	  government	  workers	  leaving	  in	  large	  numbers:	  in	  January	  1992,	  for	  example,	   the	   former	   2nd	   Secretary	   of	   the	   CPT,	   Genadii	   Veselkov,	   gave	   up	   his	  mandate	  as	  a	  Supreme	  Soviet	  deputy	  and	  retired	  to	  rural	  Russia.94	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	   of	   Tajikistan	   member	   V.I.	   Shashina	   also	   followed	   suit,	   citing	   her	   wish	   to	  move	   to	   the	   job	   of	   local	   district	   judge	   in	   the	   Russian	   city	   of	   Ulianovsk. 95	  	  Government	   agencies	   were	   founded	   slowly	   and	   inconsistently,	   with	   key	   organs,	  such	  as	  the	  Tax	  Service	  of	  Tajikistan,	  coming	  together	  as	  late	  as	  February	  1992.96	  With	   the	   budget	   still	   empty,	   moreover,	   it	   was	   sometimes	   unclear	   who	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Usmon,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  32;	  AKFD	  RT,	  0-­‐108396,	  k/ia	  В3	  02	  01.	  91 	  Interviews	   with	   Dushanbe	   residents,	   Dushanbe,	   September	   2016;	   Nazriev	   and	   Sattarov,	  
Respublika	  Tadzhikistan,	  125-­‐126.	  92	  “Poezdka	  Dzh.	  Beikera	  po	  Srednei	  Azii,”Krasnaia	  Zvezda,	  February	  14,	  1992.	  93	  In	  December	   1991,	   for	   example,	   Ishan	  Kapur,	   then	   head	   of	   the	   IMF’s	   Eurasia	   division,	   advised	  Nabiev	  to	  “liberalize	  prices,”	  “open	  up	  trade,”	  and	  “balance	  the	  budget.”	  See	  Nazriev	  and	  Sattarov,	  
Respublika	  Tadzhikistan,	  145.	  94	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  41,	  d.	  1633,	  l.	  338.	  	  95	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1281,	  ll.	  52-­‐53.	  	  96	  Proekt	   Zakona	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan	   “O	   gosudarstvennykh	   nalogovykh	   organakh	   Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,”	  TsGART	  f.	  297	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1287,	  ll.	  115-­‐128.	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supposed	  to	  staff	  the	  new	  agencies,	  although	  the	  employees	  of	  many	  different	  state	  agencies	  ended	  up	  working	  for	  months	  without	  pay	  throughout	  1992.97	  	  	  Political	   friction	   was	   also	   growing.	   	   	   Nabiev	   instituted	   a	   purge	   of	   Mahkamov	  appointees	  from	  his	  government	  and	  appointed	  a	  slate	  of	  new	  ministers	  in	  January	  1992,	   frustrating	   many	   of	   his	   former	   supporters.98	  	   With	   the	   loud	   and	   often	  impolite	  Kenjaev	  doing	   little	   to	  make	  political	   friends,	  Nabiev	   found	  himself	  with	  few	   links	   to	   the	   CPT	   or	   other	   pillars	   of	   institutional	   support.	   	   Watching	   the	  dysfunction	   in	   Dushanbe,	   moreover,	   the	   Gorno-­‐Badakhshon	   Autonomous	   Oblast	  (GBAO)	   in	   the	  Pamirs	  began	   to	  worry	  about	   its	   fate	  and	  place	   in	  an	   independent	  Tajikistan.	   	   Long	   supported	   financially	   by	   direct	   transfers	   from	   Moscow	   to	   the	  Oblast	   budget	   (via	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Moscow	   provision”	   [moskovskoe	  obespechenie])	  meant	  to	  support	  the	  far-­‐flung	  outpost	  on	  the	  Afghan	  and	  Chinese	  borders,	  GBAO	  now	   found	   itself	   adrift	   and	   its	   own	   budget	   empty.	   	   With	   its	   population	   a	   tiny	  proportion	   of	   the	   Tajik	   whole,	   the	   Pamiri	   peoples	   of	   GBAO	   had	   good	   reason	   to	  wonder	  where	  they	  might	  end	  up	  in	  an	  independent	  and	  “democratic”	  Tajikistan.	  	  In	   response	   to	   a	   large	   demonstration	   and	   overwhelming	   popular	   support,	   the	  Oblast	   parliament	   passed	   a	   resolution	   on	  December	  9,	   1991,	   convening	   on	   itself	  the	   status	   of	   “Autonomous	   Republic”	   and	   requesting	   that	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   of	  Tajikistan	   recognize	   it	   as	   the	   Gorno-­‐Badakhshon	   Autonomous	   Republic.	  99 	  	   It	  argued	  that	  this	  would	  help	  to	  bring	  investment	  to	  the	  region,	  as	  well	  as	  guarantee	  its	  legal	  rights.	  	  	  The	  Supreme	  Soviet	  failed	  to	  respond,	  leaving	  the	  question	  and	  the	  Oblast/Republic’s	   status	   unclear,	   as	   well	   as	   equally	   increasing	   tensions	   in	   the	  Pamirs.	  	  	  	  Outside	  of	  the	  halls	  of	  government	  and	  the	  parliament,	  however,	  the	  fundamental	  –	  and	   fundamentally	   unassailable	   –	   problem	   facing	   newly	   independent	   Tajikistan	  was	   the	   breakdown	   of	   social	   order.	   	   Economic	   degradation	   had	   slowly	   but	  inevitably	  bled	  into	  societal	  breakdown.	  	  Twenty	  percent	  of	  those	  surveyed	  in	  the	  fall	   of	   1991	  had	   said	   they	  were	   already	   “driven	   to	   the	   edge	  by	   the	  deteriorating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Workers	  have	  suggested	  that	  “this	  was	  the	  only	  thing	  to	  do.	  	  Sometimes	  we	  would	  receive	  food	  at	  work,	  at	  least.”	  	  See	  interviews	  with	  Dushanbe	  residents,	  Dushanbe,	  May	  2016-­‐September	  2017.	  98	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  292	  99	  Qarori	  Shuroi	  deputathoi	  khalqi	  viloiati	  mukhturi	  Kuhistoni	  Badakhshon	  Jumhirii	  Tojikiston	  “Dar	  borai	   tabdil	   dodani	   Viloiati	  mukhtori	   Kuhistoni	   Badakhshon	   ba	   Jumhuriiati	  mukhtori	   Kukhistoni	  Badakhshon	  dar	  khaiati	  Jumhurii	  Tojikiston,”	  09.12.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1274,	  l.	  260.	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economic	  situation”	  and	  matters	  had	  only	  gotten	  worse	  by	  January	  1992.100	  	  Crime	  was	  rising,	  as	  was	  drug	  use	  and	  trafficking,	  driven	  by	  “young	  people	  who	  make	  a	  living	   through	   the	  purchase,	  use,	  and	  sale	  of	  narcotics.”101	  	  With	  control	  over	   the	  Tajik-­‐Afghan	  border	   breaking	   down,	  more	   and	  more	   heroin	  was	  making	   its	  way	  into	   Tajik	   cities	   and	   providing	   a	   source	   of	   income	   for	   unemployed	   young	   men.	  	  Along	   with	   heroin	   use,	   alcohol	   abuse	   was	   also	   on	   the	   rise,	   as	   were	   cases	   of	  corruption	   and	   the	   abuse	   of	   authority	   on	   the	   part	   of	   police	   officers	   and	   other	  government	  figures.102	  	  With	  government	  employees	  and	  industrial	  workers	  alike	  out	   of	   work,	   food	   shortages	   a	   constant	   fact	   of	   life,	   and	   young	   people	   with	   few	  sources	  of	  hope	  to	  turn	  to,	  chaos	  seemed	  just	  around	  the	  corner.	   	  And	  yet	  Nabiev	  did	   little	   to	   alleviate	   people’s	   concerns,	   instead	   announcing	   on	  Republican	   radio	  that,	   “The	   republic	  has	  no	   reserves	  and	  no	  potential.”103	  Perhaps	  meaning	   to	   ask	  Tajikistan’s	   citizens	   to	   tone	   down	   their	   expectations	   of	   independence,	   Nabiev	  instead	  did	  little	  but	  fan	  the	  flames	  of	  social	  collapse.	  	  Coming	   to	  power	  on	   the	  cusp	  of	  Tajikistan’s	   independence,	  Nabiev,	  Kenjaev,	   and	  those	   around	   them	  were	   fundamentally	   unprepared	   to	   run	   a	   truly	   independent	  nation.	   	  Worse,	   they	   could	   hardly	   conceive	   of	  what	   it	  meant	   to	   be	   independent.	  	  Even	   as	   the	   USSR	   was	   collapsing	   around	   them,	   they	   continued	   to	   advocate	   for	  closer	  ties	  to	  Moscow.	   	  When	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  no	  longer	  existed,	  they	  replaced	  it	  with	   post-­‐Soviet	   Russia,	   retaining	   the	   same	   orientation	   towards	   Moscow.	   	   This	  focus	   on	   Moscow	   did	   not	   always	   lead	   to	   tangible	   benefits,	   but	   it	   organized	   the	  focus	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   early	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   policy,	  which	   remained	   directed	  towards	  finding	  outside	  sources	  of	  funding	  to	  fill	  its	  empty	  budget.	  Without	  a	  clear	  plan	   for	   independence,	   Nabiev’s	   government	   continued	   to	   operate	   even	   after	  December	   25,	   1991	   as	   though	   independence	   were	   somehow	   temporary	   or	  intangible.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  government	  inaction	  and	  dysfunction	  were	  the	  rule	  rather	  than	   the	   exception	   in	   the	   first	   days	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   independence.	   	   Government	  agencies	  were	  slow	  to	  be	  formed,	  slow	  to	  be	  staffed,	  and	  constantly	  unsure	  of	  their	  mandate.	  	  	  By	  February	  1992	  the	  outlines	  of	  a	  state	  were	  beginning	  to	  grow	  visible,	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  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  277.	  101	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1287,	  l.	  142.	  	  102	  Programma	   bor’by	   s	   prestupnost’iu	   i	   ukrepleniia	   pravoporiadka	   v	   Tadzhikskoi	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   na	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   op.	   40,	   d.	   1252,	   ll.	   53-­‐54;	   Protokol	   No.	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   Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	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  Soveta	  Respubliki	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  25.03.1992,	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but	   they	   remained	   pallid	   and	   in	   many	   places	   translucent.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  moreover,	   the	   economic	   downturn	   of	   1990-­‐1991	   had	   become	   a	   complete	  economic	   disaster.	   The	   citizens	   of	   Tajikistan	   met	   independence	   increasingly	  jobless,	  denied	  salaries,	  without	  basic	  goods,	  and	  standing	  in	  line	  for	  bread.	   	  This	  contradictory	   state	   of	   affairs,	   in	   which	   a	   paralyzed	   government	   stood	   over	   a	  disorganized	  and	  disintegrating	   society,	   could	  only	   last	   for	   so	   long;	   in	  practice	   it	  held	  together	  for	  all	  of	  two	  months	  until	  its	  collapse	  into	  violence	  in	  March	  1992.	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Chapter	  Nine	  
Empty	  Coffers	  and	  Populist	  Justice:	  The	  Final	  Road	  to	  Civil	  War	  
	  In	   the	   first	   weeks	   of	   May	   1992	   a	   young	   Tajik	   family	   found	   its	   short	   vacation	  harshly	   interrupted	   by	   the	   final	   collapse	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   social	   order.	   	   Driving	   to	  Kurgan-­‐Tyube	  from	  a	  long	  weekend	  away	  at	  their	  dacha,	  the	  family	  passed	  through	  the	   Gissar	   Valley	   that	   separated	   Dushanbe	   from	   the	   southern	   Khatlon	   region.	  	  Suddenly,	  as	  they	  crested	  a	  hill,	  their	  path	  was	  blocked	  by	  homemade	  barriers	  and	  a	   group	   of	   men	   with	   automatic	   rifles.	   	   The	   men	   forced	   them	   out	   of	   the	   car	   at	  gunpoint,	   confiscated	   their	   car	   and	   the	   boxes	   of	   strawberries	   that	   they	   had	  collected	  at	   the	  dacha,	   and	   left	   the	  young	   couple	   and	   their	   three	   children	  on	   the	  side	   of	   the	   road.	   	   The	   family	   was	   forced	   to	   ride	   to	   Dushanbe	   on	   a	   bus	   that	   the	  armed	  men	  also	  stopped,	  commandeered,	  and	  sent	  back	  up	  the	  road	  to	  the	  capital.	  	  	  	  At	  first,	  the	  family	  had	  no	  idea	  who	  these	  men	  were.	  	  Only	  the	  next	  day	  at	  work	  was	  the	  father,	  a	  leading	  surgeon	  in	  the	  republic,	  able	  to	  work	  out	  with	  his	  colleagues	  that	   the	   gunmen	  had	  been	  a	   group	   from	   the	   eastern	   region	  of	  Gharm	  associated	  with	  the	  new	  “Government	  of	  National	  Reconciliation”	  (Pravitel’stvo	  natsional’nogo	  
primireniia)	   that	  had	  come	  to	  power	  a	   few	  days	  before.	   	   	  The	  hospital’s	  chauffer,	  also	  from	  Gharm,	  volunteered	  to	  retrieve	  the	  surgeon’s	  car,	  and	  managed	  to	  bring	  it	   back	   that	   evening,	   along	   with	   some	   of	   the	   appropriated	   strawberries.	   	   The	  family,	  he	  told	  the	  surgeon,	  had	  ended	  up	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  a	  blockade:	  the	  new	  government	  had	  embargoed	  the	  entire	  Khatlon	  region	  and	  was	  not	  letting	  anyone	  in	   or	   out.	   	   In	  Tajikistan,	   a	   country	   almost	   entirely	   covered	  with	   high	  mountains,	  blocking	  a	  single	  road	  can	  be	  very	  effective.	  	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  blockade,	  the	  driver	   said,	   the	   situation	   was	   getting	   bad	   –	   violence	   was	   already	   flaring	   up	  between	   rival	   factions,	   although	   who	   exactly	   was	   shooting	   whom	   remained	  unclear.1	  	  Tajikistan	  had	  clearly	  tumbled	  over	  the	  precipice.	  	  Economic	  disorder	  and	  political	  paralysis	  had	  become	  utter	   social	   disintegration	   and	   the	   incipient	   sparks	  of	   civil	  war.	  	  	  Within	  the	  span	  of	  two	  months,	  from	  March	  to	  May	  1992,	  the	  government	  of	  Tajikistan	  had	  effectively	  collapsed,	  lost	  control	  of	  much	  of	  its	  territory,	  and	  could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Interviews	  and	  conversations	  with	  Tajikistan’s	  former	  head	  surgeon	  and	  his	  family,	  Dushanbe	  and	  Moscow,	  2013-­‐2016.	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no	  longer	  claim	  even	  a	  semblance	  of	  maintaining	  order.	  	  The	  new	  “Government	  of	  National	   Reconciliation”	   was	   ineffective	   and	   riddled	   with	   disorder	   and	  disagreement,	  combining	  elements	  of	  the	  old	  state	  with	  opposition	  politicians	  and	  activists.	  	  It	  also	  relied	  on	  unpredictable	  non-­‐state	  paramilitary	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Gharmis	  manning	  the	  Khatlon	  checkpoint;	  traditional	  police	  forces	  were	  nowhere	  to	  be	  seen.	   	   	  On	  the	  ground,	  people	  had	  begun	  to	  independently	  band	  together	  to	  protect	   themselves,	  choosing	   local	  and	  regional	   loyalties	  now	  that	   the	  republican	  state,	   and	   republican	   identity,	   had	   essentially	   failed.	   	   On	   the	   one	   side	   of	   the	  blockade	   were	   those	   supporting	   the	   new	   government,	   a	   group	   increasingly	  dominated	  by	  Pamiris	  and	  people	  from	  Gharm	  in	  the	  northeast;	  on	  the	  other	  side	  were	  the	  blockaded	  people	  of	  Khatlon	  and	  Kulyab.	  	  And	  everyone	  was	  increasingly	  angry	   and	   increasingly	   hungry,	   taking	   whatever	   possible	   to	   feed	   their	   families,	  even	  strawberries	  from	  other,	  equally	  confused	  and	  hungry,	  families.	  	  	  	  This	   final	   collapse	   into	   state	   failure	   and	   civil	   war	   happened	   too	   fast	   for	   most	  people	  in	  Dushanbe	  or	  elsewhere	  in	  Tajikistan	  to	  understand	  what	  was	  happening.	  By	   mid-­‐May	   there	   was	   no	   doubt	   that	   the	   country	   was	   at	   war	   with	   itself:	   the	  republic	   was	   literally	   split	   in	   half	   and	   sporadic	   violence	   was	   growing	   in	   both	  Dushanbe	  and	  across	   the	  Khatlon	  region.	   	  Yet	  who	  was	   fighting	  whom,	  and	  why,	  was	  not	  initially	  clear.	   	  As	  the	  years	  have	  passed,	  the	  basic	  facts	  of	  the	  civil	  war’s	  start	  have	  become	  more	  evident:	  the	  division	  into	  regional	  alliances,	  with	  Kulyab	  and	   the	   northern	   Khujand	   aligned	   against	   the	   Pamirs	   and	   Gharm;	   violence	  concentrated	  in	  the	  area	  around	  Kurgan-­‐Tyube	  in	  central	  Khatlon,	  with	  regionalist	  militias	   targeting	   those	   with	   the	   “wrong”	   backgrounds;	   depravity	   met	   with	  depravity	  and	  violence	  answered	  with	  violence.	  	  Why	  this	  had	  all	  started,	  however,	  has	  remained	  more	  controversial.	  	  	  	  As	  this	  dissertation	  has	  noted	  elsewhere,	  one	  series	  of	  works	  has	  held	  that	  without	  the	   authoritarian	   Soviet	   state	   and	   its	   institutions,	  Tajik	   regionalism	  and	   regional	  hatreds	   simply	  broke	   into	   the	  open	  –	   it	  was	  only	   a	  matter	  of	   time	  until	   violence	  would	  have	  erupted.2	  	  Other	  scholars,	  drawing	  on	  the	  insights	  of	  political	  science,	  have	   suggested	   that	   after	   the	   collapse	   of	   Soviet	   power	   politicians	   in	   Tajikistan	  were	  unable	  to	  make	  a	  deal	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  “rents”	   from	  industries	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Roy,	  New	  Central	  Asia;	  Dudoignion	  and	  Qalandar,	  “They	  Were	  All	  From	  the	  Country.”	  For	  a	  full	  list	  of	  representative	  sources,	  see	  this	  dissertation’s	  Introduction.	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agriculture.	  	  With	  strong	  incentives	  to	  “cheat”	  on	  any	  deal,	  these	  writers	  argue,	  and	  the	   Tajik	   economy	   dominated	   by	   labor	   and	   investment-­‐heavy	   goods	   such	   as	  cotton,	  violence	  quickly	  became	  the	  most	  rational	  choice	  for	  politicians	  in	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game.3	  	  	  As	  this	  chapter	  shows,	  however,	  the	  historical	  record	  tells	  a	  different	  story.	  	  When	  social	  order	  in	  Tajikistan	  finally	  collapsed	  into	  violence	  and	  chaos,	  it	  did	  so	  not	  as	  the	   result	   of	   long-­‐standing	   regional	   hatreds	   or	   feuds,	   and	   just	   as	   equally	   not	  because	  politicians	  were	  unable	  to	  share	  the	  meager	  post-­‐Soviet	  spoils	  they	  found	  on	  their	  territory.	  Both	  of	  these	  explanations	  tend	  to	  blend	  the	  causes	  of	  violence	  with	   their	   consequences:	   as	   the	   civil	   war	   began,	   so	   did	   regionalism	   and	   the	  division	   of	   spoils;	   neither	   phenomenon	   can	   be	   reliably	   identified	   prior	   to	   May	  1992.4	  	   Instead,	   Tajikistan’s	   government	   lost	   control	   of	   its	   people	   and	   territory,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  because	  by	  March	  1992	  there	  were	  basically	  no	  spoils	  available	  to	   divide.	   Economic	   collapse,	   combined	   with	   ongoing	   low-­‐level	   theft,	  embezzlement,	   and	   the	   completely	   legal	   (if	   unregulated)	   export	   of	   Tajikistan’s	  already	  limited	  produce	  had	  brought	  people	  to	  the	  edge.	  With	  unemployment	  and	  inflation	   soaring	   and	   basic	   standards	   of	   living	   flat-­‐lining,	   many	   of	   Tajikistan’s	  citizens	  were	  willing	  to	  turn	  to	  extremes	  and	  even	  violence	  if	  this	  would	  improve	  their	  lives.	  	  	  This	   was	   an	   ideal	   breeding	   ground	   for	   extreme	   populism.	   Politicians	   of	   all	  backgrounds	   took	   advantage	   of	   people’s	   anger,	   engaging	   in	   extremist	   behavior,	  provocative	   language,	   and	   calls	   for	   mass	   action	   in	   order	   to	   improve	   their	   own	  position.	   	  With	   effectively	  no	   state	   to	   stop	   it,	   this	  populism	  grew	   into	   competing	  crowds	   of	   tens	   of	   thousands	   that	   took	   over	   much	   of	   the	   capital	   and	   ultimately	  pushed	  the	  country	  into	  civil	  conflict.	  Once	  again,	  the	  government	  found	  that	  it	  had	  no	  resources	  available	  to	  calm	  the	  situation:	  the	  one	  Soviet	  military	  unit	  on	  Tajik	  territory,	  the	  201-­‐st	  Motorized	  Division,	  had	  somehow	  become	  “Russian”	  and	  took	  no	  part	  in	  the	  growing	  conflict.	  With	  no	  other	  significant	  armed	  units	  and	  thus	  no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Markowitz,	  State	  Erosion;	  Akbarzade,	  “Why	  did	  Nationalism”;	  Driscoll,	  Warlords	  and	  Coalition.	  4	  A	   number	   of	   sources	   have	   emphasized	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   regionalism	   grew	  out	   of,	   rather	   than	  caused,	   the	   conflict.	   	   See:	   Abashin,	   Natsionalizmy,	   235,	   238;	   Rubin,	   “The	   Fragmentation,”	   71;	  Epkenhans,	  Origins	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  8.	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monopoly	  on	  violence,	  the	  independent	  Tajik	  government	  could	  do	  little	  but	  watch	  as	  its	  citizens	  began	  murdering	  one	  another.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  none	  of	   this	  was	   inevitable.	   	  The	  collapse	   into	  violence	  and	  chaos	  was	  the	  result	  of	  individual	  decisions	  made	  by	  individual	  politicians	  and	  other	  leading	  members	  of	   society,	  which	   collectively	   led	   the	   country	   to	   the	   limn	  over	  which	   it	  dropped.	   	   As	   this	   chapter	   outlines,	   this	   included	   figures	   in	   Rahmon	   Nabiev’s	  government,	   as	   well	   as	   opposition	   politicians,	   all	   of	   whom	   were	   far	   more	  interested	   in	   short-­‐term	   political	   gains	   than	   considerations	   about	   the	   long-­‐term	  development	  of	  Tajikistan.	   	  And	   it	   included	  those	  who	  helped	  dictate	  Tajikistan’s	  defense	   policy,	   a	   strangely	   Soviet	   idea	   of	   “collective	   defense”	   for	   a	   post-­‐Soviet	  world	  order,	  which	  proved	  to	  deny	  Tajikistan	   the	  military	   forces	   that	  could	  have	  staved	   off	   the	   conflict.	   	   Together,	   it	   was	   these	   individual	   decisions	   and	   their	  consequences	  that	  brought	  Tajikistan	  to	  the	  edge	  of	  war	  by	  May	  1992.	  	  	  	  
I.	  A	  Search	  For	  Scapegoats	  In	   March	   1992,	   few	   people	   would	   have	   predicted	   that	   within	   two	   months	  Tajikistan	  would	  descend	  into	  civil	  war.5	  	  The	  situation,	  however,	  was	  clearly	  dire.	  	  President	   Nabiev’s	   administration	  was	   largely	   inactive,	  with	   the	   Prime	  Minister,	  Akbar	  Mirzoev,	  also	  continuing	  his	  policy	  of	  “recovering”	  from	  various	  illnesses	  in	  the	  hospital	   rather	   than	  attending	   to	   state	  business.6	  	  Other	  government	  officials	  took	   advantage	  of	   the	   ongoing	  paralysis	   to	   enrich	   themselves	   from	   state	   coffers,	  either	  directly	  or	  through	  the	  export	  of	  deficit	  goods.7	  	  Everyone	  kept	  waiting	  for	  Nabiev	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  situation,	  but	  he	  remained	  silent	  and	  inactive.	  One	  of	  Nabiev’s	  advisors,	  Ibrohim	  Usmonov,	  was	  later	  at	  a	  loss	  to	  explain	  his	  behavior.	  	  No	  matter	  what	  happened	  around	  Nabiev,	  Usmonov	  said,	  “he	  never	  said	  ‘don’t	  do	  this,	  that’s	   not	   good,’	   –	   I	   don’t	   know	   if	   this	  was	  politesse	   [madaniiatnoky],	   or	   fear,	   or	  callousness.”8	  	  No	  matter	  Nabiev’s	  reasoning,	  his	  inactivity	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  much	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  government.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Notwithstanding	  many	  claims	  to	  the	  contrary,	  practically	  no	  one	  did	  predict	  the	  war,	  even	  as	  late	  as	   March	   1992.	   	   As	   Gillian	   Tett	   notes	   in	   her	   first-­‐hand	   account,	   moreover,	   even	   many	   of	   the	  participants	   in	  political	  protests	  assumed	  they	  would	  end	  without	  violence.	   	  See:	  Tett,	  Ambiguous	  
Alliances,	  200.	  6	  Kendhaev,	  Perevorot,	  32.	  7	  Dustov,	  Zahm	  bar	  jismi,	  20-­‐21;	  Davlat,	  “Maqsud	  Ikromov.”	  8	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  48.	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Inaction,	  unfortunately,	  was	   the	   last	   thing	   that	  Tajikistan	  needed	   in	  March	  1992.	  	  Something	  absolutely	  needed	  to	  be	  done	  with	  the	  economy,	  which	  was	  simply	  no	  longer	  functioning,	  leaving	  men	  of	  all	  ages	  out	  of	  work	  and	  increasingly	  angry.	  	  The	  state	  had	  no	  money	  to	  pay	  these	  workers,	  nor	  any	  capacity	  to	  create	  jobs	  for	  them;	  its	   attempts	   to	   acquire	   foreign	   investiture	   and	   aid	   had	   equally	   failed.	   	   Simple	  foodstuffs	   and	   other	   goods	   continued	   to	   leave	   Tajikistan’s	   markets	   in	   massive	  quantities,	  leaving	  the	  citizens	  of	  Dushanbe	  and	  other	  cities	  to	  stand	  in	  breadlines	  for	  hours	  at	  a	   time.	  With	   little	  alternative,	   the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  of	   the	  Republic	  of	  Tajikistan	   began	   to	   discuss	   an	   “unbacked	   [bezresursnaia]	   credit	   emission”	   –	   in	  other	   words,	   releasing	   reserves	   of	   increasingly	   valueless	   paper	   money.	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  when	  money	  began	  to	  be	  released	  in	  April	  1992,	  it	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  forcing	  inflation	  even	  higher.	  	  	  But	  without	  money	  of	  some	  sort,	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  had	  no	  idea	  how	  else	  to	  pay	  for	  “grain,	  medical	  supplies,	  energy	  sources”	  and	  other	  basic	  goods.	  9	  	  Without	  outside	   funding	  –	   something	   independent	  Tajikistan	  was	  now	  unable	   to	  rely	  upon	  –	  there	  seemed	  no	  way	  to	  guarantee	  economic	  improvements.	  	  With	  no	  solution	  available,	  Tajikistan’s	  politicians	  turned	  to	  finding	  those	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  current	  situation.	  	  	  The	  Supreme	  Soviet	  tightened	  laws	  on	  public	  speech,	  making	  it	  possible	   to	   imprison	   an	   individual	   for	   up	   to	   three	   years	   for	   public	   acts	   of	  defamation	   or	   slander	   [oskorblenie].10	  	   Contemporaneously	   in	   February	   1992,	  Kenjaev	  brought	  a	  court	  case	  against	  the	  deputy	  chairman	  of	  Rastokhez,	  Mirbobo	  Mirrahim,	   accusing	  him	  of	   slander.	   	  Mirrahim	  was	   found	  guilty	   and	  given	  a	   two-­‐year	  “probationary”	  [Taj.	  ta’’viq	  aftod	  /	  Rus.	  uslovnii]	  sentence	  that	  kept	  him	  out	  of	  prison	  but	   required	  him	  to	  avoid	  any	  public	  pronouncements	  on	  Kenjaev	   for	   the	  two-­‐year	  period.11	  	  This	   effectively	   removed	  him	   from	  politics,	   and	  gave	  Kenjaev	  space	  to	  lambast	  Mirrahim	  and	  Rastokhez	  without	  worrying	  about	  return	  volleys.	  	  With	   Mirrahim	   sidelined,	   Kenjaev	   turned	   his	   attention	   to	   Maqsud	   Ikromov,	   the	  liberal	   mayor	   of	   Dushanbe	   who	   had	   sided	   with	   the	   opposition	   during	   the	  September	  1991	  protests.	  	  As	  Ikromov	  was	  also	  a	  Supreme	  Soviet	  deputy,	  Kenjaev	  first	  arranged	  a	  vote	  on	  March	  8	  to	  remove	  his	  parliamentary	  immunity,	  and	  then	  had	  Ikromov	  arrested	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  in	  front	  of	  the	  assembled	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Postanovlenie	  VS	  RT	  “O	  kreditnoi	  emissii,”	  06.04.1992,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1295,	  l.	  41.	  	  10	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1291,	  l.	  6.	  	  11	  Mirrahim,	  Hamtabaqi	  Shodmon	  Yusuf,	  74.	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deputies.	  	  Officially	  charged	  with	  corruption,	  Ikromov’s	  arrest	  was	  meant	  to	  show	  the	  state’s	  efforts	  to	  reestablish	  order	  in	  the	  face	  of	  growing	  economic	  and	  social	  disintegration.12	  	  	  	  Kenjaev,	  however,	  did	  not	  stop	  here.	  	  Mirrahim	  and	  Ikromov	  remained	  secondary	  figures,	   and	   their	   arrests	   did	   not	   in	   any	   obvious	   way	   put	   a	   halt	   to	   the	   state	  paralysis	  on	  view	  in	  Dushanbe.	  	  Personally	  ambitious,	  moreover,	  Kenjaev	  appears	  to	  have	  sought	  additional	  venues	  to	  publicize	  his	  political	  leadership	  and	  status	  a	  “law-­‐bringer”	   in	   increasingly	   lawless	   Tajikistan.13	  	   Success	   with	   Mirrahim	   and	  Ikromov	   incentivized	   further	   scapegoating,	   rather	   than	   a	   search	   for	   long-­‐term	  solutions	  to	  Tajikistan’s	  economic	  and	  social	  problems.	  	  Since	  no	  one	  in	  Dushanbe	  could	  as	  of	  yet	  cogently	  express	  an	  independent	  path	  out	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  problems,	  populist	  appeals	  to	  the	  masses	  through	  the	  arrest	  and	  prosecution	  of	  supposedly	  corrupt	  politicians	  must	  have	  seemed	  one	  of	  a	  few	  possible	  ways	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  
	  Kenjaev’s	  final	  –	  and	  most	  significant	  –	  salvo	  came	  on	  March	  25,	  when	  he	  launched	  a	  multi-­‐pronged	  attack	  on	  Mamadayoz	  Navjuvanov,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Internal	  Affairs	  (MIA).	   	   Accusing	   Navjuvanov	   of	   “dishonesty,“	   “flagrant	   mistakes,”	   and	  “incompetent	  leadership,”	  Kenjaev	  leveled	  a	  series	  of	  detailed	  accusations	  against	  him.14	  	  First,	  he	  said,	  Navjuvanov	  had	  not	   taken	  seriously	   the	   level	  of	  disorder	   in	  the	   republic,	   especially	   a	   series	   of	   disturbances	   that	   had	   broken	   out	   in	   Kurgan-­‐Tyube	   Oblast	   in	   December	   1991.	   	   On	   December	   15,	   1991,	   a	   demonstration	  was	  held	  in	  Kurgan-­‐Tyube’s	  Kumsangir	  District,	  organized	  by	  the	  local	  branches	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	  (DPT),	  Rastokhez,	  and	  the	  Islamic	  Revival	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan	  (IRPT).	   	  Decrying	  the	   level	  of	  economic	  degradation	   in	   the	  district,	   the	  demonstration	  lasted	  three	  days	  and	  ultimately	  forced	  the	  local	  District	  Chairman,	  a	  certain	  Rakhmatov,	  to	  leave	  his	  post.15	  No	  one	  was	  arrested	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  the	  Supreme	   Soviet	   had	   later	   asked	   Navjuvanov	   to	   fire	   the	   local	   MIA	   officials	  responsible	  for	  Kumsangir	  District.	  	  Since	  Navjuvanov	  had	  instead	  chosen	  to	  issue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Sh.	  Karimov,	  “Zamin	  ba	  “Kulak,”	  Maqsud	  Ikramov	  ba	  khabs,”	  Javononi	  Tojikiston,	  March	  10,	  1992;	  A.	   Akhmedov,	   “Priamo	   v	   zale	   zasedanii,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   March	   09,	   1992.	   Although	  infrequently	  mentioned,	  there	  was	  good	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  charges	  against	  Ikromov.	  13	  Kenjaev	  later	  emphasized	  his	  work	  passing	  laws	  and	  prosecuting	  law-­‐breakers;	  see	  Kendzhaev,	  
Perevorot,	  6-­‐12.	  14 	  Protokol	   no.	   101	   Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan,	  25.03.1992,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1294,	  ll.	  11,	  13.	  15	  Protokol	  no.	  78	  Zasedaniia	  Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,	  21.12.1991,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1274,	  l.	  4.	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warnings	  to	  these	  officials,	  Kenjaev	  accused	  him	  of	  disobedience;	  he	  was,	  after	  all,	  answerable	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet.	  	  In	  addition,	  Kenjaev	  declared,	  Navjuvanov	  had	  allowed	   “egregious	   violations	   of	   the	   law”	   to	   fester	   in	   the	   MIA.	   	   As	   an	   example,	  Kenjaev	   pointed	   to	   an	   investigation	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet,	   which	   had	   found	  “audacious	  facts	  of	  ministry	  automobiles	  being	  embezzled,”	  involving	  the	  personal	  sale	  of	  139	  cars	  by	  MIA	  officials.16	  	  	  Not	  only	  was	  Navjuvanov	  failing	  to	  keep	  others	  from	  undermining	  the	  fledgling	  Tajik	  state,	  Kenjaev	  implied	  –	  but	  he	  himself	  was	  corrupt	  as	  well,	  stealing	  the	  few	  resources	  that	  remained.	  	  	  	  Navjuvanov	  was	  taken	  aback,	  and	  his	  response	  to	  these	  accusations	  made	  it	  clear	  that	   he	   had	   not	   expected	   anything	   of	   this	   sort	  when	   he	   arrived	   at	   the	   Supreme	  Soviet	   that	   morning.	   	   “I	   don’t	   agree	   [with	   this],”	   he	   said,	   “Let’s	   form	   a	  commission….	  I’m	  not	  prepared	  to	  answer.	  	  I	  ask	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Presidium	  to	  hold	  off	   until	   the	  next	   session.”	  17	  	  And	   then,	   quite	  unexpectedly	   and	   a	  propos	  of	  nothing,	   Navjuvanov	   exclaimed:	   “I	   feel	   that	   there	   is	   a	   witch-­‐hunt	   against	   the	  mountain	  people,	  in	  part	  the	  Pamiris.”	  18	  	  With	  the	  discussion	  heating	  up,	  and	  with	  Supreme	   Soviet	   deputies	   suggesting	   that	   he	   was	   “destabilizing	   the	   political	  situation	  in	  the	  republic,”	  19	  Navjuvanov	  only	  grew	  angrier.	  	  “Stop	  persecuting	  me,	  and	   stop	   encouraging	   nationalism,”	   he	   said,	   “You	   haven’t	   brought	   the	  mountain	  people	   to	   their	   knees,	   but	   you	   hate	   us,	   and	   dishonor	   us	   everywhere.”	   20	  	  Notwithstanding	   Navjuvanov’s	   protests	   and	   accusations	   of	   discrimination,	  however,	  the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  followed	  Kenjaev’s	   lead	  and	  voted	  to	  request	  that	  Preisdent	  Nabiev	  remove	  Navjuvanov	  from	  his	  post	  as	  Minister	  of	  Internal	  Affairs.	  21	  	  Unusually,	   this	   session	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   had	   been	   taped	   and	   shown	   on	  republican	   TV,	   meaning	   that	   much	   of	   the	   Tajik	   public	   was	   exposed	   to	   both	   the	  accusations	   made	   against	   Navjuvanov	   and	   his	   angry	   response.	  22	  	   Kenjaev	   may	  have	  arranged	  this	  to	  highlight	  his	  populist	  activities	  in	  parliament,	  but	  it	   instead	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  TsGART	  f	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1294,	  ll.	  11-­‐14.	  	  17	  Stenogrammai	   Majlisi	   Prezidiumi	   Shuroi	   Olii	   Tojikiston,	   25.03.1992,	   TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	  1294,	  ll.	  45-­‐46.	  	  18	  Ibid.,	  l.	  47.	  	  19	  Ibid.,	  l.	  53.	  	  20	  Ibid.,	  l.	  61.	  	  21	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1294,	  l.	  15.	  	  22 	  Protokol	   no.	   102a	   Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan	  dvenadtsatogo	  sozyva,	  02.04.1992,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1295,	  l.	  67.	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had	   the	   ultimate	   consequence	   of	   bringing	   into	   the	   open	   a	   burgeoning	   conflict	  between	   the	   eastern	   Pamir	   region	   and	   the	   central	   government	   in	   Dushanbe.	  	  Initially,	   there	   seemed	   no	   cause	   for	   Navjuvanov’s	   outburst:	   although	   heavy-­‐handed,	   there	  was	  nothing	   insulting	  or	  discriminatory	   in	  Kenjaev’s	  accusations.23	  	  The	  majority	  of	  television	  viewers	  also	  saw	  little	  cause	  for	  Navjuvanov’s	  anger,	  as	  did	  many	  politicians.24	  	   It	  was	  as	   if,	  Usmonov	  wrote,	   “Navjuvanov	  had	   turned	  his	  personal	  problem	  into	  a	  regional	  problem.”25	  Navjuvanov’s	  reaction,	  however,	  was	  not	   entirely	   baseless.	   	   For	   the	   past	   few	   months,	   Pamiris	   had	   been	   increasingly	  worried	  about	  their	  status	  in	  independent	  Tajikistan.	  	  The	  request	  for	  the	  Pamiri’s	  Gorno-­‐Badakhshan	   Autonomous	   Oblast	   (GBAO)	   to	   be	   granted	   Autonomous	  Republic	  status	  (see	  Chapter	  Eight)	  had	  gone	  unanswered	  for	  months,	  only	  to	  be	  dismissed	   in	   early	   March	   as	   too	   expensive	   and	   unnecessary.	  26	  	   	   A	   group	   of	  parliamentary	   deputies	   from	   GBAO,	   including	   Akbarsho	   Iskandarov,	   the	   deputy	  chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  officially	  protested	  this	  decision	  on	  March	  14,	  but	  this	  also	  went	  unanswered.27	  	  Navjuvanov	  was	  also	  correct	  to	  point	  out	  that	  one	  of	  the	  subordinates	  he	  had	  been	   told	   to	   fire	  was	  also	  a	  Pamiri.	   	  Kenjaev’s	  populism	  had	  managed	  to	  stray	  into	  very	  sensitive	  territory.	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  Just	   how	   sensitive,	   moreover,	   became	   clear	   the	   very	   next	   day.	   	   On	  March	   26,	   a	  group	   of	   a	   few	   hundred	   Pamiris	   gathered	   on	   Shakhidon	   Square	   in	   front	   of	   the	  former	   Central	   Committee	   (now	   Presidential	   Apparatus)	   building.	   Incensed	   by	  Kenjaev’s	   comments,	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Pamiri	   cultural	   organization	   La’’li	  Badakhshon,	  Atobek	  Amirbek,	   had	  helped	   to	   organize	   the	   protest	   and	  mobilized	  many	   of	   its	   members	   to	   the	   square.28 	  	   The	   protesters	   demanded	   Kenjaev’s	  immediate	  resignation	  and	  Navjuvanov’s	  retention	  as	  Minister	  of	   Internal	  Affairs.	  Very	  quickly	  the	  Vice	  President,	  Nazrullo	  Dustov,	  was	  sent	  out	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  crowd	  and	   assure	   them	   that	   their	   concerns	   would	   be	   considered	   appropriately.	   	   This	  seemed	  to	  calm	  the	  crowd,	  and	  by	  the	  evening	  the	  square	  had	  emptied.	  At	  the	  same	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Claims	   to	   the	   contrary,	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	  of	   this.	  Cf.	  Epkenhans,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  223,	  following	  Sohibnazar,	  Subhi	  sitorakush,	  273.	  24	  Dustov,	  Zahm	  bar	  jismi,	  31.	  25	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  31.	  26	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1289,	  ll.	  2,	  8-­‐9.	  27	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1293,	  l.	  12.	  28	  Otambek	  Mastibekov,	  Leadership	  and	  Authority	  in	  Central	  Asia:	  An	  Ismaili	  Community	  in	  Tajikistan	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2014),	  115.	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time,	   however,	   the	   political	   opposition	   sensed	   an	   important	   opportunity:	   it	   was	  not	  just	  Pamiris,	  but	  in	  fact	  wide	  swaths	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  society	  that	  were	  frustrated	  with	   the	   government.	   	   The	   leaders	   of	   the	   DPT,	   IRPT,	   and	   Rastokhez	   spent	   the	  evening	  of	  the	  26th	  coordinating	  with	  La’’li	  Badakhshon,	  and	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  the	  27th	   Nabiev’s	   administration	   was	   surprised	   by	   an	   even	   larger	   crowd	   on	   its	  doorstep.	  29	  	   Now,	   moreover,	   the	   protesters	   were	   demanding	   more	   than	   just	  Kenjaev’s	   resignation:	   they	   wanted	   the	   entire	   government,	   including	   Nabiev,	   to	  leave,	  and	  a	  new	  constitution	  written.	  	  They	  were	  asking,	  in	  short,	  for	  a	  completely	  new	  order,	  and	  as	  the	  day	  passed	  –	  and	  then	  days	  passed	  –	  their	  number	  grew	  into	  the	  many	  thousands.30	  	  As	   the	   opposition	   had	   calculated,	   a	   great	   number	   of	   people	   were	   angry	   enough	  with	   Nabiev	   and	   Kenjaev’s	   government	   to	   publicly	   protest.	   	   They	   came	   to	   the	  protests,	  moreover,	  from	  across	  the	  country.	  	  Groups	  of	  protesters	  were	  identified	  from	   Kulyab,	   Shaartuz,	   Kumsangir	   and	   Kurgan-­‐Tyube	   in	   the	   south,	   Penjikent,	  Khujand,	   Ura-­‐Tyube,	   and	   Isfara	   in	   the	   north,	   and	   from	   Gharm	   and	   GBAO	   in	   the	  east.31	  	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  level	  of	  widespread	  anger	  was	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  sense	  the	  government	  was	  overstepping	   its	  bounds	   in	   its	  search	   for	   those	   to	  blame	   for	  the	  current	  crisis.	  	  “People	  are	  not	  so	  much	  condemning	  the	  particular	  attempts	  to	  get	   rid	   of	   Ikromov,	  Navjuvanov,	   or	  Mirrahimov,”	   the	  opposition	  politician	  Davlat	  Khudonazarov	   told	   a	   journalist	   on	   Shakhidon	   Square	   in	   front	   of	   the	   former	   CPT	  Central	  Committee	  building	  on	  March	  27,	  “so	  much	  as	  they	  are	  upset	  by	  attempts	  to	   ignore	   the	   law.”	   32 	  Rather	   than	   pass	   laws	   to	   help	   average	   Tajik	   citizens,	  Khudonazarov	  argued,	  politicians	  were	  bending	  the	  existing	  laws	  to	  exact	  revenge	  on	  their	  political	  enemies.	  	  For	   many	   of	   the	   protesters	   themselves,	   however,	   much	   more	   prosaic	   concerns	  dominated	  their	  thinking.	  	  “Prices	  have	  skyrocketed,”	  one	  demonstrator	  said,	  “and	  we	   cannot	   feed	   our	   children	   or	   buy	   them	   new	   clothing.”33	  	   Another	   protester,	  Balajon	  Bobiev,	  an	  older	  man,	  complained:	  “Over	  the	  past	   few	  months	   I	  have	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Kendzhaev,	  Perevorot,	  23;	  Sohibnazar,	  Subhi	  sitorakush,	  274-­‐276.	  30	  Around	  5,000	  strong	  in	  its	  first	  days.	  	  See	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  39.	  31	  V.	   Slezko,	   “Reportazh	   s	   ploshchadi.	   “Ne	   prichini	   zla	   blizhnemu,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   April	   14,	  1992;	   A.	   Liubimenko,	   “Reportazh	   s	   ploshchadi.	   Parlament	   –	   v	   otstavku.	   A	   dal’she?”	   Vechernii	  
Dushanbe,	  April	  15,	  1992.	  	  32	  A.	  Khodzhaev,	  “Posle	  teleperedachi	  –	  na	  miting,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  March	  30,	  1992.	  	  33	  A.	  Liubimenko,	  “Budet	  li	  dostignut	  kompromiss?”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  April	  03,	  1992.	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once	  received	  my	  salary.”	  34	  Even	  those	  who	  were	  paid	  could	  not	  make	  ends	  meet.	  	  	  A	  driver	  at	  the	  protest,	  A.	  Yusupov,	  noted	  that	  with	  inflation	  his	  500	  ruble	  salary	  was	  hardly	  enough	  to	  feed	  his	  ten	  children.	  And	  there	  was	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  injustice	  amongst	   the	  protesters	  when	   they	   thought	  about	   the	  new	  economic	  order.	   	   “The	  deputies	  sitting	  in	  their	  chairs	  receive	  much	  more	  than	  me,”	  Yusupov	  said,	  “how	  is	  this	  just?”	  35	  Mirzo	  Khakimov,	  a	  veteran	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  outlined	  similar	  motivations	  for	  joining	  the	  protest:	  	  
“I	   work	   in	   the	   cotton	   fields,	   and	   earn	   300-­‐400	   rubles	   [a	   month].	   The	  
sovkhoz	  chairman	  takes	  the	  cotton.	  	  He	  gives	  it	  to	  the	  district,	  the	  district	  
to	  the	  oblast,	  and	  the	  oblast	  to	  the	  state.	  	  The	  state	  sells	  it	  abroad	  and	  they	  
send	  us	   in	  exchange,	   for	  example,	  pretty	  coats.	   	  Look,	  you	  have	  one.	   	  The	  
other	  guy	  has	  one.	  	  But	  I	  don’t	  have	  one.	  	  That	  is	  not	  just.	  	  Those	  who	  didn’t	  
work	  received	  them.	  	  And	  this	  is	  wrong.”	  36	  	  While	   Khakimov’s	   understanding	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   new	   market	   system	   was	  somewhat	  inaccurate,	  he	  clearly	  understood	  its	  consequences:	  he	  worked	  and	  got	  poorer,	  and	  others	  got	  rich.	  He	  represented	  a	  great	  many	  of	  the	  protesters	  –	  people	  “who	  were	  far	  from	  politics,	  and	  thought	  little	  of	  it,	  but	  knew	  the	  price	  of	  bread.”37	  	  It	   was	   the	   government’s	   apparent	   inability	   to	   improve	   the	   economy	   that	   had	  brought	  the	  protesters	  out	  in	  such	  numbers.	  “Every	  one	  of	  them	  wants	  to	  improve	  their	   standard	   of	   living,”	   a	   journalist	   summarized,	   “and	   having	   failed	   to	   receive	  this”	   from	  Tajikistan’s	  current	  rulers,	   they	  were	  now	  turning	  to	  the	  opposition.	  38	  	  Populism	   was	   met	   with	   populism,	   as	   opposition	   leaders,	   including	   Rastokhez’s	  Tohir	  Abdujabbor,	   the	   IRPT’s	  Davlat	  Usmon,	   and	  Amirbek	   from	  La’’li	   Badakshon	  camped	  out	  with	  the	  protesters	  on	  Shakhidon	  Sqaure	  and	  passed	  their	  demands	  in	  written	  form	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  deputies	  at	  work	  down	  the	  street.	  39	  	  The	  deputies	  received	  the	  demonstrators’	  growing	  lists	  of	  demands,	  which	  by	  April	  7	  now	  included	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  entire	  parliament.	  40	  	  Yet	  no	  one	  knew	  how	  to	  respond.	   	   Nabiev	   declared	   that	   as	   President	   he	   did	   not	   have	   the	   authority	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  A.	   Shermatov,	   “Reportazh	   s	   ploshchadi.	   “Idoma-­‐	   prodolzhenie,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   April	   17,	  1992.	  	  35	  A.	  Shermatov,	  “Blitz-­‐interv’iu.	  Shto	  dumaiu	  o	  mitinge,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  April	  13,	  1992.	  	  36	  A.	  Khodzhaev,	  “Kazhdyi	  sam	  sebe	  politik,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  April	  07,	  1992.	  	  37	  Ibid.	  	  38	  “Rastet	  chislo	  zhertv,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  12,	  1992.	  	  39	  For	  example,	  “Ba	  rayosati	  Shuroi	  Olii	  Tojikiston,”	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1295,	  l.	  29.	  	  40	  Protokol	   zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan	   dvenadtsatogo	  sozyva,	  07.04.1992,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1295,	  l.	  45.	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dissolve	  parliament,	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  determined	  that	  the	  law	  did	  not	  give	  it	   or	   its	   Presidium	   the	   right	   to	   dissolve	   itself.	   The	   only	   options,	   some	   deputies	  suggested,	  were	  either	  to	  pass	  a	  new	  constitution	  that	  would	  provide	  a	  legal	  route	  for	  parliamentary	  dissolution,	   or	   to	   conduct	   a	   referendum	  on	   the	   subject.	  41	  	   The	  deputies	  appealed	   to	  Nabiev	   for	  advice,	  but	  he	  brushed	   them	  off,	   citing	  his	   “own	  plans”	   for	   dealing	   with	   the	   demonstrators.	  42 	  	   At	   a	   loss,	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	  promised	  the	  crowd	  that	  it	  would	  consider	  its	  demands	  at	  the	  next	  session	  on	  April	  11.	  	  It	  also	  declared	  that	  a	  referendum	  would	  be	  held,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  this	  would	  convince	  the	  protesters	  to	  go	  home.	  43	  	  Perhaps	  sensing	  the	  disingenuousness	  of	  the	  deputies’	  last	  promise,	  the	  protesters	  not	  only	  stayed	  put,	  but	  also	  expanded	  south	  to	  Ozody	  Square	  (“Freedom	  Square,”	  formerly	   Lenin	   Square)	   in	   front	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   building.	   	   	   This	   started	   a	  week-­‐long	   game	  of	   populist	   intransigence,	  where	   each	   side	   accused	   the	   other	   of	  refusing	   to	   compromise	   and	   of	   derailing	   the	   political	   process.	   	   The	   deputies	  refused	  to	  hold	  a	  session	  of	  Parliament,	  citing	  the	  “political	  pressure”	  they	  felt	  from	  the	  crowd	  outside.	  44	  	  The	  leaders	  of	  the	  opposition	  on	  Ozody	  Square,	  for	  their	  part,	  refused	  to	  leave,	  suggesting	  that	  otherwise	  their	  demands	  would	  not	  be	  discussed.	  	  When	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   did	   finally	  meet	   on	  April	   20,	   it	   proved	   the	   opposition	  right,	   deciding	   it	   was	   “unnecessary	   to	   include”	   the	   protesters’	   demands	   in	   their	  work.45	  	   Kenjaev	   demonstratively	   offered	   his	   resignation,	   knowing	   full	   well	   that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  deputies	  continued	  to	  support	  him:	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  summarily	  voted	  to	  retain	  him	  as	  Chairman.46	  	  Finding	   their	   legal	   path	   to	   change	   stymied	   by	   the	   conservative	   majority	   of	   the	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  the	  demonstrators	  turned	  to	  extralegal	  means.	  	  On	  the	  evening	  of	  April	  21,	  they	  blockaded	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  stopping	  anyone	  from	  leaving.	  	  They	  also	  took	  hostage	  around	  15	  members	  of	  parliament,	  to	  whom	  they	  threatened	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Ibid.,	  l.	  67.	  	  42	  Ibid.	  43	  Ibid.,	  l.	  47.	  44	  TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1295,	   ll.	   27-­‐28;	   N.	   Sukhacheva,	   “O	   sessii,	   kotoroi	   ne	   bylo,”	  Vechernii	  
Dushanbe,	  April	  13,	  1992.	  	  45	  “Informatsionnoe	  soobshchenie,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  April	  21,	  1992.	  	  46	  Kendzhaev,	  Perevorot,	  40.	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do	  violence	  if	  Kenjaev	  were	  not	  to	  resign	  from	  his	  position.	  47	  	  Under	  pressure	  from	  all	   sides,	  on	   the	  morning	  of	  April	  22	  Kenjaev	   formally	   submitted	  his	   resignation,	  which	   was	   this	   time	   accepted	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet.48	  	   Following	   extended	  negotiations	  with	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  opposition	  parties	  (who	  continued	  to	  act	  as	  the	  “representatives	  of	  the	  demonstrators”),	  Nabiev’s	  government	  also	  signed	  a	  formal	  agreement	   that	   obligated	   it	   to	   form	   a	   constitutional	   commission,	   set	   new	  parliamentary	  elections,	  reconsider	  GBAO’s	  legal	  status,	  and	  refrain	  from	  any	  legal	  prosecution	   of	   the	   last	   month’s	   demonstrators.	   	   In	   return,	   the	   demonstrators	  promised	   to	   leave	   Shakhidon	   Square	   and	   finally	   go	   home.49	  	   All	   of	   the	   hostages	  were	  also	  released.	  50	  	  Under	  pressure	  from	  the	  opposition,	  Nabiev’s	  government	  followed	  the	  letter	  of	  its	  agreement,	  forming	  a	  constitutional	  commission	  and	  formally	  asking	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  to	  consider	  the	  status	  of	  GBAO	  and	  begin	  discussions	  about	  new	  elections.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  once	  the	  demonstrators	  had	  left	  Shakhidon	  Square	  as	  agreed	   on	   April	   24,	   Nabiev	   and	   Kenjaev	   began	   to	   violate	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	  agreement.	   	  Although	  Kenjaev	  had	  resigned	  from	  his	  position	  as	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Supreme	   Soviet,	   he	  was	   quickly	   appointed	  head	  of	   the	   State	   Security	   Committee	  (KNB,	   renamed	   from	   KGB),	   where	   he	   began	   to	   investigate	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	  opposition.51	  	  	  In	  addition,	  Nabiev	  and	  Kenjaev	  mobilized	  a	  large	  demonstration	  of	  their	  own	  on	  Ozody	  Square	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet.	  	  Largely	  brought	  in	  on	  buses	   from	   Kulyab	   in	   the	   south,	   a	   mass	   of	   young	   men	   led	   by	   Sangak	   Safarov,	  Rustami	   Abdurahim,	   and	   other	   Nabiev	   supporters	   began	   to	   call	   for	   Kenjaev’s	  reinstatement	   and	   the	   firing	   of	   Hoji	   Akbar	   Turajonzoda,	   the	   “Qazi	   Kalon”	   (Head	  Mufti)	   of	   the	   Republic.52	  Incensed	   by	   the	   government’s	   apparent	   revanche,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  N.	  Guliamova,	  “Ploshchad’	  muchenikov	  na	  fone	  smeny	  dekoratsii,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  April	  22,	  1992;	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  56.	  48	  Kendzhaev,	  Perevorot,	  40;	  TsGART,	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1295,	  l.	  1.	  	  49	  “Protokol	   soglasheniia	  mezhdu	   predstaviteliami	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   i	   pravitel’stva	   Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan	  i	  rukovoditeliami	  mitinga	  na	  ploshchadi	  Shakhidon	  g.	  Dushanbe,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe	  23	  April	  1992;	  also	  see	  Postanovlenie	  Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan	  “Ob	  otstranenii	   Kendzhaeva	   S.	   ot	   dolzhnosti	   Predsedatelia	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	  Tadzhikistana,”	  11.05.1992,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1298,	  l.	  11.	  	  50	  N.	   Sukhacheva,	   “Krizis	   vlasti.	   Zametki	   parlamentskogo	   korrespondenta,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	  April	  24,	  1992.	  	  51	  Kendzhaev,	  Perevorot,	  43	  52	  Kenjaev	  has	  claimed	  that	  he	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  demonstration	  on	  Ozody	  Square,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  not	  organized	   (cf.	  Kendzhaev,	  Perevorot,	   44).	   	   Evidence	   suggests	  otherwise:	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  
Nabiev,	  56,	  73;	  A.	  Alinazarov,	  “S	  mesta	  sobytiia.	  Vykhod	  –	  v	  ob’’edinenii,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  April	  28,	  1992.	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opposition	  quickly	  recalled	   its	  supporters	  to	  Shakhidon	  Square.	  Dushanbe’s	  main	  road	  was	  now	  completely	  shut	  down	  by	  the	  two	  warring	  squares,	  kept	  apart	  only	  by	  a	  “fragile	  cordon	  of	   two	   lines	  police	  officers,	  holding	  steady	  behind	  aluminum	  shields.”	  53	  	  The	   arrival	   of	   the	   “two	   squares”	   on	   Dushanbe’s	   political	   scene	   in	   many	   ways	  represented	   the	   final	   and	   irrevocable	   division	   of	   Tajikistan	   into	   two	   warring	  camps.	   	  This	  pitted	   fiercely	   secular	   figures	   such	  as	  Nabiev	  or	  his	   supporter	   from	  Kulyab,	   Sangak	   Safarov,	   against	   the	   increasingly	   religious	   opposition.	   	  While	   the	  IRPT	   had	   always	   represented	   the	   Islamic	   arm	   of	   the	   opposition,	   the	   month	   of	  demonstration	   on	   Shakhidon	   Square	   had	   involved	   public	   prayers,	   the	   collective	  celebration	  of	  Id	  al’-­‐Fitr	  marking	  the	  end	  of	  Ramadan,	  and	  calls	  for	  Islam’s	  greater	  role	  in	  government.	   	  When	  Hoji	  Turajonzoda	  finally	  pledged	  for	  the	  opposition	  in	  mid-­‐April	   1992,	   it	   only	   solidified	   the	   sense	   that	   a	   secular-­‐religious	   divide	   was	  growing,	  angering	  those	  who	  felt	  (such	  as	  those	  on	  Ozody)	  that	  he	  was	  meddling	  in	  politics.54	  	   	  Combining	  with	  the	  growing	  role	  of	  Islam,	  regional	  lines	  also	  began	  to	  show.	  	  While	  the	  opposition’s	  protests	  had	  initially	  brought	  in	  people	  from	  around	  the	   country,	   the	   pro-­‐government	   demonstration	   on	   Ozody	   was	   far	   more	  homogenous	   and	   overwhelmingly	   southern.	   	   This	   had	   the	   consequence	   of	   also	  incentivizing	  regional	  mobilization	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  opposition.	  	  As	  the	  opposition	  politician	   Asliddin	   Sohibnazar	   yelled	   at	   Kenjaev	   in	   late	   April	   –	   “I	   haven’t	   yet	  engaged	  in	  regionalism	  [mahalchigi],	  but	  I	  will	  now!”55	  	  The	   lines	  were	  drawn,	   and	   seemingly	   could	  no	   longer	  be	   crossed.	   	  With	  division	  growing	   stronger	   and	   seemingly	   more	   permanent,	   conflict	   also	   appeared	  imminent.	   	   Staving	   off	   mass	   violence,	   however,	   would	   require	   a	   resource	   that	  Tajikistan’s	  nascent	  government	  had	  no	  access	  to:	   large-­‐scale	  military	  or	  security	  forces	   capable	   of	   restoring	   order,	   if	   necessary,	   through	   force.	   	   In	   April	   1992,	  however,	   the	  government	  had	   little	  more	   to	  offer	   than	  those	  “two	   fragile	   lines	  of	  police	  officers.”	  	  There	  were	  military	  units	  on	  its	  territory,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  answer	  to	  the	  local	  government,	  and	  the	  Tajik	  state’s	  attempts	  to	  form	  alternative	  security	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  A.	   Akhmedov,	   “S	   mesta	   sobytiia.	   	   Novyi	   vitok	   protivostoianiia,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   April	   27,	  1992.	  	  54	  On	  the	  growing	  religiosity	  of	  the	  protestors	  on	  Shakhidon,	  Square	  see	  Kendzhaev,	  Perevorot,	  45.	  55	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  54.	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forces	   had	   so	   far	   come	   up	   short.	   	   All	   of	   this	   left	   the	   Tajik	   state	   essentially	  defenseless.	   	   How	   this	   situation	   had	  managed	   to	   come	   about	   over	   the	   previous	  nine	   months,	   moreover,	   would	   help	   to	   explain	   the	   Tajik	   state’s	   subsequent	  response	  to	  violence	  when	  it	  did,	  inevitably,	  arise.	  	  
II.	  The	  201st	  Motorized	  Division	  Curiously,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  military	  force	  stationed	  just	  outside	  of	  Dushanbe.	  	  The	   “201st	  Motorized	  Division”	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Army	  had	  been	   garrisoned	   in	   three	  bases	   near	   Dushanbe,	   Kurgan-­‐Tyube,	   and	   Kulyab	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   war	   in	  Afghanistan	   in	  1989.56	  	  Originally	   formed	  during	   the	   campaign	   to	   free	  Leningrad	  from	  its	  German	  blockade	  in	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  201st	  Division	  had	  grown	  over	  the	  decades	  into	  an	  exemplar	  military	  unit.	  	  Its	  brigades	  took	  part	  in	  the	  Soviet	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  (1979-­‐1989)	  from	  start	  to	  finish,	  and	  its	  soldiers	  were,	  by	  1992,	  highly	  decorated	  veterans.	  	  At	  full	  strength	  it	  could	  wield	  12,000	  mechanized	  infantry	  and	  120	  tanks,	  as	  well	  as	  helicopter	  air	  support.	  It	  was	  also	  quite	  internationalist	  in	  the	  Soviet	   sense,	   with	   a	   largely	   Slavic	   officer	   corps	   overseeing	   a	   diverse	   body	   of	  soldiers,	   including	  many	  Tajiks.57	  	  When	   the	  USSR	  collapsed,	   it	  was	  unclear	  what	  would	  happen	   to	   the	  201st	  Division:	  military	   units	   across	   the	   former	  USSR	  were	  being	   nationalized	   or	   broken	   up,	   often	   chaotically.	   	   In	   May	   1992,	   however,	   the	  Division	  quietly	  and	  somewhat	  unexpectedly	  became	  “Russian,”	   further	   tying	   the	  hands	  of	  the	  already	  militarily	  limited	  independent	  Tajik	  state.	  	  That	   the	  201st	  Division	  became	  part	  of	   the	  Russian	  Federation’s	  military	  was	  not	  an	  accident	  of	  history	  or	  simply	  “ordained	  by	  fate,”	  as	  the	  literature	  has	  frequently	  suggested.58	  	   	   It	  was	  instead	  the	  direct	  result	  of	  a	  series	  of	  political	  decisions	  and	  calculations	  made	  by	  Tajik	   and	  Russian	  politicians	   alike	  over	   the	  preceding	  nine	  months.	   	   	   This	   story	   began	   even	   before	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Soviet	   state	   in	  September	   1991.	   	   Upon	   succeeding	   Mahkamov	   as	   acting	   president	   in	   early	  September,	   Qadriddin	   Aslonov	   was	   quick	   to	   note	   that	   Tajikistan	   supported	   the	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  See	  Aleksandr	  Ramazanov,	  Poslednii	  legion	  imperii	  (Moscow:	  Litres,	  2017),	  87;	  the	  official	  title	  of	  the	   201st	  was	   the	   “201st	   Gatchina	   Twice	  Decorated	  with	   the	  Order	   of	   the	  Red	  Banner	  Motorized	  Rifle	  Division.”	  57	  Epkenhans,	  Origins	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  167.	  58	  N.M.	   Nazarshoev,	   Voennaia	   istoriia	   Tadzhikistana:	   kratkii	   ocherk	   (Dushanbe:	   Matbuot,	   2002),	  416;	   Michael	   Orr,	   “The	   Russian	   Army	   and	   the	   War	   in	   Tajikistan,”	   in	   Tajikistan:	   The	   Trials	   of	  
Independence,	   eds.	   Mohammad-­‐Reza	   Djalili,	   Frederic	   Grare,	   and	   Shirin	   Akiner	   (London:	   Curzon,	  1998),	  152.	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idea	   that	   “the	   regular	   [Soviet]	  army	  will	  be	  unitary.”	  59	  	  This	   remained	   the	  state’s	  policy	  even	  after	  it	  became	  clear	  during	  the	  September	  protests	  that	  this	  “unitary”	  army	   would	   not	   actively	   support	   the	   Tajik	   government,	   having	   declared	   its	  neutrality	  at	  the	  first	  sign	  of	  disturbances	  (see	  Chapter	  Eight).	  The	  slow	  collapse	  of	  Soviet	   institutions	   in	   the	   following	   months	   also	   did	   little	   to	   shake	   the	   Tajik	  government’s	  faith	  in	  a	  “unitary”	  Soviet	  army.	  	  	  In	  October	  1991	  the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	   began	   to	   discuss	   creating	   either	   a	  Ministry	   of	  Defense	   or	   a	   Parliamentary	  Defense	  Committee.60	  	  In	  November	  1991,	  however,	  the	  deputies	  managed	  to	  form	  neither,	   suggesting	   that	   a	   Ministry	   of	   Defense	   would	   make	   a	   Committee	  unnecessary	  and	  vice-­‐versa.61	  	  This	  left	  the	  state	  policy,	  by	  default,	  one	  of	  support	  for	  a	  unified	  Soviet	  military.	  	  This	   aligned	   with	   Moscow’s	   position,	   which	   was,	   in	   the	   words	   of	   Evgenii	  Shaposhnikov,	  the	  last	  Soviet	  Minister	  of	  Defense,	  “to	  keep	  the	  military	  unified.”62	  By	   the	   fall	  of	  1991	  many	  Republics	  were	  already	   in	   the	  process	  of	  appropriating	  the	  military	  units	  on	  their	  territories,	  with	  Ukraine	  having	  taken	  the	  lead	  as	  early	  as	   August	   1991.63	  	   Moldova	   and	   Azerbaijan	  were	   also	   following	   suit,	   with	   other	  republics,	  such	  as	  the	  Baltic	  States	  and	  Georgia	  simply	  demanding	  the	  removal	  of	  Soviet	  troops	  from	  their	  territories.	  	  Tajikistan,	  however,	  had	  responded	  positively	  to	   Moscow’s	   lobbying,	   and	   Shaposhnikov	   praised	   it	   and	   the	   other	   republics	   of	  Central	  Asia	  for	  continuing	  to	  support	  “unified	  or	  combined	  military	  forces.”	  64	  	  Once	  the	  USSR	  was	  dissolved	  in	  December	  1991,	  Moscow’s	  position	  on	  the	  Soviet	  military	   softened.	   	   Its	  main	   concern	   became	   the	   “strategic,”	  missile,	   and	   nuclear	  weaponry	   that	   was	   scattered	   across	   former	   Soviet	   territory.	   	   Both	   the	  Belovezhskoe	   agreement	   on	  December	   8	   and	   the	   official	   founding	   document	   for	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States	  (CIS),	  signed	  in	  Alma-­‐Ata	  on	  December	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	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  Soveshchaniia	  u	  Predsedatelia	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	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  tov.	  Aslonova	  K.A,	  06-­‐07.09.1991,	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  no.	  69	  Zasedaniia	  Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	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  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,	  31.10.1991,	  TsGART	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  98.	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  Evgenii	  Shaposhnikov,	  Vybor:	  zapiski	  glavnokomanduiushego	  (Moscow:	  Maska,	  2011),	  115.	  	  63	  Following	   the	   failed	   Putsch	   in	   August	   1991,	   Leonid	   Kravchuk,	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Ukrainian	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  had	  appointed	  a	  Ukrainian	  Minister	  of	  Defense	  loyal	  to	  Kiev	  and	  pushed	  through	  a	  law	  appropriating	  all	  of	  the	  military	  units	  on	  Ukrainian	  territory.	  	  See	  Kostiantyn	  P.	  Morozov,	  Above	  
and	  Beyond:	  From	  Soviet	  General	   to	  Ukrainian	  State	  Builder	   (Cambridge,	  M.A.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  132-­‐172.	  64	  Shaposhnikov,	  Vybor,	  124.	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21,	  mentioned	  only	  the	  USSR’s	  nuclear	  and	  strategic	  arms	  in	  any	  detail.	  	  The	  latter	  document	   did	   note	   the	   existence	   of	   conventional	   forces,	   but	   provided	   for	   a	   five-­‐year	  period	  in	  which	  to	  reform	  or	  redistribute	  the	  military	  units.	  65	  	  With	  Western	  governments,	  most	  especially	  the	  US,	  also	  pressuring	  Moscow	  to	  retain	  and	  control	  its	   nuclear	   arsenal,	   this	   backhanded	   approach	   to	   conventional	   forces	   quickly	  became	   entrenched	   in	   policy.66	  	   When	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   CIS	   countries	   met	   on	  December	   30,	   they	   agreed	   to	   “clarify”	  military	   questions	  within	   two	  months.	   	   In	  practice,	  this	  took	  three	  months,	  and	  resulted	  only	  in	  a	  document	  signed	  in	  Kiev	  on	  March	  20,	  which	   vaguely	   gave	   the	   right	   to	   former	   Soviet	   republics	   to	   form	   their	  own	  militaries.67	  	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  Moscow	  was	   simply	   accepting	  what	  was	   already	   the	   case.	   	   As	   its	  position	   had	   softened	   since	   December	   1991,	   many	   republics	   had	   followed	  Ukraine’s	  example	  and	  nationalized	  former	  Soviet	  military	  units.	   	  By	  March	  1992,	  Moldova,	   Azerbaijan,	   Armenia,	   and	   Uzbekistan	   had	   all	   acquired	   armies	   in	   this	  fashion.68	  	  Kazakhstan	  was	  beginning	  to	  nationalize	  its	  own	  units,	  and	  Kyrgyzstan	  and	   Turkmenistan	  would	   follow	   suit	   within	   a	  month	   or	   two.69	  	   Almost	   uniquely	  amongst	  former	  Soviet	  republics,	  however,	  Tajikistan	  made	  no	  move	  to	  harden	  its	  military	   policy	   or	   to	   claim	   control	   over	   the	   201st	   Division.	  When	   the	   Cabinet	   of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Tajikistan	  was	  reformed	  in	  January	  1992,	  there	  was	  no	  discussion	   of	   forming	   a	   Ministry	   of	   Defense.	  70	  	   Instead,	   a	   “Presidential	   Defense	  Committee”	   was	   created,	   led	   by	   Farrukh	   Niyazov,	   a	   career	   officer	   in	   the	   MIA’s	  Internal	  Forces.	  71	  	   	  In	  line	  with	  official	  CIS	  policy,	  President	  Nabiev	  had	  passed	  an	  order	  directing	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “national	  guard”	  of	  up	  to	  1,000	  soldiers,	  but	  no	  real	   action	  was	   taken	   on	   this	   count.	  72	  	   	   Even	   after	  March	   1992,	  moreover,	   there	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   “Utverzhdeno	   polozhenie	   o	   Komitete	   oborony,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   January	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  1992.	  72	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was	   no	   official	   discussion	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   forming	   a	   national	   army	   or	  nationalizing	  the	  201st	  Division.	  	  	  It	  was	  not	  that	  Tajikistan’s	  leaders	  were	  unaware	  of	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  other	  republics	   or	   the	   possibility	   of	   acquiring	   former	   Soviet	   military	   units.73	  	   Instead,	  they	   continued	   to	   act	   as	   though	  Moscow,	   through	   the	   new	   body	   of	   the	   CIS,	  was	  truly	  the	  best	  guarantor	  of	  collective	  security	  for	  Tajikistan	  and	  the	  former	  USSR.	  	  As	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Defense	   Committee,	   Niyazov	   never	   failed	   to	   assure	  Moscow	  and	  Shaposhnikov,	  now	  “Commander	  of	   the	  CIS	   forces,”	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  continued	  faith	  in	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  “unified”	  military.	  In	  January	  1992	  he	  declared,	  “The	  Republic	  of	  Tajikistan	  will	  not	   form	  its	  own	  army,”	  a	  sentiment	  he	  repeated	   later	  that	  same	  month	  at	  a	  meeting	  with	  Shaposhnikov.74	  	  In	  April	  following	  a	  meeting	  in	  Bishkek	  between	  the	  leaders	  of	  Central	  Asian	  republics,	  Nabiev	  was	  notably	  silent	  –	   even	   as	   Uzbekistan’s	   Islam	   Karimov,	   Kazakhstan’s	   Nursultan	   Nazarbaev	   and	  Turkmenistan’s	  Saparmurat	  Niyazov	  all	   told	  reporters	  about	  their	  republics’	  new	  armies.75	  And	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  April	  Farrukh	  Niyazov,	  convinced	  that	  the	  soldiers	  recruited	  that	  spring	  would	  serve	  in	  a	  unified	  Commonwealth	  army,	  made	  a	  public	  call	  for	  them	  act	  appropriately	  as	  the	  “representatives	  of	  Republic	  of	  Tajikistan”	  in	  this	  multinational	  army.76	  The	  USSR	  had	  ceased	  to	  exist	  months	  before	  –	  but	  when	  it	   came	   to	   the	  military,	   Tajikistan	  was	   holding	   on	   as	   tight	   as	   it	   could	   to	   its	   last	  vestiges.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  Farrukh	  Niyazov	  and	  Tajikistan,	  the	  CIS	  military	  existed	  largely	  on	  paper.	   	   Shaposhnikov	  did	   oversee	   the	   former	  USSR’s	   nuclear	   armaments,	   but	  little	  more.	  	  The	  military	  units	  on	  Russian	  territory	  were	  equally	  in	  the	  process	  of	  moving	   to	   Russian	   control,	   and	   by	   late	   spring	   Shaposhnikov’s	   own	   position	  was	  increasingly	  insecure.	  	  Disturbed	  by	  the	  strange	  duality	  of	  power,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  Boris	  Yeltsin,	  had	  created	  a	  Russian	  Ministry	  of	  Defense	  in	  March	  1992	  and	  officially	  took	  control	  over	  former	  Soviet	  military	  units	  on	  Russian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  For	  local	  discussion	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  other	  republics	  in	  this	  regard,	  see	  V.	  Slezko,	  “Prisiagaiu	  na	  vernost’	  i	  klianus’,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  February	  21,	  1992.	  74	  A.	   Ladin,	   “Farrukh	  Niyazov:	   Vooruzhennye	   Sily	   dolzhny	   byt’	   ob’’edinennymi,”	  Krasnaia	  Zvezda,	  January	   9,	   1992;	   “Marshal	   aviatsii	   E.	   Shaposhnikov	   v	   Dushanbe	   i	   Ashkhabade,”	  Krasnaia	  Zvezda,	  January	  16,	  1992.	  	  75 	  A.	   Ladin,	   “Rukovoditeli	   gosudarstv	   Srednei	   Azii	   i	   Kazakhstana	   –	   za	   dogovor	   o	   vzaimnoi	  bezopasnosti,”	  Krasnaia	  Zvezda,	  April	  25,	  1992.	  	  76	  “Zhdem	  i	  verim!,”	  Krasnaia	  Zvezda,	  April	  29,	  1992.	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territory	  in	  early	  May	  1992.77	  	  Following	  patterns	  from	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  just	  as	  Dushanbe	  was	  working	  to	  tie	  its	  fate	  to	  Moscow’s	  security	  umbrella,	  Moscow	  itself	  was	   doing	   what	   it	   could	   to	   undermine	   the	   structures	   to	   which	   Tajikistan	   was	  clinging.	  	  Officially,	   Moscow’s	   new	   policy	   of	   pursuing	   a	   nationalized	   Russian	   military	   left	  little	   place	   for	   peripheral	   army	   units	   on	   former	   Soviet	   territory.	   In	   some	   cases,	  moreover,	   it	   went	   out	   of	   its	   way	   to	   avoid	   responsibility	   for	   military	   units,	  pressuring,	   for	   example,	   Kyrgyzstan’s	   president	   Askar	   Akaev	   into	   accepting	   the	  15,000-­‐strong	   8th	   Motorized	   Infantry	   Division	   in	   May	   1992.	   78 	  	   In	   Tajikistan,	  however,	   Dushanbe’s	   unwillingness	   to	   reject	   Soviet-­‐style	   collective	   security	  guarantees	  overlapped	  with	  Russian	  national	  interests.	  	  With	  Soviet	  troops	  having	  withdrawn	   from	   Afghanistan	   in	   1989,	   the	   country	   had	   slowly	   but	   inevitably	  disintegrated	   into	   civil	   war,	   with	   Ahmadzai	   Najibullah,	   the	   last	   Soviet-­‐backed	  President	   of	  Afghanistan	   forced	   into	   retirement	   and	   internal	   exile	   in	  April	   1992.	  This	   left	   an	   increasingly	   unstable	   (and	   heroin-­‐ridden)	   country	   along	   Tajikistan’s	  extensive	  and	  mountainous	  southern	  border,	  a	  security	  risk	  for	  all	  of	  Central	  Asia	  that	  the	  Russian	  state	  was	  unsure	  about	  leaving	  unattended.79	  	  There	  was	  also	  the	  less	   frequently	   mentioned	   but	   perhaps	   more	   immediate	   issue	   of	   the	   “Window”	  Optical-­‐Electronic	   Command	   and	   Control	   Center	   (Optiko-­‐elektronnyi	   uzel	   sviazi	  
“Okno”),	   a	   unique	   four-­‐telescope	   observation	   post	   outside	   the	   city	   of	   Nurek	   in	  central	   Tajikistan.	   	   One	   of	   the	  most	   advanced	   anti-­‐missile	   and	   satellite	   tracking	  installations	   in	   the	   world,	   the	   “Window”	   unit	   had	   taken	   the	   USSR	   decades	   and	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	   rubles	   to	  build.	   	   It	  was	   said	   to	  be	   equal	   or	  better	   to	   any	  equivalent	  American	  technology,	  and	  was	  not	  something	  that	  the	  Russian	  military	  was	   interested	   in	   losing.	   	   With	   instability	   growing	   in	   both	   Afghanistan	   and	  Tajikistan,	  the	  new	  Russian	  Ministry	  of	  Defense	  moved	  to	  secure	  de-­‐facto	  control	  over	   “Window”	   and	   the	   Tajik-­‐Afghan	   border,	  with	   the	   201st	   seen	   as	   a	   necessary	  guarantee	  of	  for	  this	  control.80	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  “Pavel	  Grachev:	  Menia	  naznachili	  otvetstvennym	  za	  voinu,”	  Trud,	  March	  15,	  2001.	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  Clark,	  “The	  Central	  Asian	  States,”	  185.	  79	  Kalinovsky,	  Long	  Goodbye;	  Braithwaite	  Afgantsy.	  80 	  Ramazanov,	   Poslednii	   legion,	   89.	   Details	   about	   the	   “Window”	   military	   installation	   remain	  classified,	  but	  is	  said	  to	  be	  able	  to	  track	  all	  of	  the	  satellites	  currently	  in	  orbit	  around	  the	  planet	  in	  real	   time,	   no	   small	  military	   feat.	   	   See	   Vladimir	   Georgiev,	   “Optiko-­‐elektronnyi	   kompleks	   “Okno”	   v	  Tadzhikistane	   de-­‐iure	   stanovitsia	   rossiiskim,”	   Fergana.ru,	   April	   17,	   2006	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  As	   a	   result,	   Yeltsin’s	   government	   made	   no	   move	   to	   counter	   Tajikistan’s	   own	  ambivalence,	  leaving	  the	  201st	  Division	  officially	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  CIS	  and	  de	  facto	  under	  Russian	  control.	  	  While	  Russia	  would	  only	  formally	  absorb	  the	  201st	  Division	   in	   September	  1992,	   by	   the	   spring	   its	   grip	   on	   the	  military	  unit	  was	  well	  understood	  in	  Dushanbe.81	  	  It	  had	  affirmed	  control	  in	  December	  1991,	  when	  it	  sent	  Colonel	   Viacheslav	   Zabolotnii,	   an	   ethnic	   Russian	   from	   Ukraine	   to	   command	   the	  Division,	   along	  with	  Mukhriddin	   Ashurov	   as	   his	   deputy.	   	   Although	   Ashurov	  was	  ethnically	   Tajik,	   his	   entire	   career	   had	   been	   spent	   in	   the	   military	   outside	   of	  Tajikistan,	  and	  his	  loyalties	  were	  clearly	  with	  Moscow.82	  	  By	  April	  1992,	  everyone	  in	   Tajikistan,	   from	   journalists	   to	   politicians	   accepted	   the	   Division’s	   “Russian”	  status.	   	   	  Kenjaev,	   for	  example,	   reported	   that	  Zabolotnii	   told	  him	  during	   the	  April	  demonstrations	  that	  “without	  the	  permission…of	  President	  Yeltsin	  no	  intervention	  into	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  state	  of	  Tajikistan	  can	  be	  made.”	  	  Nor	  did	  Kenjaev	  object,	  tacitly	   accepting	   the	   de-­‐facto	   international	   status	   of	   the	   201st	   on	   Tajikistan’s	  territory.	  83	  	   Military	   force	   sufficient	   to	   remove	   the	   demonstrators	   and	   reassert	  control	   of	   Dushanbe	   stood	   just	   outside	   of	   the	   city	   –	   and	   yet	   by	   April	   1992	   the	  government	  of	  Tajikistan	  had	  lost	  all	  claim	  and	  access	  to	  it.	  	  The	  nascent	  Tajik	  state	  was	  left	  without	  an	  army	  	  	  
III.	  	  The	  Conflict	  Grows	  Violent	  Unwilling	   to	   challenge	   the	   Russian	   Federation	   for	   control	   of	   the	   201st	   Division,	  Nabiev’s	  government	  was	  forced	  to	  consider	  other	  sources	  of	  force	  with	  which	  to	  respond	   to	   the	   challenge	   of	   the	   “two	   squares.”	   	   Its	   options	   were	   fairly	   limited.	  	  Although	  Nabiev	   had	   authorized	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   “national	   guard”	   in	   December	  1991,	  in	  April	  1992	  this	  guard	  existed	  only	  on	  paper.	  	  No	  officers	  had	  been	  called	  up	  to	  staff	  it,	  and	  no	  soldiers	  actually	  enlisted.	  	  The	  national	  guard	  had	  access	  to	  37	  armored	  vehicles	  (bronetransportery),	  which	  had	  been	  purchased	  in	  February,	  but	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   Sergei	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   “Otkryvaia	   ‘Okno’	   v	   Kosmos,”	  
Komsomol’skaia	  Pravda,	  July	  27,	  2016.	  81	  For	  Russia’s	   legal	  appropriation	  of	   the	  201st	  Division,	  see	  Ukaz	  Prezidenta	  Rossiiskoi	  Federatsii	  No.	   1068	   “O	   perekhode	   pod	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   voinskikh	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  na	  territorri	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,”	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  On	   Zabolotnii	   and	   Ashurov,	   see	   “Mai	   1992	   –	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   Mukhriddin	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  1993.	  	  83	  Kenjaev,	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they	   lacked	  drivers	   and	  mechanics.84	  	  The	  Dushanbe	  police	  garrison	  was	  already	  overwhelmed	  with	  both	   the	   two	  squares	  and	  growing	  crime,	  and	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Internal	   Affairs	   troops	  were	   both	   limited	   in	   number	   and	   of	   questionable	   loyalty	  (like	   everyone	   else	   in	   Tajikistan,	   the	   MIA	   was	   having	   increasing	   difficulty	   even	  paying	   salaries).	   	   Many	   of	   the	   latter	   even	   joined	   the	   protesters	   on	   Shakhidon	  Square	  or	  simply	  refused	  to	  arrest	  anyone	  there.85	  	  Facing	   an	   almost	   complete	   vacuum	   of	   reliable	   forces	   capable	   of	   reestablishing	  order,	   Nabiev	   finally	   took	   the	   initiative.	   	   A	   Supreme	   Soviet	   resolution	   from	   late	  April	  had	  formally	  made	  him,	  as	  president,	  the	  head	  of	  Tajikistan’s	  (non-­‐existent)	  armed	  forces	  and	  a	   later	  resolution	  was	  pushed	  through	  on	  April	  30	  establishing	  “presidential	   rule”	   in	   the	   republic.	  86	  	   Together,	   this	   enabled	   Nabiev	   to	   create	   a	  “special	   forces	   brigade”	   within	   the	   legally	   established	   but	   non-­‐existent	   national	  guard.	  	   In	   practice,	   this	   brigade,	   which	  was	   quickly	   dubbed	   the	   “national	   guard”	  itself,	  was	   drawn	   from	   the	   young	  men	   on	  Ozody	   square.	   	   A	  martial	   arts	   trainer,	  Burkhon	   Jabirov,	  was	  appointed	   its	   commander,	  and	   local	  authority	   figures	   from	  Kulyab,	   such	   as	   Sangak	   Safarov,	   helped	   to	   order	   its	   divisions.	  87	  	   The	   “national	  guard”	  also	  received	  around	  1,700	  automatic	  rifles	  from	  state	  reserves	  and	  began	  to	   conduct	   training	   drills	   on	   the	   square.	  88	  	   This	   was	   a	   risky	   step,	   but	   one	   that	  seemed	   to	   catch	   the	   opposition	   on	   Shakhidon	   off	   guard.	   	   Emboldened	   by	   the	  opposition’s	  silence,	  Nabiev	  pushed	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  into	  reelecting	  Kenjaev	  as	  its	  Chairman	  on	  May	  2.	  89	  	  He	  also	  made	  a	  public	  announcement	   that	  he	  was	   “no	  longer	   going	   to	   tolerate”	   the	   meeting	   on	   Shakhidon,	   and	   that	   this	   was	   the	  opposition’s	  “last	  warning”	  to	  disperse.90	  	  	  That	  Nabiev’s	  actions	  pushed	  the	  opposition	  into	  a	  corner	  was	  predictable;	  that	  it	  would	   disturb	   members	   of	   his	   own	   circle	   with	   its	   authoritarian	   fiat	   was	   more	  surprising.	   	  By	  May	  4	   the	  demonstrators	  on	  Shakhidon	  Square	  were	  also	  arming	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Kenjaev,	  Tabadduloti	  Tojikiston,	  v.	  1,	  41.	  85	  Epkenhans,	  Origins	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  241-­‐244.	  86	  TsGART	   f.	   297,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1295,	   ll.	   16-­‐18;	   “Ukaz	   Prezidenta	  Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan,”	  Vechernii	  
Dushanbe,	   May	   4,	   1992;	   TIA	   Khovar,	   “Chetyrnadtsataia	   sessiia	   Verkhvnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  1,	  1992.	  87	  A.	  Khodzhaev	  and	  V.	  Slezko,	  “Nikto	  ne	  khochet	  ustupat’,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  5,	  1992.	  	  88 	  V.	   Slezko,	   “Nash	   sobesednik	   –	   general	   Rakhmonov,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   May	   14,	   1992;	  Kendzhaev,	  Perevorot,	  55.	  89	  TIA	  Khovar,	  “Informatsionnoe	  soobshchenie,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  5,	  1992.	  	  90	  “Vystuplenie	  R.	  Nabieva	  na	  sessii	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan	  2	  maia,”	  Vechernii	  
Dushanbe,	  May	  05,	  1992.	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themselves,	   and	   were	   suddenly	   joined	   by	   Bahrom	   Rahmonov,	   up	   until	   that	  moment	  the	  head	  of	  the	  presidential	  bodyguard.	  	  Frustrated	  with	  Nabiev’s	  move	  to	  arm	  Ozody	  Square,	  Rahmonov	  had	  chosen	  to	  swith	  to	  the	  opposition,	  bringing	  with	  himself	  4	  armored	  vehicles,	  a	  cadre	  of	  soldiers,	  and	  450	  automatic	  rifles.	  	  This	  gave	  the	   opposition	   a	   fighting	   chance	   against	   the	   “national	   guard.”	   91 	  	   The	   main	  opposition	  parties,	   including	   the	  DPT,	   IRPT	  and	  La’’li	  Badakhson,	  organized	  their	  own	  military	   structure,	   the	   “National	   Salvation	   Front”	   (Fronty	   najoti	   vatan)	   and	  moved	  to	  attack	  first,	  blockading	  the	  Cabinet	  of	  Ministers	  building	  in	  front	  of	  which	  they	  had	  been	  demonstrating.	  92	  	  By	   May	   5	   open	   violence	   had	   erupted	   between	   the	   two	   squares.	   	   	   The	   state’s	  attempt	  to	  instate	  a	  curfew	  went	  unheeded,	  and	  the	  lines	  of	  police	  officers	  between	  the	   warring	   crowds	   proved	   essentially	   powerless.93	  Opposition	   demonstrators,	  backed	  up	  by	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  armed	  Interior	  Ministry	  defectors,	  occupied	  the	  State	  TV	  and	  Radio	  building,	   the	  railroad	  station,	  and	  the	  Presidential	  Palace.	  	  Numerous	  people	  were	  killed,	   including	  journalists	  and	  those	  with	  no	  connection	  to	   the	   conflict.	   94 	  	   Shootings	   and	   other	   violence	   between	   warring	   bands	   of	  demonstrators	  from	  the	  two	  squares	  continued	  to	  flare	  for	  three	  days,	  until	  Nabiev	  was	  finally	  convinced	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  opposition	  leaders	  on	  May	  7.95	  Browbeaten	  by	   Zabolotnii,	   the	   “neutral”	   commander	   of	   the	   201st	   Division,	   into	   admitting	   his	  practical	   defeat,	   Nabiev	   agreed	   to	   disband	   his	   national	   guard,	   create	   a	  “Government	   of	   National	   Reconciliation,”	   and	   remove	   Farrukh	   Niyazov	   and	  Nazrullo	  Dustov	   from	   their	   respective	  positions	  of	  Military	  Committee	  Chairman	  and	   Vice	   President.	   	   In	   exchange,	   the	   opposition	   leaders,	   represented	   by	   Tohir	  Abdujabbor	   (Rastokhez),	   Muhammadsharif	   Himmatzoda	   (IRPT),	   Shodmon	   Yusuf	  (DPT),	  Atobek	  Amirbek	  (La’’li	  Badakhshon)	  and	  Davlat	  Khudonazarov,	  promised	  to	  clear	  the	  city	  of	  demonstrations	  and	  allow	  the	  government	  to	  return	  to	  business.96	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91 	  Safarali	   Kendzhaev,	   “Gorod	   Dushanbe,	   aprel’-­‐mai	   1992	   goda,	   slukhi	   i	   deistvitel’nost’.	  Prodelzhenie,”	  Biznes	  i	  Politika,	  August	  23-­‐29,	  1992.	  	  	  92	  “Tadzhikistan:	   novosti	   odnim	   abzatsem,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	   October	   13,	   1992;	   A.	   Shermatov,	  “Pul’s	  mitingov,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  4,	  1992.	  	  93	  “Ch’ia	  vlast’	  v	  gorode?”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  6,	  1992.	  	  94	  “Ne	  streliaite	  v	  zhurnalistov!”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  9,	  1992.	  	  95	  These	  events	  remain	  controversial	  and	  poorly	  documented.	   	  For	  two	  strongly	  varying	  accounts,	  see	  Epkenhans,	  Origins	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  277-­‐279;	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  306-­‐308.	  96	  “Protokol	   soglasheniia	   mezhdu	   Prezidentom	   respubliki,	   Kabinetom	   ministrov,	   politicheskimi	  partiiami	   i	   narodnymi	   dvizheniiami,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   May	   9,	   1992,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   many	  supporting	  presidential	  orders	  published	  on	  May	  9	  in	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe;	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  
Tajikistan,	  308.	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  Following	  the	  agreement	  on	  May	  7,	  however,	  neither	  side	  moved	  quickly	  to	  fulfill	  its	  obligations.	  Perhaps	  bluffing,	  both	  Nabiev	  and	  the	  opposition	  waited	  to	  see	  how	  the	   other	   side	   would	   react.	   	   Neither	   Shakhidon	   nor	   Ozody	   quickly	   emptied	   of	  demonstrators,	   although	   the	   latter	   square	   began	   slowly	   to	   dwindle	   in	   number;	  neither	   the	   “national	   guard”	   nor	   the	   “National	   Salvation	   Front”	   gave	   up	   any	  weapons,	   although	   this	  had	  also	  been	   specified	  by	   the	  agreement.97	  	  No	   changes,	  moreover,	  were	  made	  to	  the	  government.	  	  This	  standoff	  lasted	  until	  May	  10,	  when	  the	  opposition	  again	  took	  the	  initiative.	  	  A	  crowd	  of	  thousands	  moved	  south	  from	  Shakhidon	   Square	   to	   the	   KNB	   headquarters	   behind	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet,	  demanding	   that	  Nabiev,	  who	  was	   said	   to	   have	   taken	   refuge	   there,	   also	   leave	   his	  post.	   	  While	   still	   refusing	   to	  get	   fully	   involved	   in	   the	   conflict,	  Zabolotnii	  placed	  a	  tank	  in	  front	  of	  the	  crowd	  and	  ordered	  his	  troops	  to	  fire	  on	  the	  crowd,	  leading	  to	  the	  death	  of	  between	  8	  and	  11	  protestors.98	  	  	  This	   loss	   of	   life	   forced	   the	   government’s	   hand,	   and	  Nabiev	  was	   again	   obliged	   to	  meet	   with	   the	   opposition	   leaders.	   	   This	   time	   they	   came	   to	   a	   series	   of	   concrete	  agreements	  and	  changes.	  	  The	  planned	  “Government	  of	  National	  Conciliation”	  was	  actually	   formed,	   including	   opposition	   representatives	   as	   Chairman	   and	   Deputy	  Chairman	   of	   the	   Committee	   for	   National	   Security	   (KNB),	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	  Affairs,	   Minister	   of	   Agriculture,	   and	   Minister	   of	   Education.99	  	   Davlat	   Usmon,	   the	  deputy	  Chairman	  of	   the	   IRPT,	  was	   appointed	  Deputy	  Chairman	  of	   the	  Council	   of	  Ministers,	   and	  Rastokhez’s	  Mirbobo	  Mirrahim,	  who	   had	   been	   serving	   a	   deferred	  prison	  term,	  was	  cleared	  of	  all	  charges	  and	  became	  Chairman	  of	  the	  State	  TV	  and	  Radio	  Company.100	  	  Dustov	  and	  Niyazov	  were	  asked	  to	  leave	  their	  positions,	  and	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97“Obrashchenie	  mirnogo	   naseleniia	   goroda	  Dushanbe	  Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan	   v	  OON,	   k	  mirovoi	  obshchestvennosti,	   glavam	  gosudarstv	   SNG,	   vsem	  narodam	   i	   pravitel'stvam,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  12,	  1992;	  Nourzhanov	  and	  Bleuer,	  Tajikistan,	  309.	  98	  These	  events	  are	  also	  contested.	  	  See	  V.	  Korneev,	  “Fotoinformatsiia,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  12,	  1992;	  Mukhammad	   Egamzod,	   “Agar	   dar	   jahon	   du	   khalqi	   aziiatdidavu	   jigarresh	   boshad,	   pas	   iake	  millati	   tojik	   ast,”	   Jumhuriiat,	   May	   12,	   1992;	   “Rastet	   chislo	   zhertv,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   May	   12,	  1992;	   A.	   Ladin,	   “‘My	   obiazany	   byli	   ostanovit’	   krovoprolitie’,	   tak	   okharakterizoval	   deistviia	  voennosluzhashchikh	   nachal’nik	   dushanbinskogo	   garnizona	   polkovnik	   Viacheslav	   Zabolotnyi,”	  
Krasnaia	  Zvezda,	  May	  13,	  1992.	  	  99	  Yusuf,	  “Chego	  zhe	  khochet.”	  	  100	  “Postanovlenie	   Kabineta	   Ministrov	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan	   “O	   naznachenii	   Mirrakhimov	   M.	  Predsedatelem	   Gosudarstvennoi	   teleradioveshchatel’noi	   kompanii	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan,”	  
Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  13,	  1992.	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majority	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  voted	  to	  remove	  Kenjaev	  as	  Chairman.	  101	  Under	  its	  new	   acting	   head,	   Akbarsho	   Iskandarov,	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   also	   formed	   a	  commission,	   which	   included	   not	   only	   deputies	   but	   also	   important	   opposition	  activists,	   to	   investigate	  the	  last	  week	  of	  violence.	  102	  	  On	  this	  background,	  the	  two	  squares	  were	   finally	  emptied:	   those	  on	  Shakhidon,	   triumphant,	  returned	   in	  small	  groups	  to	  their	  homes	  and	  villages,	  while	  those	  from	  Ozody,	  angry	  and	  frustrated,	  were	  sent	  back	  to	  Kulyab	  in	  a	  bus	  colonnade	  overseen	  by	  Davlat	  Khudonazarov.103	  	  	  	  	  Rather	  than	  diffuse	  the	  conflict,	  however,	  the	  new	  government	  simply	  managed	  to	  send	   it,	   along	  with	   armed	   and	   angry	   “national	   guardsmen,”	   south.	   	  Within	   a	   few	  days	   reports	   were	   surfacing	   about	   former	   demonstrators	   from	   Ozody	   Square	  committing	  violence	  in	  Kulyab	  and	  Kurgan-­‐Tyube.	  104	  	  Having	  returned	  to	  Kulyab,	  the	   leaders	   of	   the	   “national	   guard,”	   including	   Sangak	   Safarov,	   began	   establishing	  order	   in	   their	   own	   region.	   	   “Back	   home,	   those	   from	   Ozody	   Square	   first	   and	  foremost	  set	  about	  cleaning	  the	  region	  of	  “Wahhabists”	  [opposition	  members],”	  the	  Tajik	  historian	  Gholib	  Ghoibov	  has	  written,	  meaning	  that	  “Very	  quickly	  a	  number	  of	   people	   lost	   their	   lives.” 105 	  The	   new	   coalition	   government	   responded	   by	  blockading	   the	   south	   of	   the	   country	   on	  May	   13,	   establishing	   block-­‐posts	   on	   the	  roads	   leading	  north	   into	  Dushanbe	  and	   forcibly	  checking	  all	  cars	   travelling	  along	  the	  road	  for	  “weapons,	  explosives,	  and	  narcotics.”	  	  Citizens	  were	  also	  warned	  that	  they	  had	  one	  week	  left	  to	  turn	  in	  any	  arms	  they	  might	  have	  received	  during	  the	  last	  few	  months,	  and	  that	  the	  security	  services	  had	  the	  right	  to	  use	  force	  to	  “overcome	  any	   incidents.”	  106	  	   In	   practice,	   this	   system	   of	   block	   posts	   quickly	   became	   an	  opportunity	  for	  hungry	  soldiers	  to	  enrich	  themselves	  and	  their	  bellies,	  much	  as	  the	  young	  family	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  chapter	  encountered.	  	  It	  also	  further	  alienated	  the	   South	   from	   the	   new	   government,	   causing	   further	   hunger	   and	   deprivation	   in	  already	  desperate	  villages	  and	  outlying	  regions.107	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101 	  Protokol	   no.	   112	   Zasedaniia	   Prezidiuma	   Verkhovnogo	   Soveta	   Respubliki	   Tadzhikistan,	  11.05.1992,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1298,	  l.	  3.	  102	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  1-­‐2.	  103	  On	  the	  return	  of	  demonstrators	   from	  Ozody	  to	  Kulyab,	  see	  Usmonov,	  Soli	  Nabiev,	  73;	  Ghoibov.	  
Ta’’rikhi	  Khatlon,	  691;	  interview	  with	  Davlat	  Khudonazarov,	  Moscow,	  December	  2016.	  104	  V.	  Slezko,	  “Informatsionnyi	  golod,”	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  May	  16,	  1992;	  “Rastet	  chislo	  zhertv.”	  105	  Ghoibov,	  Ta’’rikhi	  Khatlon,	  695,	  700.	  106	  Ukaz	  Prezidenta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan	   “Ob	  organizatsii	  kontrol’no-­‐propusknykh	  punktov	  na	  mezhgorodnykh	  trassakh	  pri	  pod’’ezde	  k	  g.	  Dushanbe,”	  13.05.1992,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1298,	  ll.	  18-­‐19.	  	  107	  See,	   for	  example,	  Sangak	  Safarov’s	  particular	  anger	  over	  the	  “blockade”	  in	  G.	  Gridnev,	  “I	  Allakh	  ne	  ostanovit	  etu	  voinu,	  esli	  sam	  narod	  ne	  zakhochet	  etogo,“	  Vechernii	  Dushanbe,	  October	  9,	  1992.	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  The	  country	  was	  divided	  in	  two,	  and	  practically	  in	  a	  state	  of	  civil	  war.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  May	  “the	  violent	  conflict	  had	  moved	  from	  Dushanbe	  to	  other	  regions,	  primarily	  to	  Kulyab	  and	  Kurgan-­‐Tyube	  oblasts.”	  108	  Supporters	  of	  both	  the	  new	  government	  and	   its	  opponents	  were	   forming	  armed	  bands,	   stealing	  weapons	   from	  the	  police,	  and	  taking	  retribution	  for	  real	  or	  imagined	  slights.	  	  	  In	  Dushanbe,	  the	  situation	  was	  the	  same,	  with	  no	  one	  having	  real	  control:	  since	  mid-­‐April	  armed	  gangs	  had	  begun	  to	   take	   over	   sections	   of	   the	   city,	   and	   by	   mid-­‐May	   they	   faced	   little	   opposition.	  	  Violence	  was	   tearing	   society	   apart,	  with	   “two	   to	   three	  people	   killed	   each	  day”	  in	  Dushanbe	  and	  even	  more	  in	  the	  south.	  109	  	  On	  May	  25,	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet	  deputy	  A.	   Khabibov	  was	   desperate:	   “There	   is	   no	   authority	   in	   the	   oblast.	   	   Yesterday	   five	  people	  were	  killed	  in	  Parkhar	  and	  one	  more	  in	  Moskovskii	  District.”	  110	  	  Yet	  neither	  the	   government	   nor	   the	   Supreme	   Soviet	   knew	   how	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   growing	  crisis.	   	   “We	   have	   taken	   a	   position	   of	   either	   disengagement	   or	   reassurance,”	   the	  deputy	   Nazarshoev	   puzzled,	   “and	   pretend	   that	   everything	   is	   okay.	   	   In	   truth,	  however,	   not	   only	   in	   Kulyab	   but	   also	   in	   Dushanbe	   everything	   is	   not	   okay.”	  111	  	  	  While	   the	  deputies	  debated	  what	   to	  do,	   the	  government	   failed	   to	   take	  any	  action	  and	  the	  violence	  spiraled	  out	  of	  control.	  	  	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  That	   Tajikistan	   reached	   this	   precipice,	   with	   civil	   war	   flickering	   just	   over	   the	  horizon	  and	  the	  government	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  regain	  control	  of	  the	  country,	  was	   ultimately	   the	   product	   of	   a	   few	   interrelated	   factors.	   	   First,	   the	   economy	   in	  Tajikistan	   had	   simply	   collapsed.	   Throughout	   perestroika	   unemployment	   had	  grown,	   and	  by	   1991	   inflation	   had	   also	   cut	   into	   people’s	   basic	   standard	   of	   living.	  	  Increased	  market	  freedoms	  had	  given	  a	  new	  class	  of	  businessmen	  the	  legal	  right	  to	  export	   Tajikistan’s	   already	   limited	   produce	   and	   raw	   resources.	   	   Before	   and	  following	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  moreover,	  any	  material	  support	  from	  Moscow	  had	   evaporated,	   leaving	   the	   nascent	   Tajik	   state	   with	   millions	   of	   salaries	   and	  pensions	   to	   pay	   and	   no	   clear	   source	   of	   income.	   	   	   By	   March	   1992	   hundreds	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  TIA	   Khovar,	   “Soobshcha	   vykhodit’	   iz	   slozhivsheisia	   obstanovki,”	   Vechernii	   Dushanbe,	   May	   29,	  1992.	  	  109	  Stenogramma	  Zasedaniia	  Prezidiuma	  Verkhovnogo	  Soveta	  Respubliki	  Tadzhikistan,	  25.05.1992,	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1299,	  l.	  19.	  	  110	  Ibid.,	  ll.	  19-­‐20.	  	  111	  Ibid.,	  l.	  20.	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thousands	   of	   people	   were	   truly	   unable	   to	   support	   themselves	   and	   feed	   their	  families.	  	  The	  government’s	  promises	  to	  improve	  the	  situation	  proved	  empty,	  and	  many	  of	   these	  desperate	  masses	   turned	   to	   the	  populist	   claims	  of	   the	  opposition,	  which	   heralded	   a	   future	   free	   of	   the	   old	   class	   of	   politicians.	   	   The	   government	  responded	  with	   its	  own	  brand	  of	  populism,	  branding	   the	  opposition	  corrupt	  and	  irresponsible	  and	  finding	  scapegoats	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  economic	  collapse.	  	  On	  both	  sides	  this	  populism	  brought	  tens	  of	  thousands	  to	  the	  streets	  and	  began	  the	  social	  bifurcation	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  war.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  Tajikistan	  was	  also	  brought	  to	  the	  edge	  by	  the	  actions	  and	  approach	  of	  its	   politicians.	   Even	   after	   the	   final	   collapse	   of	   the	   USSR	   in	   December	   1991,	  President	  Nabiev	  and	  his	  advisors	  remained	  convinced	  that	  Tajikistan’s	  best	  hope	  for	   development	  was	   to	   link	   their	   fate	   to	   Russia.	   	   	   Refusing	   to	   challenge	   Russia	  openly,	   they	   accepted	   the	   opaque	   CIS	   military	   policy,	   holding	   on	   in	   the	   face	   of	  overwhelming	   evidence	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   “unified”	   CIS	   army.	   	  Making	  no	  move	   to	  acquire	   the	   201st	  Motorized	   Division	   on	   its	   territory,	   the	   new	   Tajik	   government	  lost	  control	  of	  the	  one	  force	  that	  could	  have	  been	  used	  to	  avoid	  the	  conflict	  or	  tamp	  it	   down	   once	   it	   had	   started.	   	   This	   was	   also	   representative	   of	   Nabiev’s	   basic	  approach	  to	  politics,	  which	  often	  seemed	  to	  be	  based	  on	  waiting	  for	  Moscow	  to	  say	  the	   final	  word:	   even	   after	   violence	   started	   he	  waited	   for	   Zabolotnii,	   the	   Russian	  commander	  of	  the	  201st,	  to	  tell	  him	  what	  to	  do.	  	  It	  was	  as	  if	  Nabiev	  had	  still	  failed	  to	  grasp	  that	  the	  USSR	  no	  longer	  existed.	  	  As	  Nabiev	  dithered,	   finally,	  other	  political	  actors	   took	  advantage	  of	   the	  situation.	  	  With	  the	  economy	  in	  ruins	  and	  Tajikistan	  itself	  stumbling	  into	  open	  conflict,	  those	  seeking	   power	   saw	   little	   advantage	   to	   avoiding	   violence.	   	   Instead,	   violence	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  to	  remake	  the	  structures	  of	  power,	  a	  view	  shared	  by	  the	  opposition	   politicians	   who	   had	   pushed	   the	   crowds	   into	   violence	   on	   May	   5	   and	  Nabiev’s	   erstwhile	   supporters	   in	   Kulyab.	   	   The	   career	   criminal	   and	   “field	  commander”	   Sangak	   Safarov,	  who	  would	   become	   one	   of	   the	  most	   infamous	   and	  violent	  warlords	   in	   the	   coming	   civil	  war,	  was	   blunter	   –	   and	   clearer	   –	   about	   this	  new	  logic	  than	  anyone	  else.	  	  Having	  helped	  to	  establish	  the	  new	  “national	  guard”	  in	  Kulyab,	   he	   made	   his	   way	   through	   the	   blockade	   back	   to	   Dushanbe,	   where	   he	  positioned	   himself	   at	   Nabiev’s	   ear.	   When	   Akbarsho	   Iskandarov,	   the	   acting	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Chairman	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  went	  to	  speak	  with	  Nabiev	  on	  May	  24	  about	  the	  need	  to	  take	  action	  on	  the	  growing	  violence,	  he	  found	  Safarov	  there.	  	  “Sangak	  was	  there,”	  Iskandarov	  reported	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Soviet,	  “and	  he	  said	  that	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  address	  these	  issues.”112	  	  With	  advisors	  like	  Safarov	  dictating	  policy,	  the	  descent	  into	  civil	  war	  became	  inevitable.	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  op.	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Chapter	  Ten	  
Conclusion	  	  Once	   violence	   began	   in	  May	  1992,	   it	   quickly	   spread	   across	  Tajikistan’s	   southern	  oblasts,	   engulfing	   the	   Vakhsh	   valley,	   Kurgan-­‐Tyube,	   and	   parts	   of	   Kulyab.	   	   As	   in	  many	  civil	  wars,	  this	  was	  a	  brutal	  and	  confused	  and	  terrifying	  time:	  village	  turned	  against	  village;	  neighbor	  against	  neighbor;	  friends	  against	  friends.	   	  From	  the	  very	  beginning,	   as	   a	   war	   fought	   between	   irregular	   armies	   and	   hastily	   formed	  militia	  groups,	  the	  line	  between	  combatant	  and	  civilian	  was	  irregular	  and	  blurry.	  	  Civilians	  were	   targeted	   in	   great	   numbers,	   coming	   to	   represent	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	   the	  war’s	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  casualties.	  	  	  For	  many	  people	  in	  Tajikistan,	  the	  civil	  war	  represented	   the	   absolute	   collapse	   not	   only	   of	   the	   economy	   and	   national	  government,	   but	   of	   the	   state	   itself.	   	   Fearing	   for	   their	   families’	   lives,	   people	   from	  rural	  and	  remote	  villages	  overwhelmingly	  returned	  home	  and	  “concentrated	  their	  efforts	   on	   defending	   it	   against	   all	   outsiders,	   be	   they	   opposition	   or	   government	  forces.”1	  	  For	  most	  of	  the	  population	  of	  Tajikistan,	  the	  distinction	  mattered	  little	  –	  they	  were	  simply	  trying	  to	  survive.	  	  	  Officially	   lasting	   five	   years	   (1992-­‐1997),	   the	   Tajik	   Civil	   War	   engendered	  particularly	   large-­‐scale	   violence	   over	   the	   course	   of	   its	   first	   six	  months,	   a	   period	  that	   included	   multiple	   tank	   assaults	   on	   Dushanbe	   and	   pitched	   battles	   in	   the	  country’s	   south.	   	   From	   1993,	   however,	   the	   conflict	   ground	   to	   a	   standstill.	   The	  government	   that	  had	   come	   to	  power	   in	  November	  1992	  with	   the	   support	   of	   the	  “People’s	  Front”	   [Fronty	  Halqi]	  of	  Safarali	  Kenjaev	  and	  Sangak	  Safarov	  controlled	  Dushanbe	   and	   the	   south,	   while	   the	   opposition	   retained	   support	   in	   the	   eastern	  areas	  of	  Rasht	  and	  the	  Pamirs.	  	  Khujand	  in	  the	  north	  was	  nominally	  on	  the	  side	  of	  Dushanbe,	  but	  also	  remained	  distinct,	  cut	  off	  by	  both	  mountains	  and	  local	  politics.	  	  The	   opposition’s	  military	   forces	   decamped	   to	   northern	   Afghanistan,	   where	   they	  were	   supported	   by	   Ahmad	   Shah	  Masood,	   the	   ethnically	   Tajik	   former	   anti-­‐Soviet	  
muhajid	  who	  was	  now	  in	  the	  process	  of	  fighting	  his	  own	  civil	  war.	  	  This	  stalemate	  drug	  on	  with	  bursts	  of	  violence	  until	   June	  1997,	  when	   four	  years	  of	  negotiations	  brokered	   by	   Iran,	   Afghanistan,	   Russia,	   and	   the	   United	   Nations	   finally	   led	   to	   the	  signing	   of	   a	   peace	   agreement	   between	   the	   President	   of	   Tajikistan,	   Emomali	  Rahmon,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  United	  Tajik	  Opposition,	  Said	  Abdullo	  Nuri,	  and	  the	  UN	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Tett,	  Ambiguous	  Alliances,	  200.	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Special	  Representative,	  Gerd	  Merrem.2	  	  This	  brought	  an	  official	  end	  to	  the	  civil	  war,	  with	  opposition	  parties	  again	  allowed	  to	  legally	  operate	  in	  the	  country	  and	  many	  opposition	   figures	   incorporated	   into	   the	   government.	   Estimates	   continue	   to	  diverge,	   but	   by	   1997	   between	   20,000-­‐50,000	   people	   had	   been	   killed	   in	   the	   civil	  war,3	  while	   nearly	   700,000	   had	   been	   forced	   to	   flee	   their	   homes.4	  	   Yet	   even	   then	  violence	   continued,	  with	   sporadic	   fighting	   occurring	   in	   Rasht	   and	   the	   Pamirs	   as	  late	   as	   2012.	   	   	   By	   some	   accounts,	   the	   civil	   war	   only	   ended	   in	   2017,	   when	   the	  government	  of	  Tajikistan	  was	  able	  to	  finally	  exert	  its	  complete	  dominance	  over	  all	  previous	  opposition	  figures,	  removing	  them	  completely	  from	  state	  structures	  and	  putting	  many	  of	  them	  in	  jail.5	  	  	  	  The	  Tajik	  Civil	  War	  has	  been	  examined	  in	  depth	  by	  many	  other	  works	  of	  excellent	  scholarship,	   and	   this	  dissertation	  will	  not	  delve	   into	   those	  years	  of	  darkness.6	  	   It	  has	   instead	   restricted	   itself	   to	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   causes	   of	   this	   conflict,	  emphasizing	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  Tajikistan’s	   experience	  of	   economic	  and	  political	  collapse	  during	  the	  years	  of	  perestroika	  led	  to	  civil	  war.	  	  As	  this	  thesis	  has	  argued,	  the	   final	   disintegration	   of	   economic,	   political,	   and	   social	   order	   in	   Tajikistan	  was	  inherently	   connected	   to	   the	   path	   that	   Tajikistan	   took	   over	   the	   final	   years	   of	   the	  USSR.	  	  	  Properly	  understanding	  the	  reasons	  for	  Tajikistan’s	  descent	  into	  chaos	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  the	  broader	  study	  of	  the	  Soviet	  collapse	  unavoidably	  requires	  a	  close	  study	  of	  the	  period	  preceding	  this	  downfall.	  	  As	  this	  dissertation	  has	  shown,	  Tajikistan	  entered	  the	  period	  of	  perestroika	  (1985-­‐1991)	  economically	  stable	  and	  politically	  calm.	  	  Both	  its	  population	  and	  leadership	  were	   widely	   supportive	   of	   the	   Soviet	   order,	   and	   saw	   ongoing	   year-­‐on-­‐year	  improvements	   in	   standards	   of	   living	   and	   amalgamate	   growth.	   	   When	   Mikhail	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  On	   the	   negotiations	   and	   ultimate	   agreement,	   see	   Usmonov,	   Ta’’rikhi	   siyosyi,	   115-­‐127;	   United	  Nations	   Security	   Council,	   Report	   of	   the	   Secretary	   General	   on	   the	   Situation	   in	   Tajikistan,	  S/1997/686,	  September	  04,	  1997.	  3	  V.I.	   Mukomel,	   “Demograficheskie	   posledstviia	   etnicheskikh	   i	   religional’nykh	   konfliktov	   v	   SNG,”	  
Sotsiologicheskie	  issledovaniia	  25,	  no.	  6	  (1999);	  Dov	  Lynch,	  “The	  Tajik	  civil	  war	  and	  peace	  process,”	  
Civil	  Wars	  4,	  no.	  4	  (2007):50.	  4	  By	   1993,	   there	   were	   692,000	   Tajikistani	   “refugees,”	   –	   both	   internally	   and	   externally	   displaced	  persons.	  See	  TsGART	  f.	  306,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  1613,	  l.	  123.	  5	  Interview	  with	  a	  foreign	  diplomat,	  Dushanbe,	  July	  2017.	  6	  For	  narratives	  of	  the	  civil	  war,	  see	  Jennifer	  Mitchell,	  “Civilian	  Victimisation	  in	  the	  Tajik	  Civil	  War:	  How	   the	   Popular	   Front	  Won	   the	  War	   and	   Ruined	   the	   Nation”	   (PhD	   diss.,	   Kings	   College	   London,	  2014);	   Epkenhans,	   Origins	   of	   the	   Civil	   War;	   Ghoibov,	   Ta’’rikhi	   Khatlon;	   Nourzhanov	   and	   Bleuer,	  
Tajikistan,	  323-­‐335.	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Gorbachev,	   motivated	   by	   urban	   populations	   disappointed	   with	   Soviet	   promises	  and	   a	   group	   of	   pro-­‐market	   economists,	   began	   to	   advocate	   change	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1980s,	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   were	   largely	   confused.	   	   Presuming	  “perestroika”	  to	  be	  a	  standard	  Soviet	  set	  of	  superficial	  changes,	  the	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Tajik	  Communist	  Party,	  Kahhor	  Mahkamov,	  backed	  the	  reform	  package	  and	  promoted	  his	  own	  pet	  construction	  projects	  under	   its	  broader	  heading.	   	   	  Largely	  unconcerned	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  Soviet	  periphery,	  however,	  Gorbachev	  focused	  his	   economic	   reforms	  on	  attempts	   to	  boost	  productivity	   and	  production	   through	  the	   introduction	   of	  market	   incentives	   and	   a	  more	   dynamic	   labor	  market.	   	  While	  this	  was	  supposed	  to	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  European	  Soviet	  cities	  such	  as	  Moscow	  and	   Leningrad	   for	   increased	   skilled	   labor	   and	   improved	   industrial	   output,	   in	  practice	  it	  had	  the	  combined	  effect	  of	  undermining	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  the	  Soviet	  economy.	  	  Enterprises,	  given	  the	  right	  to	  hold	  profits	  and	  determine	  their	  output,	  chose	  to	  produce	  less	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  newly	  minted	  “cooperative”	  businesses	  provided	  a	  corrupt	  outlet	  for	  the	  profits	  now	  retained	  by	  enterprises.	  	  In	  Tajikistan,	  which	   hardly	   needed	   increases	   to	   its	   already	   large	   population	   of	   unemployed	  youth,	   the	   reforms	   collectively	   led	   to	   extremely	   high	   unemployment	   rates,	  economic	  contraction,	  and	  a	  noticeable	  drop	  in	  living	  standards.	  	  By	   1988,	   it	   was	   undeniable	   that	   something	   was	   going	   wrong	   with	   the	   Soviet	  economy.	  	  Rather	  than	  admit	  his	  mistake	  and	  backtrack	  on	  the	  economic	  reforms,	  however,	  Gorbachev	  blamed	  the	  economic	  downturn	  on	  “entrenched	   interests”	  –	  ministries,	   industry,	   and,	   first	   and	   foremost,	   the	   Communist	   Party.	   	   Blind	   to	   the	  links	  between	  his	  reforms	  and	  their	  consequences,	  Gorbachev	  instead	  argued	  that	  these	  institutions	  were	  blocking	  reform	  and	  set	  about	  undermining	  their	  authority	  through	   “glasnost”	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   alternative	   political	   institutions.	   In	  Tajikistan,	  however,	  Gorbachev’s	  political	   reforms	  elicited	  skepticism.	   	  Criticizing	  the	   Party	   that	   had	   succored	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   and	   had	   until	   recently	  continued	  to	  support	  the	  republic	  seemed	  illogical,	  and	  it	  took	  direct	  interventions	  from	  Moscow	   to	   establish	   glasnost	   in	  Dushanbe.	   	  The	  new	  political	   environment	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  Congress	  of	  People’s	  Deputies	  was	  additionally	  slow	  to	  take	  hold	  in	  Tajikistan.	  Non-­‐Communist	  political	  parties	  began	  to	  be	  formed	  –	  but	  again	  following	   efforts	   by	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors	   to	   encourage	   their	   creation.	  	  Moscow	   made	   it	   very	   clear:	   staying	   loyal	   to	   the	   center	   and	   the	   Soviet	   system	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meant,	   strangely	   and	   contradictorily,	   criticizing	   that	   very	   system	   and	   allowing	  opposition	   to	   develop.	   	   Confused	  but	   pliant,	  Mahkamov	   and	   the	   other	   leaders	   of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  complied.	   	  By	  February	  1990	  both	  glasnost	  and	  political	  opposition	  had	  finally	  arrived	  in	  Dushanbe.	  The	  “national	  movement”	  Rastokhez	  was	  founded	  and	   open	   criticism	   of	   the	   Party	   and	   Soviet	   society	   spilled	   into	   street	  demonstrations	  and	  riots	  that	  could	  only	  be	  controlled	  through	  military	  force	  and	  a	  subsequent	  state	  of	  emergency	  that	  lasted	  for	  18	  months.	  	  The	  state	  of	  emergency	  helped	  to	  keep	  tensions	  under	  the	  surface,	  but	  was	  unable	  to	  remove	  the	  fundamental	  causes	  of	  conflict:	  economic	  downturn	  and	  the	  ongoing	  failure	  of	  Gorbachev’s	  reform	  program.	   	   In	  the	  eighteen	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  final	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  continually	  tried	  to	  retain	  its	  links	  to	  Moscow,	  backing	  calls	  for	  a	  new	  Union	  Treaty	  and	  trying	  to	  make	  bilateral	  trade	  deals	  with	  its	   neighbors.	   	  Moscow,	   however,	  was	   increasingly	   ambiguous	   in	   its	   relationship	  with	   the	   periphery,	   pressuring	   Tajikistan	   into	   following	   other	   republics	   and	  declaring	  its	  sovereignty	  and	  creating	  space	  for	  new	  political	  parties,	  including	  the	  openly	  religious	  Islamic	  Revival	  Party	  of	  Tajikistan.	  	  Following	  the	  failed	  putsch	  of	  August	  1991	  Tajikistan	  again	  found	  itself	  pushed	  away	  by	  Moscow	  even	  as	  it	  tried	  to	   remain	   in	   Moscow’s	   orbit.	   	   When	   Tajikistan	   declared	   independence	   on	  September	   9,	   it	   was	   at	   best	   half-­‐hearted;	   when	   the	   republic	   elected	   a	   new	  president	   in	   November	   1991	   the	   candidates	   each	   emphasized	   how	   they	   were	  “Moscow’s”	  candidate.	   	  Long	  supported	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  having	  benefited	  for	   generations	   from	   its	   economic	   development	   program,	   Tajik	   politicians	   and	  citizens	   simply	   could	  not	   conceive	  of	   life	  outside	  of	   the	  USSR.	   	   	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  USSR	  was	  crumbling	  did	  nothing	  to	  change	  this.	  	  	  	  Nor	  did	   the	   final	   collapse	  of	   the	  USSR	   in	  December	  1991	   change	   this	  underlying	  relationship.	   	  The	   leadership	  of	  Tajikistan	  remained	  convinced	  that	   its	   fate	   lay	   in	  the	  hands	  of	  Moscow	  politicians.	   	  The	  new	  state	  emphasized	  its	  dedication	  to	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States	  and	  its	  combined	  military	  force,	  making	  no	  effort	  to	  form	  an	  army	  or	  take	  control	  of	  the	  Soviet	  forces	  that	  had	  been	  left	  on	  its	  territory.	  When	   the	  economy	   finally	   collapsed	   in	  early	  1992,	  and	  with	  no	  way	  of	  improving	   the	   economy,	   Tajik	   politicians	   turned	   to	   populism,	   blaming	   the	  opposition	   for	   the	  degradation	   faced	  by	  average	  citizens.	   	  The	  opposition	  parties	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responded	   with	   their	   own	   populism,	   making	   wild	   promises	   and	   accusing	   the	  government	  of	  corruption	  and	  nepotism.	   	  Both	  sides	  mobilized	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	   supporters	   to	   the	   streets	   of	   Dushanbe.	   Without	   the	   military	   forces	   for	   the	  control	  of	  which	  the	  Tajik	  state	  remained	  too	  compliant	  to	  challenge	  Moscow,	  the	  government	   was	   unable	   to	   retain	   control	   of	   the	   capital,	   and	   two	   months	   of	  demonstrations	   led	   to	   confrontation	   and	   violence.	   In	   the	   final	   assessment,	  perestroika	   and	   its	   attendant	   economic	   disintegration	   had	   brought	   Tajikistan	   to	  the	  edge	  of	  civil	  war.	  	  	  Just	   as	   perestroika	   must	   remain	   central	   to	   the	   story	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   collapse,	  moreover,	  so	  must	  Tajikistan	  remain	  part	  of	  the	  story	  of	  perestroika	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  While	  Tajikistan	  represents	  a	  far	  periphery	  and	  unusually	  extreme	  case	  of	  violence,	  its	  experience	  of	  economic	  reform	  and	  decline	  during	  perestroika	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  reflective	  of	  the	  entire	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  this	  period.	  	  Rather	  than	  a	  statistical	  outlier,	  it	  is	  instead	  simply	  one	  end	  of	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  violence	  that	  arose	  along	   the	  edges	  of	   the	   former	  USSR.	   	   Its	  path	   to	   social	   collapse,	  moreover,	  was	   dictated	   from	   Moscow,	   making	   the	   broader	   contours	   of	   its	   disintegration	  relevant	   to	   studies	   of	   both	   the	   Soviet	   capital	   and	   other	   republics	   during	  perestroika.	   	   It	   was	   not	   only	   in	   Tajikistan	   but	   across	   the	   USSR	   that	   changes	   to	  enterprise	   law	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   private	   “cooperative”	   businesses	   led	   to	  economic	   recession	   and	   the	   large-­‐scale	   theft	   of	   state	   resources.	   	   Gorbachev’s	  attempts	   to	  wrench	   control	   over	   the	   Soviet	   economy	   from	   the	  Communist	   Party	  and	  other	  “entrenched	  interests”	  had	  equally	  destabilizing	  effects	  across	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  USSR,	  and	  the	  slow	  slippage	  into	  chaos	  that	  Tajikistan	  experienced	  in	  1990	  and	  1991	  can	  in	  many	  ways	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  representative	  of	  the	  entire	  USSR.	  	  The	  end	  result	  also	  had	  more	  in	  common	  than	  is	  often	  suggested.	  Tajikistan	  alone	  was	  engulfed	  by	  civil	  war	  in	  1992,	  but	  violence	  was	  everywhere	  in	  the	  former	  USSR	  in	  those	  years,	  from	  war	  in	  Chechnya	  and	  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh	  to	  criminal	  gun	  battles	  on	  Moscow’s	  streets	  and	  the	  infamous	  shelling	  of	  the	  Russian	  Parliament	  in	  1993.	  	   x	   	   x	  x	  	  The	   narrative	   that	   emerges	   from	   the	   final	   years	   of	   Soviet	   power	   in	   Tajikistan	   is	  ultimately	   one	   of	  misguided	   reform,	   economic	   downturn,	   desperate	   attempts	   to	  hold	  onto	  power,	  and	  political	  collapse.	  	  As	  people’s	  basic	  assumptions	  about	  life	  in	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the	   USSR	   crumbled,	   and	   their	   access	   to	   salaries,	   resources,	   and	   even	   food	  disintegrated,	  they	  began	  to	  rebel	  against	  an	  order	  and	  state	  that	  increasingly	  bore	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  USSR.	  	  Even	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  felt	  lost.	  	  “I	  truly	  have	  no	   idea,”	   the	  Tajik	  Supreme	  Soviet	  deputy	  Moyonsho	  Nazarshoev	  mused	   in	  April	  1991,	  “where	  we	  are	  living	  –	  is	  this	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  a	  foreign	  country?”7	  When	  people	  came	  out	  into	  the	  streets	  of	  Dushanbe	  to	  protest	  in	  August	  1991	  and	  then	   again	   in	  April	   1992,	   they	  did	   so	   in	   large	  part	   because	   they	   could	  no	   longer	  recognize	  the	  Soviet	  republic	  that	  had	  long	  been	  their	  home.	  Desperate	  to	  cling	  on	  to	   some	   semblance	   of	   Soviet	   order	   and	   unsure	   of	   how	   to	   operate	   as	   an	  independent	   nation,	   the	   leaders	   of	   independent	   Tajikistan	   ended	   up	   stumbling	  down	  a	  path	  towards	  populist	  violence	  and	  civil	  war.	  	  	  	  As	  this	  dissertation	  has	  argued	  earlier,	  this	  story	  of	  center-­‐driven	  collapse	  and	  the	  periphery’s	   desperate	   attempts	   to	   hold	   onto	   anything	   Soviet	   is	   neither	   terribly	  complicated	  nor	  entirely	  novel.8	  	   It	   is	  a	  version	  of	  events,	  however,	   that	  has	  been	  increasingly	  written	  out	  of	  history	  since	  the	  end	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Union	   in	  1991.	   	  As	  histories	   have	   been	  written	   of	   the	   last	   Soviet	   years,	   they	   have	   grown	  more	   and	  more	   balkanized:	   “Soviet”	   and	   “Russian”	   narratives	   are	   told	   from	   Moscow,	   and	  “Tajik”	  narratives	  from	  Dushanbe.	  	  With	  the	  majority	  of	  accounts	  based	  largely	  on	  memoirs	  and	  other	  post-­‐factum	  accounts,	  moreover,	  this	  division	  of	  narratives	  has	  had	  the	  consequence	  of	  reifying	  and	  strengthening	  the	  biases	  and	  political	  agendas	  of	  Soviet-­‐era	  politicians.	  	  Gorbachev	  and	  his	  advisors	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  events	  in	   the	   Soviet	   periphery	   during	   perestroika,	   at	   best	   considering	   them	   areas	   of	  “backwardness”	   and	   opposition	   to	   change.	   	   Unsurprisingly,	   both	   the	  memoirs	   of	  Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors	   and	   those	   academic	  works	   based	   on	   these	  memoirs	  follow	   suit,	   either	   dismissing	   or	   simply	   ignoring	   the	   periphery.	   	   In	   Tajikistan,	  politicians	  quickly	  reacted	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR	  by	  reinterpreting	  events	  to	  emphasize	   the	   supposed	   agency	   of	   Tajiks,	   politicians	   and	   citizens	   alike,	   in	  fomenting	  Tajik	   state	   independence.	   	   In	  Safarali	  Kenjaev’s	  memoirs,	   for	  example,	  which	  conveniently	  begin	   in	  August	  1991,	   there	   is	  no	  mention	  whatsoever	  of	   the	  failed	  August	  putsch	  or	  the	  actual	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  As	  Kenjaev	  would	  have	  it,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  TsGART	  f.	  297,	  op.	  40,	  d.	  1237,	  l.	  22.	  	  8	  It	  also	  parallels	  many	  other	  state	  collapses	  worldwide,	  where	  the	  statistical	  probability	  of	  revolt	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  highest	  following	  a	  sharp	  dip	  in	  standards	  of	  living.	  	  See	  Ted	  Gurr,	  Why	  Men	  
Rebel	   (London:	   Paradigm,	   2010);	   James	   Chowning	   Davies,	   “The	   J-­‐Curve	   and	   Power	   Struggle	  Theories	  of	  Collective	  Violence,”	  American	  Sociological	  Review	  39,	  no.	  4	  (1974):	  607-­‐610.	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the	  Tajik	  people	  struggled	  and	  achieved	   independence	  all	  on	   their	  own,	  much	  as	  Gorbachev	  has	  been	  heralded	  for	  bringing	  democracy	  to	  Russia	  with	  little	  concern	  for	  events	  in	  the	  periphery.	  	  Yet	   neither	   story	   is	   complete	   without	   the	   other.	   	   When	   the	   two	   halves	   of	   the	  narrative	   are	   paired,	   moreover,	   a	   quite	   different	   picture	   emerges	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  Moscow	  and	  Dushanbe	  alike.	  	   	  This	  is,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  an	  image	  of	  a	  messy	  and	  sudden	  collapse:	  a	  race	  over	  the	  precipice	  of	  economic	  degradation,	  which	  took	  all	  of	  three	  years	  to	  complete	  once	  reforms	  came	  into	  effect.	  	  When	  the	  collapse	   came,	   it	   involved	   mass	   violence	   and	   the	   destruction	   of	   established	  expectations	   about	   daily	   life.	   	   In	   Tajikistan	   and	   across	   the	   USSR,	   people	   were	  simply	   unable	   to	   feed	   their	   children	   or	   support	   their	   families.	   	   Their	  world	   had	  utterly	  collapsed,	  leaving	  them	  with	  few	  apparent	  choices	  other	  than	  to	  take	  to	  the	  streets.	   Gorbachev	   and	   his	   advisors	   refused	   to	   see	   this	   collapse	   and	   destruction	  until	  it	  was	  too	  late	  –	  and	  having	  seen	  it,	  blamed	  it	  on	  the	  Soviet	  system,	  not	  their	  own	   actions	   to	   undermine	   the	   system.	   	   In	   Tajikistan,	   politicians	   saw	   the	  perniciousness	   of	   the	   collapse	   all	   too	   well,	   but	   remained	   powerless	   to	   stop	   its	  worst	   consequences.	   	  Resisting	   for	   as	   long	  as	   they	   could,	   they	  ultimately	   saw	  no	  option	  but	  to	  go	  along	  with	  Moscow’s	  paradoxical	  plans.	  	  Rather	   than	   a	   drive	   for	   independence	   led	   by	   peripheral	   elites,	   moreover,	   the	  efforts	   of	   Tajik	   politicians	   like	   Kahhor	   Mahkamov	   point	   to	   the	   very	   opposite.	  	  Independence	   and	   even	   economic	   sovereignty	   were	   essentially	   imposed	   on	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  from	  the	  outside,	  as	  its	  politicians	  and	  institutions	  struggled	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  Soviet	  shadow.	  	  While	  it	  is	  inarguable	  that	  some	  republics	  did	  in	  fact	  struggle	  against	   Moscow	   for	   independence,	   most	   notably	   the	   Baltic	   States,	   Tajikistan’s	  alternative	   path	   should	   call	   into	   question	   many	   of	   the	   monolithic	   accounts	   of	  “nationalism’s	  rise”	  leading	  the	  USSR	  to	  the	  dustbin	  of	  history.	  	  Motivated	  not	  by	  a	  sense	   of	   wounded	   national	   pride,	   ethnic	   identity,	   religious	   fervor	   or	   other	   non-­‐Soviet	  sense	  of	  identity,	  when	  Tajik	  politicians	  finally	  turned	  to	  “stealing	  the	  state”	  and	  cannibalizing	  what	  was	   left	  of	   the	  Tajik	  economy	  in	  1991,	   it	  seemed	  at	  most	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  basic	  desperation.	  	  These	  politicians,	  along	  with	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	   Tajik	   elite,	   had	   come	   to	   age	   and	   flourished	   as	   Soviet	   citizens.	   Without	   this	  identity	   and	   sense	   of	   belonging	   it	   implied	   to	   both	   the	   Soviet	   state	   and	   Soviet	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civilizational	  project,	  the	  leaders	  of	  Tajikistan	  were	  left	  grasping	  at	  the	  increasingly	  tenuous	  strings	  tying	  them	  to	  Moscow.	  	  Even	  after	  the	  USSR	  finally	  collapsed	  they	  kept	  grasping.	  	  	  By	  that	  point,	  however,	  Moscow	  has	  lost	  all	   interest	   in	  holding	  onto	  Tajikistan	  or	  the	  other	  Soviet	  republics.	  	  For	  every	  step	  Dushanbe	  refused	  to	  take	  away	  from	  the	  USSR,	   Moscow	   either	   took	   two	   or	   shoved	   the	   Tajik	   leadership	   forward,	  encouraging	   criticism	   of	   the	   Party,	   forcing	   through	   “sovereign”	   legislation,	   and	  cutting	  the	  economic	  ties	  that	  had	  long	  bound	  the	  Union	  together.	   	   	  This	  was	  not	  the	   wave	   of	   “freedom	   and	   self-­‐determination”	   seen	   and	   celebrated	   by	   Western	  politicians	  and	  journalists	  in	  late	  1991	  –	  it	  was	  much	  rather	  a	  desperate	  attempt	  by	  the	  periphery	  to	  hold	  onto	  the	  center.9	  	  With	  Boris	  Yeltsin	  and	  other	  politicians	  in	  Moscow	  convinced	  of	   the	  benefits	   to	  be	  had	   from	   jettisoning	  outlying	   territories,	  however,	   the	  attempt	  was	   foreordained	  to	   fail.	   	  As	   the	  economy	  came	  to	  a	   literal	  standstill	  in	  Dushanbe,	  it	  was	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  until	  the	  extremes	  that	  Georgii	  Koshlakov	   had	   predicted	   would	   come	   to	   pass.	   	   Tajikistan	   would	   survive	   these	  extremes,	  albeit	  at	  great	  cost;	  many	  of	  its	  citizens	  would	  not.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Cf.	  Bush	  and	  Scowcroft,	  A	  World	  Transformed,	  564.	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Appendix	  I:	  Cotton	  Taxes	  and	  “Subsidies”1	  
	  While	   long	  a	  point	  of	  heavily	  politicized	  public	  and	  academic	  debate,	   the	   issue	  of	  Central	   Asia’s	   “subsidized”	   status	   in	   the	   USSR	   has	   not	   been	   quantitatively	  investigated	  in	  any	  convincing	  way.2	  	  Without	  reference	  to	  economic	  or	  statistical	  data,	   most	   accounts	   of	   the	   late	   Soviet	   period	   in	   Central	   Asia	   instead	   tend	   to	  rhetorically	  call	  the	  region	  either	  “heavily	  subsidized”	  or	  “colonially	  exploited”	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception	  data,	  memoirs,	  or	  other	  equally	  unreliable	  sources.	  	  Using	  data	  from	  the	  Tajik	  SSR,	  however,	  some	  initial	  quantitative	  answers	  can	  be	  provided.	  The	  Tajik	  SSR	  serves	  as	  a	  worthy	  test	  case	  in	  this	  debate	  for	  two	  reasons:	  first,	  it	  had	  a	  reputation	  as	  a	  particularly	  subsidized	  Soviet	  republic,	  and	  second,	  its	  economy	  was	  especially	  monocultured	  on	  cotton.	  	  This	  significantly	  simplifies	  the	  calculations	  necessary.	   	  Comparing	   the	  amounts	  of	   total	   transfers	  made	   from	  the	  Soviet	  center	  and	  other	  republics	  to	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  against	  the	  total	  tax	  and	  export	  value	  of	   the	  Tajik	   cotton	  harvest,	   it	   is	   thus	  possible	   to	   arrive	   at	   a	  more	  accurate	  annual	  “balance	  of	  transfers”	  figure	  for	  the	  republic.	  If	  this	  figure	  shows	  significant	  amounts	   of	   value	   being	   transferred	   annually	   to	   the	   Tajik	   SSR,	   this	  may	   provide	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  republic	  having	  been	  “subsidized”;	  if	  the	  transfer	  of	  wealth	  flowed	   in	   the	   opposite	   direction,	   this	  may	   speak	  of	   a	  more	   colonial	   relationship.	  	  	  As	  the	  figures	  will	  show,	  however,	  in	  fact	  neither	  model	  may	  be	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Tajik	   SSR.	   	   Instead,	   the	   balance	   of	   transfers	   was	   in	   many	   years	   close	   to	   even,	  providing	   support	   for	   the	   Soviet	   Union’s	   stated	   policy	   of	   broad	   economic	  development	  and	  “equalization.”	  	  	  
	  
I.	  	  Monetary	  Transfers	  and	  the	  “Real”	  Value	  of	  Cotton	  Official	   budget	   figures	  published	  by	   the	  USSR	  did	   create	   the	   impression	   that	   the	  republic	   had	   been	   significantly	   subsidized.	   	   Each	   year,	   “funds	   from	   the	   central	  budget”	  made	  up	  between	  10-­‐20%	  of	  the	  total	  republican	  budget.	  See	  Figure	  4:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	   longer	  version	  of	   this	   appendix	  was	  presented	  as	   Isaac	  Scarborough,	   “A	  Union	  of	   ‘Subsidized’	  Socialist	   Republics?	   	   The	   Case	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   1980s	   Cotton	   Revenues,”	   Economic	  History	   Society	  2018	  Annual	  Conference,	  Keele	  University,	  April	  2018.	  2	  For	  discussion	  on	  this	  point,	  see:	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti,	   “Introduction,”	   in	  The	  Cotton	  Sector	  in	  Central	  
Asia:	  Economic	  Policy	  and	  Development	  Challenges,	  ed.	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti	  (London:	  SOAS,	  2007);	  Sally	  N.	   Cummings,	  Understanding	  Central	  Asia:	   Politics	   and	   contested	   transformations	   (London,	   2012),	  46;	  Laura	  Adams,	  “Can	  we	  Apply	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Theory	  to	  Eurasia?”	  Central	  Eurasian	  Studies	  Review	  7,	  no.	  1	  (2008);	  Khalid,	  “The	  Soviet	  Union,”	  133.	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  Figure	  4:	  Budget	  Transfers	  to	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.3	  	  
	  These	  budget	   transfers	  did	  not	  constitute	  all	  of	   the	   funds	  sent	   from	  elsewhere	   in	  the	  USSR	   to	   the	  Tajik	   SSR.	   	   In	   the	   1980s,	   the	  Tajik	   SSR’s	   republican	   budget	  was	  equivalent	  to	  only	  35-­‐45	  percent	  of	  the	  republic’s	  National	  Income	  Utilized	  (NIU),	  the	   figure	   the	  USSR	  used	   to	   represent	   the	   total	   size	   of	   the	   republican	   economy.4	  	  	  The	  other	  approximately	  60	  percent	  of	  NIU	  was	  made	  up	  the	   industries,	  salaries,	  and	   economic	   activity	   outside	   of	   the	   direct	   control	   of	   the	   budget.	   	   Here,	   too,	   a	  notable	  portion	  of	  the	  total	  monetary	  value	  of	  the	  republic’s	  economy	  came	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  republic:	  on	  average,	  around	  10-­‐20	  percent.	  	  See	  Figure	  5:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Calculated	  from:	  Gosudarstvennyi	  biudzhet	  SSSR	  1981-­‐1985.	  Statisticheskii	  sbornik	  (Moscow,	  1987)	  (1983-­‐1985);	   TsGART,	   f.	   18,	   op.	   8,	   d.	   3649,	   l.	   39	   (1986);	   f.	   306,	   op.	   40,	   d.	   1146,	   l.	   3	   (1987);	  
Gosudarstvennii	  biudzhet	  SSSR	  1990	  g.:	  kratkii	  statisticheskii	  sbornik	  (Moscow,	  1990)	  (1988-­‐1989).	  	  	  	  4	  Rather	  than	  use	  the	  Western	  concept	  of	  gross	  national	  product	  (GNP),	  the	  USSR	  used	  the	  material	  product	  system	  of	  national	  accounts.	  Here,	  the	  national	  income	  (natsional’nyi	  dokhod)	  was	  the	  total	  value	  of	  all	  final	  goods	  produced	  or	  utilized	  on	  a	  particular	  territory.	  Final	  services	  (e.g.	  passenger	  transport)	  were	  excluded;	  intermediate	  services	  for	  the	  production	  of	  goods	  (e.g.	  freight	  transport)	  were	   counted	   as	   contributing	   to	   the	   value	   of	   goods.	   The	   net	   import	   of	   goods	   was	   added	   to	   the	  “national	  income	  produced”	  (NIP)	  and	  insurable	  losses	  of	  goods	  were	  deducted	  from	  it	  to	  find	  the	  “national	  income	  utilized”	  (NIU).	  See:	  United	  Nations	  Statistical	  Office,	  Basic	  Principles	  of	  the	  System	  
of	  Balances	  of	  the	  National	  Economy	  (New	  York:	  United	  Nations,	  1971);	  Mark	  Harrison,	  Accounting	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  Figure	  5:	  Tajik	  SSR	  NIU	  and	  Net	  Financial	  Imports5	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able	  to	  export	  it	  abroad	  for	  hard	  currency.	  	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Soviet	  cotton	  was	  not	  exported	  but	  instead	  used	  internally	  in	  the	  USSR	  to	  produce	  cloth,	  clothing,	  and	  other	  consumer	  goods.	   	  These	  goods	  were	  then	  subject	  to	  the	  “turnover	   tax”	   (nalog	   s	   oborota),	   which	   was	   levied	   against	   consumer	   goods.	  Turnover	   taxes	  were	   then	  distributed	  between	   the	   republican	  and	   federal	  Soviet	  budgets.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Two	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  however,	  turnover	  taxes	  were	  only	  levied	  against	  finished	  consumer	  goods	  –	  and	  by	  the	  republic	  where	  the	  consumer	   goods	   were	   produced.	   	   When	   cotton	   from	   Tajikistan	   was	   used	   to	  produce	   cotton	   shirts	  or	   suits	   in	  other	   republics,	   it	  was	   these	   republics	   (and	   the	  Federal	  Soviet	  budget)	  that	  received	  revenues.	  	  Tajikistan	  received	  nothing.	  7	  	  Thus	   the	  Tajik	  SSR	  was	  providing	   revenue	   to	   the	   central	   Soviet	   government	  and	  other	  republican	  budgets	  in	  two	  important	  –	  and	  unaccounted	  –	  ways.	  	  First,	  there	  was	   the	   revenue	   from	   the	  export	  of	  Tajik	   cotton,	   and	   second,	   the	   turnover	   taxes	  levied	  on	  products	  made	   from	  Tajik	  cotton.	   	  By	  calculating	  and	  adding	  these	  two	  figures	  together,	  it	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  determine	  the	  total	  value	  of	  Tajik	  cotton	  production	   that	   had	   been	   otherwise	   removed	   from	   Soviet	   balance	   sheets.	   	   This	  figure	   can	   then	  be	   compared	   against	   the	   annual	   level	   of	   official	  NMP	   “subsidies”	  sent	  to	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  to	  determine	  the	  factual	  provision	  or	  expropriation	  of	  value	  from	  the	  republic	  in	  any	  given	  year.	  	  	  	  	  
i.	  Export	  While	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  know	  exactly	  what	  proportion	  of	  Tajik	  Soviet	  cotton	  was	  exported	  each	  year,	  statistics	  show	  that	  Tajik	  cotton	  consistently	  made	  up	  around	  11%	  of	  the	  total	  Soviet	  harvest.8	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  cede	  to	  the	  republic	   an	   equivalent	   proportion	   (11%)	  of	   the	   cotton	   export:	   even	   if	   the	   entire	  Tajik	   harvest	   were	   processed	   internally,	   this	   would	   have	   meant	   that	   a	   greater	  proportion	  of	  other	   republics’	   cotton	  could	  be	  exported.	   	  The	   following	  equation	  shows	  the	  annual	  export	  revenues	  derived	  from	  Tajik-­‐produced	  cotton:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  RGAE	   f.	   4372,	   op	   67,	   d.	   9340,	   l.	   253.	   	   Up	   to	   95%	   of	   cotton	   from	   republics	   like	   Tajikistan	   was	  processed	  and	  taxed	  elsewhere;	  see:	  RGAE	  f.	  4372,	  op.	  67,	  d.	  7785,	  l.	  54.	  	  8	  Consistent	  for	  the	  years	  1984-­‐1989;	  in	  1983	  it	  was	  9.6%.	  	  See:	  Narodnoe	  Khoziaistvo	  SSSR	  v	  1984	  
godu	   (statisticheskii	   ezhegodnik)	   (Moscow,	   1985),	   210;	   Narodnoe	   khoziaistvo	   SSSR	   v	   1985	   godu	  
(statisticheskii	   ezhegodnik)	   (Moscow,	   1986),	   210;	   Narodnoe	   khosiaistvo	   SSSR	   v	   1987	   godu	  
(statisticheskii	   ezhegodnik)	   (Moscow,	   1988),	   189;	   Goskomstat	   SSSR,	  Narodnoe	   khoziaistvo	   SSSR	   v	  
1988	   godu	   (statisticheskii	   ezhegodnik)	   (Moscow,	   1989),	   426;	   Goskomstat	   SSSR,	   Narodnoe	  
khoziaistvo	  SSSR	  v	  1989	  godu	  (statsiticheskii	  ezhegodnik)	  (Moscow,	  1990);	  Goskomstat	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR,	  Narodnoe	  khoziaistvo	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  v	  1989	  godu	  (Dushanbe,	  1991),	  224.	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Annual	  export	  revenues	  from	  Tajik	  cotton:	  	   = 𝑥 𝑦 𝑧 	  	  
Where	  x	  =	  annual	  cotton	  production	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  (metric	  tons	  
of	  raw	  cotton);	  y	  =	  annual	  cotton	  production	  in	  the	  USSR	  (metric	  
tons	   of	   raw	   cotton);	   and	   z	   =	   annual	   total	   Soviet	   export	   revenue	  
from	  cotton	  (rubles).	  	  In	   1987,	   total	   Soviet	   revenue	   from	   cotton	   exports,	   for	   example,	   was	   equal	   to	  869,483,000	   rubles;	   the	  Tajik	   SSR’s	  portion	  was	  95,643,130	   rubles.	  9	  Throughout	  the	  1980s,	   approximately	  85-­‐100	  million	   rubles	  of	   annual	  budget	   revenue	  –	   and	  especially	   valuable	   budget	   revenue,	   which	   could	   be	   used	   to	   purchase	   foreign	  currency,	  equipment,	  or	  goods	  –	  were	  being	  provided	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  through	  the	  sale	  of	  cotton	  grown	  and	  harvested	  in	  Tajikistan.	  	  
ii.	  Turnover	  Taxes	  Cotton	   also	   brought	   significant	   revenue	   in	   the	   form	   of	   “turnover	   taxes,”	   which	  accrued	  to	  the	  Russian,	  Ukrainian,	  and	  federal	  Soviet	  budgets.	  For	  many	  years	  the	  exact	  value	  of	  turnover	  taxes	  acquired	  through	  the	  processing	  of	  Tajik	  cotton	  was	  left	   unstated,	   but	   in	   1988	   economists	   in	   the	   Tajik	   Gosplan	   decided	   to	   try	  calculating	   the	  actual	  amount.	   	  Determining	   that	   the	  raw	  cotton	  harvested	   in	   the	  republic	  that	  year	  would	  produce	  a	  total	  of	  283,000	  tons	  of	  cotton	  lint,	  they	  then	  calculated	  that	  251,000	  tons	  (or	  88.7%)	  would	  be	  sent	  out	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.	   	  This	  was	   enough,	   based	   on	   the	   standard	   figure	   of	   150.3	   grams	   of	   cotton	   lint	   for	   one	  square	  meter	  of	   cotton	   fabric,	   to	  produce	  1,670,000,000	  square	  meters	  of	   fabric.	  	  The	   economists	   then	   cut	   out	   the	   16.5%	  of	   this	   fabric	   that	  would	   not	   be	   directly	  taxed	   as	   part	   of	   consumer	   goods,	  which	   left	   them	  1,395,000,000	   square	  meters.	  	  On	  average,	  the	  cost	  of	  one	  square	  meter	  of	  fabric	  carried	  with	  it	  a	  turnover	  tax	  of	  78.8	  kopeks,	  which	  meant	  that	  the	  total	  taxes	  would	  be	  1,099,300,000	  rubles.	   	  Of	  course,	   not	   all	   of	   this	   revenue	   was	   due	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   –	   only	   57%,	   based	   on	  calculations	   showing	   that	   57%	   of	   the	   labor	   involved	   in	   producing	   cotton	   cloth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Vneshnie	  ekonomicheskie	  sviazi	  SSSR	  v	  1988:	  statisticheskii	  sbornik	  (Moscow,	  1989),	  28.	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occurred	   before	   its	   processing.	   	   	   This	   left	   626,600,000	   otherwise	   uncalculated	  rubles	  due	  to	  the	  Tajik	  SSR.10	  	  There	  were	  some	  problems	  with	  the	  Tajik	  economists’	  calculations.	  	  First,	  they	  had	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  the	  percentage	  of	  Tajik	  cotton	  that	  would	  be	  exported	  in	  1988.	  	  This	   cotton,	   as	   argued	   above,	   brought	   revenue,	   but	   ought	   to	   be	   calculated	  differently.	   	   Second,	   the	  estimates	   they	  were	  using	   for	   total	   cotton	  production	   in	  the	   Tajik	   SSR	   for	   1988	  were	   preliminary	   –	   final	   numbers	   only	   became	   available	  later	  in	  1989.	  Finally,	  they	  had	  over-­‐calculated	  the	  amount	  of	  turnover	  tax	  due	  on	  one	  meter	  of	   cotton	  cloth,	  while	  simultaneously	  undervaluing	   the	  pre-­‐processing	  labor	   percentage.	   	   Upon	   review	   of	   Tajikistan’s	   calculations,	   in	   fact,	   the	   central	  Gosplan	   office	   in	   Moscow	   had	   upgraded	   this	   latter	   figure	   to	   66%. 11 	  If	   the	  calculations	  are	  adjusted	  accordingly,	  however	  (by	  removing	   the	  cotton	   that	  was	  sent	   to	   export	   and	  working	  with	   updated	   production,	   tax,	   and	   labor	   percentage	  figures),	  one	  arrives	  at	  the	  following	  equation:	  	  	  
Annual	  turnover	  taxes	  due	  to	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  on	  cotton	  production:	  	  
=	   𝑥 1,000,000 3 . 887 1− 𝑎 𝑦 3 150.3 (.835)(z)(.66)	  
	  
Where	   x	   =	   annual	   cotton	   production	   in	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   (metric	   tons	   of	  
raw	  cotton);	  y	  =	  annual	  cotton	  production	  in	  the	  USSR	  (metric	  tons	  of	  
raw	  cotton);	  z	  =	  annually	  established	  rate	  of	  turnover	  tax	  on	  one	  meter	  
of	  cotton	  cloth	  using	  Tajik	  cotton	  (rubles);	  and	  a	  =	  annual	  total	  Soviet	  
export	  of	  cotton	  (metric	  tons	  of	  lint	  cotton).12	  	  
	  Even	   with	   the	   adjusted	   formula,	   however,	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   uncalculated	  revenue	   remains	   largely	   the	   same.	   	   For	   1988	   the	   adjusted	   equation	   arrives	   at	   a	  figure	   of	   541.84	  million	   rubles;	   if	   export	   revenues	   are	   added,	   the	   total	   is	   637.9	  million	   rubles.	   	   If	   these	   calculations	   are	   applied	   to	   the	  whole	   of	   the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1980s,	  moreover,	  the	  following	  picture	  emerges:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Spravka	  svodnogo	  otdela	  gosbiudzhetov	  Gosplana	  TSSR,	  TsGART	  f.	  306,	  op.	  27,	  d.	  1130,	  l.	  79.	  	  11	  On	  Gosplan’s	  evaluation	  of	  the	  Tajik	  calculations,	  see	  RGAE	  f.	  7733,	  op.	  65,	  d.	  5443,	  ll.	  1-­‐13,	  21.	  12	  In	  line	  with	  Soviet	  and	  international	  norms,	  it	  has	  been	  calculated	  that	  3	  kilograms	  of	  raw	  cotton	  (khlopok-­‐syrets)	  are	  processed	  into	  1	  kilogram	  of	  lint	  cotton	  (khlopok-­‐volokno).	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   1983	   1984	   1985	   1986	   1987	   1988	   1989	  Adjusted	  outstanding	  turnover	  tax	   413.51	   512.65	   522.88	   445.79	   463.12	   541.84	   447.34	  Outstanding	  export	  revenue	   84.98	   89.45	   83.36	   88.73	   95.64	   96.06	   101.28	  Total	  uncalculated	  revenue	   498.49	   602.1	   606.24	   534.52	   558.76	   637.9	   548.62	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Total	  federal	  "subsidies"	   369.4	   484.7	   815.4	   1092.8	   1177.4	   802.4	   882.6	  Difference	  between	  subsidies	  and	  uncalculated	  revenue	   -­‐129.09	   -­‐117.4	   209.16	   558.28	   618.64	   164.5	   333.98	  Tajik	  SSR	  NIU	   4766	   5001	   5248	   5388	   5532	   5680	   5700	  Difference	  as	  %	  of	  TSSR	  NMP	   -­‐2.7%	   -­‐2.3%	   4.0%	   10.4%	   11.2%	   2.9%	   5.9%	  
Table	  1:	  Outstanding	  Tajik	  SSR	  Revenue.	  All	  figures	  in	  millions	  of	  rubles.13	  	  These	   adjusted	   figures	   clearly	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   factual	   divergence	   between	  the	  income	  produced	  in	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	  and	  the	  total	  income	  spent	  there	  (NIU)	  was	  far	   smaller	   than	   represented	   in	   official	   Soviet	   documents.	   	   Rather	   than	  representing	  10-­‐20%	  of	  the	  Tajik	  SSR’s	  NIU,	  monetary	  “subsidies”	  from	  outside	  of	  the	   republic	   made	   up	   at	   most	   between	   3-­‐10%.	   	   (See	   Figure	   6,	   below).	   In	   some	  years,	   moreover,	   the	   Tajik	   SSR	   may	   have	   even	   sent	   the	   equivalent	   of	   tens	   of	  millions	  of	  rubles	  to	  other	  republics	  and	  the	  Soviet	  center,	  equal	  to	  2-­‐3%	  of	  its	  own	  annual	  NIU.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Calculated	  from:	  GARF,	  f.	  5446,	  op.	  162,	  d.	  176,	  l.	  27;	  RGAE,	  f.	  1562,	  op.	  68,	  d.	  2104,	  l.	  59;	  d.	  1773,	  l.	  1-­‐
3;	   f.	   7733,	   op.	   65,	   d.	   1731,	   l.	   9;	   d.	   2957,	   ll.	   10,	   84;	   d.	   3568,	   l.	   8;	   d.	   4639,	   ll.	   65,	   67;	   d.	   5056,	   l.	   40,	   42;	  
TsGART,	   f.	   306,	   op.	   27,	   d.	   1130,	   l.	   79;	   Goskomstat	   SSSR,	   Narodnoe	   Khoziaistvo	   SSSR	   v	   1984	   godu;	  Goskomstat	   SSSR,	   Narodnoe	   khosiastvo	   SSSR	   v	   1987	   godu,	   189;	   Goskomstat	   Tadzhikskoi	   SSR.	  
Narodnoe	  khosiaistvo	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  v	  1984	  godu	  (Dushanbe,	  1985);	  Goskomstat	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR.	  
Narodnoe	  khoziaistvo	  Tadzhikskoi	  SSR	  v	  1989,	  224;	  Vneshniaia	  torgovlia	  SSSR	  v	  1984	  g.	  Statisticheskii	  
sbornik	  (Moscow,	  1985),	  22;	  Vneshnie	  ekonomicheskie	  sviazi	  SSSR	  v	  1988,	  28;	  Ministerstvo	  vneshnikh	  ekonomicheckskikh	   sviazei	   SSSR,	  Vneshnie	  ekonomicheskie	  sviazei	  SSSR	  v	  1989	  godu:	   statisticheskii	  
sbornik	   (Moscow,	   1990),	   31;	   I.N.	   Ustinov,	   L.A.	   Feonova,	   and	   D.S.	   Nikolaev,	   Ekonomika	   i	   vneshnie	  
ekonomicheskie	   sviazi	   SSSR:	   spravochnik.	   3-­‐oe	   izdanie	   (Moscow,	   1989),	   132-­‐133;	   Kuboniwa,	  "National	  Income,”	  69;	  Belkindas	  and	  Sagers,	  “A	  Preliminary	  Analysis,”	  635.	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Figure	  6:	  Revenue	  Transfers	  To/From	  the	  Tajik	  SSR	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   1989	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  Transfers	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1983-­‐1989	  (%	  of	  Republican	  NIU)	  
Unadjusted	  (Oficial)	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   Adjusted	  (Factual)	  Value	  
	  	   272	  
Appendix	  II:	  Hierarchical	  Structure	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  	  
	  The	   Communist	   Party	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   (CPSU)	   and	   Communist	   Party	   of	  Tajikistan	   (CPT)	   were	   organized	   in	   a	   hierarchical	   fashion,	   whereby	   the	   CPSU	  “Apparatus”	   –	   the	   CPSU	   Politburo	   and	   Central	   Committee	   Secretariat	   –	   had	  authority	  over	  the	  equivalent	  structures	  in	  the	  CPT.	  
	  
Figure	  7:	  CPSU	  and	  CPT	  Structure	  	  In	  both	  Party	  structures,	  the	  Secretariat	  and	  Bureaus	  were	  nominally	  elected	  from	  amongst	   the	   respective	   Central	   Committees,	   although	   in	   practice	   the	   existing	  members	  of	   the	  Bureaus	  generally	  selected	  and	  appointed	  new	  Bureau	  members	  (both	   full	   members	   and	   “candidate”	   members)	   and	   Secretariat	   secretaries	   and	  Division	  Heads.	  Central	  Committees,	   large	  bodies	  of	  hundreds	  of	  members,	  were	  elected	  every	  five	  years	  at	  respective	  CPSU	  and	  CPT	  congresses.	  	  	  	  Membership	   in	   the	   two	   Party	   structures	   overlapped.	   	   Individual	   citizens	   of	   the	  USSR	  could	  join	  the	  CPSU,	  passing	  through	  “candidate”	  membership	  in	  many	  cases	  before	  graduating	  to	  full	  membership.	  	  Instead	  of	  anyone	  joining	  the	  CPT,	  however,	  the	   CPT	  membership	  was	   simply	  made	   up	   of	   all	   CPSU	  members	   resident	   in	   the	  Tajik	  SSR.	   	   (This	  also	  allowed	  quick	   intra-­‐Party	   transfers,	   such	  as	  when	  CPSU	  CC	  secretaries,	  such	  as	  Petr	  Luchinskii,	  were	  sent	  to	  staff	  posts	  in	  the	  CPT.)	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